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3ABSTRACT
This is a study of legal limits of the exercise of intellectual property, with emphasis on chip
designs. In Part One, the focus is on the economics of innovation dynamics and the nature of
the social bargain underlying intellectual property. It analyses the thnction of intellectual
property and the structure of protection of chip designs under the US chip law, the IPIC
Treaty and the Agreement on TRIPS. It suggests that while protection of intellectual property
is designed to promote technical innovation and enhance competition in the public favour, the
innovation process is carned out in conditions of increasingly imperfect competition. On these
grounds, a point is made to limit the exercise of proprietary rights in the welfare/efficiency
perspective.
Part Two addresses the treatment of legal limitations. An analysis is made concerning the
evolution of the safeguarding provisions on which unauthorised use of copyright and patent in
the British legal system relies. These safeguards, stnictured within the intellectual property
law, have gradually been developed to also rely on a resurgent competition legislation, which
has been considerably used by OECD countnes to order the exercise of proprietary rights.
The ability of modem competition law to induce an intellectual property order, and the
features of the adjudicatoiy process of non-voluntary licences over UK patents are also
examined. From the findings the emergence of; namely, a safeguarding policy is identified.
The conceptualisation of this institutional policy, aiming at efficiency and welfare objectives
related to the exercise of proprietary rights, is a central theme. It shows that safeguarding
provisions intrinsic to intellectual property law is insufilcient to pursue these objectives, and
holds that to protect intellectual property without an effective control of anti-competitive
practices is a distorting and unsustainable legal policy.
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PART ONE
TILE CASE FOR LIMITING THE USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN TilE
WELFARE/EFFICIENCY PERSPECTWE
14
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUC11ON: CHIP-DESIGNS, LEGAL STRUCTURING AND POLICIES
1.1 The nature of the problem
(i) Limiting the use of proprietary rights
At the conclusion of the Treaty on the Protection of Intellectual Property in Respect of
Integrated Circuits (IPIC Treaty)' in 1989, the US Trade Representative in WIPO, who
criticised the text for, among other reasons, containing a broad provision about compulsory
licensing with equitable remuneration, voted "no" on the Treaty. 2 Standing against
compulsory licensing over chip-designs3 in the early debates in WJPO, the American
representative stated that the minimal protection afforded by the IPIC Treaty differed from
the minimal protection afforded by the copyright and industrial property conventions. While
compulsory licence (a typical limitation on intellectual property) was necessary for the legal
reproduction of copyright or a protected invention, the reverse engineering (allowed by the
chip-designs law) guaranteed the desirable technological development. Thus, non-voluntary
licences were "never necessary, not for reasons of public interest, non-working, excessive
contractual licence fees, or any other reason." 4 As the discussions progressed in WIPO, the
American view was supplanted. As a result, provisions were inserted in the IPIC Treaty and
later in the Agreement on TRIPS 5 to allow non-voluntary licences over chip-designs.
Also called "Washington Treaty", the [PlC Treaty is not yet in force. Up to January l994.it has been
signed by 8 countries although it has only been ratified by Eg1 119941 1 Industrial Property 20.
2 See statements of Michael Kirk and Ralph Olman from the US delegation. 119891 38 BNA's Patent,
Trademark & Copyright Journal 123, 124.
Chip-design is applied as a particular form of intellectual pmperty right distinct from copyright and patent
but may be protected under these regimes. It is also termed as layout-design or topography of an integrated
cucuit, or mask work and circuit layout As a technical item on which the intellectual property right reies the
chip-design is the arrangement of the elements representing the three-dimensional structure of the popular chip
or integrated circuit.
WiPOdocument, IPIC/CEIII/2, atp. 20/21.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods concluded in 1993 within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr).
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The IPIC Treaty stipulates that the exclusive right over the topography of integrated circuits
is limited by the use of the topography without the consent of the rightholder in such
circumstances which make it necessa!y to safeguard a vital national purpose, or secure free
competition. 6 Under the Agreement on TRIPS, the use of the IC-Layout design without the
consent of the owner should comply with detailed conditions evaluated on the basis of
individual merit and proper procedures.7
This thesis is a theoretical-legal study about the regulatory policy concerning limitations on
the exercise of intellectual property rights (IPR), 3 and chip designs in particular. Bringing
these new international agreements into considerations together is a concern which, firstly,
transcends the domestic affairs of any country in particular, and secondly gives rise to
interrelated questions of economic, social and legal relevance which are of great interest to all
countries. The economic aspect, dominating the theme of the incentive to innovation and the
use of intellectual property under competitive conditions, is closely related to the public
interest issue. The social aspect of intellectual property arises from its welfare function, i.e.,
in simple terms the availability of wider benefits from the IPR use for society at large. These
interrelated aspects are the core of the rationale for protection of intellectual property, and
provide an understanding of the institutional regulation of the legal limits to IPR use.
Subordinated to the economic and social pre-conditions, the legal aspect accounts for what
the authorities do, and how the regulatory arrangements governing the intellectual property
issue can be designed to ensure that the regulatory policy over IPR use do actually achieve a
desired balance of interests. From the portrayal just sketched, the significance and complexity
of the intellectual property equation is visibly clear. In order to charactetise this complexity,
and demonstrate why the proposed study is important and timely, a review of the intellectual
property issue now follows.
6 Article 6(3Xa)(b).
Articles 37 and 31(a) to (k).
For the purposes of this study, intellectual pmperty is only concerned with copynght, designs and patents.
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(ii) Review of the intellectual property issue
There have been three basic ways of legally approaching the modern IPR issue. One considers
the "North/South" tension, focusing on both the disagreement over the level of IPR
protection and the implications of the so called "free-riding" economy to international trade.
A second approach, reflecting the difficulties in protecting products in the field of new
technologies, such as biological processes, computer software and integrated circuits, raises
questions of how and in what manner existing IPR models, such as copyright and patent, are
appropriate to protect those products. These difficulties are compounded by the speed of
technological change. A third approach is to focus on the balance of the iightholder's interests
and the interests of the public at large, by limiting IPR use on the grounds of public policy.
This third approach forms the conceptual foundation for the present study.
The North/South approach is obviously strongly qualified by political elements. Whether or
not to protect intellectual property, and to what degree protection should be enacted, is a
matter for the international agenda. Industrialised countries from the North claim stronger
protection is deemed necessary to recoup high investments. Against the prospect of allegedly
growing "piracy" they threaten to impose retaliatory measures. On the other side, those
developing9 or newly-industrialised economies have advocated beneficial treatment, broadly
arguing that high global standards of protection would be a vexing barrier to their ambition to
achieve technological autonomy, thus impairing their capacity to set up their own
development strategy.
Reflecting the domestic attitude at large, protection of intellectual property has been
dictated by the assumption that high protection is likely to stifle social progress and jeopardise
technical catch-up. Although debatable, this understanding may be historically explainable
For instance, up to the 1970s protection over chemical and pharmaceutical related inventions
was a controversial matter. Over a long peiiod, some European countries and Japan either did
The basis of the analysis is the limitation of the use of proprietary rights not of the scope of
protection. The study might attract the attention of policymakers in developing countries concerned with
limiting properly the exercise of rights over chip designs. However, addressing a solution of a legal
problem in such countries is not the purpose of the thesis.
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not provide for, or abolished, patent over such inventions. Alarmed at this move which
prevailed for the first half of this centuly, developing countries eventually followed suit, thus
making pharmaceutical and chemical drugs unpatentable. Amounting to a prejudicial attitude
at international level against the protection of intellectual property, that widespread legal set-
back contributed to a cultural resistance to intellectual property still existing today amongst
developing countries. These countries have so far been unable to either fully implement a
comprehensive system of IP protection, or build up the necessaiy safeguards to limit or
prevent the abusive exercise of proprietary rights.
Viewing the question within the histoncal mainstream, however, it seems reasonable to
expect that developing countries eventually will upgrade their systems of intellectual property
protection, provided that they manage to off-set the social cost by putting in place a strategic
policy regulating limits to the use of proprietary rights, as it exists in leading industrialised
countries.'0 The reason to predict that upgrade is simple. Common observation suggests that
countries usually emulate each othe?s laws. They do so either for convenience or out of
necessity. As far as international trade is concerned, the replication of economic law to a
certain extent follows the force of economic interdependence. Historically, it has largely been
so. 1f in this respect, emulation means to consciously reproduce legal IPR protection at the
level existing in leading industrialised countries, then such countries are expected to pioneer
advanced intellectual property standards. This leads to the question of adapting IPR models
to protect innovations and original creations in the field of high-technology.
More than a review and adaptation of the existing IPR models, the issue behind the new-
technology approach is a matter of adequacy of protection. Claims for stronger protection are
based on the argument, inter alia, that the Berne Copyright Convention and the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property do not secure a level of protection
required in modern times. Whilst some Government Reports (e.g., CONTU and the OTA
Background Paper) have discussed the inadequacy of IPR systems they have failed to
establish appropriate substantive elements which could provide reliable models giving
For instance The United States, The Umted Kingdom, Germany, Canada, or m OECD countries in
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adequate protection. Ths concern, as far as theoretical tenets matter, is dictated by a sense of
reasonable return to investors and a satisfactory response to public interest.
As a theoretical foundation for intellectual property, the encouragement of the innovation
process and industrial applications rely on the granting of an exclusive right. Temporary
protection allows the rightholder to put the innovation or the original creation into practice,
or to seek a successful application of it either by himself or by licensing others in return for
royalties. It also enables innovative firms to disclose the information regarding their
inventions, seek a rewarding profit and enjoy a competitive head start over rivals. It is
assumed that society at large can benefit in many ways from the application of technical
innovation or originality. For instance, new technologies may not only provide the needs of
society but also contribute to reducing unemployment by encouraging domestic
manufacturing. Moreover, once the monopoly expires the right passes into the public domain
allowing free access to the intellectual property.
The speed of technical change and the quick obsolescence of technology, however, has
impaired the equation envisaged by that theory. In technologies such as computer software
and integrated circuits by the time the monopoly expires there will be little, if any, utility.
Increasing protection to trade secret and know how has also made difficult the unleashing of
IPR-related technical information. All of these have created increasing tension between the
interests of the rightholder and the public. At the heart of this misunderstanding, the
development of the innovation process under conditions of imperfect competition is a matter
for concern. This leads to the third approach, i e., balancing interests through limitations on
the exercise of proprietary rights.
On the grounds of freedom of trade, the IPR owner has the right to seek the best strategy to
maximise his return. Failure apart, there is a tendency of the rightholder to go beyond a limit
where his trading behaviour itself constitutes an artificial influence in the market conditions.
That behaviour may work a great mischief to free competition, thus inhibiting technical
output in general terms. Taking the matter of the exploitation of technical innovation or
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originality a little further within the context of the market structure, the interface between
intellectual property and competition law and policy is inevitable.
The defence of stronger IPR protection over the two last decades has developed alongside
substantial developments in competition laws of OECD countries. Historically, the
coexistence of both legal disciplines goes back to the first quarter of the seventeenth centuly,
when the English Statute of Monopolies confirmed patent as a legal exception." A similar
position was taken later in the eighteenth century by the United States and France. In
America, the Sherman (Antitrust) Act of 1890 came into being with no restriction regarding
the patent right. The French revolution, which abolished all privileges and guilds in 1789,
favoured the Patent Act of 1791.12 However, such coexistence has not been peaceful as
American legal experience shows.
Historians are unanimous in pointing out the ability of the American antitrust policy to
affect the pace of development in the inter-war period.' 3 At that time, the leniency of antitrust
policy and stringency of patent led corporations, such as General Electric and Du Pont, to
consolidate dominating positions. Late in the 1890s and in subsequent decades many patent
licensing arrangements were challenged in antitrust suits brought before US Federal Courts.
Although the courts upheld the validity of those arrangements, it could be assumed that the
apparently peaceful coexistence of intellectual property and antitrust law resulted from
judicial tolerance. Dissatisfaction against that leniency led to legal tensions which emerged in
the post-war period, where patent protection could be less important than being competitively
viable. '
Statute of Monopohes of 1624. Article 1 prohibited all trade restraints and monopolies. Article 6 kept the
limited right of patents for mvenIIoIL
12 Cf Fricdnd-KarI Beier, Patent Protection and the Free Market Economy, 119921 23(2) TIC 159. A
correction ought to be made, that is tbe coexistence of both patent and ann-monopoly law had not been
peaceflil as Beier suggests. In this respect, the preamble to the 1624 English Statute of Monopolies is very
illustrative.
' See a detailed survey by David C. Moiy, Tbe US national innovation system: origins and prospects for
change, [1992121(2) Research Policy 125.
14 According to a survey based on questionnaire and interview of large corporations carried out in America
in 1956, "patent protection was least itnportant to R&D investment decisions, emphawing instead the
necessity of maintaining competitive leadership or remaining competitively viable." Citation fixm ML Handler
eta/u, Patent and Antitrust, p.7, Foundation Press, 1983.
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In the post-war period, US antitrust policy contributed enormously to intensive R&D
activities. The new competitive environment was dominated by newcomers - small firms,
which played a prominent role in commercialising new technologies, and were boosted by a
stringent antitrust policy and a liberal patent licensing. Government policy of that period,
which affected the coexistence of competition and intellectual property,' 5 contrasts with the
1980s new guidance. The new policy put in place, characterised by antitrust relaxation
contrasted with the strengthening of intellectual property rights, made possible the acquisition
of smaller firms by large corporations and encouraged joint collaboration'6 mainly for the
purpose of technology exchange.'7
The change in policy set up by the Reagan and Bush administrations 18 in the 1980s, while
exposing the tension still present, gave rise to considerable concern and justified new thoughts
regarding the actual aims pursued by the legal disciplines of intellectual property and
competition laws. The handling of cases concerning IPR misuse and IPR-related competitive
behaviour has illustrated how the interface of those disciplines is influential in reaching a
proper balance of the interests of investors and the society at large in matters of intellectual
property. The emergence of this pattern has led to the abandonment of patent revocation and
less use of compulsory licence as a controlling measure. In this respect, the importance of a
safeguarding policy follows the increasing role of intellectual property law in protecting
technology which is the basis of the modem world economy.
An evaluation of the intellectual property and competition laws interface is rather significant
when directed to trade practices in the field of information technology (IT). In this respect
two observations are considered: the IT ability to change the trade environment at large, and
' In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., the US Supreme Court recognised the presumption of market
power derived from patent, 314 US 488, 494 (1942). The presumption was asserted in Jefferson Pans/i
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 US 2, 16(1984), being extended to copyright.
16 In this respect, see the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984.
' As an un-hidden target; the IT industiy seems to have been considerably influenced by that policy.
18 CL Atwood & Lister, International Antitrust Enfoicement in the George Bush Administration: The
Enforcement Guidelines and Beyond, 11989] 23(2) Journal of World Trade Law 97; Us Department of
Justice's Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations 119881 12 World Competition L. and
Econ. Rev. 99.
21
the pattern of business practices in the IT market The changing trade environment is seen in
the context of computer-aided management., leading to new practices in the conception,
production and distribution of products and services. Computer-aided management does not
represent solely an attitude in management, but also - much more important - generates a
competitive advantage. Those firms and economic regions lagging behind in IT capability are
bound to fail competitively. As a result of these IT trade practices, challenges have been
posed to the legality of certain arrangements, such as tie-in deals, exclusivity and joint
businesses involving intellectual property rights, which bring additional implications to the
equation of the public interest.
The problem is much more complex as it relates to the internationalisation of competition. It
inevitably creates the need to approach the domestic market taking into account foreign
competition at both levels, market structure and legal framework. Bearing in mind the
objectives (innovation and consumer welfare) pursued by intellectual property and
competition disciplines, the effective operation of national law inevitably reflects the rules
governing international trade and technology flows. In this respect, compatibility of laws
would help to remove uncertainties'9 surrounding international trade, but such a prospect has
always been impossible to sustain once the fill implications of an approximation have been
recognised. Improvements, however, are possible in areas where the costs of converging
regulation seem to be affordable. The regulatory policy concerning limitations on intellectual
property rights is one example.
Returning to the IPIC Treaty and the Agreement on TRIPS and their key provisions on
non-voluntaiy licensing crucial issues emerge from their implementation which involves
conflicting public policies, e.g., freedom of trade, protection of proprietary rights, sound
competition, and efficient state intervention. While committed to the conciliation of these
elements at the operational level, a regulatory policy on the limits of the IPR use aims to:
ensure an expected credibility from the legal machinery;
OECD, Interdependence and Co-eration in Tomorrow's World, A Symposium Marking the Twenty-
Fifth Anniversaiy of the OECD (1987).
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• induce pro-competitive attitudes associated with the LPR use,
• ensure an effective incentive to innovation and brighter prospects of public welfare; and
• guarantee a sound adjudicatory process.
The study deals vith the theoretical-legal treatment of that regulatory policy. There are
political, social and economic aspects associated with this policy. Although aware of these
links, it is not possible to define the boundaries of these aspects, and they are therefore not
specifically discussed here. To some extent; they are reflected in the competition framework,
which is a central focus of this study.
1.2 Outline of the dissertation
The study of the legal limitations on the use of intellectual property rights, with special
reference to chip-design law, sets out to examine the exercise of intellectual property rights in
the context of market structure and, more specifically, in connection with both the process of
technical innovation under dynamic competition and the interests of society at large. There
are two main themes to this study. The first is to show the need to limit the exercise of
intellectual property rights from the welfare and efficiency perspective. The second is the
emergence of an institutional safeguarding policy framed to work towards achieving the
social bargain.
Part One takes into account the economic theory of technical innovation and its implications
on both the legal foundations of intellectual property in general as well as chip-designs in
particular, and the regulation of the exercise of the proprietary rights. It aims to justiI' the
limitation on intellectual property on the basis of the efficiency and welfare perspective. The
proposal comes from a suggestion found in an UNCTAD background paper on multilateral
trade stressing that "the argument for a looser regime of intellectual property rights could be
stronger if it were based on efficiency rather than on equity grounds". 2° A statement made by
Robert Benko on the economics of the intellectual property is also suggestive:
20 Report ct M Hoc Expert Group on Technology Policies in Open Developing Countiy Economies p.6,
UNCTADITFDTrEC/3, 12 Feb 1993 (GE.93-50434).
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[intellectual properly rights as] "monopoly privileges violate static economic efficiency or optimal resource
allocation in the short tenn in an effbrl to generate a continuing supply of inventions and other creative goods.
Djnamic or technological innovation is thus facilitated Just how this economic logic or these principles are
translated into concrete intellectual property systems is, of course, a social we/fire question. The guarantee of
specific monopoly privileges impose certain costs and benefits for the promise of adthtional, future benefits.
These costs and benefits must be weighed and balanced in the construction of any particular intellectual
property system.21
Considering the efficiency/welfare dichotomy as a paradigm for the analysis and assessment
of laws and institutions, the thesis offers a theoretical criterion to govern the limitation on the
exercise of intellectual property rights. There are two reasons why this dual claim is deemed a
good one to guide the limitation. One is that the legal pre-conditions for the protection of
intellectual property in leading industrialised countries are assimilated to welfare and
efficiency goals. The other reason is that these goals are also pursued by competition law and
policy. An analysis of the claims of efficiency and welfare in relation to the legal pre-
conditions for the protection of intellectual property shows that because the process of
innovation is nm within conditions of increasingly imperfect competition, firms tend to
exercise their proprietwy rights in a manner detrimental to those objectives. Although the
structure of intellectual property law contains in itself a sense of social bargain (i.e., broadly,
an attempt to balance the competing interests of both the owners and the public at large) this
is not sufficient to guarantee the flulfilment of the objectives of the bargain theoiy 2
 These
make a point of limiting the exercise of intellectual property rights.
Aiming at an integrated understanding of the legal and economic aspects of intellectual
property, Chapter Two discusses the nature of the social bargain underlying the theory of
intellectual property and the dynamics of the process of innovation. The discussion begins
with an analysis of two phenomena: new technology and new competition. It will be shown
that the state of disequilibrium and uncertainty in competitive conditions resulting from these
phenomena, explain the tendency of owners to develop strategic practices. These practices
21 
"Intellectual Property Rights and New Technolojes" (discon), m Intellectual Fvperty Rights and
Capital Formation in the Next Decade, p. 28, edited by Charles Walker & Mark Bloomfield, Press elAinerica,
1988.
SeetheconceptofthebargaintheoiyatChapter2 3.1.
SeediscussionatChapter2.1.
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undermine the basic assumptions inherent in the intellectual property bargain, and make it
necessary to regulate the exercise of the proprietary rights.
This theme is farther developed in Chapter Three. It considers the structure of the
protection of intellectual property, and chip-designs in particular. The study of this structure
raises the question of the appropriateness of protection. It is assumed that appropriate
protection in a structural sense conforms with the policy the legislation stands for. Through
the discussion of the US law of mask works, the agreed statutory bargain is critically
reviewed and contrasted with the legal pre-conditions as part of the theoretical background
supporting the institution of intellectual property. The discussion includes the international
standards of protection of chip-designs. It confirms the argument that at a structural level the
social bargain, deeply rooted in the modem legislation of intellectual property, does not
guarantee the ftzllhlment of the welfare and efficiency goals the protection of intellectual
property pursues. This reinforces a case for limiting the exercise of intellectual property
rights, requiring a degree of state intervention.
An assumption rather than an explicit defence is that a safeguarding policy to limit the
exercise of proprietaiy nghts does imply a degree of state intervention necessary not only to
protect the property, but also to promote a free-market economy and social welfare. To this
end, a safeguarding policy implies the inadequacy of the laissez-faire state to redress wrongs
and attain wider availability of benefits from the intellectual property. This leads to Part Two.
Looking at the steps taken to safeguard the objectives of the bargain theory, Part Two
analyses the emergence of what is called a safeguarding institutional policy, 24 emphasising its
historical origins, evolution and trends. It includes:
• the description and analysis of safeguarding legal measures intrinsic to the law of
intellectual property;
• the discussion of the increasing role of competition law and policy to order the exercise of
intellectual property iights, thus being used as a fashionable safeguarding mechanism and
24 See the concept of safeguarding policy and its variations at Chapter Four.
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the scrutiny of the process of adjudication on non-authonsed patent use.
In relation to these themes, a regulatory approach to the safeguarding policy and its implicit
ability to yield efficiency and welfare gains is considered. A cross-reference with related
international standards is also made.
Chapter Five is a study of the unauthonsed use of copyright and patent in Great Britain,
intrinsic to the law of intellectual property. The evidence points to a strong need to control
the exercise of intellectual property and to take from it the full public benefit, an early
endeavour shared by the Parliament, through legislation, and courts on a case-by-case basis.
Setting the original foundation for the scope and purpose of intellectual property, copyright
and patent statutes and cases have reflected a strong legal culture and thinking directed to the
constraint upon proprietary rights. Although the existence of this legal background does not
suggest the formation of a system of combined policies, the legal rules were designed for
purposes such as technical and trade developments, and military ends. Whether these
purposes were and are being attained or not is a different matter, which raises a question of
efficiency of means considered by the discussion of the safeguarding policy. However, the
utilitarian aspect of a statutory safeguard is not necessarily placed in a material context, nor
has such an aspect ever been claimed as a pattern of legitimacy. Thus the lack of apparent
gain from a legal measure instituting an unauthorised use, either of copyright or patent, has
never been charactensed as a meaningful hindrance to proprietary rights. Concerns in this
respect, nevertheless, have accompanied the legal move towards a conception of safeguards
based on contingent rules reflecting competition elements.
Viewing the safeguarding policy within a wider regulatory framework, Chapter Six
considers ftirther changes in the institutional discipline which emerged with the resurgence of
competition law and policy in the post-war period. The main point is to show the significance
of competition law and policy as a legal mechanism able to safeguard the social bargain
behind intellectual property. It suggests that the competition law framework is significant:
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by its implications on the intellectual property order;25
• because, pursuing efficiency and welfare goals analogous to those the intellectual property
pursues, it is equipped with more desirable enforcement tools; and
• because it is framed and operated at large national discretion, thus providing the country
not only with an additional instrument to limit the exercise of propnetaly nghts, but also
with an element which allows appreciable bargaining power.
Affecting the intellectual property order, the growing and substantial development of
competition law in selected OECD junsdictions puts limitations on the exercise of proprietary
rights into the scope of the competitive process. The natural follow on from this is the
encouragement of competitive attitudes in general, and in the market in intellectual property.
Firms which do not hold competitive attitudes in respect of the market in general, should not
be expected to hold such attitudes in intellectual property. The sense of control presumes, for
instance, the need for an alignment of the market conditions concerning licensing and exercise
of the proprietary rights. Although this alignment in relation to the market forces could in
principle result from a response to rules of supply and demand, such natural response (market
self ordering) is not taken for granted. The state regulatory intervention, by continual
enactment of new or amendment of existing laws on competition, reflects the failure of an
unconvincing natural market response.
The regulation of the competition process itself provides for an indirect control of the
intellectual propriety rights, that is, as a benefit of a more competitive market the abusive or
anti-competitive exercise of patents and copyright works is discouraged. In other words, the
less concentrated and more competitive the market is, the less opportunities owners have, or
the less they tend to use their rights in a manner incompatible with or less beneficial to the
social bargain.
As a safeguarding mechanism, the significance of competition law lies in the nature of the
proceedings it applies, and the flexibility of remedies to redress competition mischief related
25 See at Chapter 4.4 the concept of intellectual pmperty onr.
27
to intellectual property It is suggested in Chapter Six that procedures in competition law
provide more opportunity for the analysis of the alleged wrong exercise of intellectual
property rights, more emphasis being placed on the discussion of suspected competitive
behaviour. The consequence is that greater weight is given to assessing possible damage to
efficiency and welfare objectives. The remedial measures are flexible to the extent that they
may not amount to unauthorised use. Committed to efficiency an welfare allocations
through competition principles, the process may end with an acceptance by the competition
body of undertakings offered by the right 'holder in order to redress possible adverse effects
on public interest. While less upsetting to the intellectual property, this sort of "gentleman's
agreement" is easily enforced, therefore having a low enforcement cost, and is significant by
its impact (i.e., the creation of better bargaining conditions between licensors and licensees)
on the exercise of proprietary rights. The effectiveness of the enforcement measures,
nevertheless, depends on how flexible or tough the competition policy is.
The account of the legislative move from the 1950s in selected OECD jurisdictions, and in
Great Britain in particular, gives an essential picture of a legal mechanism framed in
accordance with national tastes. To what extent a country is willing to control the
competition process is a matter of domestic policy. In connection with this, it could be said
for instance that the British competition system is a benevolent one compared to the US
system. Being able to format legal control of the competition process almost entirely at its
discretion, a countly can avail itself of a protectionist and defensive system 26 free from the
fetters of international standards. Furthermore, resorting to the legal framework on
competition m order to safeguard the social bargain does not exclude the remedial setting
provided within the intellectual property law. All of this is an advantageous situation in
comparison to other countries which, still engulfed in their o political reluctance, have no
sound response to the competition phenomenon.
As the analysis of the legal treatment of the competition issues in those selected jurisdictions
reveals, competition thoughts and concepts show a significant contribution to the
understanding of the dynamics of the economic matters underlying the legal rules governing
26 Sa thediscussion at Chapter4.2 and 4.4.
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the competition process and the exercise of proprietary rights The resolving strength of these
rules, nevertheless, is limited Entailing a degree of obscurity, the legal tests are conducted
within a standard of debatable accuracy, and they reflect the application of flexible rules (eg.,
workable competition) which exclude pure economic concepts. The tenor is that efficiency is
not to be taken for its own sake. In the light of this background, an unsurprising finding points
to the reduced aptness ofThe legal framework to yield welfare and efficiency gains. From this,
however, nothing is suggested to undermine the significance of competition law and policy to
order the exercise of the proprietary rights. 	 -
Chapter Seven is an approach to the regulation of the process concerning unauthorised use
of proprietary rights, with emphasis on the discretionaiy power exercised by the comptroller
general concerning adjudication over unauthorised use of UK patents. It reflects on the nature
of the procedures from which these decisions have been made, without intending to evaluate
their correctness regarding allocative efficiency. Aiming to undertake no comprehensive
analysis of discretion, the study is confined to an understanding of the institutional process of
adjudication as it is carried out by the comptroller general. A major concern is to discuss an
adjudicatory policy sufficiently credible in the eyes of traders and consumers. A credible
regulatory policy would require, inter alia, clear substantive conditions and concepts on
which unauthonsed -use of intellectual property rights should rely, procedural regulations
designed to guide the reasoning process safflised with public policy arguments, limited
discretionary power, and sound assessment of royalties. Now projected into international
standards, these themes (already an essential part of the safeguarding policy in place in leading
OECD countries) are incorporated in the Agreement on TRIPS, and again considered in the
concluding Chapter Eight which gives frirther thoughts to a regulatory approach. In this
respect, a central question is how the limitations on the exercise of intellectual property rights
are treated, and to what extent the regulation is strong enough to achieve related objectives?
1.3 Synopsis of the research
This introductory chapter begins stating the disagreement between a number of countries'
representatives about non-voluntary licences on chip designs. Non-voluntary licensing is a
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typical limitation on intellectual property. In this respect, it seems desirable to state to what
extent limitations on the use of proprietary rights conceptually provide for welfare and
efficiency defence, and on which formal (theoretical) conditions such defence could properly
be exercised under IC law. The research explores the theoretical-legal aspects of the limits to
the exercise of intellectual property. From the analyses, it will be shown that:
it is proper for any country to limit the exercise of proprietary rights Ofl Welire/efficiency
grounds. These purposes, however, have not been properly achieved within the
framework of IP law;
a well structured and balanced policy is necessary in order to prevent and redress misuse
of propiietaiy rights;
regulation on the exercise of proprietary rights does not guarantee efficiency and welfare
gains, but determines the formal conditions and a principled basis which forms the best
response for achieving them.
Limitations on welfare/efficiency grounds: inadequacy of remedies intrinsic to IP law
It is widely recognised that a social bargain (translated into efficiency and welfare purposes)
underlies the theory of intellectual property rights, protected for the mutual benefits of
owners and society. Rather than a point explicitly defended, this is an assumption supported
by a specialised literature. Contrasting with such a theoretical basis, the innovation dynamics
tend to be performed in conditions of increasingly imperfect competition. If innovators tend
to develop their activities in a context of such imperfect competition, it should be legitimate
for the state to establish a proper policy to limit the exercise of intellectual property rights on
grounds of efficiency and welfare.
It should be evident from the existence of a social bargain underlying the intellectual
property that a set of remedial measures is necessary to police and promote the settled
bargain, as well as to remove the obstacles which prevent or impede the achievement of it.
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While providing for some control on the exercise of proprietary iights, intellectual property
law (or the theoretical background behind it) does not fully explain such control in the
welfare/efficiency perspective. Explanations are rather given by the conceptual framework
behind the regulation designed to secure free competition by controlling anti-competitive
practices. In many ways competition regulation is significant to order the exercise of
intellectual property rights. For instance, the legal proceedings or mechanisms concerning the
methods of investigation of the competition phenomenon tend to secure more transparency,
and thus attract acceptance. More than a beliel this is reflected in the growing development
of competition legislation.
Here, it is brought to the attention that leading industrialised nations (e.g., the United States
and Great Britain) have traditionally sought to improve mechanisms to limit intellectual
property. The same observation applies to the European Community as a supranational
organisation of States. In developing limits to proprietary rights, each of these States has
often resorted to competition law and policy. Whether these nations would be prepared to
provide strong protection to intellectual property without at the same time developing a form
of remedial or safeguarding law is a matter for wonder. The increasing evolution of the
regulation of the competitive process in these countries leads to a visible, interactive and
significant role for the regulatory policy of intellectual property and competition. A
suggestion arising from such an interactive role is that without proper control of the
competitive process (i.e., setting of remedies to redress mischief against the social bargain)
intellectual property protection makes little or no legal sense. It follows that the setting or
operation of limits to the exercise of proprietary rights within the framework of intellectual
property law is far from sufficient to flillil the social bargain.
Emergence and significance of an institutional and safeguarding policy
The manner in which the law in industrialised countries (the study concentrates on UK legal
experience) limits the exercise of intellectual property rights is significant. This significance
lies in the evolution of the regulation on intellectual property, competition law and policy, the
performance of relevant enforcement bodies, intergovernmental co-operation, and public
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management. The study identifies an emerging institutional policy organised and implemented
to limit the exercise of proprietary rights.
To the extent that technical innovation and competitiveness are desirable, and efficiency is
supposed to blend with social welfare, state intervention to ensure that these objectives are
achieved assumes a major feature of the modem regulation of economic affairs. This applies
also to regulation of intellectual property. The structuring of this regulation, far from being an
isolated and static undertaking claims legal safeguards which may operate in connection with
broader and strategic policies (e.g., technical and industrial policies). Thus, the limitation on
the exercise of intellectual property rights is a legal concern deserving treatment separate from
intellectual property protection and enforcement. The pursuit of welfare and efficiency
through such limitation has shaped an institutional and safeguarding policy.
Legal conceptualisation of a safeguarding policy
Assuming that there is an incomplete theoretical knowledge about the relationship between
competition and the degree to which it fosters innovation and creativity efficiently, the
possibility of efficiency and welfare being achieved through legal policy is in the main
contingent upon the assessment of particular cases. Thus, at law the pursuit of such objectives
is a matter of "formal" claims. That is, the aptness of a safeguarding policy to yield
efficiency/welfare gains related to intellectual property is conceived ultimately in terms of
reasonable operation of incomplete rules, discretion, and streamlined proceedings.
Considering these elements theoretically, the study finally attempts to establish a legal
conceptualisation of a safeguarding policy.
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CHAPTER TWO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CONOMICS AND INNOVATION
2.1 Introduction: technical chan2e, competition and policies
Over the last two decades, protection of intellectual property has undergone intense
negotiations. Two related elements which have attracted the attention of negotiators are the
nature of high technologies, and the competition in the innovation process. The aim of this
chapter is to discuss these elements and establish the importance of them to intellectual
property policy.
Protection of intellectual property, in the second half of this centuly, was marked by the
emergence of two intenelated phenomena: growing technology and new competition. The
former is charactensed by the ability of the developing technology to stimulate economic
activities and operate revolutionary transformations. Similar to developments in information
technology, they have taken place in a large range of sectors, including education and training
systems, industnal relations, managerial styles, and financial systems, thus creating a huge
volume of new services and affecting greatly the social mode of life. This has led to the
perception that innovation is good and desirable. Such awareness has resulted in a type of a
syndrome, i.e., an attitude towards a technological race and the world-wide belief that lack of
technical capability will hamper a countrys economic development.
The latter phenomenon is characterised by a natural change in the competitive structure of
industry and the emergence of large-scale fiims acting under conditions of increasingjy
imperfect competition. The perception of the changing nature of competitive behaviour over
time explains for the dynamics of the market order, and provides a justification for
intermediary forms of imperfect competition (monopolistic competition and oligopolist
market) unknown by the classical economics. While technical progress tends to be affected by
those market models, new tecimologies have brought about a sense of disequilibrium and
uncertainties.
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Such a sense of disequilibrium is, firstly, of theoretical nature. Although too formal to
function as an economic model, perfect competition is still of beneficial regulatory effects at
least because of the maximisation of efficiency and welfare it pursues When considering the
increasing conditions of imperfect competition in which innovation actities occur, it can be
assumed that the innovation process entails some degree of welfare and efficiency losses.
Secondly, an additional type of disequilibrium stems from the fact that all regions cannot
benefit evenly from new technologies as technical changes flow a Ia wave. The structural
imbalance resulting from the uneven spatial development is likely to impair the ability of some
regions or countries to compete. In order to follow the technical race, they face massive
disadvantages and uncertainties.
Any investment project contains conceptual risks, expressed in terms of costs, an ability to
satisfy demand and to compete with rivals. Such risks vary according to the magnitude of the
undertaking and the level of sophistication of the technology. Additionally, companies are
concerned about to what extent and how much existing legal regimes of intellectual property
can afford proper protection to new technologies.
Traditionally, intellectual property would protect mental creativity which results in both
works (expressed in a particular form) and inventions with industrial applications. These do
not include scientific ideas or theories which would belong to the public domain. As a
determinant feature of the intellectual property right, the mental element places the creativity
output in close relation with creators (authors or inventors). Today, the purity of this
theoretical background is being challenged as never before. What matters, essentially, in the
protection of new technologies, is to secure the return on investments. Hence, intellectual
property rights increasingiy express an investment relationship banked by firms. The mental
element is no longer the most important, nor is the relation between the creator and his
creation the most significant. The law leans towards protecting scientific theories and
mathematical sentences mainly through increasing protection of trade secrets and know-how.
'Concerning deficiency of IPR protection for new technologies, see footnotes ito 4 and accompanymg text
in Cli. 3.1. The study does not deal vith this problem in particular. It is referred to with a view to emphaw'ing
consequential uncertainties.
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Concerned with return on investments and facing all sort of uncertainties, including lack or
inadequacy of protection of propnetary rights, innovative firms are likely to develop defensive
and strategic activities, i.e., trade practices which increase market imperfection and may not
be acceptable in the light of competition standards. As an illustration, patents over chemical
inventions from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the current century were
strategically used as a tool to prevent access to the market and control output. Cross-
licensing of patents in the field of electronics, carried out by leading computer firms in a
restrictive style, has also taken place over the last two decades. These are only some examples
of how profit-mauniising firms struggle against uncertainties. In some circumstances,
government assistance is a means of support, if not the only way to turn a radical innovation
into a successful project.
The indisputable role of the government makes the laissez-faire state inadequate to attain
technological progress. The state involvement in assisting firms, plainly justified by neo-
liberalism, varies from country to country according to domestic traditions or the policy of the
government of the day, and takes different forms. Whether the state, as a regulator, customer
or underwriter, does conform its action to welfare and efficiency principles is not a matter to
set up a priori. The state presence in the innovation process is crucial for pursuing a balance
of interests.
In this chapter it is argued that while intellectual property is designed to promote technical
innovation and enhance competition for public favour, the innovation process tends to be
carried out in a context of increasingly imperfect competition. As a result, the achievement of
the social-bargain policy, underlying the intellectual property, is impaired.
Built up under the influence of the classical economics, intellectual property has been
protected under a framework of legal pre-conditions. Such protection is granted to encourage
innovative activities, induce disclosure of information, reward inventors and authors, and
boost industrial applications. These are assumed to work for the benefit of the society at
large, and to found a sense of social bargain assessed and comprehended in the light of
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welfare and efficiency goals. 2 The purpose in placing the institutional bargaining in a welfare-
and-efficiency perspective is to reach an understanding of the combined institutions of law
and economics in intellectual property. Such an analytical approach provides a dynamic and
more precise sense of the elements forming that bargain in connection with the innovation
process.
While protecting themselves against the risks inherent in innovative activities, finns move
towards concentration. As a result, baniers for entrants and distortions to competition are
likely to be created. These potentially work against the purposes underlying intellectual
property. On this grounds lies a strong argument for limiting the use of propnetary iights.
This chapters begins by describing the nature of chip technology, which is taken as a
paradigm for a number of reasons. Firstly, protection of chip design is regulated by specific
international treaties, establishing a legal regime of intellectual property and with which this
study is mostly concerned. Secondly, as a product with multiple applications, chips have a
close relationship with computer software, data-basis and artificial intelligence. Developments
on chip designing and manufacturing3
 give rise to theoretical-legal concerns.
There is not a definite description of efficiency and welfare goals. It is here assumed that to linut the
intellectual property on efficiency grounds requires a fault or competition mischief on the part of the oior. A
limitation not based on efficiency giwnds can only be justified on public welfare (e.g., expansion of
employment, export and tax basis, balance of payment, supply of a product essential to public health or
national security, and to conect a distortion of competitiveness or distnbwion of the industry). See the
discussion m Ch. 2.3.1., Ch. 6.3.1 (i) and Cli. 7.2.4.
To a degree, integrated circuits are m the core of, or associated with, technologies such as advanced
semicoxtnctor devices, artificial intelligence, digital imaging technology, flexible computer-integrated
manufnctunng; high-density data storage, high-performance computing, and sensor technology. For details,
see "Emerging Technologies - A Survey of Technical and Economic Opportunities", US Department of
Commerce, 1990. [From now on "1990 DOC Technical Survey"I.
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2.2 Technoloaical backzround: the chip as a paradiam
2.2.1 The semiconductor chip
(i) Chip: from history to business
The huge difference between todays computers (based on large-scale circuit integration) from
those in the 1950s (valve computers) can be explained in terms of cost, reliability, user-
fliendliness, speed of operations performed, and memory size. Succeeding valve computers,
transistors represented a development which was limited due to the difficulty of
interconnecting them. Advancement allowed logical units, made up of a number of transistors
and its associated circuitry and connections to be placed on single semiconductor inatenal (a
chip). The development of this technology led to machine miniaturisation, creating third and
fourth generation computers. The integrated circuits not only made the formidable change in
performance possible, but also determined the overwhelming growth of computer
technology.
Some technical definitions and the importance of the chips
The chip is a popular name for an integrated circuit or semiconductor chip, which is an
electronic device with electrical functions. These terms are synonyms, differing only in the
product manufacturing process. The terms topography, circuit layout, layout-design and mask
work, now legally coined, are used interchangeably to indicate the arrangement of the
elements representing the three-dimensional structure of the chip. The tenn chip-design also
appears in this study as a synonym for the same representation of that arrangement on which
the legal protection relies. Hence, the chip or integrated circuit is the final product or device in
solid state distinguished from its layout or design itself
The complex collection of transistors contained in an integrated circuit corresponds to
minuscule patterns of switches which control electnc current and perform assigned functions
(manipulation of electrical signals) at nearly the speed of light. The transistors determine the
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chip capacity assessed in terms of computing power, speed, power consuming reliability, and
cost. These require the use of very sensitive types of material.
Well knowi as a semiconductor system of circuits, the chip is made up of two broad
categones of material: good conductors (rich in conducting electricity) and bad conductors
(insulators). Due to high technical methods and processes, thousands of circuits are imprinted
in a single, thin structure forming a semiconductor compound or substrate of matenal such as
silicon, glass, sapphire, ceramic, magnetic domain, and superconducting material. Several
types of chips differ from each other due to the manufacturing methods or process they apply
or the functions they perform.
According to their manufacturing methods, chips are bipolar or MOS (metal oxide
semiconductor). Power consumption and speed depend on such methods. In their variations,
MOS chips are technologically dominant and have wider applications. Linear and digital
circuits differ from each other due to the methods of altering electrical signals. Linear circuits
process electrical signals over a continuous voltage range, and are suitable for analog
computers, radios and TV sets. Digital circuits are suitable for processing information in bits
(binary digital), and are largely used in digital computers. Within the digital category, a
distinction is made between logic (microprocessor) and memory chips.
Two basic fi.inctions of a chip include computing of processing information and storing data
(as either input or output already saved for ulterior computations). Although these functions
can be performed by a single device, memory chips have the primary function of storing data
or programs; they are ROM (read-only-memory), PROM (programable-read-only-memory),
and EPROM (erasable PROM) chips. A microprocessor has complex logic circuits containing
the basic elements (forming a central processing unit - CPU) of a conventional computer. For
this reason the microprocessor is regarded as a microcomputer on a chip. Both functions
(storing data, and making decisions which rely on data) could be integrated on a single VLSI
(very large-scale integrated) chip whose use is not confined to computers.
Developments in computer technology would not have been possible without integrated
circuits. Their applications, therefore, go beyond the computer industry, to include consumer
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products, telecommunication equipment, industnal process control, medical and
manufacturing equipment, defence systems, and any area which requires significant use of
electronics. These growing applications illustrate how crucial the technological progress and
competitiveness of the integrated circuit industiy is to the economic growth of any nation.
Yet, only a minority have been able to enter the chip business.
The design and manufacture of chips requires a considerable amount of investment and a
highly trained labour force. The innovative activity takes thousands of hours of research and
development, and is a costly business. Designing and marketing an entire family of integrated
circuits may take years and million of dollars. Nevertheless, such high costs are alleviated
thanks to automation and mass production, so that the price per unit is only a few dollars.
(ii) Designing and manufacturing process
Designing, manufacturing and testing a chip involves decisions regarding which techniques to
apply, costs and purposes. Advances in methods and in the manufacturing process offer a
variety of options which meet specific needs. The appropriateness of the technology t
 depends
on the type and the amount of information one wants to include in a single chip or chip
system. 2
 The scale of integration, the flexibility of the microprocessor (the versatility to
update), the advances in CAD,3 and the purposes -if it is an application-specific integrated
circuit (ASIC), or a general-purpose microprocessor - affect the costs. These technical
requirements, costs and purposes are intrinsically related. The search for profit and capability
are contributing factors. If designing and production have commercial purpose, a
microprocessor may be smaller and cheaper in order to reach competitiveness; perhaps, no
similar product has been produced before, and hence a generous scale of production is
considered. If the focus is on capability, e.g., a microprocessor for military application, power
and performance are decisive.
In the descnilion of the steps below, the designing and fabncation ct an MOS integrated circuit is
considerett The MOS technology dominates the IC market, aix! is largely ahed to VLSI circuits. Cf. k F.
Murray & Ii M. Reekie, Integrated Circuit Design, . 6,24.
2 A microprocessof system differ from a microprocessor on a single chip in the sense that the former
inoludes a printed circuit board, a few number of chips and discrete componenis.
The computer-aided design (CAD) consists of a vanety of hardware and software tools.
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Designing follows several steps. (a) Abstract descnption. A plan of the electncal functions to
be performed is prepared. The electrical specifications are descnled with precision and in
detail. A market study preous1y undertaken perhaps supports the conception of the desired
functions. (b) Logic diagram A detailed schematic data describes the circuits symbolically.
This is a very important piece of work, which requires talent and expeiience. 4 (c) Layout
design. The arrangement of the components and the complex interconnection patterns is
defined. The selected geometrical placement of the elements provides a picture of how the
chip topology will be implemented. The designer is then able to make input (progressive
specification of data) in order to optimise the layout conflguration by manipulating the
schematic he makes choices, selecting a particular way of arranging the elements in the
semiconductor substrate. 5 He is bound, however, to adhering to a set of technical design
rules. These rules represent 'constraints" upon the freedom of design, and are dictated by
technological considerations. The geometric rules, for instance, address the problem of the
transistor size; the electrical rules specify electrical parameters applied according to the
manufacturing process; some mandatory features are also imposed, and are supposed to be
present in every design. 6 To observe and implement these rules, the designer enjoys the aid of
the computer which is regularly utilised.
Although designing can be computer aided (CAD), the simulator capacity of mimicking the
circuit and predicting its behaviour is limited; some inaccuracies do exist, and thus the design
automation tolerates certain levels of inefficiency. For this reason, the designer's intuition is
needed.7 Furthermore, automation is developed inside large companies. As access to them is
rather difficult, it is uncertain how much simulation is applied. Increasing of IC density has
rendered the use of simulation nearly indispensable. Moreover correction 8 of the chip
configuration must be made before the design is released for mass production, otherwise
modifying the chip is impossible. 9 The simulation patterns are applied to veriIr the logic
design, i.e., to check its internal consistency, help generate alternate architecture, and file
Provided the schematic is sufficiently novel protection may be available under the patent law.
This job carries out the considerable work of mind that the sui generis law protects The layout design
corresponds to an encoded set of macks - the "mask work" of the American SCPA.
6 For details about the design rules, see Maurray & Reekie, ob. cit., p.63 et seq.
Murray&Reekie,ob.cit.,p. 101.
8 At every stage corrections are performed,, by adding further specifications and improving earlier results
9 Afler fabrication, each layer or mask is permanently fixed or embodied in the semiconductor material.
41
additional information regarding the whole IC network. Such data will be useful during final
testing. The more complex the chip architecture is, the more automation is needed, despite
the challenges posed by the simulation.'° A factual consequence, however, deriving from the
CAD (computer-aided design) discipline and the strict design rules to which the designer is
bound, is that limitations on engineering techniques lead designers to create independently
layout circuit which may be substantially similar."
The material is ready for manufacturing' 2 when the interconnecting pattern is complete and
correct. The integrated circuit is developed by the transfer of the encoded pattern, through an
expensive process and by applying a series of operations.' 3
 The result is a collection of
masks'4
 which determine the features of the transistors.
The stages in the manufacturing of a silicon-based integrated circuit are as follows. The
masks are produced by photo-reducing the circuit design. The manufactunng process itseW
starts with the oxidisation of the silicon. Ax a high temperature, chemical and photographic
treatments are applied on the substrate, including repeated addition and removing of
materials. The result is a resistant product consisting of a basic metal-oxide semiconductor
'° Challenges, for instaz, in terms of reliability. See M. Feuer, "VLSI Design Automation: An
Introduction", a supplemental article presented to the "Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice", of the American House of Representatives, HR 1028, pp. 380 et seq. In a less
aceurate source, the generalized use of automation seems to create no problems, mainly in designing of gate
arrays and standard cells Special Report from Business Week, May 23 1983, transcript in Hearings on S
1201, p. 162.
"The problem of substantial similarity is legally relevant, and, as a technical fact, was referred by MA
Lechter in his written comments recorded in the hearings of the l-LR 1028, p. 280. Serious incompatibility
would exist. howr, in
applying the copyright test of similarity in the domain of the semiconductor chip.
12 The chip law does not primarily focus on the fabrication or the product, but on the chip design (the
intermediate masks) instead. Nevertheless, the manufacture helps to understand sonic legal definitions.
Moreover, the design normally reflects specific manufacturing process, the interrelation bet'een them may be
rather significant "On one hand, designs may have to be substantially modified because of manufacturing
limitations while, on the other hand, aths in manufacturing techniques or materials may compel nugor
changes in design parameters." - Cf. [1988J ffl(4) Monthly Labor Review 27; see Hearings on S 1201, p. 162.
' Such as metallisation: application of a metal which is used for interconnections of the device, and act
against the high resistance of other materials; and insulation or oxidation: a layer of oxide, an insulating
material, is deposited on the wafer (a disk of silicon) in order "to prevent any undesirable short-circuits"
producing silicon dioxide. This material is a vely good insulator, permitting the application of the masking
technique at a high temperature. Murray & Reekie, ob.cit; p. 48/59.
They represent the number of layers (10 to 16), precisely aligned orjuxtaposed each of one has less than
one micron (one thousandth of a nullinieter), and bears the information concerning both the processing
iechnolo', and the electmunic system embodied in the chip; they together describe the entire topographicaJ
dimension of the chip.
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transistor. The last step is testing each chip still on the wafer.' 5 Those which do not perform
the desired ftinctions are rejected and thrown away.
(iii) Reverse engineering and audit frail
Ordinarily, there are two ways of getting access to a given chip: obtaining a pattern either (a)
in form of a tape,' 6
 or (b) through the reverse engineering process.' 7 Both may derive from a
normal technology share agreement' 8
 but the latter - although being a lawifil practice - may
be a step towards a misappropriation.
Defining reverse engineering
Reverse engineering is a process by which one may disassemble the chip into its constituent
patterns (masks or layers), using photomicrography. The top layer is photographed, carefully
measured (and the related information preserved appropriately) and etched away in order to
expose the next pattern, and so forth layer by layer, until the schematic of the whole chip is
drawn. The operation is undertaken with a microscope and a camera mounted to take
pictures, and the layers are removed by applying a set of chemical baths. When the entire
mask set is reconstmcted, the embodied principles, techniques or specifications (concepts and
ideas), are evaluated for the purposes of studying or teaching. Next, another IC layout may be
designed around the protected one, modiiying and improving it, both chips (the model and
the second one) being functionally equivalent, but visually dissimilar.'9
A wafer is approximately five inches in diameter and 0.025 inches thick; and can yield 100 to 200 chips
at one titne. The higher the number of sound dev,ces per wafer, the lower the end-cost per output unit
I6 ic layout tape, including the reticle set and working masks, are carefully kept by the company. These
intellectual assets - aceording to the 1991 amendment to the Unfair Competition Prevention Law of Japan -
should be part of an inventory in order to be protected [1991] ICLA 13, Nov.
17 One well-known case of reverse engineering that has been cited was the NEC version to the Intel 8080
microprocessor. The Intel assumed that its chip was sewed as a model by NEC, which analyzed the 8080
allowed by a private agreement signed in 1976 ith the Intel. See Hearings on HR 1028, pp. 39/40.
' Technology share agreements are commonly made by great corporations. Toshiba, Siemens and IBM
have recently joined to create a memory chip which will hold 256 megabits by 1998. The reason for going into
alliance is basically the high cost of research: "Toshiba earns US$7 billion from chip each year. It will cost
USS 1 biihon to develop the 256-megabit chip." [1992] 135(1831) New Scientist 9.
19 Cf Hearings on HR 1028 p. 392, Hearings on S 1201, pp. 27t28 and 38. American firms specialised in
chip analysis charge a few tens of thousand dollars for assembling service, including topological layouts, and
material analysis. The high-price range may oscillate from $10,000 to $30,000, but one may come across
advertised chip reports at $980 to $1880, "'vith volume discounts for additional copies." Cf M. D. Goldberg,
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It is indisputable that reverse engineering is an appreciable means of technology diffusion. Its
accessibility effect is particularly understood within the context of the second-source
manufacture (integrated circuits interchangeable with counterparts). For technical and
commercial reasons, a firm may want to make a chip equivalent to a competitor's, or a
manufacturer to have a second-source of its product in pursuit of adequate supply, market
certainty, technical compatibility and cost reduction. 2° Second sourcing, a common practice
in the US semiconductor industiy, provides the buyers with at least two possible suppliers,
protecting them against the risk of excess demand. 2 ' The equivalent product, normally
resulting from a private agreement, would be a competitive version enjoying lawful
circulation.
Whatever the status of the equivalent product, whether a copy or a legitimate and similar
one, an additional issue is the reproduction of the microcode 22
 built into a memory chip? As
far as the law24 is concerned, there is a potential conflict between the decompilation of a chip
and a computer program. 25 Apart from this aspect, to find out whether or not a second-
corner is a copying output is legally relevant. In this respect, the audit trail is of some
assistance.
Defmition of audit trail
Intellectual Property Rights and Technology - Semiconductor Chip Protection as a Case Study, paper presented
at the Conference on Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, held on
Januaiy 8-9, 1992, at the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.
20 For details, see J. C. Oxman, Intellectual Property Protection and Integrated Cuvuit Masks, an article
reprinted from the Jourimetrics Journal and presented at US Congress as supplemental material, Hearings on
FIR 1028 p. 388/9.
21 Cf UN Chip Report; pp. 142/143. See Table 8.4. Second scwting is also a legal requirement of the US
public procurement law. See Luc Soete, "International Diffusion of Technology, Industrial Development and
Technological Leapfrogging", [19851 13(3) World Development 409, at 421 (footnote 36).
The microcode is a parlicular computer program built into a chip as a pattern of tiny transistc1s i.e., a
piece or portion of electrical circuitiy.
This is a matter of great importance because the memoiy chips or RAMs form a categoly considered as
"the vital fuel of the computer industiy". Are of this and by the time the American SCPA was passed, the
US Defense Department was worried about the possibility of the US computers, weapons and
telmmunication become dependent on foreign menxiy chips. This concern made sense, because Japan soon
after emerged as a leading force in the market of memoy chips. Hearings on HR 1028 p. 359.
24 Although lasfu1 under the na generis chip law, reverse engineering is uncertainty in copyright as this
applies to computer program.
Disassembling a memoiy chip technically leads to the decompilation of the computer program microcode
embodied in the chip.
Audit trail is here applied repIing the expression paper trail. The former seems to be more appropnate,
because the elements involved in the concept rely increasingly on electronic means rather than on paper.
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The audit trail consists of the overall documented job of tiial-and-enor performed along the
course of the chip design, and include blueprints computer simulation outcomes, logic circuit
diagrams, tnal layouts, test data, and time records. These elements are necessarily generated
as a result of significant efforts put in the making ofan IC design, and may be printed on
paper (paper trail) or electronically stored in a computer (electronic trail) 27 The electronic
trail incorporates techmcal principles specilications ideas and concepts manipulated or
arranged by the chip designer in the course of the making of an original chip.
A discerning observer should be able to tell whether a chip is a copy or fruit of reverse
engineenng. The distinction which needs to be made is a matter of "change" or
"adaptaxion" rather than a direct evidence of authorship. 3° It follows, if the audit trail has
been produced it does not necessarily mean the IC-design is an original one. 3 ' The audit trail
is significant in the sense that it does provide evidence of systematic tasks and investment, but
it is not a test of originality.
As hardware, an integrated circuit is a device veiy distinct from computer software.
Nevertheless, these two technical elements work together in a large number of applications,
mainly in computing. The scale of this technical interplay is such that commercial and
industrial exploitation of integrated circuits and software considerably affect each other, and
the infringement of a microprocessor chip most likely involves infringement of computer
software as well. For this reason, an approach to advancements in computer software seems
commendable.
2.2.2 Computer software and artificial intelligence systems
27 The electronic pnnting may include accidental errors or traps. This is tIn case of a small imperfection
fixed in the Intel 8086, causing a chip designer to discover by chance the copying made by NEC in the
fabrication of an 8086 version. This most famous copying case is part of the lugh-scale competition between
Intel & NEC, the tv giants of the electronic industiy.
LI. Vadasz, icc. cit, p. 37.
The debates camed out at the US Congress suggested that the audit trail s only half important As a
result of a technical routine and in-deor activity, the paper trail could hardly be accepted as a proper test of
originality, thus, unsuitable to be included in a legislation dealing vnth intellectual property.
3° In technical sense, significantly different designs may present very subtle mask changes. Hearings on HR
1028 p. 37.
31 The conclusion is a valid one, but it is assumed that to forge an audit trail is nearly impossible.
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(i) Development of computer software32
Definition of computer software
As a legal concept, computer software includes the computer program, program description
plus any other related supporting material necessary to the whole specification of the
computer program itself 33
 The conception and execution of a software project may involve a
considerable amount of intellectual effort and investment. These inputs vary according to the
software application which could be for the control of a nuclear reactor or a washing
machine. Regardless what the software function is, its development entails the same basic
phases roughly associated with those elements relevant to the legal concept. These phases are
the specification, designing and programming.
Development steps
At the initial stages of the process, there are specifications or statements of requirements
provided by the customer. Usually wntten in natural language, the requirements may consist
of a few pages or a number of volumes, and describe what the program is required to do
(function or task) within certain conditions or limits (constraints). 34
 The language of the
statements often contains plenty of imperfections, such as ambiguities, omissions and so on.
Thorough analysis of the statements is then carned out in order to resolve such imperfections
and reach an agreed specification, formulated in accordance with certain properties and
understandable by both customer and developer. Once completed and tested, the specification
32 See IEEE Standards Collection, Software Engrneenng (1993)
The WIPO defines these terms as followa: computer program: "a set of instructions capable, when
incorporated in a machine-readable mediwn, of causing a machine having information-processing capabilities
to indicate, perform or achieve a particular function, task or result"; program description: "a complete
procedural presentation in verbal, schematic or other form, in sufficient detail to detennine a set of instructions
constituting a corresponding computer program;" supporting material: "any material, other than a computer
program or a program description, created for aiding the understanding or application of a computer program,
for example problem descriptions and user instniction" Draft Treaty (Article 1) and 1977 Model Provisions
(Section 1) on the Protection of Computer Software. Computer software and computer program are terms used
by academics and practitioners interchangeably.
A fragment of a h3pothetical statement if the driver does amit put on the seat belt and the engine is started,
an alarm will sound intermittently.
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describes what the system is to do in terms of application; the description is a basic document
to develop the system design.
The designing is the second phase. At this stage, procedures or subroutines are arranged
and grouped in units. Program wnt are sets of codes and data which define each function or
task and their performing order, and are capable of intercommunicating in a logical flow by
parameters. The architecture of the operations organises the data in terms of sequential file,
expressed in algorithms, i.e., set of steps, and is expected to satisfy the fl.inctional specification
and constraints. A detailed logical design structure of the operations is then reduced to a form
called a flowchart, 35 which expresses how a system, as a series of functions, is to be
implemented in computing terms.
In the third phase, algorithms and program units are written in computer language. 36 The
flowchart is now translated into source code or source program, which describes key
statements in mathematical notions. The translation is made through an interpreter,
instruction by instruction, or a compiler which translates the whole diagram in one
operation.37
In order to be run and commercialised, the source program is translated into object code
(code program or machine code), which is a series of instructions to be operated by the
computer, and written in a special format. As the translation is carried out aided by the
computer, the source program is taken as an input supplied to the translator.
As a second program or output, the object code takes a machine-readable form. Its binaiy
notation makes up sequences of zeros and ones, 38 which correspond to equivalent wired
me flowchait or flow diagram is independent of the culing, and is said to represent the idea behind the
computer prograni (cf. K R Moon. [1991] CLP 158). Apart from the idea/expression dichotomy, the
arrangement per se of algorithms, mathematical statements 5 procedures or subroutines5 whatever form of
language expressed, ildjusli1 copyright protection.
The tes of language applied include BASIC, COBOL, FORTRAN, PIJ1, PROLOGO LISP C and
PASCAL
Interpreter and compiler are special programmes written specially to accomplish the translation.
In computer sense, the binaiy digit "zero" or "one" is called "bit"; a sequence of eight bits form a "byte"
which is treated as a single unit and represents a character (a letter, number or symbol). According to the
American StaMrd Code for Information Inrchange - ASCII the mo commonly used characters are
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commands electronically expressed as "Off" and "ON" switches. These instructions are
loaded into the electronic memoty and organised mto sets of bytes. The physical means used
to store the data includes magnetic or optic disc, electro-mechanical switches and
semiconductor chips,39
 appropriate devices to market software. The range of tasks in the
different phases are performed by teams of professionals hired by a corporate entity. The
circumstances in which software is conceived and developed almost invariably do not allow
the creator (or creators) a close relationship with the product. This feature is more
pronounced in systems, such as artificial intelligence, in which the interoperability of hardware
and software is more complex.
(ii) Artificial intelligence systems, concepts and functions
Can a machine think? This has been an intriguing question of this centuiy, 4° and a challenge
which remains in the frontiers of the computer science. A similar question could have been
made two centuries ago with respect to the aeroplane, can a machine fly. For the average
laymen both questions (made in the corresponding due era) allow similar cuiiosity and
scepticism. Under the eyes of science, however, those questions differ fundamentally. Man
discovered the principles of flight, which enabled the machine to fly. In order to make the
machine think, man would supposedly need to discover the principles of intelligent thought.41
rePresented in decimal codes and interchanged into binaiy codes. For instance, the letters for MARY have the
notation M=77, A=65, R=82, Y=89; in binaiy codes the name in capitals is represented as follows:
0101 1010
01000001
01010010
01011001
Electronically, zero and one represent a switch with its contact open or "oft" and close or "on", and means low
and high voltages, or different polarities of magnetization.
39 A microprogram permanently stored in a ROM chip (Read-Only Memory), in microcode instructions, is
called finnware. In a microcomputer, the processor unit (CPU) consists of one or more of this dexe used to
control and direct the microprocesso?s activities.
° The question was considered for the first time in 1950 by Alan Turing, cf Paifreman & Swade, The
Dream Machine, pp. 137/138, The BBC Books, 1991.
41 The (human) inteffigence is something associated mdi the process of thought, reasoning and learning,
Although consisting of neural events confined to the brain, thinking is not identified today with conscion
expenezes - these are rather limited, hut with the learning expeneuce captured through stimuli (inputs) and
responses (outputs). This process si1d originate cognitive structures or "perceptual representations of the
world or parts of the workL" Many psychologists are concerned with the mental stnicwres irrespective of man
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Moreover, these principles are supposed to provide the scientific ground for the development
of a machine qth the ability to recognise things, adapt to a new environment, learn and
create. Such a rationality disembodiment project has no precedent in the histoiy of the
industrial revolution. In conceptual terms the implications are enormous. 42 The creations of
the so called "electronic brains", however, have not gone beyond "idiot savants,"43
 which
have resulted in little success achieved only in confined areas. In this respect, frustrations
have been debited to the complexity of the real world that artificial intelligence purports to
reproduce, and to the still mysterious scientific concept of (human or real) intelligence.
As a technology in development, Al relies on scientific models not filly confirmed, and not
yet satisfactorily defined. 45
 In attempting to draw some concepts, specialists are prone to
centre on technical concepts associated with operations and outputs. This approach avoids
both the underlying debate about the nature of intelligence, and the uncertainty concerning
actual learning as a possible result from machine tutorial. 47 Nevertheless, available knowledge
being aware of them. In the 20th centuiy there is no wianirnity among the scientists about the inteffigence
phenomenon. For a sound account on this, see Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 22, pp.641 ci seq.
42 The ability to reason distinguishes the human from the rest of the life forms and things. From this
phenomenon, the law has been universally developed under the assumption that the man is the unique being
capable of having his owa will, and so only the human being is bearer of rights and duties, with the exception
of the artificial person or legal entity being applied.
Computerized machine built to manipulate concepts like human brains has comparanvely been
"brilliantly gifted in one small area, but outside that area, he is unable to function competently." Paifreman &
Swade, ob. cit, p. 154.
Based on unexpected outcomes, üTeverent At definitions have been made, such as "any software system
which is sufficiently sophisticated that it doesn't quite iw.irk", and meant as "Always Impossible" or "Advanced
Implements". WIPO pub. 698(E), pp. 121, 95. The unfavourable comments do not seems to apply to robots.
which have a secure future in tjjjng pro and are progressing quite well in biorobotics. A team
of researchers in Montreal, at the Biorobotics Laborator y of McGill University, is building a inicrorobot called
Micro Surgeiy Robot-i. The MSR-1 is designed to perform eye surgeiy. The system "creates a three-
dimensional robot's eye view of the inside of the eye that the surgeon can see by wearing a virtual reality helmet
that has a small screen in front of each eye." [19921 134(1826) New Scienlist 22.
In the Symposium on the Intellectual Property Aspects of Artificial Intelligence sponsored by WIPO, held
at Stanford University in 1991, the WIPO Director General delivered in his opening statement a preliminaiy
definition as follows: "an expression commonly used to designate those kinds of computer systems that display
ceitain capabilities associated with human inteffigence, such as perception, understanding learning reasoning
and problem-solving" WIPO pub. 698(E), p. 17.
Apart from the lack of consensus about the definition of human intelligence, what really matters is to
know how an artificial system works in order to be accepted as an intelligent one. This treatment tends to cast
aside false and exaggerated expectations derived from the expression artificial intelligence. CL Dreier, WIPO
pub. 698(E), p. 151.
As Johnson-Laird pointed out, "neural net')rks are not so sure they only seem to learn from failure.
When they are wrong you tell them the correct answer and they adjust When they are right, it is not clear that
they are actually learning" In "Main Categories of Artificial Intelligence and Their Intellectual Property
Aspects", WIPO pub. 698(E), p. 45.
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in the field of computer science (including development in software and hardware) only
provides for limited explanations. In addition to scientific doubts and scepticism and as far as
the legal interest48 is concerned, a way of approaching Al systems is to consider their parts,
and that software is one of them. This leads to the question of how Al systems differ from
conventional software, involving, inter alia, aspects related to concepts, function and
structure, categories, applications and development.
Some attempts at a definition regard artificial intelligence as a (a) computer system, (b)
possessing certain capabilities (c) developed on a human-like basis and (d) addressed to
specific goals. As a computer system, artificial intelligence relies on sophisticated sets of
software and hardware, which process or manipulate electronic representations, and draw
inferences. 49
 These patterns of magnetic or electronic current, common in a digital computer,
are responsible for the processing of the internal representations of the external world. 5° As a
representational system, Al stands beyond its physical basis and is not reduced to a device.
The output the A! systems intend to operate include sound emission, witing, and
perception. These capabilities, achieved through manipulation or application of knowledge
(cognitive tasks), result from a process of or equivalent to, learning, reasoning, and self-
adjustment. Such a function is reduced purely to a mechanism of randomisation, 52
 processed
before and after the system is made. The operation requires the system to understand or
48 Tbe approach to these interests has been made much more on basis of speculations, because as far as
intellectual property is concerned no serious problem has been encountered yet, as it was reported at the 1991
WIPO Symposium on the Intellectual Aspects of Artificial Inteffigence, US Stanford University, Dcc. 698(E),
p. 298.
An expert system (a well-developed subdivisioo of artificial intelligence) has basically three components:
knowledge base, inference engine aix! user interface. The knowledge base contains interrelated information
about particular area. The inference is a reasoning process or a means of using that information and so as to
render speofic -
5° CYC, a super knowledge base, is being bwlt since 1984 in AustilL Texas. The project shall take at least
ten years, and is intended both to capture the eveiy-day wvrld knowledge and to express common sense. Such
an ambitious project has inspired scepticism. The Dream Machine, p. 157 et seq.
The representation of knowledge is largely developed in a hand-crafted way. A initial 30%-error rate is
something expected. The error rate after the training test set is inferior to 7%
52 Randoniisation is a sort of interaction operator/machine. The operator presents a series of codified facts
(inputs) and then the machine is asked questions associated with those facts. Incorrect answers (outputs) are
supposed to come out Each mistake requires adjustments, until the right answer is served. This may be a long
job, complex and costly, equivalent to a training or tutoring performance, on which the intellectual content or
ereativity rehea
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interpret input, and gradually infer solutions from stored knowledge (database). 53 Bearing a
utilitarian character, the Al systems aim at meeting a human need, rivalling or assisting man,
replacing him in the performance of complex tasks, TM and solving problems efficiently in
narrow areas.
Before discussing the next point (machine tutoring), a conceptual line is now drawn
between what is called artificial intelligence and intelligence as a human attribute. AL systems
may only assume a putative intelligence in the sense that they express imperfect analogy with
few faculties of human beings, and there is no need to demonstrate the nature of the artificial
representation of the external world. Such a remark, while limiting the expectation created by
the Turing query, confines A! systems to tnily semi-autonomous and therefore limited
creations. In other words, the "intelligence" of the so-called inteffigent machines is reduced
merely to a particular achievement which may, to a certain extent, recollect or emulate an
attribute inherent to a human one.
In order to sufliciently describe the object of protection, the law-maker has to set, among
other prerequisites, the minimal level of complexity, technically defined by the speed and the
number of inferences, as a pattern of both intellectual and investment inputs.
(iii) Al development and machine tutoring
The creation of an Al system involves a large number of specialists, such as programmers and
knowledge engineers, as well as professionals from different fields other than computer
science. The development encompasses those activities achieved in the production of any
conventional software, plus improvement tasks and testing on a more intensive scale. These
Something similar, bit really in a 1or scale, applies to "convenlional programming disciplines",
reduced to routines mathematically serviced step-by-step and as part of the "intelitual creativity of computer
programs (i.e.) the creative coxubination of instructions and statements expressed therein." The Al system
"training", hover, is distinguished by its "indeterminacy". S S. Mild, "The Creation of Works of Copyright
under Japanese Copyright Law Resulting from the Utilization of Artificial Intelligence"; and R S. Laurie, "The
Patentability of Artificial Intelligence Under US Law", both in WIPO pub. 698(E), pp. 294 and 122.
Some applications include medical diagnosis translation, financial analysis, geological seaith, ather
forecast, and recognition of inilitaiy target
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activities may vaiy within the A! categories," however all of them are intended to be capable
of learning. The focus will be, notably and briefly, on the processing of the representation of
knowledge and inference, tutoring, and the audit trail formation.
The processing of knowledge relies on two forms of representation: symbolic and non-
symbolic;56 expert systems, for instance, apply the former and neural networks apply the
latter. In standard expert systems, the knowledge (substantive and procedural information) is
translated into appropriate and formahsed rules (representation) and implemented in a data
base. In a further stage, the inference engine (software set) 57 is designed and implemented by
applying the knowledge to a particular problem area. In neural networks, which simulate
human brain functioning, 58 three layers of artificial neurones, equivalent to RAM-memory
chips, 59
 comprise the system structure: input layer, "hidden" layer and the output layer. These
layers form a sort of connectionist system, in which the relation between input and output is
given through assigned weights. 6° For the system to work successfully, the skill in choosing
the data representations (i.e., the number of neurones attributed to the input, hidden and
output layers), the initial weights, and the selection of training facts are crucial. In addition to
such required skills, an interesting feature of the neural system is that its intelligence "derives,
The WIPO has identified three categones of A! systems: the classical expert system, perception system,
and natural language. Other classification includes less explored subclasses, such as neural network and
robotics, and exclude perception
systems. From the point of view of the US Patent Office regulation, a broad class (364 - electrical computers
and data processing systems) lodges Generic Al Inventions (subclass 513) based on expert systems, neural
netvrks and robotics There are other tens of subclasses connected with a few classes (381, 382, 414),
covering a number of A! applications, besides the non-generic (dedicated Al-based inventions tools) covering
related subcategories. {WIPO pub. 389(6), pp. 123/41.
Machine translations and genetic algorithms, for instance apply representations based on symbolic
framew)rk as most A! systems do. Non-symbolic representations rely on connectionist or neural framerks,
as is the case of neural network systems regarded today as an embiyonic form of artificial intelligence.
See i. FL Spoor, 'Protecting Expert Systems, in Particular Expert System Knowledge A Challenge for
Lawyers", in WIN) pub. 698(E), p. 77. The inference engine operates and controls the expert system by
"selecting rules to use, accessing and executing the selected rules, and determining when a solution has been
found" (Fechnical Appendix to "The Patentability of Artificial hiteffigence Under US Law" by R S. Laurie, p.
141.)
The first logical model of artificial neuron (an idea of brain-like machine) s produced in 1943 by
McCulloch and Pius (University of illinois). CL Aleksander & Burnett (1987), Thinking Mhines, The
Search for Artificial Intelligence, pp. 156, 198, Oxford Univ Press.
A bit-organized RAM (random access memoiy) is imprinted in microchips or silicon iimns, which are
repostofes and processors of information. They simply wirk as interacting computers.
60 The netwxk relates the input values to the correct output by irKans of 'iwights. Before training, the
designer aibitranly sets "the weights from the input layer to the hidden layer and from the hidden layer to the
output layer." Cf Appendix, WIP() pub. 698(E), p. 143.
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at least in part, from the way in which the elements are interconnected rather than being
entirely the product of programming. n61
The distinct categones of systems descnbed above lead to different procedures of learning
simulation.62
 Two examples of these systems, which focus on specific tutoring patterns, are
natural language processing (a translation machine), using symbolic representation, which is
nearly hand-crafted, I e., written and encoded explicitly by hmd,63 and a neural framework
applying non-symbolic representation.
The natural language system requires: a) a grammar to assure the right order of words in a
sentence. Since there is no formalised grammars, TM such as the existing standard codes of
computer language, a particular grammar has to be made, which is time consuming and
costly, b) a lexical system, which is a definition of words (dictionary); c) lexical
disambiguation, i.e., a set of rules designed to provide contextual meaning. This is
fundamental for dealing with the syntax of certain words which play different roles, such as
verb, adjective, or noun, according to the context; and d) a combining approach and testing,
necessary for generalisation of algorithms and instruction of the system with patterns of
translation. Ths activity is a plus in terms of intellectual content, and so remarkably distinctive
in the whole system.
The example of a non-symbolic representation is a neural framework designed for the
analysis of DNA sequences, with the purposes of recognising "promoter sites" and "splice
junctions."65
 Extracted from biological literature, an inaccurate theory is formulated to
explain the rules of promoter sites and splice junctions. Following that, these rules are
encoded into a neural network, i.e., in a network t)pology, and an initial set of weights is
61 Aleksander&Burnett,obcitp 197.
62 As it is pointed oul "in a traditional expeit system, the knowledge engineer specifies rules and search
techniques to correlate input and output In a neural network, tbe system itself designs and adjusts tIn weights
in order to correctly correlate input and output" In Technical Appendix, WIPO pub 698(E), p 143.
63 L. 1. McCarty, bc cit, p. 34.
The Japanese Elecimnic Dictionary Research Institute is canymg out research to develop an electronic
dictionary intended to apply to any type of system. CL Makot Nagao, WIPO pub. 696(E), p. 41.
65 Promoter site is a biological element associated with the process of gene transcnption. The identification
of a promoter site means that a gene discovery is likely to happen. On a DNA sequenee, splice junetions are
points "in which segments of messenger RNA are spliced cut" To be aware of these is unportant for the
biologist. WIPO pub. 696(E), p. 35.
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provided. The next stage consists of training the network. The training consists of
strengthening or weakening the connections between the processors of the system; this
adjusting of weight patterns with the initial typology, using known examples of DNA
sequences, aims at improving the theofy. The result is a particular representation of
knowledge in biology, useful for the study of promoter sites and splice junctions. The error
rates in the recognising of those elements are inferior to 6.5% considered as vely good.67
The Al systems in general, as aforementioned, are developed on a crescendo of thai and
error. The errors and rejected output are imprinted in a way that a trail is electronically
coined. The way the trainer has carned out the training, the patterns of tests have been
applied, the facts and the code that simulated the neural network have been inputted. This
suggests that creative efforts and investments have been camed out. All of these hidden
aspects make up a sort of "cartographic trick" 68 ., and thus assisting in the indirect
identification of the system.
The background just described reflects an intellectual work suffused with challenging
barners, explained by the study of the nature of the innovative process, and relating to the
bargain underlying intellectual property.
For more about training neural ne see Johnson-Laird, at pp. 50/51 WIPO jb. 696(E), and H. Collins,
[19921 134(1826) New Scientist 40.
67 This is a summarised description made by Prof McCaity of a vrk done by Mick Noordeier, bio1ogst
and compiler scientist at the Rutgers University, WIPO pub. 698(E), pp. 35/36.
Cf Johnson-laird, bc cit., pp. 52/53.
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2.3 Intellectual property and innovation dynamics
2.3.1 The intellectual property bargain and competition
(I) The nature of intellectual property bargain
The early structuring of intellectual property emerged as a result of the liberal ideas behind
perfect competition, and the property as a iight. Both were vital fuel for capitalism centred in
the notion of a contractual relationship between the owners of means of production and
society. The rationale for that relationship was as follows. Without private property "no
rational economic calculation would be possible"', and competition was conceived as a
bargaining process for public favour, hence, rendering an unrestricted competition with the
notion of society. 2
 The focus on these ideas is only to state briefly the historical background
within which intellectual property was developed.3
As a legal institution born under the influence of the classical economics and exempted from
unwanted monopolies, intellectual property was designed to ensure temporary protection
"only to the end of promoting science and the usefl.il arts." 4
 Early in the current century, this
steadily founded theory was vastly absorbed by the law of the industrial countries. The
conceptual basis was first developed by the British courts. In common law, judges learned
that letters patents could be ruinous to the society by affecting the price of commodities. The
courts had, however, at least two reasons for tolerating patents: the encouragement of
manufacture in the country, thus furthering trade for the good of the nation, and even if not
recognised as lawful monopolies, letters patents would be granted anyway by the Sovereign
"as a convenient means of raising revenue."5
A Radomysler, Welfare economics and economic policy, p. 81 passing in "Readings in Welfare
Economics", The Amencan Economic Association series, vol. XII, 1969.
2 Maiy S. Morgan, "Competing Notions of 'Competition" in Late Ninetemith-Centuiy American
Economics". [19931 25(4) Hlstoy of Political Economy, 563, at 570 and 580.
Sin existing literature deals th liberal ideas abundantly, further investigation on them is unnessazy
and beyond the purpose of the chapter.
' United States, The Constitution of the United States of Amenca - Analysis and Interpretation, p.317,
edited by N. Small & S. Jayson, 1964.
Great Britain, Board of Trade, "Patents and Designs Acts, Socond Interim Report of the Departmental
Committee", p. 3. Crud. 6789(1946). Darcy v. A/un orAllen (Noy 173) [1602J 74 E.R. 1131.
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Principles and practices which prevailed in the construction of the British patent regulation
were incorporated into the US Constitution and law and conferred a true right to inventors6
The theoiy behind the clause of science-and-technology promotion of the American
Constitution is read univocaily as being for the benefit of both inventors or authors and
society at large. The clause calls for a balance between private and public interests or a
bargain7 between inventors or authors and society
The social bargain theory
The sense of bargain is that somebody's gain is someone else's
loss. This gain-and-loss relation is synallagmatic in the sense that inventors and authors on
one hand and society at large on the other are placed in a prospective context of both gains
and losses. The framework of this quid pro quo underlying the concept of protection of
intellectual property is determined by four social objectives: 8 encouragement of innovative
activity, inducement to the disclosure of the invention, reward inventors and authors, and
inducement towards industrial application. Here it is suggested that the achievement of these
objectives is a combination of social welfare and efficiency ends. To what extent these legal
pre-conditions are achieved has always been a matter
of contention and concern.
Encouragement of R&D and inventive activities
Although arguable, the literature regards the incentive for R&D activities as the main
justification for patent protection. Several surveys, nevertheless, have showed that the
stimulating effect varies according to industiy, size of firms and traditions. 9 In this respect
6 U.S. Constitution, Alt I, § 8, ci. 8. Abraham L Pennock and James Sellers v. Adam Dialogue, US
Supieme Court, January 1829, pp 327-335.
For the discussion of the protection of intellectual properly as a bargain, see "OTA Background Paper" p.
7; Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges tba Law, OTA-CIT, 1989, cli. 3; US Congress/OTA,
Intellectual Property in an Age of Electronics and Information, OTA-CIT 302.
8 Cmd 6789, p. 3.
0. For some accounts, see Sipa-Adjah Yankey, International Patents and Technology Transfer to Less
Developed Countries, p. 10-24, 1987; and IL Ullrich, Tba Importance of Industrial Property Law and Other
Legal Measures in the Promotion of Technological Innovation, [1989J Industrial Property 103-112.
57
empirical data does not always tell the same story, for instance, the general pharmaceutical
industry appreciably relies on patent, and to a certain extent large firms have a propensity to
patenting, however, the impact of this tendency on R&D, varies from country to country.
Inducement to the disclosure of the invention instead of keeping it segregated
It is expected that access to patent information may render improvement around the
invention, enabling the creation of a substitute product. The disclosure of technical data,
hence, provides everyone, combining talents and resources, with the competitive opportunity
of making a broader use of the technology. Although the patent is a valuable source of
technical information by avoiding duplicative R&D activity, in practical terms, its
informational function depends on the disclosure of the real value of the invention. For many
firms, patent applications are only filled when it is no longer possible to keep the invention
secret.'° The patent hence works as an additional framework with which know-how or a
trade secret is extended and negotiated. In the areas of software and integrated circuits, which
are characterised by large use of secrecy and fast technical obsolescence, the scope of the
disclosure, where patenting is possible, may be very limited indeed. In fact; the increasing
reliance on secrecy in the information technology sector stands alone as a component of
business strategies. Ths was considered with much concern by the CONTU Report.
Over the initial period of 12 years when copynght was made available for computer
programs in the United States, the US Copyright Register received only slightly more than
1% of the number of computer programs, developed each year, for registration." While the
figure showed a very low interest of the 300,000 programmers in copyright; it dismissed the
belief that protection of computer software under registrable copyright would ease great
"public access to innovative programs"' 2 . The industry made it clear that it would not give up
trade secrecy protection and, additionally, it "would fight hard to assert its undeniable
'° See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System [1977] 20 Journal of Law and
Eaxionucs 265-290, at 275-278.
"Acurding to the CONTU Report p. 34, only 1,205 programs w registered from 1964 to Januaiy 1,
1977, 971 of them we registered by IBM and Burroughs. By that Un, about 1,000,000 re developed each
year.
12 CONTIJ Final Report, p. 34.
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continuing right"' 3 to secrecy. Furthermore, technical know-how necessaiy to explore the
invention is not always satisfctorily disclosed; this may occur deliberately or because of
incomplete or inaccurate patent specification.
Reward for inventors and authors
A rewarding profit available for successfiul inventions or works, to the extent in which the
invention is commercially practicable and the work original, is in itself indisputable and
includes the prospect of a reasonable return on investments. Such a prospect, from the
theoretical point of view, relies on the competitive head start over rivals created by the
temporary monopoly right. The reward, however, as an isolated function, is an incomplete
view of the intellectual property which is more than "a system created to guarantee income to
creators."4
Inducement to industrial application
No protection will be worthwhile if the invention, design or use of copyright on hi-tech
renders no industrial application. While the output stemming from them makes it possible to
meet a human need, resources are put at risk at the owner's expense, by joint
application, or by means of licensing in return for royalties.
Towards the welfare/efficiency perspective
An approach of intellectual property within the perspective of welfare and efficiency
necessarily faces a margin of conceptual insecurity reflecting the inaccuracy of existing
theories. Avoiding the disputed aspects involving the meaning of welfare,' 5 the economic
'3ldem,ident
' 4 US Congress, OTA Background Paper, p.7.
In a popular sense, welfare descnl,es the happmess of human beings In pohtics, the term welfare state is
associatad with social justice, i.e., the state has the duty to provide assistance for those people in need.
Philosophically, the exercise of individual preferences as a value linked to personal sitisfion is contested.
Through the perception of values, which are associated with a process of justification, people underand the
world. Some preferences, as that concerning food, for insta needs no justification, but others do. For some
aunts on these notions and welfare nomics, see Robin W Broadway & Neil Bruce, Welfare Economics,
Blackwell, 1984; Ainartya Sen, "Choice, Welfare and Measurement", Blackwell, 1983; Kenneth J Arrow,
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theory has dealt with it in terms of individual preferences and associated it with both
economic and technical efficiency.'6 The higher the efficiency of resource allocation, the
higher the welfare rate. Focusing on this association (social preferences with efficiency of
resource allocation), economics creates a consumers' welfare function as a value-free
relationship. Instead of dealing with assumptions based on ethics, justice and political
desirability, welfare economics' 7 is most concerned with the measurement of efficiency or
optimality of satisfaction of consumers' preferences.
As described by K.J. Arrow,' 8 the social function is translated into a "constitution or set of
conditions to govern the welfare judgements. Arro's idea was to transform individual desires
into concrete social choices.'9 One procedure inferred from his theoty was that no individual
alone should be allowed to dictate the outcome. What ArroWs theorem in its entirety means
is that no set of rules could possibly and consistently devise that judgement. His theory,
nevertheless, proves, firstly, the inherent imperfection of any legal policy regulation on
welfare grounds, and, secondly, that a sense of welfare which goes beyond the pure logic of
economics does exist. There is, in other words, a strict and a broad sense of economics
welfare. How much this broad sense lives up to the concept of welfare entailed in the
intellectual property bargain is a matter for later consideration.
For now, the study will concentrate on further explanation of the strict meaning of
economics welfare. As such, welfare is a function of economics efficiency fully understood in
the context of two other notions, market and competition. In order to clari1' this point, a brief
account on the whole competition context is necessary.
General Equilibrium (Collected Papers), Blackwel], 1983; American Economic Association, "Redingc in
Welfare Economies", (papers selected by K J Arrow & T Scitovsky) 1969.
16 Efficiency "relates to the most effective manner of utilizing scarce resources." There is an increase in
allocanve efficiency d"higher scale of output is produced at lor cosi" A techn,coi efficiency oceurs when a
firm using superior technical process compared to another produces the sume level of output using less inputs.
OECD, Glossary of Industrial Organisalion Economies and Competition Law. p.41
The expression is used to designate the study and evaluation of public policies designed to achieve
maxiniization of hiimin well-being.
18 Kenneth J. Arrow, General Equilibrium (Collected Papers), BIackweIl, 1983. The author, an American
Professor of Econonucs at Stanford University, was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1972.
' 9 K Arrow, ob cit. p. 222-225, heading "the theory of social choice".
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(ii) From perfect to imperfect competition
As a straightforward concept, the market describes a relationship between sellers (supply) and
buyers (demand) subject to economic laws,2° for instance, demand tends to increase as the
price falls. Owing to individual preferences and income within a penod of time, variations
occur mostly because demand is a function of consumer income and puce levels. 2 ' On the
supply side, within a period of time and depending on the length and characteristics of that
period, an increase in a price commodity is likely to work as an incentive for the producer to
increase the quantity of commodity supplied. However, higher pnces sooner or later act
against the demand level. The picture may be changed when the introduction of new
technology lowering the production cost, enables the producer to produce more cheaply and
increases the quantity of supply. In addition to the interaction of demand and supply the price
is an important element. Above an ideal price, part of the commodity supplied is unwanted
(excess supply), and below that price demand tends to increase. At an ideal point, there is an
equilibrium between quantity demanded and quantity supplied, and the price tends to be
stable for a period of time. Although very formal, the notion of equilibrium in the model of
perfect competition is important for a number of reasons, mainly for guiding a pricing policy
(methods used by flims for determining their prices) which determines the behaviour of flims
concerning the allocation of resources and shapes the competitive process, where the market
is visualised as a relationship among rivals.
The conditions under which firms relate to each other define two broad classes of market:
perfect competition on one hand and imperfect competition (monopoly, monopolistic
competition, and oligopoly) on the other.
Perfect competition
20 Edwin Mansfield, Micmeconom:e Theory andApplicaftons. 6th ed, Norton, 1988, p. 20. In writing this
expositoiy section, 1 have much drawn from MansfiekVs work; as ll as from Roger D Blair & Lawrence W
Kenny, Miaveconomics With BusinessApplications, Wiley, 1987.
21 TI nanire of the sensitiveness of a product demand in a particular market is called in economi price
elasflczzy of demand.
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Although appreciably sensitive to the welfare/efficiency claims lying behind the protection of
intellectual property, the model of perfect competition is conceptually unfavourable to
technical changes. In its static monotony, the model presents the following features: a large
number of sellers have the same product; provided that the price is the same, purchasers do
not care which seller they buys from, as both purchasers and sellers are so small in relation to
the entire market, none of them acting alone are able to affect the product's price. The
resources mobility is such that raw materials, for instance, cannot be monopolised
consequently, firms can enter and leave the market freely. There is a perfect share of
knowledge regarding pnces, technological data, and all the possible uses of the resources, so
as consumers, firms and resource owners are able to take the best economic decision at an
unfailing accuracy.
Pure monopoly, a contrasting approach
Opposite to perfect competition is the situation of pure monopoly, where "there must exist
one, and only one, seller in a market." The two states (perfect competition and pure
monopoly) move from a point of a market impersonally defined by a myriad of suppliers to
the extreme of a market personalit? based on a sole supplier. These theoretical models are
so formal that one could hardly adopt one or other as a permanent policy. Nevertheless,
monopolies occur for different reasons, some of them being that a single finn may:
• control the entire supply ofa basic input that is required to manufacture a given product;
• become a monopolist because the average cost ofproducrng the product reaches a minimum at an output
rate that is big enough to satisfji the entire market at a price that is profitable;
• acquire a monopoly over the production of a good by having patents on the product or on certain basic
pvcesses that are used in its pvdu cflon;
• become a monopolist because it is awarded a market franchise by a government agency The firm is
granted the exclusive privilege to produce a given gooa ar .semce rn a particular area.24
Monopolies have the ability to change market conditions by affecting prices and output.
Economists believe that under monopoly the use of resources tends to be less effective than
22 Mansflekl, p. 280.
' 
"The firm in a perfectly competitive market - says Mansfield - has so many rivals that competition
becomes impersonal in ibe extreme; tbe firm under pure monoly has z rivals at alL" Gb. cii, p. 281.
24 Mansfield, th. cii, p. 281, 282. The second situation (the competitive advantage ct minimum cost
production) above defines tbe so-lled natural nxnopoly.
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under perfectly competitive industries. In the latter situation, output tends to be greater and
prices lower than under monopoly. One of the means through which monopoly may act is
pnce discrimination, which economists regard as socially inefficient, but which is sometimes
recommended Due to some type of indirect competition, however, monopolies rarely hold
their position in the long run, giving room to intermediary market forms, such as monopolistic
competmon and oligopoly.
Monopolistic competition
Three conditions define monopolistic competition: the existence of a large number of firms,
producing and selling similar products, and having the same level of demand and cost. For the
sake of economic theory, firms producing similar products are arbitrarily grouped. Each firm
has a degree of monopoly power over its own product, but not enough to enable the firm to
threaten rivals. Each competitor's product is a little different from the others'. The variation is
based on several elements, such as physical make-up and brand names, making the products
or dresses very close substitutes.27
The model of monopolistic competition is supposed to operate under a degree of
inefficiency, but close top
	 competitioa From the above conditions one could infer that
under monopolistic competition deterrence to entry is rather weak compared to an oligopoly
industry.
Oligopoly
The main features of an oligopolist market are: a small number of firms (not necessarily large
ones), great independence among them, and each firm's policy is likely to affect the other rival
firms 28
 The oligopolistic firms tend to make entry difficult and pursue an economy of scale.
Mansfield, p. 297.
When a finn sells a commodity at more than one price, or sells similar pnxiucts at prices in different
rations to marginal costs, it is said that price discrimination oirs. Discrimination however is needed if
without it the good can hardly be produced. See Mansfield, p. 301, 312.
27 Typical monopolistic competition include toothpaste, food, shoes, clothing and furniture industries.
Some of the US oligopolies are IBM and Microsoft in the IT industiy GM, Ford, and Chiysler in the
automobile mdustiy and GE and Westinghouse in tho electrical equipment industiy.
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Various theoretical models have been developed to explain the oligopolist behaviour. The
duopolist equilibrium of output says that each firm tends to make profit-maximising choices
on the assumption that the other competitor will not respond to change in output. The price
rigidity theozy assumes that a price cut by an oligopolist is likely to be followed by the others;
conversely, competitors most unlikely change their prices to respond to an individually taken
price increase.
Although these theoretical approaches do not take any form of collusion into consideration,
oligopolist industries tend to come into collusive arrangements in order to increase profit,
fight uncertainty, and make entries uneasy. Cartel arrangements designed to set price
uniformization, distribution of sales, or to divide up a market, however, tend not to last for
long because sooner or later firms are likely to cheat and breakdown the collusion. This
flows to the game theory which explains how decisions are made in the oligopoly
environment where conflicts and co-operation take place. The competing game requires each
player to set up its dominant strategy, and this sometimes includes cheating the other cartel
members by cutting price, for instance.
Pricing policy under oligopoly is often guided by a dominant oligopolist who tends to
determine the price of technology by negotiation 3° rather than on the basis of competitive
market principle. The decision of the price leader affects the rest of oligopolist firms, and may
work to bar entry. Barner to entrants depends on the market size. Limit pricing may
discourage newcomers to invest miffions of dollars in order to establish and maintain, for
instance, a sophisticated and modem foundry of integrated circuits. Entries, nevertheless, are
not impossible in the long run.
Entries versus theory of contestable market
29 Based on this competitive bliaviour one may believe that the market itself is able to self regulate thus
making government intervention unnessaiy. Historically, this conclusion has lot been proven true.
3°See Yoo Soo Hong UNC'FAD/ITDTIECI3, 12 Feb 1993, p. 35.
Pn negotiation may take VER (voluntaiy export restraints) form, or bilateral agreement In Europe it is
estimated that VERs cover 30 per nt of international trade in electronics. MJt Kostechi, [1991] 14(4)
World Competition 32. Warning about the debatable legality of such arrangements is found in "GAiT
Activities 1989", p. 18. See "Japan-Trade in Semi-Conductors" m CIAU/BISD, 36th Supp. 1990, p. 116-163.
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The theoty of contestable market says that at a given time in a market there is a vulnerability
to entry. Under the threat of newcomers, flims tend to behave as perfect competitors. They
stop attempting to collude so as to prevent prices from rising otherwise entry would be
affordable.3 ' The existing firms, however, may not be prepared to engage in a price-cutting
policy which would work in the opposite way, i.e., would bar entry, but also would lead to a
pricing war within the monopolistic industry, a dangerous and also unwanted outcome. All of
these points lead to the assumption that in conditions of imperfect competition, firms are
likely to behave in a way that affects price, output, and profits. When such a behaviour is
coupled with the use of intellectual property right, the effects, although difficult to predict,
will head to a loss of efficiency and welfare.32
(lii) Social welfare and efficiency
Turning now to its restrict concept, welfare is desenbed as a measure of consumer's ippy,
i.e., "a net benefit received by the consumer." 33 Such benefit is translated into greater quantity
of commodity the consumer is supplied with for the lowest pnce the producer can possibly
charge, given certain conditions of supply and demand within a market and a period of time.
While on the demand side the conditions are chiefly dictated by consumer preferences, the
supply is considerably related, inter a/ia, to costs. These may include expenditure on R&D
activities and royalties paid for intellectual property licensing. It is now understandable that
increased consumer supply is a benefit ansing from competition. Applied economics has
developed fairly secure methods through which a learned technician is able to calculate the
effects of a business practice on consumer supply. The theory, however, tells very little
beyond the economic logic.
Theoretically, a static model of perfect competition assumes that the interrelated markets
for all products are in a general equilibrium. At such a point, it is said that the firms apply the
best combination of resources at the lowest cost, thus leading to maximisation of profit and
utility. Efficiency, then, is synonymous with optimality. Optimal efficiency, in other words, is
As Mansfield states "if existing firms are charging a price in excess of marginal cest, it is profitable for
an entrant to wxiereut the pre of the existing firms." 01,. cii, p. 358. This describes the market contestahility.
32 Mansfield, ob. cii, p. 359-362.
Mansfield,p. 100.
65
a concept which describes an optimal allocation of resources. 34 In order for that unreal world
of general equilibrium to exist, it is assumed that consumers exercise different levels of
preferences and consume, but the utilities flow from consumer groups to others without
affecting the overall level of demand. This efficiency in exchange is a necessary condition for
general equilibrium. Knowing all products with an unfailing accuracy, consumers are able to
exercise a perfect substitution of products for others. This is another condition, i.e., efficiency
in product substitution. A third condition for the general equilibrium relies on the efficiency in
production, that is, the optimal allocation of resources remains unaffected, so the overall level
of supply or production also remains unchanged. The whole picture gives a sense of optimal
welfare distribution. Although too formal, the model provides for some practical lessons. One
is that the concept of social welfare goes beyond the measurement of individual preferences.
In view of those three conditions of efficiency (efficiency in exchange, efficiency in product
substitution, and efficiency in production) a situation called grand utility possibility frontier is
created.35
 At this point it is said that some people have increased their utility to the maximum
at the expense of the reduction of the utility of other people. The welfare frontier is an
imaginary point representing the maximum well-being a person can enjoy "given the level of
welfare enjoyed by the remaining members of the society."36 Theoretically, it is not possible
to establish the maximum point of the frontier, but outside of it no point is possibly attainable
by society.
A situation of grand utility possibility frontier provides no more than a sense of optimal
welfare distribution, it fails to establish a fair meaning of interpersonal satisfaction. A lesson
can be drawn, nevertheless, which is that social welfare is desirable and is a fimction of
consumer utility and resource allocation. An attempt to incorporate a sense of fairness into
that functional relationship leads to the assumption that society as a whole is better off when a
degree of utility is allocated from a consumer group to another. Scientific criteria, however,
The concept s developed last century by Vilfrido Pareto (Pareto Optimal). Blair & Kenny, . cit. p
457.
The oconomic analysis of the social welfare funclion is based on a mmdcl which takes into aceount a pair
of goods and of consumers. hxhiferent levels of the distribution of the commodities to both consumers are
discussed. These levels represent a range of possibilities waler optimal coikliuiciis of distribution of the total of
the available quantities of the goods. See Mansfield, ob. cit., p. 474; Blair & Kenny, th. cii, p. 45/66.
OECD, Glossary of Industrial Orgamsation Economics and Competilion Law (1993).
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do not exist to guide a fair distribution of utility or income. This is arbitrarily developed either
by a dictator or a parliament through a democratic process (majority rule). This suggests that
a safeguarding policy affecting the exercise of the own&s nght based on welfare and
efficiency ends could hardly follow rigid criteria.
In so far as it is pursued, efficiency measure is supposed to conform to welfare, but other
grounds are available to back the limitation of the exercise of intellectual property lights in the
name of social welfare. The state knows to what extent a system should limit the use of
intellectual property on basis of social welfare rather than efficiency, as much as it knows how
heavily the middle class should pay taxes for the benefit of social welfare. Therefore,
technological progress is desired to increment the level of community prosperity.
The maximisation of welfare and efficiency in a static sense cannot be flulfilled unless it is in
conditions of a fixed level of technology. "That is, - Mansfield says - they show how inputs
and commodities must be allocated if welfare is to be maximised, given afixed level of
technology. It is possible that an allocation of inputs and commodities that violates these
conditions might lead to a higher level of consumer welfare than any allocation that meets
these conditions, because it might result in a faster rate of technological change and
productivity increase." 37
 In this respect, it is suggested, "a perfectly competitive economy is
likely to be inferior in a dynamic sense to an economy including many imperfectly competitive
industries."38
 It follows that the introduction of new technologies is required to push forward
the frontier of utility which in turn creates a paradox.
The technical change, although desirable to the extent which it promises a new dimension of
welfare and efficiency frontier, leads to an innovation process developed under conditions of
imperfect competition where some degree of welfarelefliciency losses are greatly expected, if
not unavoidable. It is on that paradoxical prospect of gains and losses in welfare and
Mansfield, ob cit, p. 552.
Mansfield, idem. Economists do agree that competitive markets potentially favour greater social swifait,
but monopoly is not necessarily bai An effectively productive monopoly h the ability to operate technical
change bringmg a ppe
 of higher social dfare. In %iew of this doubts exist whether perfect competition is
desirable. Since such an unreal model cannot be achieved in all markets, a sort of "workable competition"
would be the target But there is no consensual criteria to define tins.
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efficiency that both protection and limitation of intellectual property encounters the best
justification from the economic rationale point of view.
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2.3.2 The nature of the innovation process and policies
(i) Innovation under uncertainties
The uncertainties affecting the innovation process are not per se detrimental to the intellectual
property bargain. The assumption made here is that in order to cope with uncertainties,
innovative firms are likely to develop strategic behaviour,' the effects of which may ruin the
intellectual property bargain.
Economists do not contend the uncertainty as an element of innovation activities. 2
 Studies
available on the matter are based on empirical analysis. Although these empirical and
statistical studies are criticised for lack of completeness of information on which researchers
elaborate, one survey published in Great Britain3
 is a very illustrative source from which the
following assertions are briefly drawn.
The innovation process is described as being inherently surrounded by risks. Although low
in 'adaptive' and 'imitative' types of project, the rate of uncertainty is reported to be
considerably high. Three categones of uncertainties are identified; they relate to technical
matters, market, and general business. These two latter categories are based on management
of technology, involving a team of specialists with knowledge in interdisciplinary matters,
including business affairs and potential demand forecast. The techmcal uncertainty "lies in the
extent to which the innovation will satisf, a variety of technical criteria without increased cost
of development, production or operation."4
 Uncertainty of this kind is normally associated
with integration of R&D and manufacturing, product and interface standards, and product
liability.
'In the course of Part One, it will be clear that the uncertainties of the innovation process themselves make
fcc a strong point to claim pntion of intellectual property. This is out of the question.
2 See FM Schemer, Inzxwaiion and Gmih pp 94,182, MiT, 1984.
Christopher Freeman, The Economics of Inthistnal Innovation, Pinter Pthlishers, reprinted in 1991.
Freeman is a vell knoii senior researcher of the University of Sussex Science Policy Research Unity - SPRU.
His bo comments on a considerable number of swveys camed out in Europe and the United States.
Freeman,obcit,p 149.
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Uncertainty may be minimal, for instance, in "adapting electronic circuit designs to novel
applications, but well within the boundaries of established technologies, or minor
modifications of existing designs." 5
 However, in general the scale of uncertainty is such that,
it is argued, "most finns have a powerftul incentive most of the time not to undertake the more
radical type of product innovation."6
Due to these uncertainties, the bulk of investments concentrate on less risky projects
accounting for minor improvements, 7
 and profit-maximising firms are likely to develop
strategic trade practices leading to block technical information. For instance, in a situation
where the firm can make some profit by ultimately licensing to other firms the process or
innovation, "there may be a deliberate preference for secrecy and not licensing." 8 Resorting to
government assistance is another means of greatly reducing the technical and market
uncertainties. 9
 Yet, the remarkable, and to a certain extent debatable, finding is that high
investments in radical long term innovation are likely to be confined to large firms enjoying
oligopolistic competition
(ii) Innovation in the context of imperfect competition
As aforementioned in section 2.3.1, perfect competition leads to maximisation of welfare and
efficiency. The logical assumption to draw from the preceding discussion is that under
imperfect competition a degree of loss in welfare and efficiency is expected, if not
unavoidable. The evidence that the innovation process is carried out in a context of dynamic
imperfect competition allows another assumption, that is, the more the innovation process is
encouraged, the more incremental losses will be expected in a certain penod of time. It thus
follows that the innovation process entails a threat to the intellectual property bargain. The
explanation made in the previous section has proved this remark to be true on a theoretical
level. Large market share in itself; it may argued, does not upset the intellectual property
bargain. Being large, however, means being able to capture economic resources and
Fieman,obcit,p 151.
6 Idem,p. 150.
Freeman. obcit, p. 162.
8 Freeman,obcit,p. 163.
On the government role m the innovation pross see below in this Chapter, heading "The syndrome of
the thnica1 capability and policies".
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monopoly position thus holding the power to influence or manipulate market forces. Even
being strategically advantageous or necessary to shield investments from the risks of
innovation activities, such ability is per se a cause for concern about the achievement of the
intellectual property bargain. The task now is to show the empirical evidence related to the
environment of imperfect competition under which the innovation process is carried out.
The phenomenon of new competition
The case that innovation dynamics reflects an observable reality of or leading to, an imperfect
competition is historically supported by the termed "new competition" phenomenon.'° In the
middle of the last century, economic theorists were unfamiliar with the idea of industnal
monopoly (large-firm competition). Economic studies were predominantly centred on the
classical model of perfect competition opposed to monopoly. As that theoretical model did
not explain the behaviour of large-scale firms, economists of that period viewed the firms'
"trustification" as an emerging reality which required a new economic theory of competition.
Accounts on the nature of that phenomenon in America, focus on the growth in concentration
and oligopolies of the late nineteenth century as a trend "associated in the contemporary mind
with greater efficiency and lower prices," dominating large industrial sectors. This
impressively challenged the economists' "perceptions of the nature of competition." In fact
the growing number of combinations, which appeared dining that period as a result of the
free competition, was later confirmed as part of a complex competitive reality which today's
legal policies recognise and are designed not to condemn or revert but to control.
By establishing the first large-scale industry development of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries as marking the emergence of a "new competition", historians have
contributed to the explanation that the phenomenon of intermediaiy imperfect competition is
associated with the wave of the today's technical pace. This relationship between market
structure and innovation, first suggested by Schumpeter followed by (Ialbraith,' 2
 illustrates
10 See Maly S Morgan, Competing Notions of 'Competition' in Late Nincteenth-Ceimuy Anrican
Ecozkxnics [1993] 25(4) History of Political Ecnixmy 563-604.
"MMorgan,loccit,p. 564,565.
12 Joseph Schumpeter's work, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy", was pthlished in 1947 and is
frequently cited by nEdern analysis. Similar strand was developed in 1952 by J. K. Gaibraith in his work
"Ameiican Capin".
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that an imperfectly competitive economy will satisfy the conditions for a higher rate of
technological change. There is, however, some controversy regarding the extent imperfect
market is conductive to technological innovation. No analyst, however, has denied
Schumpeter's proposition.
Holding a pessimistic view of the Schumpteiian perspective, Scherer says that "rivalry
normally accelerates the pace of technological research, development, and innovation, as long
as the number of firnis competing is not excessive." He, then, establishes his sense of balance
by adding: "what is needed for a rapid rate of technological advance is the proper blend of
competition and monopoly." 3 Concrete evidence is provided by Freeman, addressing the
role of the firm's size's in the innovation process.'4
Small firms established by inventor-entrepreneurs have made some good contributions "in
the early days of the chemical industry, and the early days of the semiconductor and radio
industries" and continue "to flourish in the minicomputer industry and in computer
software." 5
 The contribution, however, varies greatly from industry to industry and
according to the level of innovation. Concerning the American semiconductor industry in
particular, it has been pointed out that small firms have played exceptional role thanks to
tactics of "technological entrepreneurs bringing with them ideas and half developed new
products from a scientific environment in universities and government laboratories."
However, when referring to "key innovations" large corporations continue to predominate.'6
The contribution of small firms in types of innovations, such as "complex engineering
products for which more than 10,000 components may be needed", including telephone
exchanges and large computer systems, is beyond their resources.' 7 In electronics, for
instance, the "fairly significant contribution" British small finns have made is in printed circuit
board for the electronics industry.' 8 This consorts with the general assumption that in
' FM Scherer, Innovation and Growth - Schumpetenan Perspectives, pp. 114, 127, The MIT Press, 1986.
14 C Freeman, The Econonücs of Industrial Innovation, 1991, chapter 6.
15 C Freeman, oh cii, p 131. It is conventionally regarded as a small firm that with 200 or less employees.16 C Freeman, oh cii, p 138.
'7ldein,ident
Idem, pp 141-143.
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Europe, as in Japan, the innovation process has been greatly dominated by large
corporations.'9
Enjoying advantages such as more access to finance, ability to cope with government
regulations, and specialist management expertise, large finns are more prepared to engage in
long and costly R&D projects. This has been proven to be just as true in Europe as in the
United States. Conclusive evidence from a study for the OECD shows "that the vast majority
of small finns in OECD countries do not perform any organised research and
development."20
 Similarly, a survey about R&D in America also suggested that "there is
some tendency for R&D intensity to increase with size of finn with the largest size-groups."21
The scale of research and development may suggest some relationship with patenting as a
measure of scientific output. In this respect, information has not been found reliable, but has
provided interesting findings.
Large firms' behaviour towards patenting
While "some firms attach great importance to patents and have large departments with a
strong interest in patenting activity", others "either do not want to bother with patents or
prefer to rely on secrecy," postponing filing patent applications? Large firms, as a general
assumption, are more strongly interested in patenting, confirming the historical view that
patents represent a strategic tool in a large firm's hands By 1945 in Britain, for instance,
electrical engineering, chemical and pharmaceutical industries "accounted for 60 per cent of
all patents " The assumption of the large-firm propensity to patenting, however, is not
plainly supported. Surveys canied out in the United States and Britain have suggested that
propensity to patenting is higher among small finns. The conclusion is based on the fact that
large finns depend on "patent sharing and know-how exchange anangements" and small
firms, in contrast to large ones, who "usually cannot afford not to patent and cannot afford to
Idezn,p 138.
20 CFreeman,obcit,p 132.
The sinvey conducted by Soete s pubhshed in 1979. See C Freeman, ob cit, p. 134.
n CFreeman,obcit,p. 136.
Jonathan Liebenau, Patents and the chemical industry: tools of business strategJ, in 'The Challenge of
New Tethnology, lnzxwation m British Business Su 1850", 135 at 136, edited by J Leibenau, (Iosvr, i9ss.
74
wait."24
 These studies just referred to did not take into account copynght and chip-designs,
two vely considerable forms of intellectual property protection in the field of information
technology. The force of the surveys' outcome is thus very limited. They do not alter the
monopolistic aspect of the intellectual property concentration as part of the nature of the
innovation process. As a general rule, such a concentration is not only a reality at a firm level,
but also observable at the spatial level of industnal structure.
(iii) Industrial structure and technical innovation
In section 2.3.1 it has been assumed that baniers to entry is an element which works against
efficiency and welfare. Due to the uneven nature of technical change, the innovation process
has the effect of forming a structural barner to entrants, thus, threatening the intellectual
property bargain. The formation of this potential deterrence is now considered.
The analysis of the relationship between innovation and industnal structure has led theonsts
to compare the technical difli.ision to a wave motion. Difihision follows waves of development
prospects determined by social and economic conditions, which vaiy from region to region. A
consequential outcome is that technical changes are accelerated in selected industiies or
regions, and set back in those sectors and regions adversely affected by lack of adequate
conditions.25
A study of the industrial structure related to innovation in the United Kingdom has also
confirmed the exacerbalion of regional dispanties associated with uneven technical diffusion.
It has been suggested that the unbalanced technical development is not simply a matter of the
concentration of innovation activities. The reality is that technical revolutions induce
instability because it is impossible for all regions to develop even rates of technical capability
simultaneously. The fatality of capitalism is stated in these terms: "the constant drive to raise
24 CFietnan,obcix,p. 136.
Carlota Perez "Microelectronics. Long Waves and World Structural Change: New Perspectives for
Developing Countries" [19851 13(3) World Development 441.
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profits, the anarchy of the market and the inability to plan production in consonance with the
market all lead to uneven development between individual firms."
Resulting from an accumulation of conditions such as a skifflul work force and competitive
muscles, the disequilibrium is a determining thctor in the nature of the innovation activity as a
process of gains and losses. Some enterprises of different regions lose out at the expense of
others in the same product market.27
The stigma of the imbalance of industrial structure in the OECD areas has also been
discussed. Showing his concern in this respect, a representative of Japan stated:
If technological innovation were to take place uniformly in every fieIa there would be no problem. However,
advanced technology innovation is bound to centre on selected industries; there will inevitably be a ladc of
eqwlibrium in the development of industries due to the time lag caused in the procesr of the spread of
technological innovation from one industry to another. The present situation is causing a domestic and
international disequilibrium in structure between the field which remains in the dai* and the field which is in
the limelight and where technological innovations are rapidly taking place and towards which capital and
human resources grm':tate.
Two contributing factors to that imbalance and particularly associated with information
technology are speed of technical change and economy of scope. For instance, in the case of
personal computers with potential applications to industrial use, the lapse of time for
upgrading performance has become shorter than a twelve-month period. Furthermore,
describing the technical speed in the computer business, an IBM representative testified in
these terms: "the art is growing and changing with blinding speed that if the automobile
industiy had progressed on the same curve as computer in the fifleen years, we would now
have been ableto buy fortwenty dollars a seW-steeting carthat would attain speeds up to four
hundred miles per hour and be able to drive the length of California on one gallon of
26 Ash Amin & John Goddard, 	 hnological Change, hxlustnal Restmctunng and Regional
Development", p.3, Allen & Unwin, 1986.
27 Amm & Goddard, ob cii p.2, 10. In order to tadde the problem, state inteivention is contemplated on
the assump(ion that "what is happening due to the operation of mañ forces in the growth areas can be
reproduced through public interventions in the crisis regions." The authors, nevertheless, do hot lake it for
The statement has been made at the OECD forum by Mr G. Takanashi when he s Chairman of the
Fair Trade Commission -Japan "Compition Policy and Thno1ogica1 Jnition", p. 23.
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gasoline." As to the economy of scope, the impact3° is on production management,
requiring a ready response.
Economy of scale (single production line of uniform products) is based on cost-efficient
large-scale investment in production facilities, mass production and mass sales of standard or
homogeneous products. Yet, today development of microprocessors has made possible
production management of different products on a single production line a possibility 3' The
management of this economy of scope includes.
• collection ofinformation about conwner demands at point ofsales (POS);
• analycs of the customer data by POS computing syrtem; and
• data communication from the distribution system to manufactures.32
The features of the economy of scope is that it allows prompt identification of diversified
demands, accommodation of consumer needs through manufacture of different (related)
products, an increasing variety of business opportunities, and fill operation of the small and
medium-sized firms capabilities. This dynamic environment illustrates a performance only
attainable by selected technologically equipped industrial segments. In order to tackle
distortions of this kind, the limitation to intellectual property seems to be a valid assistantial
policy, and in this respect the role of the state has been rather noticeable.
(iv) The syndrome of the technical capability and policies
The theoretical and economic background has been developed to support the existence of
welfare and efficiency claims framing the underlying intellectual property bargain. As much as
this bargain is associated with technical change relying by definition on an unstable economic
structure, the welfare and efficiency ends anticipated by the protection of intellectual property
are kept under impairing conditions. While the economic rationale makes a case for limiting
the use of intellectual property, it is now argued that the limitation depends on the assistantial
29 Testimony of Ralph (lommery, CONTU Report, p. 35.
3° The rapid development in the fields of hardware and software has been identified as giving rise to
pmblems of compalibility or miemperability of equipments See Karl H. Pilny, LegalAspects ofInterfaces and
Reve,e Engineenng - Protection in Gennany, the United States and Japan, [1992J 23(2) IIC 1%.
' The text followa the expana1ion stated by G. Taghanashi, OECD Report W.00050/D.390, 2473, p. 22.
32 Idem.
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role of the state acting along side the private enterprises. Control on IPR use is not, or should
not be, an isolated policy. The point here is this: if technical capability and change are part of
a country's policies and law, to not ensure proper protection of intellectual property does not
seem logical. The social objectives of protection however are hardly achieved, unless IPR use
is controlled. Neither does it seem logical to not have a policy to safeguard those objectives.
Concerning incentive to innovation, protection and safeguarding policies together are only
meaningftil within a complex arrangement where state and societal acting forces work
together. The observations of the way the incentive for new technologies are organised
support and justify these remarks, as well as the degree of state intervention. The question
now is how much do state assistantial policies matter.
They matter where they rectify the defects of the market economy and complement it, so as
to respond to the Nation's will to catch up with, or to maintain leadership in technology by
supporting innovation strategic activity; to ensure that firms act, and society's resources are
free from undue restraints; to preserve or promote social welfare by making the improvement
of living standards possible.
Justification of state intervention
Although plainly justified in the light of modern liberalism, 33
 government intervention has
always been a veiy controversial matter due to the distortive effects it may have. 34
 The
influence of the increasing role of the government, nevertheless, in the creation and difilision
of new technologies is veiy strong. 35 In exercising influence, as a consumer, regulator or
underwriter, the state acts either in partnership with the industiy, or by leading actions to
create conditions for industrial development and competitiveness. 36 The ways in which state
' R. Eccieshall, "LIberalism", pp. 3 7-78, in PoI,ticoJ Ideologies -An introduction, 1984
For some acaxmts see comnicnls by Yoo Soo Hong in tbe "Report of Ad Hoc Expert Group on
Technology Policies in Open Developmg Countmy Eounomies", p. 33-37, UNCFAD/I1D[I'ECJ3, 12/
FEB/1993.
See abstracts of significant articles appeared in the period of 1972-1991 in (1993122 Research Policy
101.
For details about tbe US policies for the untive of new technologies. - "1990 DOC Technical Survey"
[footnote 31 and John Street, Politics and Technology, Macmillan, 1992.
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support is organised vaiy from country to country and depend on histoncal and contextual
reasons.
Four examples of state intervening partnership
In Japan, for instance, the coalition of state and business contrasts with the partnership of
business and labour in Germany. 37
 This relationship between government, business and
labour is qualified by both, the catalyst function of the state and societal commitment. In some
cases the state assumes a dominant position, such as in France, distinguishing from the
business-dominant system of the United States. 38 In any case the state acting alone, i.e.,
without pnvate affiance, would hardly conform to the liberal ideal.
A commitment and a choice rest in the core of that affiance. Both state and citizens are
aware of the technological dilemma, that is to miss the technological race seems to jeopardise
the welfare of the Nation. Conversely, the risks of sharing the race are several, at least in short
term. Some welfare and efficiency losses may occur due to disruptions in market structure,
and a number of jobs may be put at stake because of the displacement caused by automation.
The consent to technology, if it occurs, invariably leads to a syndromic technical capability
charactensed by the particular attitude of the country as a whole to catch up with, or keep the
leadership in technology and competitiveness. Such an attitude is reflected, for instance, in
government policies and law. Three examples illustrate the point.
In passing the American Technology Pre-eminence Act of 1991, designed to speed
technical development and maintain economic competitiveness, the US Senate stated that the
decline in both technological leadership and market share of the US industries could not be
allowed to continue in prejudice of the "Nation's standard of living." 39 The desire for
Jefli-cy Hart, "The Effects of State-Societal Arrangements on International Competitiveness: Steel, Motor
Vehicles and Semicondtxtors in the United States Japan and Western Europe", [19921 (22) Bntish Journal of
Political ScielKe 255-300.
38 Jeffrey Hart, bc cit
P1. 102-245, H.R 1989, Senate Report No. 102-157. The ATPA 1991 traces the national needs in
technology, sets out progranunes, allocates finding, organizes the technology administration, and refeis to
other four Acts which form the legal framework of the US technokgy policy.
79
technical leadership was also expressed in the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991,°
thus shaping the American technology policy. One consequence of this policy 41
 affecting the
use of intellectual property is that the title to any intellectual property arising from joint R&D
programme supported by the government shall vest in, and cannot be transferred except to, a
company incorporated in the United States. The legislation also outlines a range of
administrative measures and Government-funded programmes which are part of a complex
framework.
The best example to illustrate the syndrome of technical leadership in Japan is in the
integrated circuit business, where the Japanese industry is regarded as a strong rival to the
United States'. As soon as very-large scale integrated circuits (VLSI) appeared in the l97Os -
J. Hart comments -
it became palicy of both the major Japanese finns and the Japanese government to beat the Amencans in
process technology so as not to be dealt out of the competition in VLSI products. The government committed
itself to this ente?prise not just because it was concerned about semiconductors, but aLsv because it believed
that overtaking the United States in semiconductors was the key to improving Japanese competitiveness in all
major downstream industries such as consumer electronics, computers and telecommunications equipment.
Thus in the transition from IS! to VLSI in semiconductors, the connection between state-societal
arrangements and technological innovation was extremely clear.42
The strong desire for a rapid economic growth has not only been a Japanese post-war
commitment set up by the government and businessmen, but also a "central political goal to
which all other Japanese policies have been subordinated,43 " including the intellectual
property policy which has become a weapon Japan's
developmental system.
An account of the Brazilian ground rule
4° Pthlic Law No. 102-194, S. 272
41 Senate Report (Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee) No. 102-157, p. 17, Sept. 24, 1991.
42	 Effects of State-Societal Arrangements on International Competitiveness: Steel, Motor
Vehicles and Semia.mduciors in the Umtul States, Japan and Western Europe" [19931 (22) B.J. Pot S., at 281.
Michael Bomis, Macroeconomic Perspectives on the Use of Intellectual Fvperty Rights in Japan's
Economic Performance, in "Intellectual Property Rights in Science, Technology, and Economic Performance",
p.261 at 264, edited by F Rushing and C Bros, 1990.
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In Brazil, the Nation's will for catching up with technology is part of the constitutional
framework, creating a state duty and preordaining objectives and means. While the
responsibility for developing and commercially applying new technologies lies within the
private sector, the Constitution charges the State with the duty to promote and foster
scientific development, research and technical expertise, by means of supporting training and
investment in R&D. Government actions are also directed at fostering science and technology
for the benefit of the population, the solution for Brazilian problems, the development of
national and regional productive systems, and the technological autonomy of the country. All
of the above mentioned have been made permanent political goals.
Despite the non self.executing character of the constitutional provisions, 45 the clear
fundamental purpose has been to create the foundations of a state-societal covenant shared by
the State and the society at large, expressing a strong desire to catch up with technology and
to develop a technological market. The institutional agencies, nevertheless, have so far failed
to respond to these economic and social ambitions effectively.
Brazilian technology policy has always been implemented under a canot basis, i.e., on the
basis of financial incentive and market restrictions which, in the recent past, put the country
under severe foreign pressure. Set up under the selfreliance assumption., market restrictions
were much cnticised. Due to the dynamic nature of high-technology, IT policy has fallen far
behind the technical pace. There is no precise reason for this failure. Strong suggestions
however refer to either lack of confidence or will of foreign firms to transfer advanced
technology, or the State's subsidising policy being carned out on a carrot basis rather than on
a carrot-and-stick basis under which some penalty would be imposed upon national firms for
not pursuing technical capability. Moreover, the targets set up in the informatics programme
(National Plan of Infonnatics and Automation - PLANIN), per se too ambitious, have never
been met.47
" 1988 Constitution, Articles2l8 and 219.
M. G. Gonçalves Ferith-a Filho, "Fundamental Aspects of the 1988 Constitution", p. 11-25, in A
Panorama of Branhan Law, Dolinger & Resenn (ed), North-South Center/EEL, 1992.
Gallangher, The United Stales-Branlüin Infomiatics Dispute, 119891 23(3) The International Lawyer
505; Ellene FeWer & Andrew Hurrell, "Tl US-Branhan Informatics Dispute", FPIJSchooI of Advaxed
International Studies, 1988.
Law8,244,l6Octoberl99l.
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Apart from some optimistic views', a general feeling of doubt among the business sector
has always existed as to the efficacy of the IT policy, coupled with the belief that to promote
high-technology foreign co-operation is indispensable. A major inconsistency or weakness in
the overall policy, therefore, has been in not enacting proper protection for intellectual
property.
It is part of the constitutional covenant that Brazilian and foreigners, as provided in law,
shall be ensured temporary protection of tights on works and industiial inventions (including
any intellectual property with industrial applications). As to the latter, protection aims at both
social interest and technological and economic development of the cowy. The rationale
underlying such a clause is that protection of intellectual property is mandatory to the degree
it works for the welflire of the Nation. In this regard, the lack of a steady intellectual property
policy has made the countly ill-equipped to comply with the fundamental agreement and the
Nation's syndromic pursuit of technological autonomy.
Guidance to the state catalyst function
The challenge in limiting the exercise of intellectual property rights rests on the country's
ability to combine policies, i.e., to safeguard the social objectives behind the protection of
intellectual property as a component tunefully integrated with the overall policies put forward
as a means of fostering the development of new technologies and technical change. In
connection with this, two principles guide the function of the catalyst state: surveillance as a
means to improve, in terms of welfare and efficiency, the state assistantial machinery; and
planning as a process to justify legal measures or reliefs which especially affect the use of
intellectual property.
Surveillance is necessary to the extent that it makes state action effective by capturing the
best opportunity to act, while the process of justification makes the implementation of the
For some cmts, see Hubert Schmitz & Jose Cassiolato (eds), "High-Tech for lndustnal Development -
Lessons from the Briilin experience in electronics and automation", RoutIedge 1992.
1988 Constitution, Article 5 (XXVII and XXIX)
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legal policy, m a particular situation, reasonably acceptable to the parties concerned. The
force of these principles relies on the need to identi1j circumstances where welfare-improving
interventions are likely to be feasible in practice In dealing with this, in Part Two the study
identifies the intellectual property policy as a complementary instrument to explore concrete
possibilities of improving welfare and efficiency.
Especially in the information technology sector, the policy is translated into legal measures
made available to facilitate new entiies, to increase the bargaining power between rivals, to
discourage abusive behaviour, to encourage regional development, and to foster high-
performance computing for the improvement of state services such as education, public
transport, national health, and basic and applied research. In this respect, a balancing
protection of chip designs should be included as a state commitment.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE CHIP-DESIGN LAW AND THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BARGAIN
3.1 Introduction: legal structuring of intellectual property
In the previous chapter, the effects of the competition dynamics of the innovation process
upon the "social bargain" was studied. Lying behind the intellectual property theory, such
bargain is linked to efficiency and welfare goals. In chapter three, the protection of
intellectual property, particularly that of chip designs is examined. The statutory framework
is considered in the context of the bargain theory.
The grong awareness of the importance of intellectual property has led industrialised
countries to claim at international fora the strengthening of protection on the grounds that
uneven levels of protection world-wide had caused losses in business and employment due to
an increasing economy of counterfeit goods. Distortions associated with inadequacies of
intellectual property regimes' were reported to upset the system of international trade.
In entertaining the question whether a desirable and adequate level of protection does exist,
it may be justifiably argued that a proper protection would be that which provides for a
reasonable return on investments. Relying on a reasonable period of exclusivity, such an
adequate protection would also allow a balanced rate of private and social returns (rewarding
the right holder and benefiting society). However, this study (which is not concerned with
appropriate level of protection) suggests that from the legal viewpoint appropriateness can
only be assessed in terms of the scrutiny of the framework of the statutory protection
designed to achieve certain requirements of a social bargairL
'Intellectual property has been brought to the GAiT frannrk in the belief that protection could be
improved. Arguments put forward by the USA, Japan and EC presented tsiv reasons. Fnst, they iixlicated trade
losses due to deficiencies in protection of intellectual property, and that existing copyright and patent
convenlions did ix enire adequate level of protection. Second, in the GATF a settlement system of dispute
could remedy trade distortions and impairment of previous coissions arising from weak protection
worldwide. See MTN.GNG/NG1 lJWt7, 29 MAY 87
Furthermore, an oljective sense of adequacy is connected with the consistency of the body
of nghts related to the different forms of protection. A set assumption is that all systems have
a degree of inconsistency and ambiguity which make appropriation of rights imperfect.
Additionally, the legal structure itself; i.e, the manner in which the rights are formulated, does
not prevent owners from exercising their rights in a way which is contrary to competition
rules. As a result, the welfare and efficiency goals that the statutory framework is supposed to
pursue are permanently at stake.
The analysis suggests that a sense of social bargain linked to welfare and efficiency
objectives has been a part of the intellectual property law for over two centuries, and
therefore deeply rooted in the bundle of rights and exceptions which form the modern
statutory protection. The primary concern of protection is the assertion of rights rather than
the regulation of the outcome derived from their exercise. In this respect, although the legal
framework itself conceptually strikes a balance of interest, it cannot be taken for granted that
the working of proprietary rights will effectively be canied out in accordance with such a quid
pro quo.2 This denotes that any system of protection is by its nature imperfect 3 , to the extent
that an adequacy of protection is or should be committed to welfare as well as efficiency
functions.
No country can aspire to provide inventors and authors with a perfect appropnability
system of intellectual property. Not even the United States regarded as having one of the
most effective mechanisms for protection has such a system. Therefore, it must be stated that
"the intellectual property protection mechanisms need not guarantee perfect appropriability
for the innovator to yield net benefits to the country involved."4 Provided that international
2 It is noteworthy to stress that the insertion in the PlC Treaty of non-voluntary licensing contrasted to those
vie which found it unnecessary.
For an example of mperfection, see the cniicism on the tests designed to draw a line between expression
and idea in computer programs. The tenor of these tests is that "copyright should not grant anvne more
economic power than is necessary to achieve the incentive to create." But they have been "incompatible
standards." See the update survey of Julian Velasco, "The Copyrightahility of Non-literal Elements of
Computer Programs" L19941 94(1) CoIL. R 242 at 253,281, 291.
' Richard P Rozek, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Reseanch and Development Decisions and
Econonuc Growth, in "Intellectual Property Rights in Science, Technology aix! Economic Performance", p 33,
edited by F. W. Rushing and C G Brown, Wcstview Press, 1990. At p. 34, Rozek adds that a perfect
appropriability would be costly that would not pay off Apart from the cost/benefit imbalance, there is a
tremendous factor which is the traditional element In other words, "perfect appmpnability is difficult because
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agreements are complied with, level of protection is a matter of national discretion. Therefore,
whatever the protection a country is prepared to afford, within the framework of intellectual
property treaties, a system of remedial measures is needed to redress the adverse effects the
exercise of proprietary rights may cause to public interest.
As aforementioned, the legal structuring of intellectual property intends to provide both a
sense of appropriateness of protection and an agreed statutory bargain. The discussion of the
drafting of the US law on mask works, in addition to the INC Treaty and the Agreement on
TRIPS reveal not only the sense of bargain underlying them, but also that in order to protect
new technologies negotiators have had to drive a hard bargain. Based on a critical analysis, an
apprehension of thilure of this bargain is entertained. Several points explain this concern,
emphasising the need for putting in place a permanent policy about legal limitation of
intellectual property.
In choosing a sui generis protection for mask works, the US Congress once again
confirmed the federal policy of not protecting useful articles under copyright. In contrast, this
fundamental principle, adhered to by US law for over two hundred years, is to afford
protection for useful articles under patent provided that the standards of novelty and
inventions are met. Consequently, it is for the public benefit that designs which do not meet
the patent requirement are available for "imitative copying", unless the reproduction seems to
be too predatory to competition. In the Congressional judgement, mask work designs (a
functional article not eligible for patent) deserve protection for their technical merit, that is, a
combination of advanced, known and valuable technical elements.
Aspects of the US law are critically examined. In particular, it is argued that the permanent
fixation of the mask work as a requirement for protection may encourage the coupling of
designing with manufacturing activities. This may give rise to anti-competitive practices, and
is certainly an inappropriate provision for the interests of regions or countries not possessing
the capability of chip manufacturing.
t1 intellectual property of each industiy has unique chaiacteristics which tl protection of mecluinicm
have to uicorporate."
The bargain behind the traditional forms of intellectual property (patent and copyright) is
critically analysed. A noteworthy point, while patent is designed to expand the use of
knowledge by meaningful disclosure of information, the increasing use of secret, 5 eg, in the
field of information technology, is a potential impairment to the social bargain by making the
access to non-novel utilitarian elements uneasy.
A sense of bargain is also found in the discussion and drafting of the IPIC Treaty and the
Agreement on TRIPS. This viewpoint stems from several provisions, including those dealing
with the objectives of the Agreement, public interest exception, non-voluntary licensing, and
the control of anti-competitive exercise of intellectual property. 6 These provisions make the
Agreement on TRIPS not only a framework of standards of protection, but also a charter for
efficiency and welfare goals.
In the particular field of integrated circuits, the study traces further concerns, for instance,
regarding the debatable appropriateness of the term of protection it is pointed out that if the
period is such that it appears to eliminate competition, than the intellectual property bargain
may not be fulfilled. 7 Moreover, in order to benefit from reverse engineering and non-
voluntary licensing a country needs to master capability not only of designing, but also of
manufacturing of chips. For those countries lacking capability of chip manufiicturing the
safeguarding mechanisms, such as non-voluntary licensing and reverse engineenng have
limited beneficial effects.
On the grounds of these inherent imperfections, a case is drawn up to limit the exercise of
proprietaiy rights. To this end, it is realistic to infer the legitimacy of a proper policy in order
to curb the adverse effects of the right-holder conduct. The chapter starts by discussing the
debates at the US Congress concerning the model of protection for mask works.
The use of confidentiality in know-how transfer has been pointed it as a cause for concern in the sphere
of the European Community. See chapter 6, subsection 6.2.1 (vu).
6 Agreement on TRIPS, Articles 7, 8, 31, aixl 40.
For a similar argument, see The MMC Report on the Ford's licensing policy, paras. 6.62 to 6.65, Cmnd.
9437 (1985).
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3.2 The structure of the US sui 2eneris law of mask works
3.2.1 The debates at the US Congress
(i) The copyright approach
When opening the hearings on the Bill S. 1201 to protect semiconductor chips, the chairman
of the US Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the proposed legislation would give
designers and manufactures the necessary instruments to protect investments in research and
development from unauthorized reproduction. The bill asserted protection for ten years. The
use of mask works was included in the bundle of exclusive rights, but innocent purchasers
were allowed to use the infringing chips on a basis of compulsory licensing, thus eliminating
liability for innocent infringement. Legitimate reverse engineering was encouraged. Copyright
was chosen as "the best tool at hand to get the job done." 1 Whether the protection could be
integrated into the copyright regime was, nevertheless, unclear.
At the US Copyright Office, a rnimber of issues were raised. The main objections against
copyright rested on the utilitarian nature of the mask work and chips. In this respect, the
Copyright Office did not consider copyright the most appropriate form of protection for four
reasons. Under the US system, copyright is not available for useful articles themselves. The
design of an utilitarian article is eligible for protection only to the extent that the design can
exist separately from, or independently of; the useful product. Protection for drawings of an
useful article does not prevent the latter from being copied. Copyright over expressions does
not extend to ideas, plans or processes. 2 Since the layout or the mask work and the chip
represented the published version or embodiment of an imprinted technical drawing only this,
on a paper blue-print-type deposit, could be registered. It was on these grounds that years
before, the registration of a claim to copyright a chip was refused.3
'Hearings on S 1201 Before the Subcomm. on Patents Copyiights & Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciaiy, 98th Congress. 1st Session, 98-493 (1983). [Hereinafter cited as 1983 Senate Hearings.J
2 See Statement of Dorothy Schrader, 1983 Senate Heanngs, SUPIU note.
As it ns reported in the Schrader Statemenl in 1977 an action was filed to compel registration but the
case was eventually wtthdra%11 (Intel Corp v. Ringer, C 77-2848, ND. Cal., 1978). See 1983 Senate Hearings.
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The Senate 1201 Bill was not the first proposal for copyright protection. In 1979, a bill
introduced in the House of Commons proposed including "the photographic masks used to
imprint patterns on integrated circuit chips and the patterns themselves" in the categoty of
pictorial works by amending the copyright law. 4 Protection of mask works as ornamental
copynght designs was also considered. 5 These bills had no legislative progress due to the
scale of controversy they caused among the industiy and experts. In general they were very
similar, and attempted to assimilate semiconductor mask works to existing subject matters.
This was the case of the S. 1201 and the HR. 1028.6 These two bills, however, would create
a new category of copyright work. The advantage was that it would not interfere with those
existing subject matters which enjoyed different terms of protection and would not share the
exceptions to exclusive rights, such as reverse engineering and innocent infringement
particular only to chip-designs. The industry seemed to be comfortable with the new
developments particularly as they would create a new category of work and relax the useful
article doctrine.7
The Senate Committee concluded that protection of mask works could be accommodated
in the copyright framework. The integration, it was pronounced, was both "adequate" and
"well suited to the task at hand," rather than "an untried form of sui generis protection"8
which the Committee dismissed. Six reasons were put forward to support the copyright
choice.
Arguments for copyright protection
4ldexn.
FiR. 2985, 98th Cong., 1st session (1983), drawn around the H.R 20, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 1983
Senate Hearings. Scbrader Statement, at 47.
6 See H.R 1028, 98th Congress, 1st Session (1983). Other twn bills, the S. 3117 and H.R 7207, written
around S. 1201, were introduced for the benefit of discussion. See Scharader written statement in 1983 Senate
Hearings.
Letter wntten by Warren Davis, Diroctor of the Semiconductor Industiy Association, attached to the record
of the Hearings on HR 1028 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice of House of Comm. on the Judiciaiy, 98th Congress, 1st session (1983), (Appendix 1). [Hereinafter
cited as 1983 HR Heanngs.J
8 Senate Report No.425,98th Congress, 2nd Session, at 12 (1984), hereinafter cited [1984 Senate Reportl.
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Firstly, for over two centuries the evolution of the American copyright has included new
forms of expression.9
 While keeping
pace with technology, modern copyright law "protects a vast range of works, some of which
have value almost exclusively as utilitarian objects."° The Committee found that, to protect
mask works could be beyond the traditional copyright, but not "a giant leap." In
overcoming the bar of the utilitarian doctrine, the Committee embraced an expanded
interpretation of the constitutional term "writings", already established by the Supreme Courts
in accepting copyright in sound recordings.' 2 In approaching the matter, the CONTU Report
referred to the term "literary works" as connoting no "criterion of literary merit or qualitative
value. 13
Secondly, the Committee argued that mask works were considerably similar to maps and
technical drawings. On these grounds, copyrightability of chip designs would cause minimal
distortions.'4
The third copyright argument was of a practical nature. Relying on copyright background,
protection would provide for legal certainty and avoid costly litigations. For the Committee,
the past developments in copyright would "encourage certainty and stability within the field of
semiconductor chip-design. "s The Committee's concern was that under a sul generis
protection the members of the semiconductor industry could count on no judicial guidance,
and a scheme of protection standing alone with new concepts and terms would "invite costly
litigation to define the parameters of the new form of protection."6
1984 SenateReportat 12.
'° Idem. As cited in the testimony of Professor Miller, some useful articles include "belt bkles", "E.T.
lunch pail", and "E.T. piggy bank". 1983 Senate Hearings.
Idm
2 For instance, in Goldcle,n v California quoted by the 1984 Senate Report, at 13, the Court established
that Tmngs" included "any physwal rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aest1ic labor." (412
US 561). In this case, fi s discussed copynght m sound recordings.
' CONTU Final Report, p. 16. The passage refers back to the discussion of the US 1976 Copyiight Act, PL
94-553 (1976), Senate Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong, 1st session, 1975.
l984SenateReport,a113.
'5Ide
6I
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Protection of the American chip abroad was the fourth reason. The Committee was aware
that a copyright on mask works differing from the traditional copyright would lead to a
degree of uncertainty and thus render the recognition of the US copyright internationally
unsafe. The Committee contended, nevertheless, that a sul generis regime would made
protection abroad more troublesome.'7
The "simplicity and economy" of a copyright form of protection was, according to the
Committee, preferable to a sui generis one.' 8 As a fifth argument, it was thought that
applying a new form of intellectual property to protect chip-designs would require the courts
to borrow considerably from concepts inherent in copyright. If this was the case, the job
would be simpler if protection of chip designs were accommodated in the copyright
frameworlç despite the danger of such an integration.
On its last issue, the Committee held that the Senate Bill containing the developed copyright
proposal had been sufficiently well drafted to avoid the fear of distorting copyright.' 9 The
alleged danger of distortion appeared as a serious concern posed by publishers. They
contended, for instance, that the accommodation of reverse engineering in the concept of fair
use would be likely to erode their interests, or at least would create a grey area as to the
extent of protection for publishers' works embodied in chips. 20 Opposing the Senate
Committee, the House of Commons rejected the copyright approach, ennching the debates
with its arguments for a .sw generis protection.
(ii) Arguments for a sui generis regime
The copyright route with adjustments would have been technically possible by elaborating
adequately on the wording of the bill. The choice would not necessarily have facilitated
17 Ident Conirasting with this view see the opinion held by FLC. Jehoram who sugges that the lack of
protection for the American chip abroad u1d have been the main and decisive reason for the US Congress to
make the rn genens choice. In Some Curious Problem Caused by Chip Protectioif 1198913 WIPR 91.
1984 Senate Report, at 14.
' l984SenateRepozt,atl3.
20 See statement of Jon A. Baumgarten, representing the Association of American Publishers in 1983
Senate Hearings.
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protection of American chips abroad, and would have considerably diluted the two-centenary
fundamental principle of non-copyright protection for useful articles. These were the major
reasons why the House of Commons' Committee substituted its copyright version,
introducing an hybrid form of intellectual property.2 ' Moreover, anti-copyright precedents
had already been created, refusing copyright protection for mask works, equipping the House
Committee with additional munitions to refute the Senate Committee's arguments for the
copyright approach.
Designing a legislation primarily to combat unfair chip copying, the House Committee
elaborated:
The creation of a sui generis form of protection for mask works represents, in the Committee's view,
appropriate recognition of the industrial nature of mask work designs and avoids conceptual confusion in
copyright law to accommodate a form of intellectual property which is better protected by reference to the
background and practices of the semiconductor indushy.
For the Committee, copyright would not strike mask work copying, nor safely
accommodate reverse engineering - a practice well established among the industry. In this
respect, to experiment with a modified copyright protection which would sacrifice the useful
article doctrine would not be of public interest. Unavailability of copyright in useful articles
was, as it is, a fundamental principle adhered to the US law for over two hundred years.
Copyright was available to protect expressions
rather than ideas, and as to useflul articles protection fell within patent provided that the
standards of novelty and inventions were met. As a result, it was for the public benefit that
designs which did riot meet the patent requirements were available for " imitative copying",
unless the reproduction was too predatory to fair competifion.
21 After tbe Hit 1028 being declared a "clean bill" ith adjustments, the HR 5525 Bill s intnxluced as
a substitute amendment lbs the former. Consubstantiating Na new form of legal protection separate from and
i,endent of the Copyright Act," the hR. 5525 vas appoved in the House Committee without dissent,
"a Ibmi of industnal intellectual property" U "pnf on a finding that original mask wirks are
RjfljgN See 1984 House Report No. 98-781, U.S. Code, Cong. & AcL Ne at 5754/5, 5758 and footnote
22, 5764/5 and footnote 36.
22 Idem, at 5756.
23 klein, at 5757/8.
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When the law protects artistic features, existing independently of the corresponding useful
articles, protection does not extend to the overall shape of the article. This has been
established by courts, which have refused copyright to designs of automobile wire wheel, or
outdoor lighting fixtures.' The Committee recognized that mask works are in some
superficial aspects similar to maps, technical drawings, photographs or audiovisual works
which are not useful considered articles. These categories, however, have no function beyond
their information content, appearance, visual or aesthetic appeal. Conversely, mask works
deserve protection for a vely different reason, that is, "the technical and creative skill
employed in laying out or designing electronic circwtiy", and although mask works may
convey information, "their primaiy purpose is being used in the manufacture of a useful article
- semiconductor chip products." Therefore, protection of mask works would not fall under
copyright. Their reproduction would not be a violation of the tight on the technical drawing
as already established in judicial precedents?
Acknowledging that the semiconductor industry was of international nature, the House
Committee realized that a legal form which would be paramount for the protection of mask
works domestically should also induce protection abroad. In this respect, there were sufficient
reasons to believe that "the possibility of international protection under copyright conventions
[was] speculative." 27 Whatever form of protection chosen, there was no guarantee that the
US standards of protection would be easily followed by other countries. If protection was
made available under copynght framework, the United States would have to protect foreign
chips at home by virtue of the national treatment rule. Protection of Amencan chips abroad,
nevertheless, would be uncertain. 28 A suE generis form of protection, escaping from the
compulsory effects of the national treatment rule derived from both copyright and industrial
24 See among other Norris Industries v I. T&T. Corp. and Lada and Erqwre Inc. v Ringer cited in 1994
House Report, at 5758.
25 Idem, at 5759.
Idem, at 5757. The House Report cites the Intel Corp v Ringer case. Furthcrmore, copynght on drawings
does not prevent the use of drawings because traditionally the nght of use is not included in the bundle of the
owner's exclusive rights. 1984 House Report, at 5770.
27 1984 House Report, at 5756. See also 1987 House Report No. 100-388, U.S. Code, Cong. & AL News, at
843.
See 1984 House Report, at 5756 and H.C. Jehorani, "Some Curious Prlems Caused by Chip Protection"
1198913 WIPR9I.
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property conventions,29 would make it possible for the US Congress to conduct an
innovatory in the field of intellectual property. In order to encourage a new and uniform
regime of intellectual property worldwide, the House Committee introduced a scheme of
reciprocity based on a bilateral comity, 3° which three years later was reported to be a success.
Finally, the House Committee argued that a specific regime regulating only the mask work
protection, "would avoid the possible distortion of copyright law."31 Additionally, in the
development of a new legal form, concepts from the copyright background could be invoked
by analogy "to the extent clearly applicable to mask works." 32 A sul generis regime,
however, the Committee added, "should not be restricted by the limitations of existing
copyright law."33 These responded to the claims for certainty and economy in litigations
inserted in the Senate's arguments.
The choice made by the US Congress duly considered the interests of the industiy, and
expressed the sense of bargaining asserted on behalf of the society at large.
3.2.2 Intellectual property structure and social bargain
(i) The social bargain under copyright and patent
As a hybrid form of protection, the suE generis regime, created by the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA), integrates a degree of both, copyright and patent. The SCPA
history reveals a conspicuous congressual efforts to protect the interests of right holders and
safeguard the interests of society et large. In short, these interests consist of encouraging
innovation by making possible a rewarding and reasonable return on investments, as well as
The Hcnise Committee believed that a rw form of intellectual property iId not ll either under the
Universal Copynght Convention or tbe Paris Convention for the Pn1ion of lndustnal Property. 1987 House
Report No. 100-388, U.S. Code, Cong. & AL Ne at 843.
3° The experiment refers to the application of the Sections 902 and 914 of the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act aut&irizing the grant of interim protection under eertain conditions to national of foreign
couniries. l'he reciprocity mechanism s described as a si, and the Section 914 as "a unique provision
4thcmt parallel in the intellectual property flea" Idem, at 845 and 849.
311984 House Report, at 5759.
Idem, at 5760.
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giving the society a wider prospect of material satisfaction. Focusing on these objectives, it
explores the main features of the bargain theory inherent in the structure of the traditional
classes of intellectual property, copyright and patent; and then considers its implications for
the analysis of the SCPA framework
All countries have a particular method of structuring their patent and copyright laws. The
legal construction tends to follow traditions developed over years. These traditions, ie,
doctrines and fimdamental principles, reflect the perceptions of the courts, parliament and
experts who almost invariably are not prepared to abandon their dogmas, unless they are
urged to do so on behalf of a superior cause. Therefore, the precise features of patent and
copynght valid for all countries can be hardly traced. Even an identical copyright or patent
rule common to two countries may be construed differently. In view of this, the similarities
and differences which now follow are general indications particularly associated with the US
system. While forming the legal structure34 of both types of intellectual property, these
indications are subject to variations from countly to country and can only be meaningfully
examined within the context of a particular system.
The legal structure of patent and copyright
Patent and copyright represent two sets of legally enforceable rights which differ from each
other in several aspects. A patent owner is normally entitled to exclude others 35 from making,
using, or selling the subject matter of the patent which is granted under the conditions of
exchange of a meaningful and extensive disclosure of the state of the art and later unlimited
use of the invention. The granting has at least a two-pronged rationale. The disclosure of
the knowledge derived from a patented item or process is necessaly, firstly, for the
examination of the claim and the requirements of novelty and, secondly, to make the
The expiession legal strncture, as it refers to copyright and patent means the bundle of rights legally
enforceable, including exclusive nghts and exceptions to them, conditions and pmcedures for pretection,
duration, remedies and enforcement For the purpose of the study, the legal stuxture does nct include
contingent measures (hmitations or suspension) affecting the use of the rights.
A patented invention may be used for non-ammercial purposes Ic, purely for scientific study or
interests.
See White, "Why a Seventeen Year Patent?" 11956138 J. Pat Off Soc'y 839,440.
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incremental art known to skilful men. Lack of proper disclosure 37 will frustrate the quid pro
quo, and enforceability to the extent beyond the technology not disclosed will not be
available. If the subject of a claim is not novel, the granting would not achieve one of the
patent aims, to promote innovation, and would serve only to restrict free access to technical
knowledge already available to the public. It would go
against not only the public polic behind the patent, but also be a fraud to society.
The exclusive rights may last for seventeen years, and can be enforced against a
supervenient inventor. The duration is to a certain extent arbitrarily fixed. While from the
economic point of view no criteria can sensibly justifi a shorter or longer term, an interesting
speculation in the field of law exists in why copyright grants a far longer period of protection.
One possible reason can be found in the basic nature of these types of intellectual property.
Traditionally, the patent owner is granted the right to practise the art disclosed in the
invention. This legal monopoly is exercised through the manufacturing of an utilitarian article
and by discharging new corners. Conversely, by protecting only expressions disclosed with
the publication of a work, copyright does not prevent identical works independently created
from being circulated. Therefore, in the view of its increasingly wider role in protecting useful
articles in the context of information technology, such as protection of computer software,
copyright has interfered with industrial property.
Under copyright, the owner controls the copying and distribution of copies, hence
preventing others from reproducing and selling the work. In general, however, no power is
available to prevent others from using an infringing article. Subsisting for at least fifty years,
copyright's term of protection is the longest of any other form of intellectual property. The
period is so long, some analysts argue,39 because protection is limited to expressions4° and
Exceptions are made for fln so called "secit inventions." Being a contradiction in terms, this
eqiression designs those invention of strategic interest for national security.
Interpreting Thomas Jefferson's writings on patents, the US Supreme Court reasoned: "Tl grant of an
exclusive right to an invention s the creation of society - at ockis with the inherent free nature of disclosed
ideas - and was not to be freely given. Only inventions and disco'vnes which furthered human knowledge and
vere new and useful, justified the special indueement of a imuted private monopoly." In Graham v John Deere
Co. (383 U.S. 1, 1966)
39 As Pamela Samuelson argues, "it is one thing to grant a lengthy term of pmtection to songs, poems, and
paintings, and quite another to di) so for airplane wings, pomps, and clothes diyers." In "Creating a New Kind
of Intellectual Property Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs" [1985] LXX
Minnesota Law Review 471 at 512.
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traditionally does not cover the utilitarian aspects of the work. Protection of expressions aims
to compensate authors for their creations in exchange for dissemination of expressions and
ideas; the latter can be used by anyone, and both promote learning. The implicit disclosure of
ideas and expressions, by registration and/or publication, in exchange for granting exclusive
rights to copyright owners is thus part of the social bargain.
Although publication is not a condition for protection, nor the commencement of duration
of protection depends on registration, a basic assumption underlying copyright is "that
authors will publish their works when seeking to reap the commercial rewards for them'
Since "that reaping commercial rewards would not be possible without publishing and
disclosing,"42 publication and disclosure are not explicitly required. A consequential effect of
the requirement of disclosure is to exclude trade secret.
(ii) Trade secret and the ambiguity in medlo
Clearly, the extent of the bundle of rights that patent and copyright embody and the
conditions on which they are asserted follow considerations of public policy. It is
acknowledged that the structuring of these rights bear inherent imperfections, in terms of
inconsistency and uncertainty, as well as giving opportunity to abusive exercise. These are
likely to affect the underlying social bargain. Two issues will be examined: firstly, the
implications of trade secret coupled with copyright and, secondly, the unclear boundaiy
between enforceable legal monopoly and legitimate public access in the area of useful designs
with industrial applications.
° To draw a line between expressions and ideas has been a matter of ingenuity. As it is pointed out in a
survey by J. Velasco, "by protecting only an author's expression from an unauthorising copying, copyright law
strikes a balance that is intended to "promote progress" The author concludes: the vanoos couit tests applied to
determine the copyrightabihty of computer programs are "incompatible standards" couits tests so far
developed have failed to oonthine simplicity with acouracy. The We/an se, for instance, is stated in a simple
way "the court need merely determine the program's function to arrive at its idea, and thon determine what is
unissaiy to that idea to arrive at the protected expressiolL" Julia" Velasco, 'Ilie Copyriglitability of Non-
literal Elements of Computer Programs" [1994] 94(1) Columbia L. Review 242 at 253, 241, 291.
' Pamela Samuelson, idem at p. 511, footnotes 198 and 199.
42 Iden, footnote 199.
97
Trade secret in computer technology
In the United States, the vast use of trade secret coupled with copyright has raised some
controversy43
 in the past. Currently the issue seems to be resolved, especially in the field of
computer programs marketed in small numbers by licensing." Trade secret has been held on
the grounds of the particular nature of computer programs, ie, the high development costs
and expertise they require, and easy copying due to their intangible nature. The secret over
software and computer systems, both compared to industrial processes, has been found
necessazy to insure a just competitive advantage for the right holder, and secret may cover
combination of "known computer elements", eg. logic and coherence in computer
software."45
Although the widespread distribution or publication of the content of an existing trade
secret generally has the effect of diluting the relation of confidentiality, courts "have been
fairly liberal in allowing extensive distribution of software information without terminating the
related trade secrets.
Even a copyright notice on protected material does not preclude the trade secret claim. 47
 An
unlimited trade secret undermines the social bargain inherent in intellectual property, first; in
creating "a perpetual bar against copy1ng" and, second, in creating an unrestricted
protection regardless of the degree of originality the programs bear, if any. To a certain
extent; secret might not harm and may in fact be needed. However, since
Smedinghofi "Critique of Trade Secret Approach to Protecting Computer Software", in Hohnes
Protecting Computer Software, p. 2 1-29, 1984 John Marshal Intellectual Property Institute, [1984] 2 Software
Pmtectic
Sally March, Creating Solutions for a Creative Industiy Protecting Computer Software, [1987] Patent
World 10. For an update sw',ey, with large number of cases in different jurisdictions, see Melvin F Jager,
"Trade Secrets: The Steady Protection for Computer Technology", in A.LPIA, 1992 Mid-Winter Initule on
The Law of Computer-Related Tecluiologj', VoL 1, Section P. But see different thoughts in Bonito Boats v.
ThunderDraft Boats [19891 489 US 141.
' Jostens; Inc. v National Computer Systems; Inc. 214 U.S.P.Q. 918, Minn. S. Ct. (1982), cited by Melvin
Jager, see previous note, at P4.
46Idem,atP-15.
' Idem,atP-16.
48 Idem,P-10.
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secret provides for a business scheme with no transparency, the concern is that consequences
likely detrimental to the social bargain will rarely be perccived.
The trade secret defence in computer technology is based on the assumption that patent and
copyright are inappropriate forms of protection. The argument states that if early access
through public disclosure of the computer elements is allowed, the right holder is likely to
loose his competitive advantage which the intellectual property intend to insure. Based on this
and other assumptions, the hypothesis of the trade secret defence is, or should be, that the
right holder should be prepared to offer the computer technology to public disclosure as soon
as the risks of loosing his competitive advantage have been overcome, or that the secret-
based exploitation of the technology over a period of time has already given a just return on
the investments of risk-taking innovative activities.
Provided that the hypothesis is followed, the integrity of the social bargain will be
preserved. Nevertheless, two contentions still apply. The weakness of the secret scheme is
that the judgement of what is fair return is left entirely to the discretion of the right holder. An
additional weakness is that trade secret will, by definition, subsist as long as the relation of
confidentiality lasts Following this, the iight holder may promote the disclosure of the
technology through patenting or copyright. At this stage, it may be possible that the
technology has already reached its obsolescence due to the rapidity of technical change. The
conditions of the market for the product- or service-related technology, as well as the
technical pace are crucial for the assessment of the social bargain.
Assuming that customers are sufliciently informed about the advancement of art in
computer hardware and software, it may be argued that the distortive effects of trade secret
can be paid off or at least alleviated. In other words, customers will not be prepared to enter
into a confidential agreement to buy a technology-based product which they know is, or will
soon be, outdated. In an industry considerably marked by exploitation relying on secret
however, it would be unrealistic to expect entrepreneurs to possess such a high level of
For instance, a relation of confidentiality may lead to the absurd of providing prot1ion for a slavish and
unregsteTed copy of computer program that may be licensed to a customer with no sufficient skill to discern
about tbe state of tl art
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market information. 50 The picture is worse in technologically less privileged regions or
markets.
Speed of technical change and secrecy
A further factor which may counterbalance the distortive effect of secret exploitation is the
speed of the technological change which is a feature of the software and chip industries.
Owing to the technological race, new products are commercialized and soon superseded by
others, particularly in technologically developed regions. As aforementioned in the previous
chapter, the theory of technical wave explains that technology flows unevenly. In those
markets and regions where for a multitude of reasons5 ' technological development is
retarded, trade secret has an additional function, of securing the innovative investors'
maximization of profits on technology which is likely to be obsolete. The distortive effects on
the social bargain are thus greater.
Between copyright and design patent
There is a gap between copyright and design patent where protection is uncertain, or no
protection at all is available.
A basic distinction between copyrightable design and patentable design is that the latter is
concerned with aesthetic related to function, while the former with aesthetic related to non-
functional form. Having emerged with the flounshing of the industnal revolution, industrial
designs initially played the role of adding a conception of industrial decoration to the ugly
machine. 52 It evolved to the stage where the machine's form and fi.mction are intimately
5° The deficiency regarding market information about the resources available, including resources of
technical nature, is also a feature of a market of increasingly imperfect competition. Perfect knowledge as a
theoretical presupposition of perfect competition mld be desirable to make trade secret perfectly compatible
v,ith social selfare.
' The reasons the technical flo may be retarded include incapacity of the market to absorb efficiently the
technology, and lach of proper proteclion of intellectual property, and the ccuntis infrastructure in general
(eg, educational system). See Edwin Mansfield, "Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment,
and Technology Transfer", pp. 15, 18, 23-32. International Finance CorporaiionfWcrld Bank, Discussion
Paper no. 19, Washington, 1994.
52 Sec Rtheit C Denicola, "Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copynght in
Useful Articles" 119831 67 Minnesota Law Review 707 at 738/9.
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connected. 53
 Aesthetic and utility are mutually influenced, determining a "nexus between
what the product must do and how it must look." 54 One element relates to the other, and
both inflict upon the designer the constraint of limited choices dictated by industnal and
commercial interests.
Conversely, in copyrightable works of applied arts features and shapes reflect the
"unconstrained aesthetic perspective of the artist." 55 Usefl.iI aspects that the articles may bear
are "viewed as an attempt to identif, elements whose form and appearance reflect... [that]
perspective."56
 From the legal standpoint, an independent utility which may be attached to the
aesthetic form is irrelevant. 57 This establishes non-utility as a fundamental principle of the US
copynght law.
The statutoly protection for design patent ensures a monopoly over the appearance of
mass-produced useful articles which are new and ornamental. 58 If the industrial design as a
type of usefI.il article59
 does not meet the standard of novelty, no protection is available.
Although some variations60 have been admitted, the useful article doctrine is still a
predominant principle which excludes unpatentable useful products from protection. While
maintaining this policy, the Supreme Court,6'
in addition to the US Congress62 allows free copying of utilitarian articles which do not meet
the requirements of invention nor originality, 63 ie, containing no merit either for design patent
or copyright.64
Idem, at 740.
ldem,at739.
Idem, at 707.
56 Idem, at 742.
For instance, us the Mer v Stein (347 U.S. 201, 1954) where statuettes were employed as bases for table
lamps. "the Mazer statuettes remain copyrightable despite their use as lamp bases, because their form is not
responsive to utilitarian demands." Idem, at 742/3
58	 U.S.C. § 171.
Forthe definition of useful article see 17 U.S.C. 101.
60 For an account, inclusive relevant cases see Robert C Denicola, see footnote 52, at 737/8.
61 BonitoBoatsv Thunder Craft Boats 119891 489 US 141
62 For cnticism, see Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: ifiusion or Realit)'?, [1985] 10 0kb City
L. Rev. 195.
63 More comments on this including constitutional aspects. see "Constitutional Limits on Copynght
Protectiosi" in (1955) 68 Han,. Law Review 517; and "Protecting the Ailistic Aspects of Articles of Utility:
Copyright or Design Patent?" [1953] Harvard Law Review 877. Before the 1911 Copyright Act, this was also a
valid principle in Great Britain. See Board of Trade, .port of the Copyright Committee, October 1952, Cmd..
82, at 83. Although in principle protection is affordable, the right may not be enforced if it deprives
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Despite the pressures from economic segments, attempts for more specialized protection
have been rejected by the US Congress. A segment particularly dissatisfied with the situation
has been the textile industry, to which the inadequacy of the law has motivated a widespread
piracy of fabric designs. The industry has argued that its "success depends largely on ability to
capitalize on the popularity of a particular pattern, which often lasts but a single season."65
Considering the issue from the social bargain viewpoint, it is highly unlikely that protection
of non-novel utilitarian articles leads to a better society. This is a premise behind the American
system, which nevertheless may afford protection for unpatentable useflul articles to the extent
that the free appropriation has such a competitive consequence that it impedes the
development of an industiy. A number of arguments support the premise.
First, the cost of protection is expected to be considerably high, depending on the form of
protection. In those countries where the regime of registered utility models is available for the
protection of non-novel designs the number of applications tends to be higher than
applications for design patent. 67 If protection is under registered copyright, the cost will not
be lower and some inconsistency may arise, for instance, under copyright the term of
protection tends to be longer than that available for patents. The disparity is apparent. Patents
enjoy less protection than an unpatentable industrial design. An adjustment of duration, by
lowering the period of protection, may correct the disparity. This, however, opens a door for
reducing copyright standard of protection. The result of such an interference of copyright in
consumers from the benefit of competition. See the doctrine of non-demgation from grant in British Leyland
Corp. and OthersvArmstrong Patents Co. Ltd [1986] RP.C. 279.
In Great Britain, two landmarks decisions illustrate the situation before the 1988 Act: the Dorling v
Honnor and Amp v Ulilux. The first set up that unregistered designs were eligible for copgbt protection, and
the second excluded functional articles which shape was not appealing to the eye, from protection under the
Registered Designs Act 1949. For a historical background about the legal protection ct industrial designs in the
United Kingdom, see Whitford Report, Chapter 3, March 1977, Cmixi 6732.
65 
"Developments in the Law - Unfair Competition", notes published in 11933146 Harvard Law Review
1171 at 11%.
See 1984 House Report No. 98-781, U.S. Code Cong. & AL Ne 5750 at 5757/58. hi a letter to the
chairman of the House Committee, professor Robert C Denicola of the University of Nthraska Lincoln 1ute:
"Beth Congress and the courts have taken pains to insure that copght has not mterfered with free aocess to
useful articles" 1983 Hit 1028 Heatings p. 234/5.
67 This is the case of Brazil, China, Germany, and Japan. In 1991, in these countnes the number of
applications for utility models far exceeded the number of applications for industrial designs. See WIPO,
Industrial Statistica for the Year 1991, table at p.9, Supp. to IP 2/1993, Pithhcataon IP/STAT 1991/k
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industrial design is the breaking of the theoretical rationale behind the intellectual property,
that is, copyright protects artistic works in opposition to industrial property which
traditionally protects useflul articles with industrial applications.
Second, nothing suggests that the costs for producing non-novel industrial designs are high.
These designs are currently considerably facilitated by computer aids. Even customized
designs can be rapidly adapted to the customer's taste without significantly altering the cost of
production. Computer-aided designs not only facilitate the job, but also do not require highly
trained designers. Therefore, industrial activities involving non-novel designs do not require
substantial investments nor intensive research. Legal monopolization is thus far less than
decisive.68
Third, the meaningful social bargain rests inter a/ia on the benefits expected from a
successful working of an advanced art that is not expected from non-novel designs. In this
respect if the postulate of promoting innovation inherent in the industrial property is missing,
there is point in the argument for non protection. The absence of novelty can only be
excepted if the functional article, beanng sufficient technical merit, has
resulted from substantial investments and intensive learning-by-doing activities. Otherwise, no
imperative factors would justifi the alteration of the terms on which the social bargain relies.
Fourth, the market for non-patentable industrial designs is at a face value presumably
centred on monopolistic competition, characterized by a large number of fin 69 none of
them being large enough to affect the market conditions artificially. In such a competitive
environment, the decisions firms take do not threaten competitors, and firms' mobility is not a
problem. The suggestion based on that presumption is this. Even if not capable
of meaningfully altering firms' performance, protection could upset market stability, by
creating conditions which may enhance monopoly positions, thus leading to losses in welfare
As it was suggested by E. Mansfield, protection of intellectual property tend to be more decisive in the
fields of advanced technologies. See E Mansfield, "Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct hestincnt,
and Technology Transfer", LFC/World Bank, Discussion Paper no. 19, p. 11/12,1994.
The bulk of the firms are in specific indusIries &xh as textile and dress toys, replement parts in cars
and home appliance, furniture, carpets and cro±eiy/cutlery. See Report of the Copyright Committee, Part X,
Cind. 8662.
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and efficiency by favouring a tied market, excessive pncing and curtailing consumer
choices.7°
These arguments concur to invigorate the tenet of the American system, 7' which allows
free access to non-novel utilitarian articles regardless of the impact of the copying on business
ethics. 72 It must be acknowledged that such an effect is highly likely to be competitively
adverse in the field of high-tech, including microchips.
(iii) The social bargain under the SCPA
As previously mentioned, mask works are non-aesthetic designs. Excluding a small number of
patentable circuitries, protection relies on the arrangement of technical elements, as a product
of labour skills and investments. In ensuring protection for mask-work designs, the American
society had great concern for the economic utility of a functional article. The US Congress
tailored a legal regime which is selective, by applying it only to a specific useful article, and in
addition highly solicitous to competition. Possessing neither inventive nor artistic tenor, mask-
work designs deserve protection for their technical merit, that is, for the combination of
advanced, known and valuable technical elements they bear. Lack of protection would disturb
competition. In the societal judgement, both technical and competitive elements justifr the
protection of some usefhl articles while denying it to others73
Selected aspects of the sui generis mask work law, such as the subject matter of protection,
duration, exclusive rights and exceptions, and registration are now examined. The purpose is
70 See Whitfoni Report on Copyright and Designs Law, paras. 136, 147 and 156, Cmnci 6732, March 1977.
71 Tbe useful article doctrine is strong as ever. See Bros, Design Protection: An Overview, [19871 34
UCLA L Rev. 1341. It has also been confirmed in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats
[1989J 489 US 141.
72 p venflon of unethical business practices is a concern of the Federal Trade Commission.. In the
circumstances of copying of unprotected industrial designs, which does not fall in the conc of unfair
competition, tbe Commission's actions is limited. As part of its role tbe FTC has conducted conferences for
business men and encouraged tbe industries to formulate self regulation on ethical conducts. See notes on
"Developments in the Law - Unfair Competition" [19331 Harvard Law Review 1171 at 1200-1202.
' The pitfall of the selective protection is that it could lead to a sort of economic discrimination which falls
shert of the itheral ideals.
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to stress the argument that although any intellectual property form strikes a balance of
interests,74 the state needs to control or limit the exercise of proprietaiy rights75
The social bargain as to the subject matter
As a key concept in the SCPA, the mask work is the core of the subject matter in which the
technical merit, ie, the combination of technical elements, lies. In addition, originality is
ed76 in relation to such combination. The public policy behind originality, as a minimum
requirement to qualify the mask work, is "to prevent public domain material from being
usurped and turned into proprietary rights." Apart from this, in order to be eligible for
protection the mask work has to be fixed in a permanent means, ie, not in a data base tape,
but in a semiconductor product. 78 The fixation clause only appeared in the last bill, and its
rationale is not explained by the House Committee. It is here argued that the fixation, as it is
required by the SCPA, may run counter to public interest.
The permanent fixation of the mask work as a requirement for protection encourages the
coupling of designing with manufacturing. The former contains some degree of intellectual
work, but the latter is purely investments and management. This
condition results in legal protection being extended to include manufacturing. To extend
protection over manufacturing in theory sounds consistent, to the extent that i generis law
aims to protect investments and consequently ensure fair competition, but it seems
unjustifiable.
'' It took the US Congress six years to build up the sui generis law in a manner which met public
requirement Such a concern s thus reported: "When creating new intellectual property rights or in
expanding old rights. 1egisbors must therefore weigh the relative equilies between the rights of the property
holders and the interests of the public. Where technological changes have occurred, and those changes have
had an impact on the lives of millions of people (as [it] is the case for semiconductor chips), Congress must be
extremely careful that its apxoach be reasonable and vvrkable." 1984 House Report 98-781, at 5754.
Against this contention, it s argued at WIPO that because reverse engineering souId strike a proper
balance of mterests non-voluntary licence sild be not needed. WIPO, Committee of Experts on Intellectual
Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, Doe. IPICJCEJIV/3, para 50, September 1988.
76 SCPA, § 901 (aX2), 902(b) and 906(aX2). The mask-vrk design consists of a combination of technical
elements induding arca, lines and rectangles. 1984 House Report 98-78 1, at 5768.
' Idem, at 5768.
This is a condition particular to the SCPA, § 901(aX3).
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The coupling of designing and manfucturing may contribute to the development of business
practices wiuich are likely to create an economic independence upon designing firms. The
flourishing designing industry consists of small and medium independent flrms dedicated to
the business of mask-work designs. They do not require big laboratories and plants, only
labour skills and software-tools in order to process simulations of the designs they make.
Such design firms rely on manufacturing companies, firstly, for the chip manufacture and,
secondly, for infonnation related to manufacturing process. The manufacture of microchips
designed by finns which are established in the majority of developing countries is generally
ordered abroad. This makes the economic dependence a problem of international scale. In
addition, designing requires access to technical data which is regarded as a valuable asset in
the hands of the manufacturing companies. The data consists of programs and files describing
technical requirements, that match specific manufacturing techniques, and which designers
have to comply with This situation affords the manufacturing companies a bargaining power
over the designing firms. Relying on their economic strength, manufacturers may refuse
orders to manufacture certain types of chips which might compete with their products.
It could be argued that the above situation may occur
notwithstanding the scope of protection. Moreover, whether refusal to deal would have or
not an effect adverse to competition would be a matter to be accordingly dealt with under
antitrust rules. This argument is correct, but does not prove that to extend protection over
manufacturing is necessary.
A practice in the chip industry is the transfer of the proprietary rights over the mask works,
required by manufacturers as a condition to accept a manufacturing order 8° As a
Small chip-design firms play a significant role in challenging big companies and preventing them flDm
dominating and abusing the market The flourishing of these small firms in the 1980s, mostly in the ASIC
business, in the USA and Europe, couioided ith a gradual do-coupling of chip design from process
technology. See Mike Hobday, Wrl European semi-conductor industzy resurgence and rationahsanon", in
"Technology and the Future of Europe, Githal Competition and Environment in the 1990s", edited by C.
Freeman, M Sharp and W. Walker, p. 80 and 87, SPRU, 1991; and David Mowery, The U.S. national
innovation system Origins and prospects for change, [19921 21(2) Research Policy 125 at 138 and footnote 32.
° Presumably, the ground for the transfer of the propnetaxy nghts is the lad of protection fcc the mask
works, not necessarily because they are onginated from a countiy having no legislation on integrated cirQñt
protection, but because the US law afford no protection to unfixed mask works.
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consequence, designing finns are found m a bizarre contractual position as a buyer of the
manufacturing service and at the same time co-developer of mask-work designs.
The practice just described is highly detrimental to designing firms established in
unpnvileged countries, such as those in Latin America, which possess low level of
manufactuiing capacity or no capacity at all. Designing firms from these countries order
almost all the manufactuiing of their integrated circtuis from abroad. In this circumstance,
these firms face a substantial barry to access the market.
The entiy of designing firms in the chip market, which is oligopolistic and international by
its nature, is especially affected by limited access to key resources, economies of scale and
product differentiation, and predatory actions. 8 ' The large semiconductor chip companies
control the access of designing firms to maniithcturing processes, thus, determining what type
of chip markets82 they can or cannot share. The designing business is thus under the control
of manufacturing companies.
The social bargain as to the duration of protection
As far as duration of protection is concerned, the rationale is this: the owner is given an
opportunity to recoup the investments. Beyond this opportunity, the society holds the
expectation of bearing fruit from the work or invention once it falls into public domain. The
expectation is based on the assumption that once protection has expired, access to the work
or invention is still worthwhile. The shorter the term, sooner the free-of-charge reproduction
of the creative matter may take place.
81 See Thomas R Howell et alal, The Microelectronics Race: The Impact of Government Policy on
International Competition, Appendix B (The Economics of Semiconductor Production and Competition), p.
233, 1988, Westview Press.
82 DRAM, SRAM, EPROM, Microcontroller maitels. See WIPO, Studies and Analysis Dealing th Legal
Matters Cciicerning Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, Study number seven, Annexo I,
Dcc, IPIC/S17, Februaiy 1988.
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A shorter duration for the protection of chip-designs was a common concern of the US
Congress, which found the copyright term excessive.83 Furthermore, long protection for
chip-designs would be contrary to normal practices for industrial property. Examining the
balance of interest objectively, the Congressional stance reflected an old principle, which is
the enrichment of the public domain as a cardinal tenet of the intellectual property law. The
social bargain is thus explained:
A limited term ofprotectzon against copying is granted to an author's original expression in exchange for the
dedication ofthat expression in exchange for the dedication ofthat expression to the public domain at the end
of the term. The public ordinarily benefits at least twice from this bargain: once when the original expression
isfirst createa and then again when the original expression is added to the public domain from which anjxine
may borrow freely to farhion a new work Although a copyright belongs to an author during its term the
ultimate purpose of this bargain is not to protect authors but rather to enrich the public domain. The cardinal
principle in copght law, then, is that any decision to extend the law or to recognize new interests ought to be
based on a realistic expectation that one day the public domain will bear new fruit.
It may be contended that in the field of fast-moving technology, where the integrated circuit
is one of a kind, once the term of protection expires there is little or no realistic prospect for
the society to gain any benefit from copying a specific subject matter of protection. It follows
that the law can preserve no meaningfiul social bargain if in the course of the duration of
protection the public is given no opportunity to benefit fully from the protected work or
invention. This is at the core of the challenge the law faces in properly protecting new
technologies, ie, to ensure due return to investors, while
preserving the intellectual property bargain.
Two parameters, patent term and the chip's commercial life circle,85 could guide the
Congressional deliberation. The patent term, seventeen years, would be inappropriate. The
great majority of chip-designs are not eligible for patent, hence a patent-related term would
appear illogical since it would put inventive and non inventive mask works on an equal
footing.
83 The Bills introduced in 1983 and 1984 granting only ten years refleeted the nsen&is reached in the
House Committee's dthates. 1983 House Hearings on R.R. 1028, p. 171.
84 Statement of Professor David Lange, quoted in the 1984 House Report 98-781, at 5754.
85 The ecommic life circle is defined as a period starting "with the produc1s introduction into the market"
and ending "when there is i longer a demand" for a given produa WIPO, Doc. IPICJSI7, p. 6, Febniaiy
1988.
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The length of commercial life circle varies, taking "two to five years in the normal case".
The trend, however, is that newer and more complicated chips are likely to require more time
to yield a reasonable payback. Such a period may exceed seven years. 87 Taking two
important chip families, such as DRAM and EPROM: the decline of life circle is between
seven and eleven years. A ten-year term may take twice as long as the life circle of the bulk
of integrated circuits, leading to the assumptions that, firstly, after the life circle there is still a
commercial value worth exploiting; and, secondly, protection extending past the life circle is
not sufficient for the chip-design owner to recoup the investments he made. The question
now is whether after a penod twice as long as the life circle, society can possibly expect to
benefit from an unprotected design. The variation of the life circles for the majority of chip
flunilies provides no secure answer, but it is realistic to suggest that a ten-year term for a fast-
moving technology is unlikely to render a meaningful benefit for the public, unless
access is facilitated.89
A term of protection as long as, or longer than, chip's life circle could be justified on
grounds of compensation for a weak protection9° with respect to relevant elements, such as
the bundle of the exclusive rights accorded, the exceptions to them, and the enforcement
measures and penalties against infringements.9 ' Such an argument would consider that the
life circle is a valid parameter and once it expires a prospect of commercial value still exists. It
is very difficult, however, to assess the concept of weak protection. This is a too ambiguous
expression to be taken as an element for comparison. Therefore, for the weak-protection
argument to prevail it would have to be taken for granted that in virtue of a low but too long
Comment, Copyright for Integrated Circuit Designs: Will the 1976 Protect Act Against Chip Pirates?,
(1983)24 S. Tex. L. J. 817 at 850, as it s citedby Pamela Sainnelson in [1985] 70 Minn. L. R 471 at 492.
SecThomasDunlap'sstatementinthel983HearingsonRRl028,atp.43.
WIPO, IPIC/St7, Annexes I and II, Februaiy 1988.
For instance a non free-charge licensing scheme.
° As R Stem suggests, "one y to compensate for more or fewer years of protection is to afford a weaker
01 stronger arsenal of remedies." In "The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Tecluiclogy" [198516147 University
ofPittsburghL.R. 1229, at 1251.
9! Infringements can be satisfactorily controlled through economic sanctions 11984 House Report 98-781, at
5774 and 5776],
and the exclusion of criminal penalties avoids the inconvenience of the ciiminal procedures which require a
znoie rigorous test of evidence, and a total disclosure of information. Additionally, penalization may inhibit the
legilimite practice of reverse engineering At least one can say that criminal sanctions create expectations
contraiy to the nature of the aess provided by the reverse engmeering and to the designing psychology. It is
natural that the legal system should reflect this fact.
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protection the public requirement would be realistically met,92
 by means of greater
accessibility. The more people can trade in the chip business early in the life circle, the better
for the public.
In addition, provided that the weak protection makes possible the realisation of the public
requirement, which would to a certain extent be translated into a compensatory level of
welfare, a long protection would be acceptable as a sort of tax levied upon the society at
large. Otherwise, a protection that lasts too long would stimulate an unjustifiable monopoly.
The incremental protection beyond the life circle would be of little value or incentive, if any,
to innovation.
Social bargain as to the exclusive rights
Concerning exclusive tights, 93 the most sensitive aspects in the perspective of the social
bargain rest on the exceptions allowed. It is important for both the owner and the State, that
the scope and the number of exclusive rights granted are justifiably set for the recouping of
the investments, and conform with the nature of the concerned intellectual property regime
and technology. It should be noted that a determinant sense of proportion lies in the fact that
the larger the set of tights, the more the risk of inflingements. Having considered these
features, the US Congress eventually rejected the right of use which, although not included
in the 1984 SCPA, is of some assistance in understanding the exceptions to exclusive tights.
The social bargain as to exceptions
The vagueness of the argument does not demerit its conceXua1 validity which much relies on a case-by-
case test and on the
	 eucy/ie1fare cntena.
The owner of a protected chip-destgn has the exchi rights to reproduce the mask work, import or
distribute chip products embodying a mask woit or to induce a person to do any of these. SCPA. § 905.
The tight of use appeared in the Bills FLR 1028 and the S. 1201. Cmnhing on it, an official of the
Copynght Office swote in her statement: uthe 'use' right proposed here soema unrelated to anything known to
any copyright system, past or present, here or abroad. It is a right foond in patent law, but alien to copyright
law. Such a right appears by its terms to give a copyright oi the right to control the manufacture of a
useful article and to control in evety respect how a bona fide purohaser of a chip product uses that cqy. Ms
Schrader, 1983 HearingsonlLR. 1028, at 110/111. Seealso 1984 HooseRepoit 98-781, at 5770 andfootnote
40.
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As an exception to the right to reproduce, 95 the Chip Act allows the free copying of any
"idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discoveiy"
and incorporation of "concepts or techniques embodied in the mask work or the Circuitry,
logic flow, or organization of components used in the mask work" which are disclosed as a
result of reverse engineetingY
Reproduction of a mask work for the purpose of study and analysis is a point of departure
for a firm to "create another semiconductor chip product that competes with the first," the
second chip having "the same electrical and physical performance characteristics as the
existing chip (so-called 'form, fit and function' compatibility)."'°° Incorporated in the industry
metier, this practice is deemed to foster competition, and the legislative history of the SCPA
indicates that the US Congress intended to legalize and encourage it, in so far as it is not a
bridge to slavish copying.'°'
Reverse engineering defence, however, is not an euphemism for unlawful copying. In order
to stand as a legally created design, a mask work (i) has to be the product of substantial
analysis and study, recorded in a substantial audit trail' 02 showing how the mask work was
designed, thus, reflecting the considerable time and money invested in the worlç (ii) must be
original, in the sense that, although incorporating portions of a previous competing product, it
is not substantially identical' 03 to this, ie, includes improvements upon, or is an alternative to,
the mask work first created; and (iii) has to contain substantial variation compared to existing
ones, thus, enabling the creator or owner to claim an independent creation.
SCPA, § 905(1) and 906(a).
SCPA, § 902(c).
SCPA, § 906(aXl). Patented integrated circuit excluded, obviously.
As it is recorded in the Whitford Report, within several industiy segments there is a strong feeling that
"the future health of the engineering industry depends on the right to copy (or at least emulate) being
comparatively unfetterei" Report of the Committee to consider the Law on Copyright and Designs, pam. 150,
at 40/41, March 1977, Cmnd 6732.
1984 House Report 98-781, at 5770.
Idem, at 5771.
101 Idem, ident
102 For the concept of audit trail see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.1 (iü).
103 It has been argued that in assessing infringement the variation between two mask works is concerned
with substantial similarity, but no clear cut exists between substantial and insubstantial mi1arity. The
boundaiy between the two is a matter for the courts to decide. 1984 House Report 98-781, at 5775/5776.
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Clearly, the interface between reverse engineering and originality permits the contention
that the audit trail is not a test of originality it is a test of fair competition. Since the
incorporation of other designs' features is permitted, originality does not imply a creation
entirely independ from previous designs.'°4 The degree of originality is thus a requirement
which merely indicates a technical surplus or a contributory merit, distinguishing a mask work
from others, non inventive ones, by the particular form that techniques or concepts, and
components, used or embodied in the mask work are illustrated or organized. In total this
reveals that protection of chip designs integrates a strong component of competition, which
diminishes the conceptual dimension of property.'°5
The social bargain as to exhaustion of rights
From competition law viewpoint, it is ordinarily inappropriate for a firm to control its
customer's business policies. In intellectual property law, this general principle is named
exhaustion doctrine, meaning that once an intellectual property asset is firstly and lawfully
sold, the owner has no iight to control the subsequent sales. Unless the US Congress
provides otherwise, such a rule is a basic tenet of the American systems of intellectual
property.'°6 The exhaustion of right is connected with sales, not reproduction or "use".
Owners enjoy a continuing right to control reproduction of their mask works, but such a
control does not apply to tight to import or distribute. Once the mask work embodied in a
semiconductor product is lawfully sold, the owner has no right
104 Section 901(4) of the final version, the HR. 5525 Bill, provided for a concept of onginality in these
terms: "a mask rk is original if it is the independent crealion of an author who did i copy it from another
source." The 1984 SCPA, hoswver, does not reproduce such a concept, and the House Report 98-781 gives no
explanation for the deletion.
'° Serious doubts re raised at the US Congress in relation to whether or not the sul genens law of mask
works s wider the constitutional copyright-patent clause. See 1984 House Report 98-781, at 5765, footnote
36.
106 1984 House Report; 98-781 at 5772. For a legal analysis of the economics of the exhaustion of
proprietaly rights, soe David L. Perrott, "The exhaustion of intellectual property rights as a constraint on
mujlinationals", . 44.67, in Current 1&ies in International Busine Law, edited by David L Perrott &
Istvan Pogany, Avthwy, 1988. See Boesch v. Graff 119891 133 US 697; United States v. Geial E1ric Co.
[19261 272 US 476; U.S. v. Univis Lens 119411 316 US 241.
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over the pricing or any business conduct of the re-seller, who is free to use and re-sell the
product but not to reproduce it. '°' The continuing subsistence of the right to control
reproduction has the effect of protecting the owner against the selling and distribution of
infringing chips, however such a right does not interfere with the "use" of infringing products,
provided that the user has taken no part, either directly or indirectly, in illegally copying.' 8
Therefore, the tenet of the law is to combat slavish copying for commercial gain.' 09 The
competition element is once more apparent.
The social bargain as to registration
A final issue, registration serves to identify and disclose the design on which protection is
granted. It contains a twofold intent: to promote access and legal certainty. The public is
given the opportunity to access the technical contribution to the designing art. Such
acknowledgement permits the business circle to design around, and to build up a sense of
competition ethics, or to structure a business conduct by figuring out the degree of creativity
or originality the industry has established as a common sense of the staple product. The
rationale is this: "the disclosure and consequent contribution to the art is the quid pro quo for
the monopoly rent, or the proposed shifting of resources from the pockets of users to
creators."° On the side of the evidenciary policy, the registration requires the applicant to
enter a description of the protected subject matter. This enables others to do a
straightforward or facial verification and may consider a claim for inflingement, if it is the
case. In creating greater legal certainty, registration fuffils the public interest by not only
reducing the risk of litigation, but in addition by avoiding or fighting a sham claim thus
107 The SCPA, § 905(2) and 906(b).
108 If the user, as a purchaser, mduces a firm to illegally reproduce the mask work he or she may be liable.
See the SCPA § 905(3).
109 If the US Congress had granted "use" right, the owners of mask svrks would have been given "the
power to sue and zecxwer from persons who used a pirated chip, such as using it in a factozy as part of a
computerized machine, even though the user had not itself copied, manufactured, or sold the pirated chip."
1984 House Report 98-781, at 5770 footnote 40. The mere use of the mask iw'rk or the chip embodying it
affects no exclusive rights. This is important to determine the liability of the innocent purchaser, who cani be
held liable only for the acts of purchasing and using. See the SCPA, § 9 01(aX7), 905 and 907(a).
110 Richard H Stem, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 11986147 U. Pit Lit 1229 at 1248.
113
preserving a healthy relationship among the industry. As far as legal disputes postpone or
prevent the marketing of cheaper products," long litigations are against the public interest.
The discussion of intellectual property issues at international fora involves a great deal of
vaiying interests. On one hand, countries respond to these issues in different ways and, on the
other hand, they have legal systems which are not uniform Despite the divergencies there
seems to exist a desire among them in formulating international standards of protection in a
manner which integrates domestic requirements. This makes the intellectual property bargain
a universal concern, to be considered in the international negotiations.
" A dispute ben AMD and Intel hung over i& AMIYs 386 and 486 clones of Intel's chips. AMD won
the right to use Intel microcode in the chips. The decision brought the prospect of price falls on PCs and
processors. See details in "PC DIRECT", May 1994, p. 37. Compure with the briefing in "IEEE Speclrum",
August 1993, p. 47/48. See news about the first decision in [1990140 BNA's Patents Trademark & Copyright
Joun 444.
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3.3 The policy
 of the IPIC Treaty and the A greement on TRIPS
3.3.1 Building up the groundwork
(1) The unwritten policy
General principles are significant both for the interpretation of legal instruments and
understanding legislative policy. in the negotiating process of the IPIC Treaty certain claims
which had the purpose of limiting protection were put forward and eventually rejected. These
included a preferential treatment for a group of underprivileged countries and a broad
statement of aims and effects of protection. The final text was approved without important
elements of legal policy. The lack of such ground rules expressed the interest of leading
countries, such as United States and Japan, which advocated strong protection. Perhaps, an
intellectual property treaty is a too limited instrument to set broad policies.
The public policy behind intellectual property is generally forged domestically under the
power of both, the Parliament through legislation and the courts on a case-by-case basis.
Such a policy is a product of cultural and legal traditions formulated, construed or developed
within a framework of state institutions. Domestic intellectual property policy also relies on
general principles of welfare which dictate the transfer of resources on a just basis with a view
to improving conditions of the national life in such vital areas as health and education. This
implies a type of solidarity among the citizens at a national level which is not true of the
international context. Consequently, it seems correct to suggest that a true international public
policy does not exist.
The central purpose of the international law of intellectual property is to reduce trade
distortions, not expand the beneficial distribution of technology. As the public policy
objectives vary from country to country, a multilateral agreement concerning economic
exchanges, hence regulating trade matters including intellectual properly, can only set up
universal grounds. The formulators of the IPIC Treaty certainly were aware that broad
principles have a considerable guiding function, but they contrasted with a desired strong
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protection, and enforcing them is very difficult. Thus, it seemed wiser for the member States
to insert such principles in national legislation.
Claims and counterclaims
At the early stages of the first meeting of experts convened for the discussion of the
protection of integrated circuits and drafting the IPIC Treaty, the issue of the balance between
the owners' tights and the interests of the society was raised. Since the Treaty was being
drafted primarily to inhibit piracy, rather than to grant monopoly, it was questioned where
that balance should lie. In fact, there was not much to be balanced, it was argued, since the
draft under discussion already expressed a convergence between "the interests of the society
and the interests of the creators." It was believed that to a certain degree States were
allowed to limit rights, and the reverse engineering would enable competitors "to build upon
existing technology without the need for an authorisation of the owner of the rights." 2 This
contention seemed illogical for those underprivileged countries having little access to the
technology of integrated circuit. There was considerable apprehension, among country
representatives claiming weak protection, that the benefits of reverse engineering were
confined to a small number of countries which dominated chip technology.
A proposed bargain was tabled on the basis of preferential treatment for the least-developed
and developing countries, 3 claiming the recognition of a sort of "compensating inequalities"4,
or "structural weakness." 5 Such special treatment, which was forcefully opposed, included
facilitation of the technical progress, technology transfer in reasonable terms, control of
licensing contracts, setting of appropriate measures against abusive trade practices, and co-
operative anangements in the field of technology transfer, all of which aimed at the social and
WIPO, Dcc. IPICJCE/1112, p.8, paras. 19 and 20.
2 Idein, para. 20.
For the concept of least-developed, developing and developed countries, see GAiT, International Trade
88-89 (Technical notes at tbe Appendix 1), V.!, at p. 45/46, Geneva, 1989.
' A concept of "compensating inequalities" includes legal measures discriminating in favour of developing
in1nes which, asiming they were discriminated in the past, now believe that "under the usual teims of Ixee-
trade market they would never be able to reap profits so large as to enable them in the foreseeable future to
fuiffi their ambitious development plans by their own means." Ignaz Seidi-Hohenveldem, International
Economic Law, p. 7, Kluwer, 1992.
See "Legal Aspects of the New International Order" edited by Kamal Hossain, specially Introduction (p.
9-22) and Part II, no. 9, p 156-159, Frances Pinter, 1980.
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economic development of developing countnes. 6 The claim for preferential treatment was not
considered by the WIPO International Bureau in detail, and was apparently abandoned.
Nevertheless, as the historical evolution of the draft Treaty records,7 significant efforts were
canied out with a view to settling general commitments.
The would-be preamble
A short preamble prepared by WIPO intended to capture the views of the negotiating parties.
It indicated both the reasons for and the aims and effects of the protection. The former were
of a social and economic nature.
The aims of the Treaty consisted of firstly the "equity" associated with the social reasons,
secondly, the technological and economic progress associated with the incentive for creation,
thirdly, the promotion of international exchange of technological achievement, and finally a
balance of private and public interests at an international level. As to the effects envisaged by
protection, it was intended that the framework would provide for dissemination of chip
products, and "transfer of technology towards developing countries in particular."8
 The
wording of the third paragraph carned an element of preferential treatment. Consequently,
perhaps the preamble was not reproduced in the official text of the Treaty.
The history background to the Treaty hence clearly unveils diplomatic effort of a group of
countries willing to set up the foundations for multilateral protection for intellectual property
in respect of integrated circuits. The deletion of the would-be preamble need not necessarily
be regarded as a total failure of commercial diplomacy. The policy not included in the IPIC
Treaty was introduced in the Agreement on TRIPS concluded under the GAU framework.
6 [1986] IP 373, at 375. For dotails about the diussion of the proposed "preferenflal treatment" s WIN),
Dcc. JPICJCE/lVf3, paras. 119 to 127, September 1988.
' S the la draft Treaty and ccmpamon explanations (notes on the preamble) prepared by the Dir1or
TJ()	 brog	 Diplomatic Confereiice in Washington, IPIC/DC/3, paras. 12 to 29, 31
Januaiy 1989.
8 Idem, idem - for the explanations of the preamble.
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(ii) General disciplines and comities
As aforementioned, a major objective of the Agreement on TRIPS is to reduce trade
distortions resulting from uneven levels of protection of intellectual property. This defines the
scope of its underlying policy, which does not intend to eliminate such distortions. In
approaching the groundwork of the Agreement, the analysis is limited to those principles
relevant to the study of the legislative policy as far as the protection of integrated circuits is
concerned.
From the outset of the GATT negotiations on trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights, the position of the member states were clearly defined. 9 The piimaiy concern of those
willing to raise the level of protection was to define the amount and duration of exclusive
rights, and the conditions for limiting them under state discretion through neat provisions.
Conversely, those countries beliewig that through the Agreement could loose their obligation
for protecting intellectual property nationally,'° relied largely on broad principles. These were
chiefly designed to soften the standards of rights by undertaking not only to discourage piracy
and trade restrictions at international level, but also domestically to fulfil special needs and
promote social and economic development.
A welfare-and-efficiency charter?
The final text of the draft Agreement on TRIPS, reflecting the views of all member states,
eventually became a framework of not only intellectual property provisions, but also a charter
The United States, Japan, and the European Community as an economic institution, here identified as
First Group, had similar positions, distinguishing from the position of the 14-counfly group, or Second Group,
formed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt India, Nigeria, Peru Tanma and
Uruguay, later joined by Pakistan and Zimbabwe. S the GATF documents series MTN.GNGNG1 hG
numbers 14 (20.10.87) and 14/Rev.! (17.10.88) presented by the USA; 17(23.11.87) and 17/Add.! (23.9.88)
originating from Japan, 16 (20.11.87) and 26 (7.7.88) from the E.C.; 30 (31.10.88) tabled by Brazil; and 71
(14.5.90) circulated at the request of the 14-counny Group. And NUR 036, at p.9,1.6.90. Although holding
concernS of their own, the oiler countiies were remained somehow attached to one or other group.
'° Compare the draft Treaty presented by the 14-conntiy Group and that one presented by the United States.
GATF documents MTN.GNG/NG11/Wt71, 14 May 1990; and MTN.GNG/NG11JW!70, 11 May 1990.
Substantially, the 14-countiy Group eventually cropped very little. However, their contribution to the
conceptual structure of the Agreement should not be neglected
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of welfare and efficiency pnnciples." Designed to regulate proprietaiy rights, the text include
important competition rules. This is a singular and prominent feature of the Agreement not
encountered in any multilateral treaty of the kind. Recognising the limitation of rights based
on competition goals, the Agreement on TRIPS provides for a conceptual development of the
intellectual property law at international level.'2
Insisting on a framework of general principles which addressed a balance of interests
through political commitment, the second group of countries relied on the nature of the
GATT frameworlç the mandate of the Uruguay Round, and the large scope of the trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS).
Although nothing could conceptually bar the discussion of beneficial distribution of
technology at WIPO, the negotiations there on the protection of chip-designs were expected
to be primarily concerned with the matter of intellectual property. Therefore, the GAIT
seemed to be a more appropriate forum for dealing with the overall implications of TRIPS.'3
As a trade forum; the GAIT was given a mandate which, although arguable, could render the
discussion of the "trade related aspects of intellectual property rights in the context of the
promotion of growth and development" 4 possible.
When putting forward their arguments negotiators from the second group shared the
apprehension that if a balance of interests was not considered, expanded protection could
' This is perceived from the preamble, Articles 7,8 and 31 of the Agreement on TRIPS. In respect of the
insertion of these pnuciples and rules the second group played a vital role. See also the provisions of Section 8,
dealing w,th the control upon the use of intellectual property rights.
12 The conceptual development is perceived from the evolution of competition policies and lawa over the last
t dev1es in the OECD countries, the structure of their competition mechanism being reinvigorated
considerably. See Chapter 6.
13 In the outset of the negotiations, the Second Group of cxxuitries contended that WIP() would not be the
right forum to deal with substantial mailers of intellua1 property. See Frederick Abbot. Protecting First
World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATF Multilateral Framevork
[1989J 22(4) Vaixi J. of Transi Law 689 at 713. In turn, there a good faith basis in the argument that once
the GATF was chosen as an acceptable forum iha negotiations on TRIPS slxmld contemplate the full
conseruences ofa GATF-based solution fur the issue of intellectual property.
14 Linking intellectual property and economic growth, a mission from the Bra'iliin representative
proposed to read in this extension the mandate of the Uruguay Round concerning TRIPS. See GATF note
MTN.GNGNG1 1/30,31.10.88. As it was highlighted in furtl discussions, the intention was to re-introduce
the claim for a "favourable treatment". See notes released by the Media and Relations Division of the GATF,
NUR 034, at p. 5,23.2.90; NUR 035, at p. 14, 19.4.90; and NUR 036, at p. 8/9, 1.6.90.
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amount to more difficulties in accessing technology, and increase abusive or anti-competitive
use of intellectual property rights. It was asserted that "only few countries are in a position to
take greater advantage of a very strict protection of IPRs. That is so because these countries
maintain a monopoly of technological knowledge, dispose of a long tradition in managerial
capacity as well as of wide financial resources."' 5 Protection thus required "that abuses or
restrictive practices are eliminated and punished." 6 Otherwise, it was added, stronger
protection would ironically cause "restrictions and distortions in international trade."'7
Differing from the agenda on the drafting of the IPIC Treaty at WIPO, negotiations of the
Agreement on TRIPS at GATF included the whole range of the intellectual property issues.
This would render the dimension of the divergence far larger, requiring the opposing groups
of country representatives to strengthen their views. Whether the approved text of the
Agreement on TRIPS satisfies the many concerns of all trade partners, is difficult to judge. As
far as the discipline of general commitments is concerned, however, a number of principles
were introduced in the final text which is quite different from the drafts presented by the
major opposing interest groups.' 8 Most of these principles and disciplines'9 are relevant to
the structuring of national policy.
A private right tempered with public policy
The clause which recognises the intellectual property as private rights has the effect of
entithng right holders to sue against uncompensated and unauthorised reproductions which
violate an enforceable law. Being created by legislators, 2° the lights of authors and inventors
' MTN.GNG/NGI1/30, 31.10.88 (Submission from Brazil).
' 6 Iclem, idein. The argument here is correct, as r as the need to control abusive use of intellectual property
rights is the case. Nothing in the international trade regulation suggests, hovivver, that any country cannot take
the appropriate measures to cure unjustifiable restraint of trade.
'' Idem, idem. See also GAiT, "News of the Uruguay Round", NUR 041, at p.5,9 October 1990.
18 See the draft Treaties, GAiT notes MTNGNG/NG1 1170, 11.5.90; and MTN.GNGING1 1171, 14.5.90.
Apart from those traditional principles of trade regulations, such as national treatment, mest-favoured nation,
and transparency, the US draft contained no ground rules nor specific provisions concerning the control of the
IPR use, which only appeared in the draft presented by the Second Group of countries
' These principles and disciphnes are: (a) the principles of private nghts, national pubhc pohcy, and
fleedom of implementing methods; (b) causal statements - reasons for, anus and effects of the protection; and
(c) meaningful limitalious - proper measures to promote public interests acurdingly, awl to curb unreasonable
restraints of trade. See the Agreement, preamble, Artides 1,7 and 8.
20 Even considering copyright as deriving from natural law, it does not prevent legislatois in recognizing
and developing the autlx,r's rights from subjecting them to social obligations, as it is the case of Germany
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are only those expressly granted, and confined to the national boundaries. The very nature of
such a principle (private rights), which did not appear in the previous drafts, is to convey a
sense of power (control) over the rights conferred. Nevertheless, the light holder is given the
duty to exercise his tight in a certain fashion. It is a property right 2 ' albeit limited by a social
function22
 qualified by a public policy. The underlying theory is that intellectual property
consists of "statutory tights given by the State, and the State is entitled to see that the
advantages so given are exploited in such a way that the benefits can be enjoyed by the
general public, and not withheld from them."
The public policy principle claims due respect for national objectives which intellectual
property, as a potential instrument of state policy, is designed to serve. One such legitimate
objective is social and economic development, which relies heavily on the technological
paradigm as a modern developmental factor. When building up its policy, each State has the
freedom to choose the most appropriate method of implementing the Agreement at the
domestic level. The principle offreedom of implementing met/wth entitles the Contracting
Parties to set up the proper mode to combat anti-competitive use of intellectual property
rights. To this end, states need to improve and from time to time check their defensive legal
mechanisms. This assertion is part of the lesson from industrialised States, which have a long
experience in limiting proprietary rights. Over many years they have developed an antitrust or
competition system which has worked as an indispensable tool in assuring that the society is
benefiting properly from intellectual property. While failing to follow the same track, i.e., not
establishing domestically an efficient legal control of competition, developing countries have
copyright theoiy (1965 Act) which accommodates an extensive series of compulsoiy licences. See W.
Nonicmann, A Right to Control or Merely to Payment? - Tords a Logical Copyright Systeni [1980111 IIC
49.
21 As a private iight committed to a social function, the intellectual property is based on Parliamentaty acts
not on natural law, and complies with the old liberal ideahsnL The concept is in agreeincnt with the British
law, to which the patent is "a personal property witheut being a thing in action" and copyright is a property
subsisting in ardai iith the law. See 1977 Patents Act, S. 30(1), 1988 Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act, S. 1(1).
The recognition of the social function of property in the international economic law is indisputable. See
lgnaz Seidi-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law, 2nd revised edition, at p.4, 29-30, and 72. As it
applies to intellectual property, social function is therofore a limited concept rather than an unfettered State
UK/Board of Trade, Report of the Copyright Committee, pam. 179, CmncL 8662,1952.
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insisted on a type of international competition law24 which industrialised States have not yet
developed.
It can therefore be concluded that any State wanting to discourage abusive exercise of
propnetaiy rights at international level will not succeed unless such measures are introduced
in domestic law where the reasons for, and the aims and effects of; protecting intellectual
property have to be established and consolidated. In this respect, it is important to consider
that one of the functions of the Agreement is to encourage member states to improve national
legislation on competition.
The scope of protection and the underlying quid pro quo
Protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights form a central objective of the
Agreement. As a result, member States are under the obligation to protect the right holder
interest by enabling him to prevent others from unlawfully copying, thus protecting creativity
and the return on the investment. From the private interest viewpoint, the function of the
protection is
thus twofold: offering the right holder an opportunity of reaping a just return, and providing
an incentive for creation.
Protection has four contributory aims inserted in the general disciplines:
pPvmotlon of technological innovation,
transfer and dissemination of technology,
• mutual advantage ofpmducers and users of technological Jnowledge. and
• a balance of rights and obligations.25
24 See the stuKiure of the draft Treaty presented by the 14-countiy Group. In the preamble (part I) it is
stated the desirability "to ensure competition in international trade and to prevent arrangements which may
restrain such competition." GATF, MTN.GNG/NG1 1JW!71, p.2.
Agreement on TRWS, Article 7. Similar provision was found in the draft presented by the Second Group
of counines (Part II, chapter I, Article 2), and nothing alike in the US draft.
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By assuring protection, the Agreement and national legislation create an environment of
confidence, as it makes iight holders relatively certain that their technology will not be
unlawfully appropriated.
Content with the expected remuneration, right holders will thus be ready to invest in
creative activities and to make the result of such activities available to others. In this way,
transfer and dissemination of advanced technologies will not only be feasible, but faster and
more secure. This expectation is based on the assistance and co-operation which are part of
the duty of right holders. This is the result of the quid pro quo which the assurance of
protection implies, i.e., the conferment of rights to a reasonable return and the obligations of
promoting the transfer or exchange of the technical knowledge to meet local demands and,
consequently, benefiting the development process. Such a balance of rights and obligations26
is a vely sensitive concept, and in practical terms requires of the government surveying
permanently the conditions of the intellectual property market in order to eliminate or reduce
distortions.
Elimination of distortion, an unrealistic suggestion
If the aims are achieved, two effects can be envisaged from the Agreement and the legal
framework implementing it:
the reduction of distortions in - or impediments to - international trade, and
• the realisation of social and economic weWare.V
It seems incorrect to suggest that the Agreement on TRIPS is a basis for eliminating all
distortions derived from the unevenness of the national systems of intellectual property. The
It is also part of tic nghtholde?s thliganons to distribute his technology in fair conditions, i.e., not
resorting to abusive or anli-compeutive practces.
27 See Agreement on TRIPS, Ailicle 7 aM preamble (first paragraph). The social and economic welfare
furtion s also ixluded in tic draft circulated by tic 14-counliy Group, MTN.GNGING1 1/W171, at p.7.
The same draft envisaged to rede trade distortions by discouraging anti-competitive use of intellectual
property. Reflecting the 'view of the First Group, tic US draft set out to reduce "dIsto4tions and impediments to
1egilimi1e trade," and makes no specific refereuce to tic welfare matter. See MTN.GNGiNG1 1IW!70,
preamble, at p.2.
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desire for harmonisation of the laws, which would be necessaiy to eliminate all distortions, is
both unrealistic and impractical. It presupposes that all countnes enjoy equal economic
conditions, which is untrue. Furthermore, distortions exist also in other areas, resulting in
trade baniers. This reality led member States to claim reduction, rather than elimination, of
IPR-ongmating distortions. Precisely because of the distinct economic reality of each countiy,
the pursuit of the social and economic welfare - achieved essentially by offering wider choices
to the consuming public - requires resorting to practical measures which are likely to valy in
scope from country to country.
The public interest exception
In order to pursue the realisation of social and economic welfare, member States have the
discretional right to apply necessary and proper measures on the grounds of public interest,
namely, protection of health and nutrition, promotion of other public needs in sectors of vital
importance, and prevention of abusive IPR exercise and unreasonable trade practices.29
These principles are a recognition that the structure of protection (that is, the set of exclusive
rights, exceptions, remedies against infringement, and enforcement mechanism) is not itself
effective in ensuring respect for the social and economic welfare goals.3°
States are in a position to make available a workable and meaningful mechanism, intrinsic or
extrinsic to the framework of intellectual property, making inteivention possible either to
recti1' a situation resulting from anti-competitive behaviour, or to promote the working of
protected technology for the improvement of social welfare. 3 ' In fonnulating such a
mechanism, the discretionary power of the state is, nevertheless, limited. Although free to
chose whatever method or legal measure it wishes, the State is committed to adopting a
For an account about IPR-originating distoiiions see the joint submission (EC, Japan and US) on Nj
problems erxouniered in connection ivith intellectual property nghls." GAU note MTN.GNG/N01 11W17, 29
May 1987.
29 Agreement on TRIPS, Aiticle 8, and Articles 31, 37(2) and 40 for further provisions. Similar provisions
only appeared in the draft made by the 14-country Group, GATF note M1N GNG(NG1 1/W171, Part I, Article
5, and Part II, Article 2(4).
3° This, again, confinn the point already made that out of the context of the compelition goals intellectual
property makes little or no sense.
' In the case of technology relating to integrated circuits, ireasures with purposes other than remedying an
anti-competitive situation are limited to official and non-commercial use.
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practice or mechanism which is consistent with the Agreement, e.g., that creates no barriers
to legitimate trade or adversely inhibits technology transfer.
In the framework of the Agreement, the wording of the general principles and disciplines
contrasts with detailed provisions concerning iights, enforcement and related arrangements.
The general principles and disciplines reflect a sense of temperance and a balance of interests
resulting from a long and complex negotiating process. To read these provisions with
disregard to that sense would be to discredit the Agreement.
3.3.2 Substantive multilateral standards and related issues
(i) Critical aspects of the scope of protection
Apart from a few alterations regarding the term of protection, extension of infringing acts,
and conditions for granting non-voluntary licences, the IPIC Treaty remains an important
source for the legal protection of chip-designs. 32 Despite a general wish to limit the
regulatory powers of the Contracting States as little as possible,33
 changes in the scope of
protection set up in the Agreement on TRIPS reveal the ultimate stage of the evolution of a
legislative policy marked by an increasing restraint upon national discretion 34
 related to key
aspects of the scope of the chip-design protection.
The degree of originality
32 1n the GAfl negotiations, the Contracting Parts were aware of the importance in saving those pmvisions
as to which consensus bad already reached during the negotiations €1 the Treaty. To neglect entirely the
laborious compromises taken in WIPO weuld be a risk and mistake that negotiators e not prepared to uir.
Thus, it was politiailly wise not only to confirm those points on what there were general agreements, bnt also
to incorporate into the GATF frameweck the INC Treaty as an Intellectual Property Convention, together with
the essential conventions on intellectual property administered by WIPO. See Article 2 of the Agreement on
TRIPS and the submission made by EC, GAU Note MTN.GNG/NG1 IJW/26, 7.7.88. (Guidelines).
See GATT note ICICJCE/IV/3, at p.15 (reflections of the International Bureau of WIPO, pam. 27). See
also Agreement on TRIPS, Article 1(1).
The range of agreements concluded as a result of the Uruguay Round, under the GATT framewerk, is
illustrative of the restrictive titni As to the intellectual property in partiailar, the structure of the IPIC Treaty
aml Agreement on TRIPS are the ease, differing fivm the traditional multilateral standards as to the thjectivity
of the rights conirred, and tighter discipline (e.g., Agreement ailicle 31), and denying or limiting
considerably the possibility of miking reservations.
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Apart from the layout design which is required to be the result of the creator's own
intellectual effort, 35 no concept for originality or degree of intellectual effort is established.
National legislation may valy on the matter. The US suE generis approach adopts a low level
of originality36	le under the multilateral standards. As no particular form of
protection is mandatoTy, 37 countries can even require a degree of originahty near to novelty,
ensuring no protection for a large number of layout-designs, or adopt a liberal interpretation
with a reverse effect. Countries are not obliged to define the degree of intellectual effort
required. The relevance of this element, therefore, is attached to reverse engineering. The
higher the degree of intellectual effort, the less the designer is allowed to benefit from reverse
engineering.
Subject of protection and designing
Representing the three-dimensional disposition "however expressed" of the IC elements
prepared for the manufacture of a chip, 39 the topography of a layout-design does not need to
be permanently fixed in order to be eligible for protection. It is sufficient that the chip-design
be encoded in any form, a magnetic tape for instance. Therefore, the topography does not
have to be manufactured. A legal regime which provides otherwise encourages the coupling
of designing with manufacturing. Such tying is an invitation to anticompetitive practices, and
provides no security for the IC-designing business, which is a fast-growing area. It would not
foster creative innovation if the designing firm is not given protection to its layout-design
independently of the manufacture.
The right to protection is legally established under certain conditions which imply the
emergence of a need. Protection is apparently needed at least in two situations. Firstly, when
The IPIC Trealy, Article 3(2)(a).
Acxording to the practices established by the US Copyright Office, a mask woit contnbeiion may be less
than tvnty percent. See 37 C.F.R. 211(1986).
INC Treaty, Ailicle 4.
As a result, countries may ados,$ diverging standards. See R. J. Hail, High Technology 'Reverse
Engineering': The dual standard 1198715 EIPR 139.
The IPIC Treaty, Article 2(ü). As a result of the debates in WIPO, the permanent fixation as a condition
for protection s rejected. See IPIC/CE/11/2, at p. 12, March 17, 1986.
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the integrated circuit is commercially exploited, thus exposed to competitors. Secondly, when
the topography, fixed in a magnetic tape or encoded in a digital form, is sent by a designing
finn to a manufacturing enterprise. In the course of the manufacturing service, usually hired
confidentially, the topography is exposed to the risk of copying. Not to ensure protection to
the topography encoded in digital form would be a failure in fostering the designing activity.
Independent design firms need access to details about the manufacturing process, i.e.,
technical infonnation belonging to the manufacturer. Allowing protection of layout-designs
regardless of manufacturing, the Treaty therefore fails to clarifj the relation between the
designing firm and the owner of a manufacturing process. 4° As such processes in the form of
software are normally patented, the manufacturing industry controls the access to it,
exercising a controlling power over the designing business and the chip market. Such a
control is exercised in different ways. One example is where the manufacturing company
limits the types of chips the designing firm can design and market by selecting the
manufacturing process the designing firm can access or has access to (each type of chip
corresponds to a specific manufacturing process). The order of manufacturing service can be
accepted under the condition that the property right is fully transferred to the manufacturing
company, which may regard the chip as being developed jointly, the ownership being thus
transferred to the owner of the manufacturing process.
Duration of protection
During the negotiations in WIPO, a minimum term of both five 4' and ten years were strongly
considered. Despite the divergence, it was recognised that at the expiration of a five-year
period, from either the first exploitation or registration, the integrated circuit may retain some
commercial value. 42
 On this ground, a balanced term of eight years was established in the
IPIC Treaty with no specification as to the date of commencement.
4°For me amts, see WIPO note INC/CM/i, at p.8.
It s argued that "a minimum term of five years *ild be sufficient as the effective life span of most
layout-designs s four to five years and as likely to decrease in future." See WIPO, Report of tbe
International Bureau [19861 IP 373, at p. 375.
42 See IPICJDC/3, at p.52
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No national legislation grants less than ten years. Therefore, a term of this duration would
not be seiiously objected to in the GATT. The duration provided by the Agreement on
TRIPS, commencing from the filling of an apphcation for registration or the first commercial
exploitation suggests that if a countiy is willing to protect the topography which is not
incorporated in an integrated circuit, a longer period of protection has to be asserted in order
to comply with the minimal term and to allow the owner a lead time to test the layout-
design43 before registration takes place.
Since the market for integrated circuits is of an international nature, excessive protection
nationally implemented tends to be distortive and may lead to discnininative effects in so far
as it is granted with the sole purpose of attracting investments. Higher protection may also
affect the stmcture of the intellectual property bargain, if further assertion is not justified in
the light of specific circumstances. Nevertheless, extended and variable terms of protection
may be a valid alternative for those countries mastering capability or having no capability in
chip design and manufacture. In this connection, any provision will have no meaningful result
without additional measures, such as a plan for technological development; including a sound
scheme to survey imported "pirated" chips, although such an enforcement measure is not a
part of the States' obligation.45
Innocent end purchaser
' As it was clarified by the WIPO International Bureau, "it is in the public interest - and particularly in the
interest of competitors - that registration should occur as soon as possible because registration is a source of
informatiOn. On the other hand, it is generally believed to be mssaiy to allow creators of layout-designs a
period of time during which the market acceptability of the layout-designs may be tested and any necessaiy
modification of the layout-designs may be camed out before registration is sought" IPICJCE/IV/3, at page 26.
Variable penods of protection could be set. For instance: (1) ten years from the fifing of an application
for registration, or the first commercial exploitation, wheiever in the world any of the events occur first; (2)
twelve years from the first commercial exploitation if the integrated circuit is manufactured in the countxy (3)
fifteen years from the creation if an application for registration is entered accordingly before the layoutdesign
is permanently fixed or manufactureci In the circunsstaices (2) and (3), the law could provide that the
incremental protection granted by nns of supplementary certificate could only be considered to specific types
of layout-designs classified by density, speed and multi-fuactionahty, and subject to the monopolistic situation
and competitive practice of the rightholder.
Obhgation related to border measures is only confined to the importation of counterfeit trademarks and
pirated copyright goods. See Agreement on TRIPS, Aitide 51. However as illegal computer programs
protected under copyright most often are found fixed on senuconductor microchips for example, in 'read only
memoir, the ROM chips are also subjected to customs procedures.
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Allowing the importation of an article incorporating a chip with a layout-design unlawfully
reproduced may discourage creative activities and, hence, is incompatible with the idea of
adequate protection. Based on this assumption, a case was put forward to extend the
exclusive iight conferred to the chip-design's owner under the Agreement on TRIPS. The
extension was to grant the right holder the power to stop the importation, selling, or
distribution for any commercial purposes of an article incorporating an integrated circuit
which contains a layout-design unlawfully reproduced. The provision cannot efficiently be
enforced unless a mechanism for actions at the border is put in place. Moreover, enforcing
such a provision will probably raise a question involving the liability of the end user which
needs to be clarified.
It must be acknowledged that the dynamics of legitimate businesses canied out in bona
fide, might be disrupted as purchasers (importers) are obliged to investigate if the imported
articles concerned contain pirated chips. Such an importer may be a small company with
limited finances unable to afford an expensive lawsuit, and such finns cannot satisfactorily
resort to the reverse engineering defence. Even more delicate is the position of an innocent
importer of an end product, who purchases a machine solely for his own use, not for
commercial purposes.47
Within the Agreement, once the innocent purchaser is noticed that he has purchased a
machine containing an infringed microchip, he is not pennitted to sell or deal in that article
without the payment of appropriate compensation. The Agreement does not elaborate on
the circumstance that the owner claimed and received compensation from the actual inflinger.
Has the owner the choice to sue the infringer or the innocent purchaser, or has he to sue the
The Agreement on TRIPS, Article 36. Under the IPIC Treaty, Article 6(aXil), tbo illehty covers only
the topography or the integrated circuit embodying it, xt tbo article incorporating the chip.
Notewinthy to refer to the JS Congress debates. Bh, the Bill S. 1201 and H.R. 1028 piwided for a
compulsoiy licence to enable the innocent purchaser to commercialiy deal with the articles in stock In
sunpli1ing thingc, the SCPA allows the dealing with reasonable pay negotiated with the owner. In this
fashion, the SCPA provides for an automatic noir-free licence. In those bills, iho provision related to
compulsory licence as silent as to the situation of the end purchasers. They conid not use iho articles because
the bills intended to give the owiier of the mask work an exclusive right to "use" that the US Congress
-
SeecommentinlPlC/CE/IV/3, p. 34 para. 113.
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former first before asking the latter for compensation? Furthermore, in the situation that the
end purchaser takes no part in the chip illegal reproduction, nor carries out any form of
commercial distribution, but only use the chip or the article containing it, there is no legal
ground for compensation. 49
 National legislation may address all these questions.
Registration
The issue of registration and disclosure may give nse to inconsistency. Where it is required,
registration is a source of information. The requirement to disclose details concerning the
electronic functions, that the layout-design represents and the integrated circuit is intended to
perform, may not amount to an obligation of disclosure equivalent to that the law impose
upon a patentee. 5° However, registration does in principle discourage secret integrated
circuits. By allowing national legislation to exclude part of the identif'ing material related "to
the manner of manufacture of the integrated circuit", 51 the Treaty limits the extension of the
disclosure, hence, affecting the intellectual property bargain.52
Additionally, the manufacturing process normally is covered by the patent, for which the
patent owner has a general and relative obligation of disclosure. 53 If the manufacturing
' One may argue that the end purchaser importing an article contaming a pirated chip is committing an
act, ie., to import, which falls in the set of the owner's exc1usi rights. To import, therefore, is an equivalent
action to buy. There should be no discriininatoiy consequex as to exemption from liability, beten who
buys locally (ithout importing) from who buys abmad, in both situations the purpose being solely for one's
own use.
° The ordinary function of the registration is to identil the subject of protection, and ensure greater certainty
of rights, both to the public and the or. Hovver, depending on the scope of the bargain construed under
the domestic law and policy, national legislation may attah to the requirement of registration an extended
obligation of disclosure. Compare Article 7(2Xa) of the IPIC Treaty ith Article 29(1) of the Agreement on
TRIPS.
' The INC Treaty, Article 7(2Xa). If the information regarding the manufacturing process does coincide
sith the description acxxmpanying the patent application, the exclusion does z make much legal sen.
52 The conflict between the chip-design law and patent was
accused in WIPO document IPIC/S/6 at p. 21.
The extent of the patent disclosure may vary, and the scope of compatibility between patent and
manufacturing and business secrets is rather narrow. Compare Article 29(1), 34(3) and 39(2) of the Agreement
on TRIPS. For instance, as the disclosure of the "best nxxte" required is that known bjr the inventor at the time
of the application, supervenient refinements may be kept in secret
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process, as a non-patentable software, is protected as a trade secret the inconsistency remains
since the secret information is accessible through reverse engineering. 54 Prevention of abuses
stemming from conflicting matters of this kind may be addressed properly through a system
of non-voluntary licensing.
(ii) Non-voluntary licensing: pros and cons
Driving a hard bargain
In the debates of the IPIC Treaty, views differed on whether compulsory licensing in the field
of chip-designs was necessary or not. Opposing voices argued that the weak protection
afforded by the Treaty, allowing the copying of the layout-design through reverse engineering
and without the owner's authorisation, made such a licence unnecessary. Some delegates
contended that the Berne and Paris Conventions permitted non-voluntary licences as these
were the only means of copying a copyrighted work or a patent. Chip-designs were
considered to be different:
non voluntwy licences are not neces.saiy since the effect of the minimum protection provided for in the
proposed Treaty is quite different from the effect of the minimum protection provided for in the Pans and
Berne Conventions and the typical national patent and copwight Iaw& The effect of the Jatter is that the
patented invention or woi* protected by copjright cannot (except for a non-voluntaiy licence) be copiecL etc..
without the propnelor's pennission, and the same technical or aesthetical effect cannot be obtained without
copying, etc. The effect of the protection of layout-designs zsfimdamentally different.55
Arguing with reverse engineering it was emphasised:
that non-voluntaiy licences are never necessary, not for reawns of public interest, non-wcirlang, excessive
contractual licence fees, or any other reawn. The protection of layout-desgns cannot hamper transfer of
technology, the development of science and technology etc.. since, as alreaaw state4 reverse engineenng will
result in the same technology guarantees the desired and desirable development ofscience and technology.
On the chip is commercialized trade secret is iK* available. People v Gopal, 522 F. Sopp. at 369. See
also Donald L Wenskay, Intellectual Property Protection for Neural Networks, [199013 Neural Networks 229
at 235.
WIPO, IPIC/CEIIIt2, at p. 20.
56 Iclem, klein.
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An additional argument put forward was that the short term of protection was a second
reason for denying non-voluntary licences.' 7 All of these were open to debate
In view of opposing experts, non-voluntary licences were a proper vehicle for a country to
safeguard national security and other vital interests 58 In the case where "a refusal to allow
the working of a layout design had the effect of hampering technology transfer," 59 the non-
voluntary licence was the right remedy as well.
Objectively, manufacturers of electronic products, such as television sets, washing
machines, watches, and radios, need a constant supply of microchips. If there is an
intemiption in the supply, for whatever reason, the users have to find another supply source
in order to avoid disruption of businesses. To reduce such a risk, compelling measures
towards the availability of second sources of supply have to be instruments at the States'
hands.6°
There are also considerable doubts about the capability of many countries, chiefly least-
developed and developing ones, to benefit from reverse engineering. Furthermore, there is the
fact that manufacturers may encase layout-designs in material in a manner which makes
access to the topography rather difficult. Contemplating such a prospect, a country delegate
stated:
a developing count,y which does not possess the resources nor the technology to engage in the manufacture of
articles involving high technology when faced with the question of whether or not to support and ultimate'y
adhere to a treaty, as in this case, which would grant direct benefits to entities and nations other than itself
and only to a limited extent or perhaps incidentally to its nationals, has the duty to find a solution with
deliberate care.61
57 Iden ideni
In sununaly, non-voluntaiy licences were held on grounds, such as, the need to prevent abuse of rights;
lack ci technical capability in a cin1iy to advantage of the reverse engmeenng precedent in patent and
copyright under which fnimevrk compulsory licences are available; necessity of accessing the integrated
circuit techno1ogj and short life circle of an integrated circuit See IPIC/CE/IV/3, at p. 17.
See Report of the International Bureau 11986] IP 373 at 375.
60 See IPIC/CE/IV/3, at p. 17.
61 See document IPICJCM/1 A&L4, at p.8.
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Once again, considering the consumers' interests, the country may be in a position to decide
whether to foster the national chip industiy or to rely heavily on supplies from abroad.
Whatever choice is made, it would be incorrect to believe that
consumers need no safeguard to protect their interests.
In the view of these developments in the WIPO negotiations, the prohibition of non-
voluntaiy licences was decided to be unsustainable; such a restriction would be a constraint
on the power of the member States which could not be justified. The strong wording
"prohibition" which appeared in the early draft Treaty seemed illogical If the weak protection
afforded by the Treaty coupled with the reverse engineeiing clause provided sufficient and
free access to the topography, thus making non-voluntary licence unnecessary, anticipation of
such a licence would not result in harm to chip-design owners. This would be a simple but
adequate reason for rejecting the prohibition of compulsory licence, as an inappropriate
restriction on the discretion of the member States. Additionally, if by means of reverse
engineering considerable access to chip technology was allowed, automatically and free of
charge, no explanation was possibly given for not allowing access under compulsory licensing
and for reasonable royalty. On this basis, the owner may not only exercise some sort of
control over the access, but also capture some financial return. Consequently, the licensees'
satisfaction based on a non-free licence will not cause the owner to be worse off compared to
a situation where compulsory licensing were not allowed.62
At a certain stage of the negotiations in the WIPO, it became clear that it was not possible
for the United States to insist in the prohibition of non-voluntary licences. As several
industrialised countries63
 came into line with developing ones, the USA worked out a draft6'
to the compulsory licence provision the corresponding provision of the IPIC Treaty,
nevertheless, reflected otherwise.
62 This is a typical vlfare-based argument
63 As Thomas Dicier pomts out; "t absolute prohibition of non-vohmtaiy hceis which still existed in the
third version was supported only by the experts from the LISA, while tha Umted Kingdom, Australia and also
the Commission of the EEC, on behalf of its Member Slates, uv1icded that it sild not be possible for them to
abuaclun non-luntazy lis providing for equitable remuneration in certain vciy specific ses to prevent
abuses of the propnetaiy right" L'eu1zawn de Ia pvtechon des c:rcwLc intégres sennconductew 119891 142
RLDA 21 atp. 50.
64 See WIPo document IPIC/CEIIV 10,10 Nov 1988.
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Safeguarding mechanisms: limited beneficial effects
The non-voluntary licensing, as it is provided for in the Agreement on I1UPS and in the IPIC
Treaty, reflects the judgement that, against the early proposition, the technology of integrated
circuits, as much as any other technology, requires due accessibility to fiulfil the intellectual
property bargain, hampered by potential problems to which different countiies or regions,
lacking or possessing uneven levels of technical capability, give vaned responses.
In this respect, it seems proper to suggest that only a few countries are prepared to benefit
from the availability of non-voluntaiy licences in the field of integrated circuits. It is clear that
such an advantage requires certain degree of technical capability and a sound regulatory
policy.
The effectiveness of non-voluntary licences in the field of integrated circuits requires, firstly,
a capability to reproduce the layout-design. Although the designing business is growing fast,
this business may be highly limited by the lack of a countrs manufactunng capacity. The
more complex the layout-design is, the bigger the manufacture difficulties are. It implies that
for the great majority of developing countries, lacking capability in manufacture, the utility of
non-voluntary licences will rely a great deal on collaboration from abroad. Additionally, the
chip market is of international nature and the chip industry relies considerably on accumulated
technical experience (learning by doing). These aspects are major barriers to enter the chip
business, which needs to be competitive in order to survive. It follows that in the first place
non-voluntary licensing will favour most those countries which already have a developed chip
industry. And given the fact that only isolated cases of non-vohintaiy licences are brought up
at times, any developing country willing to develop a domestic industry based on non-
voluntary licensing is unlikely to succeed. The need for a regulatory policy is a considerable
challenge as well.
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Vanous aspects related to the legal administration of non-voluntary licensing, such as,
substantive conditions, adjudicatoty process, and the delinition of the role of official bodies,65
require the member States to set up a reliable legal infrastructure which not only should
comply with multilateral disciplines, but also encourage private enterprises to apply for
proper relief. To this end, streamlined mechanisms and procedures, which breed confidence
and work as a bridge to business, seem to be a particular challenge, chiefly for developing
countries traditionally not keen on legal enforcement.
Adjudication on public policy unfortunately tends to be opaque by its nature. The discussion
of the merits of a case may involve concepts of economic substances not well defined which
leads to instances of uncertainties, and for this reason the perceived views of the majority
quite often inspire criticism and disagreements. 67 The same applies to the adjudicatory
proceedings of non-voluntary licensing, which involve entertainment of rules on intellectual
property and competition. The precision of decision criteria, most welcome in the business
circle, requires the employment of the logic of expenence, by comparing ideas and principles
long developed by courts to found the intellectual bargain. Such an ideal can only be sought
within a country's enforcement traditions supported by a managerial capacity 68
 and legal
infrastructure able to address the problems of a pressing need for a sound protection. All of
these are part of a safeguarding policy identified and discussed in Part Two.
65 Seechapter7.
See Agreement on TRIPS, Article 37(2) combined with 3 1(a)-(k).
67 Cl I. D. Heydon, The Restraint of Trade Doctrine, espocially pp. 34/35,275-277, Butterrths. 1971.
In the GATF Uruguay Round, it s argued that lighter IPR protection s difficult to comply th due
to, inter aim, la of financial resources and "managerial capacity" necessaly for a countzy to take greater
advantages from an intellectual property system and g axxss to technthgy. GAU ncte MTN.GNCW
NG11JW/30, at p. 3. 11 managerial capacity should include the management of an equipped legal
infrastnicture which only a few countnes have.
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PART TWO
CONSTRAIXf S ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TUE EMERGENCE OF
AN LNSTITU11ONAL POLICY
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CHAPTER FOUR
LNTRODUCflON: EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINES
It was concluded in Part One that it is necessary to limit the exercise of intellectual property in
the perspective of welfare and efficiency objectives, and in connection with the nature of the
innovative process. Addressing the legal mechanisms for limiting the use of propnetaly rights,
Part Two is concerned with the identification and analysis of the evolution of a safeguarding
policy as a legal institution developed to ensure that the social bargain is followed, and
adverse effects against it are prevented and corrected. The institutional safeguarding policy'
is defined as the maimer in which the law defines the mandate of incumbent authorities, the
rights and obligations conferred to or inflicted on individuals and the state, and relates them to
the enforcement and legal structuring of remedies intrinsic to intellectual property and
competition laws, these being designed to limit the exercise of copynght, designs, and patents.
It would be erroneous to view the limitation on intellectual property as a set of legal measures
isolated from other policies, such as technology and trade and industrial policies. As seen in
chapter two, the safeguarding measures, together with these policies, are in fact part of a
multifaceted reality. 2
 The availability of a legal mechanism of non-voluntaiy licensing is not
expected to work satisfactorily if the industiy and commerce are not provided with the
necessary means3
 to use that mechanism. Supporting the argument of the emergence of such
an institutional policy for intellectual property, evidence will be brought forth to reflect three
elements: the legal structurin& the competition, and the adjudication factors shaping the legal
formation of this policy.
In chapter five, the focus will be on the safeguarding measures (eg, compulsory licences,
and Crown use) intrinsic to the intellectual property law in the United Kingdom. It examines
the origins of safeguards, their relationship with changing economics, and the evolution of the
legislation to modern time. Chapter six outlines the legal development of competition law and
'The expression safeguarding policy is applied throughout the text and some times it is replaced by the
expressions safeguarding meanires, remedial law, remedial safeguards or simply safeguards.
2 Ch.2.3.2(iv).
These means include not only an effective and winicable enforcement mechanism, but also government
support as a catalyst force to keep the pz of the economic development and technical leadership or to catch
up with the technology.
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policy in selected juiisdictions in the post-World War H penod, as a reflex of the "new
competition" phenomenon. 4 It additionally assesses the ability of modem competition
thoughts and concepts, as influential sources of commitments, to govern the competitive
process and thus order the exercise of intellectual property rights. Finally, approaching the
delicate issue of public policy arguments inherent in the reasoning process and discretionary
power, chapter seven undertakes the analysis of the institutional process of adjudication of
unauthonsed use over UK patents.
4.1 The legal structure of remedial measures
As far as UK law is concerned, a safeguarding policy is, firstly, stated in Government reports
and, secondly, in legislation which is periodically revised. In fact, the policy stated in those
reports tends to reflect a balance of the views of different concerned sectors. 5 In reflecting the
variety of these competing interests, the safeguarding policy is not a unilateral act of
Government, on the contrary, it expresses a harmonisation of claims and counterclaims
ansing from society. Taking these into account, the Government reports (laid down in the
Parliament) amount to a significant instance of decision-making. Moreover, the law and the
policy it contains entail a vast consensual element.
Updating the legal safeguards, by reviewing periodically the relevant legislation and
adjusting it to developing technology, is a permanent concern. As a second instance of
discussion of those competing interests, the Parliament seals a society covenant, i.e.,
institutionally it turns into statutory form a legal machinery agreed upon between the State
and members of a consuming; productive and trading society. This makes the societal policy
an instrument designed to attend actual needs.
Keeping up with technological and economic developments, the safeguarding policy tends
to live with the changjng needs of society and the challenging pressure from abroad. In
connection with the technological element, it attempts to adjust society's needs to new
opportunities of consume and the prospect of welfare by facilitating the use of benefits
Cli. 2.3.2 (ii)
AUthOrS and inventors' associations, users, inthvidual experts, and a,mnrce and industry repitsentatives.
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provided by creative works and inventions. As to the economic aspect; the safeguarding
policy makes wider availability of these benefits possible despite or in respect of the economic
circumstances affecting production, trade and consumers' interests. Ultimately; the
safeguarding policy is designed to ensure that the intellectual property is protected for the
best benefit of society and in accordance with legal conunitments taken at an international
level.
The influential impact of the international agreements on the legal stnxctunng of a
safeguarding policy shows that the effects of such a policy go beyond the thresholds of the
domestic law and policy. The international conventions on intellectual property and related
trade confer to the contracting states the discretion to regulate limitation on proprietary
rights. For instance, by providing for an exception to the exclusive right, the Paris text of the
Beme Convention allows compulsory licensing over copyright to be imposed by domestic
legislation.6
 Siniilarly, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property permits
contracting states to act accordingly where patents are not sufficiently worked. 7
 The extent
of involuntary reproduction under copyright and patent regimes is now limited by the
Agreement on TRIPS, which recognises the discretion of States to limit the exercise of
intellectual property rights within the framework of competition law.
4.2 The competition factor
The resurgence of competition legislation in the post-World War II period is a step ahead in
the reluctant world-wide philosophy on competition. Furthermore, the growing legislation
lends credit to the legitimacy of the State regulatory intervention, based on the presumption
that controlling the competition process is needed and desirable regardless of the profile of
any domestic economy. Thus, limiting the exercise of intellectual property by controlling
competition seems a mandatory policy in an open economy.
6 Articles llbis (2) and 13(1).
Article5A.
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Apart from some formal variations, national laws have points in common. They condemn
cartel behaviour8 , discourage monopolists from either abusing their power in an exclusionary
way or taking action to strengthen their position. The legislation also proscribes anti-
competitive collusion through mergers and acquisitions. However, compethion law and
policy do not provide universal standards, nor straightforward answers to competition
problems. Each countly has a particular response when facing the complex and diverse nature
of the market structure. For this reason, countnes are likely to disagree on enforcement
practices, and, in this respect, the manner in which the law is enforced may even disservice
competitive purposes. In general, the concentration of public enforcement at government
hands, for instance, may favour protectionism resulting from pressures on public authorities
to deviate from the policy underlying competition law for the benefit of one group or
another. 9 To the extent that enforcement with a protectionist'° end could possibly be ironic,
this does not deny the strength of competition law and policy as meaningful instniments with
which to strike a balance of interests that intellectual property is, at least theoretically,
committed to.
There is a common view that applying competition law and policy has always been an
uneasy task because, political reasons apart, the "correct application of a free market policy
requires a sophisticated understanding of the economic analysis of the ways in which markets
and competition do or do not operate."" As a result, the legal test on matters of competition
8 Cartel behaviour includes price-fixing, restrictions of outpat amongst competitors and market allocalion
siith no efficiency grounds.
S F. M. Fisher, "Industrial Organization, Economies and the Law", p. 289/90.
10 James Mod suggests that competition law is developed and enforced in a protectionist style. Cf
Positive Comity - Is it a Positive Step?, in "Fordham Corporate Law Institute", p. 79 at 87, 1993 edition.
Guilihermo Cabanellas writes that the antitrust limitations are "sometimes enforced through conceptual
acrobalica which hide their real soupe." The author uses the expression "conceptual acrobatics" to refer to the
American misuse doctrine, and he casts doubt about the "real scnpe" of the existence exe?vzse divide applied by
the Court of Justice of the European Community. Aaording to him, such a distinction sms to be "logically
unatlainab1e." "Antitrust and Direct Regulation of International Transfer of Technology Transactions", IIC
Studies, voL 7, p. 42J43 and footnote 145, Max Planck Institute, 1984. A reference about protectionism in US
antitrust law is made by John Haley, Administrative Guidance versus Formal Regulaiioit Resolving the
Paradox of Industrial Policy, in Law and Trade Issues of the Jaise Economy, p. 107 at 115. Haiwy
Appldum stated that American "1TC has generally disregarded Justice Department and importer antitrust
allegations against domestic industiy." Paper prepared for distribetion at the "17th Annual Advanced Antitrust
Law Seminar - International Trade and the Anlitnist Laws", p. 139, Practising Law Institute, N. York; October
18, 1977.
"F. M. Fisher, icc. cit.
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is carried out with a degree of obscurity. Improvements, however, have been implemented in
the way the law is drafted, construed and enforced.
Apart from being a fact of incontestable importance in itself developments in competition
law and policy reflect modern thoughts and concepts which from the legal stance address
problems of regulation and construction. The prominence of these concepts relies on their
contribution for the understanding of the dynamic character of the economic matters
underlying the legal rules on competition and intellectual property.
Thoughts and concepts have shown great sensitivity to the reality of market and
competition in many senses. Resorts to guidelines as supplemental regulation have been made
to give broad rules a narrower sense, or to tackle the problem of legal rigidity. At an
evidential level, courts have adapted their reasoning to consider fresher thoughts, so as
reviewing, for instance, the presumption of economic power for patent and copyright-related
products in tying arrangements.' 2 Developments in anti-trust law point to the erosion of the
per se rule, apparently a short judicial answer to certain competition issues.' 3 Under
considerations of economic nature, courts have admitted a degree of investigation into the
merit of those legal categories of trade practices normally regarded unlawful in themselves,
thus, providing a fresher sense of the due antitrust process.' 4 As another key concept,
"workable competition" has become a valuable tool used to exclude pure economic concepts,
placing the regulation of the competitive process in a feasible context. That is, in the legal
field, the dimension of weifre and efficiency objectives is ultimately reduced to formal
considerations. In short, notions such as guidelines approach, prohibition principle, workable
competition and nile of reason are all attempts to subordinate substantial matters into legal
forms. As common ground, they all express a permissible degree of discretion in the treatment
of legal methods, and manifest a common guise in which they do not take competition for its
own sake. The application of these theoretical elements is controversial, and not often
12 About the rise and igation of the presumption of economic power solely based on intellectual pmperty,
s William Montgomeiy, The Presumption of Economic Power for Patented and Copynghted Prodixis in
Tying Arrangemenls 11985] 85 Columbia Law Review 1140.
13 Non-price vertical restraints, for instance. See Thxnas E. Kauper, Antitnist in 1992: The Year of the
Stoiyteller 119931 61(2) Antitrust law Journal 347.
14 Forarecentdecision, see Business ElectronicsvSharp Electronics 485 US 717(1988)
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suggests the existence of a paradoxical character arising, above all, from an incongruence of
competition goals, as the legal enforcement shows.
As it now stands, enforcing competition law and policy will continue to be an exercise of
approximation of results. The administration of the law on a trial fashion suggests that no
perfect testing of welfare and efficiency exist. This is so because of the limited ability of the
legal test to warrant an essential correctness and so to control the competitive process within
which the exercise of the intellectual property rights is qualified. In providing a type of
solution, or an accommodation of conflicting interests, the legal machinery at hand remains,
therefore, desirable.
4.3 The adjudication factor
As an indispensable part of the institutional disciplines, regulations on adjudication and
adjudicatory agencies (i.e., courts and administrative bodies concerned) play a distinct role in
policing the bargain behind the intellectual property theory. While they test the law, the
agencies build up a legal tradition based on accumulation of experience and expertise, and
serve a catalyst function by supplying the Parliament informative data with which to improve
statutory provisions. Such tradition is necessary for the consolidation of reliable safeguarding
rules and procedures, without which the business circle might lose confidence in the whole
system. This is an observation of major importance. Countries, such as United Kingdom and
United States, which have great traditions in enforcing protection of intellectual property
tights, apply safeguards with the same strength It suggests that a sound enforcement system
of protection may lead to a strong enforcement of safeguarding provisions intrinsic either to
intellectual property law or competition law. This makes a huge difference, in terms of the
benefits derived from the legal system already in place, between those countries which have a
workable and those which have a poor legal machinery, which is structured under domestic
law and limited by international conventions.
The key aspects of international standards governing enforcement of intellectual property
tights are transparency of procedures, cost and expediency and reasoning of decisions,
independence of adjudicators, and unnecessary hindrance to intellectual property rights and
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trade.' 5 With regard to safeguardmg measures in particular, proceedings on unauthoiised use
of patents and chip designs are required to give due considerations inter alia to the individual
merits of non-voluntary licences, and temporary circumstances characteiising notions such as
"national emergency" and "extreme urgency", prior negotiations between would-be licensors
and licensees, anti-competitive practices ascertained under fair process in the legal meaning,
guarantee of reviewal jurisdiction by a distinct authority, adequate assessment of
remuneration and correction of anti-competitive practices." Read in conjunction with those
principles delineating the social bargain,' 7 these requirements claim a streamlined process for
the implementation of the safeguarding policy.
Although facing inherent imperfections which permeate legal methods and process, a
regulatory approach of the adjudicatory system plotted in the Agreement on TRIPS is
featured as follows:
A satisfactoiy statement of conditions on which the safeguarding measures are
implemented (the more the legal conditions are narrowed down, the more the
discretionary power of the adjudicatory body will be);
A balance between the degree of details of these conditions and the amount of discretion
conferred to the adjudicatory body. This departs from the premise that this balance is
fundamental to the establishment of a streamlined process through which the courts can
give their best response to the implementation of the delicate intellectual property bargain,
Avoidance of general rules for which there is no sound guidance on how to practically
assess them with regard to welfare goals, presuming that an obscure welfare policy may
unreasonably restrict legitimate owner's interests;
• Availability of procedures designed to allow the pursuit of a satisfactory degree of
efficiency defence.
In its conceptual frameworlç the adjudicatory system relies on rules, and discretion. That is,
in implementing legal policies with discretion, policy-makers tend to not use a particular rule
AgreementonTRlPS,Aitcles4lto49.
16 Agreement on TRIPS, Artides 13, 14(6), 26(2), 31,37(2).
Ch. 33.1;AgreementonTRlPS,Articles7and8.
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to bind themselves in advance, to a particular course of action. Whereas under the theory of
rule, policy-makers are mandated to act in accordance with binding commitments reflected in
clear descriptions of legal circumstances.' 8 The British system of statutory adjudication gives
the adjudicator a mandate which is exercised under specific duties. Constraints on him are set
up either by the patent statute or created judicially (self-constraint). In fact, the adjudicator
follows rules which are not designed to be totally free from a degree of imprecision. This is
inherent in the nature of legal regulation. Such a nature results in an opportunity for the
adjudicator to resort to discretion and construction, even relying on rules drawn with a degree
of detail. Nevertheless, the more imprecise or broad the rules are, the wider the exercise of
discretion and construction is. By means of discretion, the adjudicator selects the best action
which should fit a given situation, and through the statutory construction, he has the duty to
search for the right answer to a particular case. In performing his office, the adjudicator
inevitably brings into consideration elements of public interests. Stressing either on the theory
of rule or on discretion, the structuring of the system has obvious implications concerning the
pattern of decision suffused with public policy arguments.
In principle, specifications of public policy which emerge from Pailiamentary debates inspire
transparency, and are subject to a considerable political control. Whether the delegation of
these specifications to administrative or judicial authorities is or not a valid scheme depends
on a country's enforcement traditions. In general, however, if an administrative authority does
not enjoy legal independence, he is likely to suffer from the influence of the short-term
political mood. Nothing suggests that this is the case of the British system of legal
adjudication. As a general observation normally referred to the enforcement of competition
legislation, competition objectives may serve interests of groups and put a long-run policy in
jeopardy. Although not entirely warranted, the best prospect of transparency and control still
lies in a judicial approach.' 9 Nevertheless, the State, again, is free to organise its own policy-
making process, and auto-limits under international agreements.
18 For an account of theoiy of regulation in general, soe: K J. Barro, Macro Economic Policy, 1990; and
George L. Piiest, The Origins of Utility Regulation aixi the Theories of Regulation' Debate [1993J XXXVI
Journal of Law & Economics 289.
19 does n nn that tl judicial approach is the mo efficient one, nor desirable for alL Criticism states
that the judicial policy-making is "profoundly anti-political and anti-democratic." Rithani A.. Maidment, TI
Judicial Response to the New Deal - The US Supreise Court and Economic Regulation 1934-1936, p. 145,
1ster Press, 1991.
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Based on the analysis of the exercise of discretion by the comptroller general, the concept of
"useful discretion" is proposed as a general critenon to examine the discretionaiy power.
Useful discretion is here described as one that, once authonsed or not prohibited, is
reasonably necessaly, by the nature of the relevant facts and circumstances, to satisfy the
policy which is drawn from the statutory rules, and, with regard to the same facts and
circumstances, is reasonably acceptable as it dos not unnecessarily hinder proprietary rights.
Firstly, the useful discretion mplies a type of commitment to fundamental assumptions. 2° In
practical terms, the concept is confined to those decisional criteria implicitly or explicitly
derived from, or consistent with, the statutorily fixed policies.2'
The analysis of the adjudication process about non-voluntary licensing over British patents
suggests that there will always be a grey area (eg, whether a particular procedure does hinder
or not legitimate exploitation of the proprietary right, or yet is regarded as a disguised
restriction on trade) where compliance with international standards will remain a debatable
matter.
4.4 A matter of comparison
The two following chapters will deal with two broad groups of safeguarding measures,
intrinsic to intellectual property and to competition law frameworks respectively. While the
first is based on indidual grievances, the second does not necessarily need an individual
claim to operate, i.e., the latter does not rely on a particular complaint against abusive
exercise of intellectual property, or the non working of an invention in the country.
It has been suggested that compulsory licensing does not "provide an effective redress
against the abuses of patent monopolies," perhaps, due to the lack of know-how. Despite
this alleged ineffectiveness, non-voluntary licensing under intellectual property law is an
20 See the discussion of social bargain in Ch. 2.3.1.
21 Examples of valid criteria are those purposes and matters described in s. 50 of the 1977 Patents Act, and
s. 84(1) of the 1973 Fair Trading Act
DIT, Intellectual Propertyand Innovation, p. 26, Cmnd. 9712 (196).
It has been ommended that the existing poers to set liceie terms should be used to require the
patentee to transfer associated 'know-hoV to tbe licensee." Cmnd. 9712 p. 26/27. (1986).
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available mechanism kept in British law. It does have its deterring role to play apart from the
safeguards operated within the framework of competition law and policy. As a fashionable
apparatus distinct from that mechanism and designed to control the competitive process in the
OECD countiies competition law has its importance recognised by the Agreement on
TRIPS.
The competition law mechanisms have a value apart for the intellectual property order.
Having a comprehensive ability to tackle the improper exercise of proprietary rights, such
mechanisms are distinct from the remedial measures intrinsic to intellectual property law. The
estimation is that the existence of these remedial measures alone operates as an influential
basis for private bargaining, but they are less than effective in curbing the improper exercise of
intellectual property rights. Given the growing tendency for industrialised countries to rely on
competition law mechanisms, it is suggested that, in effect, taking into account the objectives
of the social bargain, to protect these rights makes little or no sense without an effective
control of the competitive process.24 In this connection, the examination of the Monopolies
and Mergers Commission's reports shows the significant role of these mechanisms in
maintaining intellectual property order, i.e., the extent of the control of competition ensures
an alignment of market conditions concerned with the licensing and exercise of intellectual
property rights. Intellectual property order is defined as the way intellectual property rights
are exercised in relation to market forces. It is assumed that the exercise of these nghts is
responsive not only to the rules of supply and demand (the market self ordering), but also to
state regulatory intervention on competition.
Paradoxically, while the industrialised world has successfully pressed for a higher level of
intellectual property protection, it has failed to agree on a body of rules governing
international competition. For their own benefits or advantages, industrialised countries apply,
at a national level, a developed set of competition rules which have transnational effects. In
this way, competition rules and policy have been implemented in industrialised countries with
a protective sense, amounting to a comparative advantage over those countries who have not
been able so far to put into place the same competition mechanisms which prevent effects
24
Cli. 7.2.4.
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(aiverse to public mterest) from arising due to anti-competitive exercise of intellectual
property rights. As far as international trading is concerned, this suggests an imbalance at a
regulatory level.
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CHAPTER FIVE
COPYRIGHT & PATENT: EVOLUTION OF UK LAW ON UNAUTHORISED USE
5.1 Introduction: expansion of le2aI re2ulation on safeauards
Awareness of the importance of a body of rules on intellectual property iights (IPR) designed
for the benefit of the country goes back to seventeenth-century England when a sense of
safeguards of interests was introduced in the early legislation. Along with it, legislative and
judicial control over undue IPR exercise related effects was raised and has become a
permanent concern since then. In this respect, two legal indications could be cited: the Statute
of Anne 1709 regarding copyright, and the Statute of Monopolies 1623 regarding letters
patent. The legislation in fact reflected the emergence of an intellectual property policy
strongly supported by the contemporaneous legal thoughts central to common law that
recognised a "public utility" function in copyright,' and viewed the patent as a grant for the
public benefit,2 and thus it was not supposed to be worked as a basis for restraint of trade.
From those early days to modem law and policy, the development of safeguarding
provisions has formed a body of regulation distinguished from the general framework of
intellectual property law by the ends it pursues. The purposes are various, such as to
encourage industry and learning; in war and peace times and in economic growth and
hardship, to promote the proper exploitation of intellectual property rights, to protect trade
and create conditions for catching up with technology. The utmost aim has always been to
strike a balance of owners', producers' and consumers' interests. All of these are within the
very core of the Government policy.
In the 1986 White Paper, the legal policy was stated in terms of promoting competition and
wider availability of technology, and serve properly the needs of all users. 3 The policy equally
Mgi/ar v Taylor 11558-17741 M E.R. (Rep) 119 at 120/121 Ifor extended discussion, see 98 E.R 201-
267]; and Donaldson v Becketi [17741 1 E.R 837.
2 Attorney-General of the Common-Wealth ofAustralia v Adelaide Steamship Company Limited [1913J
kC. 781 at 7931794 (Lord Parker of Waddington).
The 1986 White Paper, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovailon, Cmnci 9712, pp. 3/4, 35/36
(prefaces).
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applies to the whole range of intellectual property rights, including copyright and designs
which have played an increasing role in the economic context and on them relies "the
livelihood of the multitude of firms and organisations." 4 More than to ensure reward to
intellectual efforts, the central concern is, in parallel, to recognise the distinct value of
remedial measures without which the system of intellectual property rights would be seriously
impaired by merely allocating ownership, granting "unrestricted monopolies" 5 and stifling
innovation.6
This chapter sets out to discuss safeguarding measures intrinsic to intellectual property
(copyright and patent), and the principles governing them. These safeguards and principles
are described and classified from an historical perspective. Based on the British experience, it
seems realistic to suggest that no country is prepared or can afford to protect intellectual
property rights without a meaningful regime of remedial measures to balance competing
interests. This suggestion is made on the ground that legal evolution has proved these
safeguards constitute not simply an exercise in describing, as precisely as the incumbent
bodies can do, the detailed conditions in which protection is balanced, but also to be
authorised sources of an official policy on intellectual property. Policy-makers are fully aware
of the undisputed role of these safeguards related to the incentive for innovation and
promotion of competition as a means of improving public welfare and efficiency. Moreover,
the safeguarding mechanism is continually evaluated and adjusted in the context of new
technical developments, maintained over years and in different economic stages. Presumably,
such a mechanism is worth 7 maintaining, despite some criticism.
The 1981 Consultalive Document on the Rcfonn of the Law relating to Copyright, Designs and
Performers' Protection, Ciund. 8302, p. 1/2, paras. 3 & 5.
The 1983 Green Paper, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation, Cmnd. 9117, at p.7. According to the
Chief Scientific AcMser (Cabinet Office), "Rights should be available where they would support commercial
exploitation... Exploitable ideas should not lie dormant" Loc. cit, p.2.
6 In a press release of 11 July 1991, Sir Leon Brittan, vice-president of the E.C. Conumssion then in charge
with competition policy, stated. "Companies cannot unreasonably sit on their intellectual pmperty in order to
stifle enterprise and prevent the emergence of new forms of competition."
In the field of patents, the number of applications made by third parties for compulsoiy adjudications. i.e.,
dispute settlements in the context of compulsory licences and licences of right, in the period between 1975 and
1982, exceed one thousand. For an overall picture, see the Annual Reports of the Comptroller-General from
1950 to 1989.
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Copyright-related safeguards
As the effect on competition of copyright exploitation remained obscure for a long time, a
balance of interests has always relied a great deal upon exceptions on the exclusive rights.
These exceptions include fair dealing and other specified provisions, designed to respond to
scientific and technical developments, and educational or training purposes. Unauthorised use
of copyright by means of non-voluntary licences focusing on exercise of copyright only
appeared in 1911 in respect of, e.g., musical works of increasing industrial application. For
this reason, a distinction is made between the role of exceptions from the role of limitations.
The emergence of provisions limiting such an exercise reflected the influential technical
developments, such as sound recording. In this connection, the conflicting interests between
copyright owners and users have been solved in a less contentious manner compared to
patent safeguards. For instance, since it was established in 1911, the collective administration
of copyright through licensing schemes has in practice been operated in a fairly satisfactory
manner. 8
 The application of such experience in respect of proprietary rights upon high-tech
assets, such as computer programs, is a significant trend not only for the potential economic
value of those assets, but also for their industrial application.
As long as the commercial use of copyright works has largely been left to the competitive
market forces, the application of safeguards is moving towards a competition issue, as much
as to patents.
Unauthorised use over patents
Submitted to complex regulation, the unauthonsed use of patent is divided into two periods,
from 1883 to 1946, and from 1949 to 1988. The first set of provisions emerged at a time of
remarkable increase in patented inventions in the chemical and electrical industries. It was a
period of depression followed by years of technological adaptation and slow growth, 9
 and
8 Provided the recommendations made by the MMC are obseived, collective licensing continues to play a
significant role. See the MMC Reports on "Collective Licensing", Cm 530 (1988), and on the merger situation
Wamer/Chappell,Cm 301 (1988).
A. Tylecote, The Long Wave in the World Economy, pp. 65/66, 214,216-218,222.
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distracted by wars which brought some technical impetus but also caused some stagnation. In
general, Great Britain experienced a decline in its economy which was both affected by
industrial concentration and governed under the influence of a reluctant philosophy of a
competitive ideal'° This picture together with the British aspiration to be a world power
explains the country's defensive attitude in adopting protective measures, including
mechanisms to benefit from "the technology of other countries." As a matter of legal policy,
patent safeguards fit conspicuously in this context. It starts with defence safeguards which
rely on a set of rules and practices based on war motives.
The point of departure of the second period of patent safeguard regulation coincides with
three elements: new technical paradigms, new ideas in international trade, and a move
towards a more competitive market structure.
Five years after World War II a new upsurge in the systematic use of innovation took place.
A new technological style was characterised by advancements in microelectronics and
biotechnology. Microelectronics in particular gave rise to new obstacles in terms of "methods
of organisation, and attitudes within organisations".' 2 These represented not only a difficulty
in the catch-up policy shared by countries in general,' 3 but also a matter of concern from a
competition stand point.
Together with new technical paradigms, early in the post-war period prospects for
economic growth emerged and were fostered by the idea of economic integration and trade
'° By the end of the 1930s British exports had fifflen significantly. Capie & Coffins, The Inter-War British
Economy - A statistical abstract, p. 71. For General accounts, see: C. Barnett, The Audit of War - The illusion
& reality of Britain as a Great Nation, Ch. Fourteen (Papermac. 1987); J. Turner (ed), Britain and the First
World War, Cli. 4 (Hyman, 1988); D. H Aldcrofl, The Inter-War Econom y: Britain 1919-1939, Cli.!
(Batsford, 1970). Report by Mr Justice Devlin, J. concerning the cotton industry, in Re The Yarn Spinners's
Agreement [19591 1 All E.R. 299 at 310 etseq. maybe found instructive.
' J.H. Dunning & C.J. Thomas, British Industry Change and Development in the Twentieth Century, p.
35 and 37-62, 1963 edition. In post-war penods the UK industries also benefited from the conclusion of
thousands of licensing agreements. See also D. Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-
41, p. 29 1/2.
12 Concerning for instance, process of production and distribution of commodities. See A. lylecote, ob. cit.
pp. 55-60, 65/66,252-55.
Some theorists believe that m the early stage of new technical paradigms there is a discontinuity in
technical progress where leader countries are required to adapt to new situations, reflecting in the dynamics of
competition.
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liberalisation which did not go far enough.' 4 In parallel with this move, Government policies
sought economic reconstruction and markets abroad.
The third factor was the legal development in competition law. The dimension of this factor
is studied in the next chapter. For now, it should be said that as a key thctor in the formation
of an institutional safeguarding policy, the impact of the legal regulation of the competition
process was not only perceived in the ordering of the exercise of intellectual property rights,
but also reflected in the development of concepts associated with the remedial measures
intrinsic to intellectual property. Assuming that intellectual property rights operate or tend to
do so in line with the circumstances of the national interests, the regulation on patent
safeguards was deemed to reflect those factors.
The principles and the needs of particular sectors
A basic principle concerning copyright and derived from a statutory policy gradually
improved is that protection is afforded by the State as far as the users' interests are properly
safeguarded. As the same principle is read in the field of inventions, the patent is granted as
far as it works to the fullest extent in the countly for the benefit of the public. As a corollary,
copyright and patent mischief do not prevail against competition law, i.e., both copyright and
patent are not supposed to be worked as a basis to restrain trade nor distort competition.
As far as the State's use of intellectual property is concern, the formal boundary of the
Crown's prerogative is unclear as to copyright use. As to patents, the use by the State may
become inconveniently intrusive in the extent of the involvement of the State in industrial
affairs. A predominant principle is that no Government department is to be hindered in the
discharge of its duty by the existence of a patent.
More than describing the conditions in which protection is balanced and unauthonsed use is
allowed, the legal development relating to these safeguards has evolved aiming to improve
' While Econoimc Powers failed to approve the ITO (International Tmde Organisalion) bringing back a
pTotedlionlsm mood, the setting of the GAU s only a small step towards a freer World economy. The event
did little to resolve the tensions among counines.
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public welfare and efficiency A remedial measure on grounds of efficiency is here designed to
require a default or competition mischief committed by the owner In the absence of such a
requirement, the safeguard may be justified on public welfare grounds. Since the legal
mechanism is less than effective, the achievement of these goals is not always clear. This was
particularly the case, for instance, of licences on works of deceased authors and licences to
republish copyright works. Concerning patents, the revocation purely for not working had no
apparent benefit. Moreover, legislation has addressed the needs of particular sectors, such as
statutoly licence on sound recordings and their broadcasting, and on rental (copyright), or
non-voluntary licences over medicine and food-related inventions (in the patent field), or over
inventions making a substantial contribution to the art.
Changing concepts
The law has changed concepts in several senses. The basis for compulsory licensing evolved
from "public requirement" to "abuse of monopoly right" and then to general grounds, which
necessarily do not include a true default of the patentee. Rather, they define detailed
conditions on which the justification for state intervention lies. Revocation as a remedial
measure was abandoned. The definition of non-working of an invention in the country to the
fullest possible extent has been re-worded. Conditions governing patent use for the service of
the Crown have also been clarified, and today admit limited compensation for loss of
manufacture.
Remedial measures in the public interest and intrinsic to intellectual property law may rely
on a "competition report." The major effect associated with these changes is the real
dimension of the obligation (or duty) of the patentee to exploit an invention as much as it
would be desirable from the point of view of the development of British production. Minor
effects that the changes in law have provided include more transparency of the regulatory
framework, and respect to the proprietary rights by avoiding, for instance, measures
unnecessary for the aim intended; increasing observance of competition rules (including in the
fields of designs and copyright), so as reducing State intervention, and more participation of
private initiatives, by resorting to the framework of competition law.
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To examine in detail the developments of the several types of legal measures concerning the
unauthorised use of copynght and patents, the chapter begins with an outline of the historical
foundations.
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5.2 Unauthonsed use of copyriaht
5.2.1 The threshold between exceptions and limitations
(1) Statutory underpinnings
The foundations of safeguards in copyright rely on the early perception of the need for
copyright protection. The oldest legal basis is the 1709 Statute of Anne. Before this Act, "it
was usual to purchase from authors the perpetual copyright of their books, and to assign the
same from hand to hand for valuable considerations, and to make them the subject of family
settlements." 1 As it was stated in its preamble, the Statute intended to encourage the "learned
men to compose and write useful books", and this purpose was pursued in two ways: by
reducing the period of the monopoly right conferred to publishers and authors, and providing
the authors with printing control of their works. In prescribing a non-perpetual 2
 term of
protection, the Statute of Anne 3 created conditions for changes of the bargaining basis in the
flourishing art of printing, in the way that publishers and printers would have to renew the
consent of authors to new printing after the end of fourteen years.
As they had more control over their writings, authors could not only entertain brighter a
prospect of return, but also contribute to increase the number of diversified literary works. It
is illustrative that to encourage the production and availability of literary works the statutory
copyright came out to reduce the extent of privilege, as a form to accommodate the interests
involved.
'[1558-1774 1 All E.R. Rep. 119 at 120. With the Statute of Anne the common law copyright in published
worics us extinguished. See Donaldion v Beckelt (1-louse of Lords) [17741 1 E.R 837
2 The pomt of perpetual copyright was raised before the Gregory Committee. It was argued that "property m
the product of a man's brain deserves as much protection as property in the product of his harxls and that,
unprotected, it is more open to subsequent mutilation." The force of this argument, however, did not prevail
upon the lustoncal tendency of limiting the period of copyright protection, so as to better serve the social
welfare arid competition purposes. If there had been no commitment to the Berne Convention, it would be
reasonable to speculate that the UK would have chosen a copyright term on basis of an exact number of years
rwming from the first publication. Gregoiy Report, paras. 16 to 23.
The Statute of Anne was repealed by the Copyright Act 1842 (5&6 Vict 45) enacted equally "to afford
greater encouragement to the production of htenuy waits of lasting benefit to the World."
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Reviewing the foundations of copyright, the Whitford Committee recognised the existence
of a conflict between public and private interests, and accused "the need in certain cases for
the exclusive right of the author to be limited." 4 As a general view beyond any doubt, the
Committee observed that exceptions in favour of copyright users is about right, 5 as part of
the balance of those interests. It implies that protection is afforded by the State as far as the
users' interests are properly safeguarded. To this end, over centuries a number of exceptions
have been provided in favour of art and education, by different legal formulas.
(ii) Strategic responses to scientific and educational purposes
Universities and colleges' copyright
For over two centuries universities and colleges enjoyed the right of copyright of books
donated to them. 6 This old perpetual right was saved by several statutes for the advancement
of learning and education, but ceased to exist as a result of the enactment of the current law.7
By the time of the last copyright law review, no university or college pressed for the
retention of the said right, which was found by the Wh4ford Committee 8 to be of little
commercial interest and, as a matter of principle, unacceptable in modern law. This type of
privilege was both discriminatoiy and anomalous. Only a few universities and colleges were
entitled to it,9 and an unrestricted enjoyment of copyright for an unlimited period of time
seems incompatible with a modern theory of copyright.
The Whitford Repoit para 16 in fine.
5IdenL
6 Fortheor nofthisrightgrantedin 1775. see Dona1donvBeckettI17741 1 ER. 837at849.
The right was repealed by the 1911 Copyright Act which therefore allowed some umversities and colleges
to keep the right already enjoyed. See Scli. 1, pam. 13(l) o(the 1988 Act.
Report of the Committee to consider the Law on Copyright and Designs Cmnd. 6732. pam. 648. The
Report recommended the repeal of the copyright of universities and colleges. The recommendation was
aceepted by the Government Reform of the Law relating to Copyright, Designs and Performers' Prc gection, A
consultative document, Cmnd. 8302, at pages 43/44, HMSO, 1981.
See 9 HalsburVs Laws of England, Fourth Edition. pam. 804, at p.511.
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As an specific privilege, "universities and colleges' copyright" today has only a historical
importance. The focus on it, included as an old form of safeguard, is to emphasise a particular
feature in the evolution of IPR safeguards, that is the departure from individual privileges to a
system designed to ensure that the benefits from the market is fairly distributed.
Fair dealing
Modem law makes provisions allowing restricted use of specific works for limited purposes,
namely research and private study, criticism, review and reporting of current events, and
subject to some restrictions.' 0 Fair dealing was firstly regulated by the 1911 Copyright Act,
which made no restriction as to either the number of copies permitted or the types of works
affected. The regulation has therefore moved to limit the works affected, and make fair
dealing subject to specific conditions," such as the acknowledgement of the author and
restriction in copying.
The changes in law have reflected both the degree of conflicts emerging from time to time
amongst users, authors and publishers and the stage of technological advancement enabling or
making easier the reproduction of works. Taking account of such a phenomenon, the
Gregory Committee regarded the contemporaneous "technical developments such as contact
photography and micro-photography" as a changing factor of copying conditions, making
possible the transcripts and extracts of copyright works in a scale which could affect the
expectation of return.' 2 The Committee referred to the need of the scientific community
which the Royal Society stated as follows:
10 The main current legislation is the Copyright, Designs & Patents Act 1988, whose sections 29 and 30
prescribe the conditions under which copying is regarded as fair dealing. Fair dealing for purposes of reseazvh
or private study involves a single copy of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works and published editions;
there is no need for acknowledgment Criticism and review involve all works, and multiple copies are
permitted provided that the copyright owaer is given sufficient acknowledgment Reporting current events may
invoiw all works less photographs although multiple copies are permitted, sufficient acknowledgement is
required except reporting through sound itcording film, broadcast or cable programme.
"To establish intelligll)le and systematic conditions under which copying could be statutonly permitted was
a concern held by the Gregory Committee which preceded the 1956 Copyright Act This Act was found to be
complex, confusing and ambiguous by the Whitlord Committee, which was aware of that an extensively
detailed legislation would be unworkable. Gregory Report, preliminary and § 27 & 47; Whifford Report, §
11 & 27, and Considerations submitted by the Council for Educational Technology for the Umted Kingdom.
12 Gregory Report, pam. 43. Before the development of mechanical reproduction, transcript through the
laborious process of hand-copymg had never been regarded as an infringement of copynght
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Science rests upon its published record, and ready access to pub/ic scientific and technical infor,natzon is a
funda,nental need of scientists everw here. All bars which prevent access to scientific and technical
publications hinder the progress of science and should be removed Making of single copies of extracts from
books or perzothcals is essential to research workers, and the production of such single extract copies, b y or
on behalf ofscientists, is neces.sarv for scientific practice.'3
The fair dealing provision fundamentally caters for that need which is contrasted with the
right of exploitation the owner is entitled to. The statute reflects an attempt to reconcile those
contrasting interests and to establish an acceptable basis for a modus vivendi between users
and owners. 14 But the law has no dogmatic provision as to either the amount of material
allowed to copy, or the concept of fairness. It is left to the court to decide the extent of the
copying. The criteria the courts provide cannot always be applied to all situations. The judge
looks at a range of elements, including the nature of the work, the purpose of the use and its
effect upon the market!5
Qualified exceptions
Apart from fair dealing which is treated as a general exception, there are other permitted acts
performed for purposes other than those referred to above and regarding a range of qualified
entities, purposes and works including educational use, copying by libraries and archivists,
administrative proceedings, reading or recitation in public, scientific or technical abstracts,
artistic works, broadcasts and cable programmes. The increasing number of these exceptions
is due to the expansion of the copyright regime to cover new subject matters. 16 In order to
' The quotation of the original statement wss inserted in the Whitford Report, pain. 213.
'4 The balance of the interest of copyright owners to control the reproduction of their works and the interest
of those committed to research servicing in pursuing 'Mder dissemination of infonnation is universally
concerned. See Whitford Report, para 222.
15 It is not appropriate to undertake here further study on the subject. It is suffice to say that the dealing, i.e.,
11 H not conflict with normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the
copynght's legitimate interests." Berne Convention, Article 9(2). This guidance was agreed by the Wfutford
Committee, Report, pain. 219, but it is still imprecise. For some court guidance, see Independent Television
Publications Ltd v. Time Out Ltd 11984] F.S.R 64 and at p. 21; Siiitoe v. McGraw-Hill Book Co. (UK) Ltd
[19831 F.S.R. 545, Be/off V. Pressdram Ltd[19731 1 All ER 241; and Hubbardv Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84.
16 In the 1911 Copyright Act, s. 2(1), these special excep(ions included publication m a collection of
passages from published literary works for bonafide use in schools, publication in newspapers of lectures given
in public, and reading and recitation of any reasonable extract thxn published works. The items added by the
1956 Copyright Act s. 6(4), 7,41,42, included use in judicial proceedings, reproduction of works for the
purpose of broadcasting, in respect of libraries and archives and public records.
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meet the statutoly conditions, the implementation of these exceptions may involve a degree of
bureaucracy' 7
 and thus discourage authorised access to works.
Copying for educational purposes under licensing
A good cause does not necessarily give grounds for free-of-charge copying. This rationale is
inherent in those provisions which withdraw some specific exceptions where "licensing
schemes"8
 are available under reasonable remuneration. Instead of granting a blanket licence,
the Statute encourages authors to seek opportunities for reaping some return at affordable
costs by way of licensing schemes, which emerged as a solution acceptable by book and
recording industries.
Under the legislation preceding the 1988 Act, educationalists had to refrain from copying
copyright material to satisfy their daily needs which could easily be met by making use of the
technical fcilities at hands. The legislation then in force which favoured the interests of
authors restricted the potential benefit of photocopying. Discussing the problem, educational
establishments recognised the authors right to an adequate remuneration for their works, but
claimed a reconciling and unambiguous support for educational institutions. In this respect, a
suggestion was made to extend the fair dealing provision for educational purposes, and to
confer freedom of copying within agreed limits statutorily prescribed on behalf of educational
users.'9
The widening scope of fair dealing as it was suggested would amount to a "free-for-all"
basis which was reasonably accepted for literaiy works but highly opposed by the recording
industry. 20 It was argued that, in the case of audio and video recording; individuals may easily
17 The 1988 Copyiighl, Designs and Patents Act, part I, chapter ifi, sections 38 to 43. Alxxit the formalities
recpiired by law see the Copyright (Copyright by Librarians and Archivists) Regulations 1989.
18 The schemes cxwer (a) recording of broadcasts and cable programmes, (b) reprographic copying of
passages from published rks, and (c) subtitled copies of television broadcasts or cable programmes.
Situations (a) and (b) apply to educational estabhshments, aix! (c) to people in special care. 1988 Act, S. 3 5(2),
36(3) and 74(4).
' 9 Evidence to the committee to Cid the Law on Copynght and Desi submitted by the Ccmucil for
Educational Technology for the United Kingdom, undate*i [KD 1281 COU, QMW college's libraiyl See also
Whitford Report, pam. 415,416.
20 Whitfonl Committee. paxas. 319,320.
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afford the acquisition of equipment enabling copying in considerable proportion. This
background in principle favoured a "blanket licence" approach with a levy upon the sale price
of all products which were sold. Practical issues associated with mass-production of
electronic equipment2' and involving the interests of consumers, manufacturers or sellers and
authors gave rise to doubts about the efficiency of the levy scheme which was less than
welcome. A licensing scheme was therefore preferred instead.
By definition, a licensing scheme gives the licensing body the discretion to choose the
works or classes of works under which a licence is available. It encourages incumbent
bodies to organise licensing schemes, 24 including as many works as possible, and deciding
about the charging for the copying. In this respect, the "scheme" regime gives educational
establishments and licensing agencies a significa.nt role in the operation of the copyright law,
without prejudice to the mandate conferred to statutory authorities concerned, 25 which may
act accordingly to settle disputes or to order remedial measures.
Non-voluntary licence for educational purposes
If copying copyright material for the purposes of instruction is not free, and general licences
or "schemes" are not available for educational establishments, 26 then the Secretary of State
may intervene in two situations. He may issue an order to extend the coverage of existing
schemes or general licences to similar works unreasonably excluded, 27 provided that the
compulsory inclusion is not incompatible with normal exploitation and does not impair the
owners' legitimate interest unreasonably
21 CBS Songs LtdvAnzstradpk [198812 All ER 485 at 499.
A levy system is provided by German law and was recommended by the Whitford Committee, siith
diversified treatment for private and educational audio-and-video recording. Whitford Repoil, pans. 230,231.
The Parliament, nevertheless, has given no effect to the zeconunendation.
1988Act,s.116(1).
24 1988 Act, s. 36(3).
The Copyright Tnl,unal and the Secrelaiy of State The 1988 Act, Sections 137-141, 149.
1988 Act, sections 32 to 36.
27 198.8 Act, s. 137.
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A second situation involves works not similar to those already covered by a scheme or
general licence,28 and requires a two-step measure which consists of a recommendation
preceded by a proper inquiiy. To the extent that the recommendation is not implemented
within one year, a statutory order is set up treating the reprographic copying of the prescribed
works as licensed free of charge.
Distinguishing exceptions from limitations
As already stated, traditional exceptions, such as fair dealing and restricted use of material by
educational establishments and libraries, make part of the structure of copyright. As copyright
has increasingly interfered with industrial applications (e.g., software, sound recordings, or
even chip-designs), these exceptions have varied. For instance, a copyright regime may not
afford the same sort of exceptions to books and software, although these elements pertain to
the same class of works?9
The variation of the scope of the exceptions suggests that in order to pursue a proper
balance of interests (intellectual property bargain) the structure of protection may vary to suit
the competitive features of some types of works. 3° Such accommodation, one has to
emphasise, does not interfere with the need to maintain a safeguarding policy applying to the
control of the exercise of copyright. While the exceptions affect the bundle of exclusive rights,
the limitation or control by means of unauthonsed use affects the exercise of these rights.3'
The former, whatever the amount, are not sufficient to preserve or flulfil the intellectual
property bargain. It follows that limitations to copyright, by means of unauthonsed use and
under specific legal conditions, remain a legal mechanism triggered ofl when necessary, to
safeguard either a broad public interest or to secure a degree of competition.
28 1988 Act, s. 140 and 141.
Following the wvrkfwide legal tendency, Article 10(1) of the Agreement on TRiPS classifies computer
programs as literaiy its.
3° For the discussion of exceptions concerning copynght protection of computer programs, - notes on
"New Exceptions to Coigbt Infringement for Computer Programs by David Baithridge and Smion
Chalton, 119931 9 CISR 113; The Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations 1992: comments from
FAST, BSA and SPA, 119921 8(5) CIP. 157; and Guy Vandenberghc, Copynght Protection of Computer
Programs: An unsatisfactoiy proposal for a Directive, 119891 11 E.LP.R. 409.
The distinction follows the scheme of the Agreement on TRIPS. Compare Articles 13, 14(6), 30 and 31.
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5.2.2 Limitations on copyright
(i) Official use
No statute contemplates the use of copyiight works for the service of the Crown. The matter
was twice considered, first by the Gregory Committee32 which recommended the statutory
grant of a power for the Crown to reproduce copighted matenal for purposes of civil
defence and communications, in lines with the tight of patent use. More recently, the matter
was considered by the Whitford Committee. This Report pointed out that the previous
recommendation was never rejected, nor translated into law. The Committee, nevertheless,
saw no case to make a positive recommendation.33
Since that the 1911 Copyright Act abolished the old common law copyright, 34
 any right
over works and related exceptions and limitations are supposed to rely only on statutory
provisions, in view of this, there would be a question open for contention whether there is a
non-statutory safeguard, i.e., a limitation not specifically covered by the Copyright Statute.
This point is considered only for the sake of speculation; further discussion on it is beyond the
scope of this chapter. It could be argued, however, that a government department, acting
under statutory authority, may have a compelling reason of public good 35 to use a copyright
work for the services of the Crown. 36 Provided that it is not found against an express37
32 Report of the Copyright Committee (Gregory Report), 1952), Cmnd. 8662, pam. 75.
The Commission pointed out that the compulsory use of cinematographic film to entertain British troops
could make a case to extend the copyright safeguards, but would not seem to be enough for a recommendation
of that kind, Whitford Report, paras. 691-694.
Section 31.
The 1988 Copght, Designs and Patents Act recognises the public interest defence, s. 17 1(3). But there
is doubt whether the provision cover issues other than disclosure of information relating to public interest as it
usdealtvithinA-GvGuardzan 11988] 3 All ER 545.
The use's right on behalf of the Crown may be sustainable in the light of the nile that says the Crown's
interest caumot be prejudic.ul by the application of a statute unless it enacts so There is also a presumption in
law aceording to which in the absence of express wni'ds the Crown is bowxi by an Act of Parliament 1947
Crom ProceethngsAct, s. 40(2Xf).
' in the absence of express wnrds the Crown is bound by a statute only if the purpose of the statute nuld
be wbo1ly frustrated' if the Crown se not bouixL" Cf Wade & Bradley, "Constitutional and Administrative
Law" (1988), p. 693/4, which in footnote 8 cites supporting cases.
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statutoly provision, 38
 the protection of the Crown's interest would make a strong point. Even
statutorily bound, the Crown may not be sued for breach of copyright duty any way.
The Crown use, necessary to mobilise resources for the national interest, can also be held
on grounds of emergency, in peace or war time. 4° In such a situation, the formal limit of the
Crown's prerogatives is by nature unclear, and therefore cannot be precisely stated. As far as
the Crown's right is sustainable, it could be assumed that it cannot be exercised in a manner to
destroy the individual right, consequently the owner would have sound basis to claim
compensation in line with the patent law.4'
(ii) Take-and-pay licences
In two situations, the 1911 Copyright Act allowed the reproduction of a work for sale,
without the author's consent and by way of an automatic statutory licence:
• regarding a work in general, after the expiration oftwenty JIve years of the copyright term; and
• in respect ofa musical work or an adaptation of it, to make records in the United Kingdom bsequently a
lawfid exploitation of the work in the counby.42
In both cases, two basic conditions were observed: written notice to the copyright owner of
the intention of reproduction, and payment in prescnbed manner and time of statutory royalty
rates.
Section 50(3) of the 1988 Act does not rule out a Government use under "any defence of statuto!y
authority."
Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (c. 44), s. 3(1), as it was amended by the 1988 Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act, Schedule 7(4X1). In this case, how much does the lack of statuto!y licence matter?
4° See Patents, Designs, Copyright and Trade Marks (Emergency) Act 1939; 1988 Act, S. 303(1) and 5th.
7(3); and The Emergency Laws (Re-enactment and Repeals) Act 1964. Under emergency legislation, in 1949
and 1951 the Comptroller made nearly 2,000 compulsory grants over copyright rks. See the 67th Report of
the Comptroller-General for the years 1949 and 1951, [195018 Reports Commissioners & c., p.9 and 69th
Reports [1951-521 10 Reports Commissioners & c. p. 11. If a private firm is ai1od to use a svork under a
non-voluntary licence, the Cros4ll wxild have no less right
The Crown is entitled to use any invention for its service against which the inventor has only a right to
claim compensation, which may include loss of profit See s. 55 to 59 of the 1977 Patents Act and s. 3 &
40(2Xf) of the 1947 Cmsiii Proceedings Act42 1911 Copyright Act, s. 3 and 19; 1956 Copyright Act, s. 8.
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Unauthorised reproduction of works for the remaining period exceeding 25 years was to
make available cheap versions of published works upon payment of a statutory fee. The legal
purpose was pre-empted by lack of commercial interest, i.e., few books remain in demand
after 25 years, and therefore the provision proved to be useless in the context of market
conditions.43
The statutory licence to record musical works was a suggestion which originated from
gramophone manufacturers in response to illegal copying of sound recordings which was a
general of concern. Reflecting on the problem, the 1909 Committee stood in line with the
Beme Convention45 which prescribed the exclusive right of owners to authonse the
reproduction of copyright works. The sensitiveness of the industry, however, prevailed over
the Committee's recommendation.
The statutory sound recording licence, adopted by other countries, was saved for a long
period. Largely justified, the licence was introduced "to encourage the growth of the then
infant British recording industry."47 The conditions of the industry changed over years, but
the provision continued in force operating as a legal basis for a consolidated practice widely
welcome within business circles. Both music copyright owners and recording manufactures
were found to be entirely satisfied with the provision which, nevertheless, had little practical
application. The significance of the statutory procedure was assessed more as a bargaining
element, rather than a crucial necessity, on which the interested parties relied to reach an
agreement voluntarily. Its retention by the current law encountered several obstacles.
° See Gregoiy Report, paras. 20 to 23. The provision
was not saved by the 1956 Copyright Act Suggestion to reintroduce it was rejected by the Whitford Committee
which alleged a second ground, that was, disposition on contraiy of the Brussels text of the Berne Convention.
Whitford Report paras. 875 and 876.
The suggestion was nevertheless rejected by the 1909 designated Copyright Committee. Gregoiy Report,
para8O.
The 1908 Berlin version, article 13. The improvement of British copyright was much influenced by
external pressures. The Adherence of Great Britain in 1887 to the Berne Convention was a stimulus not only to
revise and consolidate the "unintelligible" national law, but also "to provide foreigners with adequate
protection". MMC Report Cm 301 (1988), App. 1.1, p. 57, item 4.
As noted by the Whitford Committee, countries having a compulsoty recording licence provision include
the USA, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and other British Commonwealth countries. Whitford Report, paras.
340 and 341.
The 1986 White Paper. Intellectual Property and Innovation, p. 57, Cmnd. 9712.
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On account that the statutory recording licence was well accepted by the business
community, the Whitford Committee recommended its retention with some alterations. The
recommendations consisted of the calculation of royalty rate and its revision by a tribunal, and
the insertion of permission for importation of "matrices" or tapes to be manufactured in the
United Kingdom. The importation of matrices would expand the scope of the licence, but the
manufacture of the products would take place only in the UK territory. As to the royalty fee,
it would be set by means of a flexible procedure which would replace the existing fixed
statutory rate, which was found to be incompatible with market conditions and allegedly
contrary to the negotiated scheme in force in rest of the EC countries." 8
 itt was argued that
the fixed rate provided for low royalties contrasting with higher fees paid in other EC
countries, and in effect the British statutory rate could differentiate price areas for copyright
royalties, and adversely affect the balance of movement of goods from low-price areas to
high-price areas."' To protect the Community goals was the major reason for the statutory
sound recording licence not being saved in the 1988 Act. 5° Notwithstanding, a statutory
licence on broadcasting of sound recordings was recently put in place on the grounds of fair
use of copyright monopoly under the management of collective licensing bodies.5'
(iii) Compulsory licence to republish
This was a licence to reproduce literary, dramatic or musical works of deceased authors in the
event that republication was impeded by the owner of the copyright. 52
 Similar to the
automatic licence over 25-year old works, the compulsory licence to republish did not
produce the desired effect either, 53 and was confined to the 1911 Copyright Act. Its purpose
was to secure wider availability of a literary, dramatic or musical work after the author's
death, in the event that the copyright owner had failed to republish or allow the republication
of the work or its performance in public. The safeguard was established on behalf of users,
A fixed statutory rate existed only in the UK and Ire1and In the other EC counthes, a negotiated scheme
was regulated by an agreement entered into by a pool of societies of composers and muc publishers which
under this system mrmally rehes higher royalty rate.
49 Mv.s,k-Verlrieb Membran BmbHv. GEM4 [198112 C.ML.R. 44.
° 1981 Government Green Paper, Reform of the Law relating to Copyright, Designs and Performers'
Protection, Cmnd. 8302, at pages 18/19.
' Section 95 and 175 of the Broadcasting Act 1990. See MMC Report Cm 530 (1988) para 7.18 aM 7.49.
52 1911 Copyright Act, s. 4.
Gregory Report, para. 23.
168
from whom the work had been withheld. The licence was granted upon application and on
conditions the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council deemed fit.
(iv) Statutory licence on rental
Whilst rental, rather than sale, has become a significant means of distribution to the public of
video-grams, the recording and entertainment industries realised that this growing practice is
detrimental to their interests. As members of the public have the facility to rent video tapes
and records for entertainment at home, they tend to buy fewer of these products. Relying on
this assumption, the industries made a case to claim an "explicit right for a video or audio
copyright owner to control or to obtain remuneration from commercial rental of his
products."54
In the Government's view, the introduction of a new iight "could result in anti-competitive
effects on the market."" In fact, little evidence was brought to show the gravity of the
problem raised by the industry. The reluctance of the Government did not impeded the
creation of the rental right,56 based on a presumed compensation for alleged damages. As a
deal of caution, nevertheless, the Statute provided for two safeguards: (a) a remote licence,
i.e., to be implemented by means of a statutory instrument subject to Parliamentary
approval,57 and (b) a statutory licence on rental concerning the issue to the public of
computer programs in electronic form, after 50 years from the first distribution.58
Apart from the licence (b), which needs no implementing measure, the efficiency of the
licence (a) depends on how quick the Government is on the trigger. An order made by the
Secretary of State treating rental as licensed by copyright owner may likely not be needed.
The availability of the legal mechanism, however, which may be put in operation at any time,
D.T.L, Government's Green Paper, Intellectual Property and Innovation, p. 74, Cmnd. 9712, London,
1986.
55Idemden
56 Rental ("arrangement under which a copy of a 'rk is made available") relating to sound recordings,
ifims and computer programs is a new exclusive right to issue copies to the public, either for commercial
purposes or to me interests of public libraries and museums. 1988 Act, s. 18(2), 178, and Schedule
7(6X8X34).
1988 Act, s. 66(4).
1988 Act, s. 3(5).
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is itself a deterrent against abusive exercise of the exclusive right of issuing copy to the public
of prescribed material. The statutory authority does not need to justiI,' the order on specific
grounds, such as anti-competition conditions or refusal to licence on reasonable basis.
However, if a default of such kind is present, the Government has the alternative of seeking
remedial measures based either on Section 66 (subsections I to 4) or 144. The latter depends
on a competition report and follows different proceedings canied out by different department.
It is up to the Government of the day to choose the more expedient and proper method,
having regard to political circumstances. Nevertheless, as the modem regulation concerning
the control of IPR use tends to rely on competition principles, the Section-66 licence
(unimplemented) may well fall into disuse.
(v) Licences of right to secure competition
In cases reported by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) an anti-competitive
practice is expected to operate or has operated against the public interest, involving a
specified copyright matter, the owner is subject to ministerial measures (i.e., either to vary
licensing conditions or provide for the availability of licence of right or both). 59
 The power to
grant licences of right in order to eliminate a violation against competition law was only
introduced by the 1988 Act.6° Before that, the limited power of the Secretary of State to
provide for remedies in respect of the anti-competitive exercise of copyright did not include
the ability to grant non-voluntary licences.6'
These provisions indicate that a copyright mischief does not prevail against competition.
The principle is the same as that which applies to patents. Although limited in scope, the
preceding legislation62 also supported this principle.
Tbe measures include the cancellation or modification of the anli-competitive conditions; additionally or
alternatively, a licence of right in respect of the copyright may be made available on terms settled by the
Copyright Tribunal by dthuh clagreement and on reqncst 1988 Act, s. 144.
60 To this effect, recomincadation was made by tl Monopolies and Mergers Commission. MMC Report,
pam. 6.70, Cmnd. 9437 (1985).
61 See section 10(1) of tbe 1980 Competition Act.
62 1956 Copyright Act, s. 27(2X5) only applied to perfonning rights. Earlier in emergency legislation,
compulsoiy licence of copyright is available on a par with patents. Patents, Designs, Copyright and Trade
Marks (Emergency) Act 1939.
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The effect of the exercise of copyright on competition was obscured for a long time. The
history of copyright shows that in eighteenth-century England the publishers' control of the
book trade was a real source of monopoly, but the problem was not obvious. Copyright was
granted to encourage the development of art and learning. In order to pursue this undisputed
cause, it was fundamental, as Parliament recognised, that all rights derived from the author.
Protection, however, was in fact granted against competition for the benefit of publishers.
The consequential effect on monopoly in the beginning was not perceived by the courts.63
Having to apply a copyright law heavily influenced by pnvate groups, judges ended up
protecting entrepreneurial interests. That was because:
fivm the beginning, copyright was a statutory concept, not one of convnon law. And the judges in copyright
cases felt themselves bound by the language of the statutes. There was, in the light of history as they
understood it, little mom to make careful distinctions, analyse problems, and define function. Their task was to
resolve disputes under the statute, not to formulate guiding principles.64
Obviously, the courts later played some role in construing the statute towards the need to
reconcile competing interests - authors, publishers and the society. 65 The dimension of these
interfacing interests is most conspicuous in the advent of technical developments, enabling
individuals to copy copyright material in greater scale, and motivating claims for protection of
new category of works (e.g., photographs, films or motion pictures, sound recordings, and
more recently computer programs). The growing of copyright-based industry has given rise
to matters on competition. Reflecting this concern, the 1956 Copyright Act introduced a non-
voluntary licence limited to the area of performing iights. The measure was available on the
grounds of unreasonable refusal to licence or refusal to licence on reasonable terms or
conditions.
The current legislation contains wider statutory power and gives the Government the
authority to compel owners to deal on reasonable terms or conditions. This keeps the law
63 For a historical account, see Patterson, L.R "Copyright in Historical Perspective", chapter 12, 1968.
Nevertheless at common law judges had a perception of copyright as "public utility", that was, "productions of
the mind should be diffusod as wide as possible." Donaldron v. Beckelt [1774] 837 at 840.
Ob. cit., at p. 229.
65 See for instance, the discussion of some copyright cases by P. S. Aliyah, "The Rise and Fall of Ftedom
of Contract", atp. 107-109.
Section 27(2X3).
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abreast with modem business ethics in respect of the exercise of copyright. Due to
refinements introduced to non-voluntary licensing system, the intellectual property bargain
tends to rely on more detailed legal conditions, and is translated into rules and principles of
competition. There has been no change in the essence of the law, that is, the use of intellectual
property is subjected to statutory controls. Such control or limitations, which have existed for
over two hundred years, may vary in forms or methods or opportunity, charactensing a
generalised non-voluntary licensing 67 or a system growingly based on individual merits, i.e.,
in the light of actual circumstances and sound proceedings. Despite the number of "copyright
exceptions", the types of limitations on the exercise of owner's rights have a role apart
5.2.3 The non-volitional element in licensing schemes
(1) Historical background
The origins of the licensing scheme, which did not exist before the 1956 Copyright Act, lay
on the confluence of competing interests in copyright. Firstly, there was the interest of the
author of a literary, dramatic or musical work. Traditionally, writers and composers have
given the right, inter alia, to make any adaptation, reproduce in any material form, and
authonse the performing in public of their works. 68 Secondly, there was the interest of
performing artists, including singers and musicians. Although having merit of their own,
performers always had a precarious right, difficult to enforce and protection by the early
legislation was made in a defective and incomplete manner. 69 Protection was considerably
improved in a period of four decades, from the 1956 Act 7° to the 1988 Act, 7 ' market by
67 A generalized type of licensing includes those serve-yourself licences (in respect of sound recording and
after-25-year licence), licence to republish works of deceased authors, and licence on rental of computer
programs after 50 years of exploitation.
These rights have invariably been recognized by the UK ccpynght law. 1911 Act, s. 1(2); 1956 Act, s.
2(5); and 1988 Act, s. 16(1).
11 1906 Musical Copynght Act and the 1925 Dramatic and Musical Performers Protection Act only
made criminal provisions; there were difficulties to prove the offenses and these Acts did not give any civil
righL See also the MMC Report on the merger situation (Warner arid Chappell), Cm 301 (1988), App. 1.1, p.
57, item 3.
° The 1956 Coright Act, as the Whitford Committee reported, gave "to the owoer of the copyright in a
musical, dramatic or literary work the sole right to reproduce such work in the form inter a/ia of records
(including tapes and discs) and to the owr of the separate copyright in a sound recording the sole right to
control the making of finther records from that re*xwding. The maker of a cinematograph film is pnjted
against cng for any purpose. Broadcasters are protected
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interrelated technical and social concerns. For instance, technical advancements in the
transmission, reception, recording and reproduction of sounds and signals, originally used in
war and espionage, 72 have for the past half-centuiy been employed, inter a/ia, for mechanical
reproduction of musical works largely through magnetic tape and recording equipment,
marking the emergence of the entertainment and recording industries. This industrial and
technological expansion created social and legal problems.
Parallel to lawful trading, an increasing number of contrivances took place through illicit
copying of sound recording and commercial exploitation of performances, live or broadcast.
As an attempt to curb the illicit activities, legal measures were enacted to penalise those who
embarked into contravening reproduction of performances and films or broadcasting of
both. 7 Because of the easy fixation of sound and images through electronic means, the
deterrent measures were difficult to enforce and thus they were found of little effectiveness.
There were, for instance, practical difficulties as to the control of the basic right to produce,
reproduce or publish a work or perform it in public. 74 The ease of technical reproduction,
legally or illegally, caused considerable concern to both authors and performers.
Whilst technical developments led to a wider mechanical diffusion of public performances,
authors were becoming more and more separate from their works, and performing could no
longer be an unlimited right. One of the consequences, for performing artists, was that the
increasing use of recorded popular music put jobs of singers and musicians in public houses
(cafes, discotheques and alike) at risk.75 The fear was that the progress in methods of
acoustic and visual reproduction could cause the number of artists practising their art
professionally to reduce.76 Despite the prospect of trade expansion at international level,
industnal development, for instance in broadcasting and recording, was also at stake.
Through the apparatus of the electronic media performances were brought to the eyes and
against the making of recordings or copies of their broadcasters other than for private purposes." Whitford
Report, para. 295.
' Paitil, Section 180 etseqq.
72 CBS Songs Ltd vAmslradplc (Lord Templeman), [198812 All ER 484 at 486.
Sec, for instance, the 1958 Dramatic and Musical Performers' Protection Act
The problem s reported in the Gregoiy Comnütt, paras. 141, 174, and considered by the Whitfoni
Committec, para. 410.
' Whitford Report, paras. 398, 399; Gregoiy Report, para 154.
76 Gregoiy Report, para. 180.
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ears of the public. Contemplating this background, the Gregory Committee faced a
!imdamental question, that was, "how to secure for the general public the maximum benefit of
these scientific and technical developments, while at the same time providing adequate
protection for those who make these developments possible. "
Reflecting on the problem, the Committee had a clear view that under all known rules
"dramatists and composers were entitled to denve their income from the power to control
perfomiance."78 They needed a sufficient degree of protection to produce works. However,
plays and musical works are written to be performed, in being wntten, they attract other
rights. The Committee then moved to the argument that to restrict the control of the
copyright owners was inescapable. 79 This gave rise to the conception of a "cumulative"
performer's right: a right of performers derived from public performance 8° and a right on
behalf of the broadcasting and recording companies.8'
It was the coexistence of separate but interrelated copyright interests that created the needs
for the availability of licence. Refusal by any rightholder to make the due authorisation would
prevent the general public from achieving maximum benefit from copyright works, and the
development of the copyright-based industiy would be impaired. As to the recording issue in
particular, a proper balance of interests would include assistance to the industiy which needed
to continue to produce and sell records. 82 Trade expansion, however, required the tackling of
piracy. In this respect, and as a practical matter, it became urgent to allow easy access on a
fair basis for those firms 'vi1ling to enter the sound recording market. A legal mechanism
which met such a purpose would also encourage those firms which were running recording
businesses illegally to compete fairly.
.T Gregory Repoit, para. 179.
78 Gregoiy Report, para. 178.
Idem, pain. 179.
80 The performer su1d have TMpnieclion against copying the characteristics of his performance, aixi (... to
control the use made of his performance, for example its recording and the purpose to which the recording are
subseent1y put TM Gregory Report, pain. 168.
81 j 	 Report, pain. 177.
82 For an amt on the features of the UK music industiy and the bargain between publishers aixi
singer/songwriters, see: MMC Report on the Warner/Chappell merger; Cm 301 (1988); MMC Report on
Collective Licensing; Cm 530 (1988);AIRC andAnother v PPL andBBC 119941 R.P.C. 143 at 159.
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(ii) Residual compulsoriness
Under the 1956 Copyright Act, the Performing Right Tribunal had the ability to confirm or
vary licensing schemes, 83 in a given situation, e.g., when a licence to perform the work in
public, in the statutoly meaning, in respect of the copyright in a musical work was
unreasonably refused, or the terms made available were not reasonable. 84 Expanding the
statutory junsdiction, the 1988 Act altered the Tribunal's mandate and the scope of the
licence, but determined that licences have to be operated predominantly by collecting
societies. The licensing scheme, however, is a legal refinement of non-voluntaiy licensing in
the way and to the extent that it retains an element of compulsonness.
The legal policy underlying the licensing scheme is this: (a) as a general principle, access to
intellectual property on a fair basis cannot be denied unless the nghtholder has a reasonable
excuse; (b) in exercising control over reproduction in any material form and over performance
of works in public, authors have the right to establish in first place the reasonable terms and
conditions under which that access is made available for a plurality of willing licensees or
users; (c) where the interested parties fail to operate these rules accordingly, a statutory body
may act upon reference or be compelled by duty to intervene.
A first observation is that a licensing scheme is in its origin a private agreement. This,
however, by no means follows the general proposition, adverse to compulsory licensing, that
individual owners should be allowed to contract with whoever they wish. Objection,
however, has to be taken to an outmoded unfettered freedom of trade, mainly in intellectual
property where iightholders, committed to a social bargain, are not absolute masters of their
consent. In this connection, the private element is rather overndden "either in the interests of
83 Article 25(5).
84 Licences covered "copyright in literary, dramatic or musical work, or in a sound recording or a television
bmadcast." 1956 Act, S. 24(2).
85 The Performing Right Tribunal was replaced by the Copyright TribunaL The junsdictiou covers "licences
to do, cc authonse the doing of; any of the acts restricted by copyright." The mandte include an order about
the proposed scheme deciding either "generally" or upon the points the reference relates to. The licensing
scheme can also be operated by an individual person. See 1988 Act, ss. 149,145(1), 143, and 118(3).
Akhough authors cc collecting societies may exclude works from licensing schemes, the exclusion has to
be at least reasonable or justifiable otherwise it may be cballengeL 1988 Act, ss 66 (not in force), 137, 138,
140, 141 and 144.
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a majority, or to give effect to values which a majority believe to be of overriding
importance."87
As an instrument of intellectual property order, the licensing scheme attracts interests from
the business community, represented either by the licensing body, which operates the
"scheme", or by a representative organisation of willing licensees. It is therefore in the veiy
notion of licensing schemes that the scope of the collective agreement is in the first place
offered or open to a community assessment. At the heart of the legal structure of the
"scheme" lies the assumption that the collectivity of commercial organisations gathers the best
judges about the reasonableness of the "scheme". i in the interest of them the "scheme" is
reasonable, it is presumed to be so in the public interest. This has the effect f rejecting the
individualism as a central element of free consent. 88 In this respect, the conceptual structure
of the licensing scheme goes beyond its practical purpose, that is to facilitate copyright market
between a plurality of users and owners.89
In reducing the rightholder's freedom to licence, the licensing scheme by its nature differs
essentially from the classical sense of private agreement, which is normally associated with the
idea that, natural market conditions apart, dealers have a wide freedom of choice to contract.
To what extent such a freedom can reasonably be, it cannot be suggested. However, it is
certainly correct to argue that a limited freedom of trade has to accord with the conflicting
interests involved, and in accordance with them the reasonableness of the scheme is assessed.
The anti-competitive exercise of intellectual property is incompatible with a sense of social
bargain. This general proposition makes unsuitable a proposed licensing sctheme which in
effect does or may potentially lead to disruption of competition. In this connection, a refusal
to license is primarily a matter of statutory concern. Unless otherwise justified, the refusal is
anti-competitive, and thus unreasonable, as far as it leads to preventing prospective entries,
87 See Aliyah, P. S. (1988) The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, p. 726. The importanee of the
interests of the majority has determined the decline of the freedom to centract.
88 Ideni, idem.
In the area of performing rights; the experience shows that individual negotiations are unpractical
Collecting organisations have proved to be greatly handy, instead, making tI user/owner relation easier.
Concerns; however, have been raised as to operational practices of collecting societies, which have been
involved in allegations of imnopoly and collection of excessive tanI. Whilford Report, paras 389-401.
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eliminating or hampering competitors or discriminating among them. In regard to these
criteria, the Tribunal has to apply the "social bargain" test, by answering the question - does
confirming or varying the scheme make society better off'? In searching for a proper answer,
the Tribunal has the opportunity to consider efficiency criteria informed by competition
principles and economic concepts, but the Statute rules out no "relevant considerations,"9°
implying that arguments on grounds of social weiflire or public policy may apply. This
suggests that adjudication on a licensing scheme does not necessarily have to follow rigid
concepts of competition or economics.
State intervention either through the Tribunal or reference made by licensing body or
representation of licensees, is symptomatic of the residual compulsoriness of the licensing
scheme. More significant yet is that representation of rightholders cannot block a reference to
the Tribunal made by a representation of willing licensees.
As a refinement of non-voluntary licensing, the licensing scheme is a remarkable legal
improvement in many senses. As it is formulated statutorily, the licensing scheme allows a
great deal of involvement of the business community. This makes the scheme a quasi self.
regulated an-angement9 ' designed to make copyright works readily available on request and
on fair grounds. As a consequence, state intervention is minimal.
As a legal tool suitable for addressing practical problems of competing interests related to
copyright and high technology, licensing schemes seem to be very desirable for the
achievement of the social bargain. Such an achievement is a major concern in the field of
patent law.
9° 1988Act,s. 135.
91 The statutoly ccpynght licensing scheme may have dra'vii inspiration fmm private patent policy adopted
by industry associations afler the Second World War. Arrangements were made by, for instance, the Cable
Makers Association, the Covered Conductors Association, and the Independent Cable Makers Association, for
the purpose of making patents available for their members aii non-members on equal conditions and terms.
For information, see The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission Report on the Supply of Insulated
Electric Wires and Cables, [1951-521 10 Reports Commissioners & c., pages 23.24,50, and 88.
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5.3 Unauthorised use of patents
5.3.1 Fundamentals of patent safeguards
(I) The early foundation
The immediate scope of patent is to protect inventors against mfiingements. In Britain,
statutory protection came about under the premise that a patent was a singular monopoly
granted for the public benefit. From this rationale, theoretical justification gradually supported
unauthorised use of inventions as a means to secure technical catch-up and trade
development. Therefore, statutory protection was, as it has always been, very linked to a
sense of safeguards, in the way that protecting inventions against infringements and
safeguarding the public interest were a twofold function of the patent as a complex concept.
In seventeenth-century England all monopolies were declared void, but an exception was
made as to the validity of letters patents granted to the "true and first inventor" for a limited
term.' The 1623 Statute discouraged but did not prohibit the formation of monopolies which
would be supervised and examined under common laws. Al that time the existence of
monopolies was a matter for concern and, nevertheless, a fact of the countrs economic life.2
In such a context the association of patent with the idea of monqpoly was a point of legal
contrast. Although largely tolerated in practice, monopolies were statutorily disallowed.
While a formal ban made monopolies unpopular, patents were a valid monopoly excluded
from the official bar.
'The Statute of Monopolies 1623, Articles 1, 2,6.
2 The 1503 Statute of Heniy vu, Ch. x struck at those letters patents granted for term of life making them
void and of no effect They re an element of privilege rather than indiwlual nght& An inlroductoiy
explanation to the Article I of the 1623 Statute informs that despite the King in 1610 had declared all
monopolies contrary to his la'cs unduly monopolies had been granted. It has been reported that abesive
granting of patents were more pronounced in Tudor times (Mr. Justice Adcner, J. in Hoffinann-La Roche &
Co. A.G.'s Patents [19731 KP.C. 130, at p. 137). Royal grants of monopolies in consideration of grace or
fawMJr, or to increase the royal revenue were a matter for attrition betn H Majesty and the Parliament
which as keen on observing the constitutional principle of freedom of trade winch the King had no power to
alter. Inthisrespectsee77Eit 12 Co. Rep. 74 TheZamora (1916)2A.C. 77a190.
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As an exceptional monopoly, patents were to be, nevertheless, under control. This command
was part of the foundation of the statutory protection. Although the 1623 Statute did not set
up specific measures as to the use of inventions, it limited the scope of the patent and
provided a legal basis for its control. In this respect, the Statute established that the patent
could last no longer than fourteen years and only for the working and making of a "new
manufacture", and that the patent could not be used as a pretext to raise "prices of
commodities", hurt trade or otherwise be inconvenient.3
As it entailed a sense of limitation to the patent-monopoly, the 1623 Statute became an
inspiring theoretical source, supporting the perception that it was legitimate to get from the
patent the best benefit for the public. This leads to another ground nile underlying patent
safeguards: a patent is granted on the understanding that it will, without undue delay, be
worked on a commercial scale to the benefit of the public as a whole. This legal principle
comes from ancient common law. According to it, with no consideration to the public benefit
there was no valid monopoly. This principle has been recognised a number of times. In an
illustrative case, 4 the House of Lords confirmed that the substantive right of letters patent
conferred by the Crown was "generally described as a monopoly" regulated by the Statute of
Monopolies but limited at common law. As a derogation from the common right offreedom
of trade, [a monopoly] could not be granted without consideration moving to the public.5
As an exception to the principle of freedom of trade,6 the patent monopoly was designed
much more to encourage manufacture within the country than to encourage creation of
inventions. It was concerned with the disclosure of information about new and useful articles
or processes. As an institution founded in the interest of the public, the patent was granted
also on the assumption that it was not to be used as a basis for restraint of trade, nor was not
to be operated unreasonably to the public injury.
The 1623 Statute, Article 6.
4 Attorney-General of the Common-Wealth ofAustralia v. Adelaide Steamship Company, Limited [m shoit
A-U Australial, (1913) A.C. 781, statement of Lord Parker 1 Waddington at p. 793.
A-U Australia, (1913) A.C. at 794.
6 It has been suggested that a free trade sentiment has its primaly smive in the Magna Carta, and bad two-
legged defrnce. It was either in favour of merchants in those days oppressed by feudal barons, or of interest of
the later who encouraged foreign traders. See T. P1ucknett, Tasell-Langmead's English Constitutional
Histoiy, lithed., p. 83.
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The notion of public benefit to which the patent should serve has always been part of the law
of the land. It derived from the wording of the "Form of Patent" attached to the 1883 patent
statute. 7
 The principle was also introduced in the text of 1919 patent statue 8
 in a provision
which was later repealed, but its matrix is still in force. 9
 As a ground rule, the principle today
stands as a comprehensive proposition underlying those provisions' 0
 governing statutory
safeguards.
(ii) The technical connection
As far as inventions are concerned, safeguarding prcMsions has long been part of the
country's catching-up policy, aiming at keeping the pace of industrial progress. In this respect,
Great Britain seemed to leg behind the Continent at different points in time, from the Middle
Ages to the current centuly. The superiority of neighbouring nations apparently caused the
country to build up an attitude of competing ambition."
As FL Fox points out, during the Middle Ages the Continent experienced supeiior material
progress than that of England, which moved from an agricultural society to the textile
industry fostered by regulations aimed at self-sufficiency.' 2 More recently,' 3
 reports show
The relevant portion of the Form reads as follo: and also f the said patentee shall not supply or cause
to be supplied for our service all such articles of the said invention as may be required by the officers or
convnissioners athninistering any department of our service in such manner, at such times, and at and upon
such reasonable prices and terms as shall be settled in mannerfor the time being by law provadea' then, and in
any of the said case these our letters patent, and all privileges advantages whatever hereby granted shall
detennine and become void notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained Excerpt from the "Form D"
attached to s. 33 of the 1883 Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act repealed by the 1907 Act
The principle vas clearly stated in s. 27(2Xe) of the 1907 Patents and Designs Act, as it was amended by
the 1919 Act, reading: it shall be taken that patents for new inventions are granted not only to encourage
invention but to secure that new inventions shall so far as possible be worked on a commercial scale in the
United Kingdom without unthie delay. The whole 1919 Act was repealed by the 1949 Patents Act (sck 2).
The matrix is the Statute of Monopolies s. 6. This provision embodies the concept of invention, and was
confirmed by (a) the 1949 Patents Act, S. 101, aM (b) the Patents and Designs Act 1932, s. 3 [or 1907 Act, s.
25(2Xd)J. These provisions are net listed as repealed by the 1977 Patents Act, scK 6.
10 Since the 1949 Act the safeguard regime was expanded, so as a range of more detailed rules furnishes a
large basis for the public benefit principle, assessed under tbe discretion of the comptroller. See 1949 Patents
and Designs Act s. 18(lXa), and 1977 Patents Act, s. 50(lXa).
"Owing to the lack of Sufficient data, it is hard to establish that the patent safeguards came up as a result of
an ambition to compete ith neighbouring nations, snoh as France and Germany. The f that technologically
Great Britain has always legged behind those counines, however, suggests that at least there a state of need
tojustif' the enactment of patent safeguards.
' 2 ld G. Fo; Monopolies	 patents: a study	 p. 30,
1947.
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that Great Britain was behind rivals in keeping pace with development. Such performance is
reflected, for instance, in patenting. In the 1880s, when the numbers of patents grew rapidly,
the trend was one of gradual growth, but the picture changed considerably by the turn of the
century. In the chemical industry in particular, which accounted for a large proportion of
patenting Britainhadasetbackin compaiisonwith Germany. Inthedecadeafiertheturnof
the century, in the overall level of the US chemical patenting in the ten most significant classes
"Germans had taken out 1754 patents [against] only 212 British."' 4 Although it cannot be
concluded that this background led to the creation of patent safeguards, as legal tools to
foster technical progress, the existence of a tecimological gap together th that competing
attitude at least suggests an association of the development of patent safeguards with a
catching-up policy.
The link between patent safeguards and the desire to catch up with technical development is
further suggested from the attitude of the Government before the increasing violation of
competition. Before the turn of the nineteenth centuly, a monopoly-led widespread mood was
evident both in America and Europe. The alarming scale of the phenomenon caused great
astonishment to economists and politicians, who supported responsive measures. The US
Congress passed the 1890 Sherman Act, which was designed to penalise those engaged in
anti-trust practices. In the same period, Britain was to some extent being affected. The British
chemical industry, for instance, was severely impaired as a result of an astute patent policy
carried out by German chemical firms which relied on patents as an extension of cartel
arrangements. Despite these facts, the example of the US Congress was not convincing to the
British Government. Perhaps the Country had a distinct perception of the problem, tackling it
in its own way. Intriguingly enough, nevertheless, the Government continued with no clear
policy against competition violations, making its mind up only after the Second World War.'5
Instead, the Government preferred to set out a safeguarding policy whose effect was to allow
' During the penod from 1870 to 1913, the difference in grov4h and technological levels is mainly
contrasted with those of Germany and the USA. Tylecote, The Long Wave in the World Economy, pp. 218 and
226. The coninieitial rivaliy with these t countnes is also accused by David Reyno1ds The Creation of the
Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941, p. 291.
' Jonathan Liebenau (also editor), "Patents and the chemical industiy: tools of business strategy", p. 139, in
"The Challenge of New Technology, Innovation m British Business Since 1850", GOWER, 1988.
' The 1948 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquuy and Control) Act was an initial step taken on a
inal basis.
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firms to capitalise on foreign patents. Was it a subtle understanding of a short cut to pursue
technical innovation? There is no evidence of such a link, but the facts are obvious. Economic
and political circumstances, as well as an increasing claim for state interference, provided for
the iight opportunity to set out a general policy against the increasing tendency to
competition violations. A specific statutoly control over patents was put in place, instead.
(lii) From thoughts to statutory control
Prior to the last quarter of the nineteenth century the idea of patent safeguard as it is here
applied was inconceivable. There was a statutory concept of patent limited by its own
function, but no provision existed to allow in practical terms the compulsory tuse of an
invention for purposes such as domestic industrial progress, and wider availability of a
product at reasonable price for the benefit of the public as a whole. The dominant legal
thought of the time was founded on a dual scheme of privileges or exclusiveness and a broad
and ambiguous principle of freedom of trade.'6
It took some centuries from the time protection for inventions was made available in
Europe to the statutory recognition of the interest of third persons in a patent. Only in 1852 a
provision was for the first time introduced into an amendment to the patent law which
determined that:
Notwithstanding any Fvviso that may exist informer Letters Patent, it shall be lawful for a larger nwnber
than Twelve Persons hereafter to have a legal and beneficial Interest in such Letters Patent.17
The patent law, nevertheless, provided no practical measures either for one to exercise that
interest, or to question the patent's exclusive right. It was only in 1883 that the conduct of a
patentee in the exercise of his monopoly tight could be challenged on statutory grounds.'8
16 It was an mfant legal stage based on a mixture of protectionism and move towards a free economy. To a
ceTtatn extent, this thinking basis has an influential impact on the regime of patent safeguards.
S. XXXVI of the 1852 Patent Law Amendment.
' The challenge of the patentee conduct was made possible as a result of the 1883 Patents, Designs and
Trade Mark Act, s. 22 (main provision). See statement of Mr Justice Luxmoore J. in Brownie JIire/ess Co.
Ld's Patent, [1929] XLVI B_P.C. 457 at 469.
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The event coincided th the emergence of changing thoughts and attitudes which influenced
the economic and political life of the countly.
The introduction of statutory provisions allowing third persons to use a patent without the
consent of the owner was a contribution to the problems raised by monopolies and anti-
competitive behaviour in the last two decades of the nineteenth centuly. At that time, the
safeguarding move in patent law was distinct in the way it contrasted th a laissez-faire state
and a freedom of contract strongly reflected in the legal infrastructure of the time. These
doctrines were regarded as failures on several counts. For liberal forces, they did not respond
to contemporary problems, such as social inequality and market disarray. Moreover, they
were found to be lacking by social and political theorists when put to the test. In addition,
they allowed monopolies to prosper freely. Therefore, the mood of the time was conducive to
the emergence of a safeguarding policy.
Growing industrial concentration took place in England during the latter half of the
nineteenth century. It involved practices of restrictive arrangements, such as market sharing,
quota and price fixing, and resale price maintenance. As this monopolist tendency moved
beyond national frontiers, the formation of transnational corporations led to "squeeze out
competitors almost anywhere." 9 Two theoretical elements were blamed for such
development: the laissez-faire doctrines and the principle of freedom of contract, which to a
certain extent worked as restricting forces against state interference.
In a time of visible social inequality, politicians and social theorists started demanding social
reforms, which required state interference, using legislation as a means of distribution, in
order to protect underprivileged. In their efforts to turn the scale, they undertook to remove
those theoretical obstacles. They considered freedom of trade as an instrument which tended
to perpetuate inequaliti&° The criticism also included laissez-faire doctrines, to the extent
that they supported a non-interference policy. Describing this development, Atiyah observes:
P. S. Atiyali, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Conlract, at p.617
20 Joseph Chamberlain and Alfred Marshal sere prominent politicians who forcefully argued that in many
situations laissez-faire did not actually pmduce the maximum public advantage." Atiyah, ob. cit., p. 615.
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It came to be said that liberty was not merely a negative concept, but had also a positive side to it. Traditional
freedoms, like freedom of contract, had over-stressed the negative side, but for those who could not benefit
from these freedoms freedom of contract was no better than freedom to starve. Positive freedom, by contrast,
was not freedom from restraint, or indeea freedom from anything; it was the freedom to do something worth
doing, to achieve the self-fidfilment ofwhich the individual was capable.21
Moving on to the legal system, the criticism was that while restraints in trade were made
unenforceable, the policy then in place allowed entrepreneurs to merge, and that it was a
paradox of English law to have "a restraint of trade doctrine, but no anti-monopoly
docttine." The most aggressive spirits came to regret the "lack of common sense and
knowledge of business" of the legal members of the House of Lords. This in some sense
denounced the judicial policy embodied in "the idea that all contracts should in principle be
enforceable, at least in the absence of plain illegality."24 Assuming that "free competition
required them to abstain from interference in what they saw as a mere move in a competitive
struggle, [judges] did not see how they were to draw a line between fair and unfair
competition, or normal and abnormal competition The unsteady judicial attitudes reflected
the ambiguity of doctrines in transition.
Concerning the 1880s laissez-faire, a distinguished politician wrote: "Trade was free. But
hunger and squalor and cold were also free and the people demanded something more than
liberty. " While political thinking shifted from negative to positive freedom, the role of the
State was to be modified. Changes in attitudes would lead to legitimate State interference,
making easy the passing of liberal legislation. 27 If such an age of laissez-faire existed, it had
then come to an end. In tune with these changing attitudes, a safeguarding policy was born
in the iight time to respond to the unscrupulous use of the patent system by German firms.
21 P S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, p. 586.
Idem,atp. 617.
The reference found in Memorial ofAlfredMwrhalI has been quoted from Atiyah, oh. cit. p. 617.
24 See Atiyah, alp 697.
Idem, alp. 698.
Winston Churchill, passage from the biography of his father, Lord Randolph Churchill, iUen by the
former. Qted from Aiiya1i ob. cit. p. 587.
27 For instance, in the late 1880s the rights of landlords re overrode in the interests of tenants, in 1903
taxes sveie imposed on riches to pay old age pensions Atiyah, ob. cit, p. 587
'fl laissez-faire doctrines re propagated by A V Dicey. Dicey's critics strongly regard these doctrines
as a myth and a misconception. By the end ci the First World War the faith in the laissez-faire state had fadei
For more information, see Atiyah, ob. cit, alp. 23 1-247 and 625.
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The monopolist strategy of German chemical industiy became part of the patent history. They
used "the patent system as weapon in their attempt to secure the markets by blocking
domestic competition from Amencan manufacturers. Along with this strategy, they used their
powerful market position to compel foreign firms to join them in international control or
cai-tel agreements in which patents played an important role." Apart from taking out
patents, the strategy also was to claim "closely related patents", [thus exercising a] "tight
control over a product area or production process." 30 Giving a historical account of this
business strategy, J. Liebenau observes that:
In the USA this strategy took advantage of the patent law which tolerated patents as instrument for monopoly
and cartels, while other forms of anti-competitive behaviour had been ruled illegaL In Britain most of the
practices covered by the American will-trust Act violated no law, but patents were seen as one of the most
useful means ofmaintaining control overforeign selling and licensing arrangements.3'
Within this overall background, it was not surprisingly that the 1883 Patent Act was held,
overtly, as an instrument to guard against the unfair German tactic of protecting but not
manufacturing their products. 32 Not manufacturing their patents nor allowing Britons to do
so, German chemical firms were blamed for "the premature ruination of the British dye
industry.
The point ofew that the British industiy was being destroyed by unfair behaviour led
Parliament to introduce legislation for the compulsory working of foreign patents in the
country34 as an obligation of the patent owner. Since then the legal framework about patent
safeguards has been gradually developed and adapted to new legal conditions, suggesting an
expansion in parallel with technological paradigms. The legal development 35 has moved
See Jonathan Liebenau, The Challenge of New Technology, p. 144. By 1890, the three leading German
firms (Bayer, BASF, and Hoechst) owned together 66 per cent of all German-held US chemil patents.
30 Iciem, idem
31idemdeni
32 Iden ident
33 1dem, ideaL
Idem, at p. 146.
Legislation relevant to the development of patent safeguards: 1852 Patent Amendment Law 1859 Patent
Amendment Law, 1883 Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1902 Patents Act; 1907 Patents and Designs
(Amendment) Act; 1919 Patents and Designs Act 1932 Patents and Designs Act; 1938 Patents (international
Conventions) Act; 1939 Patents, Designs. Copyright and Trade Marks (Emergency) Act; 1942 Patents and
Designs Act; 1946 Patents and Designs Act, 1949 Patents Act; 1949 Registered Designs Act; 1977 Patents
Act; 1988 Copyright, Designs & Patents Act, ScK 5, paras. 12 to 16.
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toward the setting of appropriate conditions on which patent safeguards rely. The degree of
detail of these conditions implicitly unveils an attempt to define and redefine a standard of
public interest in the exercise of patent tights, and organise a legal machinery 36 for the
enforcement of the relevant safeguarding provisions which have undergone considerable
elaboration. In this respect, the legislation has departed from a broad public interest test to the
establishment of more specific conditions, under which individual firms and the Crown are
entitled to make use of patents without the consent of the patentees.
Through government assistance, the underlying policy has invariably been to subject patents
to societal control for industrial development, improving exports, and supporting welfare-
state programmes, by encouraging entrepreneurs to increase domestic production and
promote technical innovations and technology exchange, and "making food, medicine and
surgical or curative devices available to the public at the lowest possible price."37
Next sections will cover different categories of statutory measures in two periods of time,38
with the purpose of showing the evolution of a safeguarding policy, and its essential principles
and features.
5.3.2 Remedial measures 1883-1946
(1) Crown use: legal rules and practices
In principle the Crown was bound to comply with patent law. However, in practice it was a
iirly flexible provision,39 aimed at securing compensation to the patentee against the right
conferred to the Crown to use a patent for its service.
36 The development of the enfoiting machineiy is of independent value for the improvement of safeguards,
wi only in terms of improvement of quality decision-making but also for the reason that cases can be used as a
catalyst clement for political review.
Board Of Trade, Patents and Designs Acts - Second Interim Report of the Departmental Committee. p.
14, Cmd. 6789, 1946.
Each set of statutory measures issued in successive periods of tune suggests a degree of complexity and an
impact of ciivumstantial elements (e.g., nomic, technological and war
factors, and competition problems), which intend to affect specific interests such as patent use and
enforceability.
Section 27 of the 1883 Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act
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Prior to the 1883 Patent Act, the Crown was entitled to use any invention without
compensation. As a matter of practice and ex gratia the patentee, nevertheless, was paid for
such use. There was a sense of justice according to which individuals could not be simply
deprived of the tight upon their properties. Reflecting the old practice, the statute affirmed the
Crown's right to take the invention and pay. Ordinarily, this tight applies in times of peace and
in emergencies and periods of hostility.40
Legal principles
On account of the Communits needs and war affairs, detailed provisions were made on
grounds of public interest to justifr the patent use for defence and related purposes. From the
legislation a number of legal rules stand out to define the public interest related to an
invention. It included:
• tin invention which, by reasons of its particulars and the manner it is perfonne represented a valid
contri bution for improvements ofwar instruments and munhtions,4'
• i,wentions necessary for or in connection with the production of any article essential for the needs of the
convnunzty in the event ofwai-,42
• the supervenience of war does not make invaIid null or void an existing JPR licence involving an enemy
right holder, unless specific rules provide othervise;43
• provided that the interest of the Crown is satisfiea the authority may grant limited licences under
proprietary right of enemie
• provided that the interest of the Crown is satisfle4 the authority may grant patents for the benefit of the
enemy inventor,45
• under condthons deemed fit by the authority, time limited under the patent regime may be extended on
war circu,nstances
• prohibition of publication of patent specifications, where an application has been abandoned by enemy
applicants, shall not apply during the war perioa',47
• the authority may refuse an application for a patent or registration of a design invented or designed by the
enemies in an enemy temto,y during the period ofhoshuity.
° About penod of hostihties, see "penod of emergency" or "r penod" in Patents and Designs Act 1942, s.
2(IB); Patents and Designs Act 1949, s. 30(2); and Patents Act 1949, S. 49(2).
41 1859 Patent Law Amendment Act, s. 1,3; 1907 Patents and Designs (Amendment) Act, s. 21; 1907
Patents and Designs Act, s. 30.
42 1939 Ministry of Supply Act, S. 2(3) and 19(c); 1942 Patents and Designs Act. S. 2(1).
1939 Patents, Designs, Copyright and Trade Marks (Emergency) Act, s. 1.
1939 Patents, Designs, Copyright and Trade Marks (Emergency) Act, s. 2. 1914 Patents, Designs, and
Trade Marks (Temporary Rules) Act, s. 1.
1939 Patents, Designs, Copyright and Trade Marks (Emergency) Act, s. 4. 1914 Patents, Designs and
Trade Marks (Temporary Rules) Act, s. 1.
1939 Patents, Designs, Copyright and Trade Marks (Emergency) Act, s. 6; 1942 Patents and Designs
Act,s. 1; l946PatentsandDesignsAct,ss. 1,6.
' l946PatentsandDesignsAct, s. 5.
1946 Patents and Designs Act, s. 3,4.
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Although the circumstances of war, characteiising a situation of national emergency or
extreme urgency, entitled the United Kingdom to use a patent, the obligation to pay was on
several occasions put under discussion. In the singular event of hostility, the use of the
invention is a lawfiul act exercised by the Crown under the royal prerogative49
 statutorily
regulated. The legal consequences of this act depend upon the qualification of the inventor,
whether he is a British national, an enemy or non-enemy.
Ordinarily, both national and foreign (non-enemy) inventors have the right to compensation
as to patented inventions. In principle, the enemy has no such right. To the satisfaction of the
Crown, however, the authority may confer a limited iight to the enemy patentee. Whatever
the qualification of the inventor, his right to compensation against the Crown, if any, is a
precarious one in two senses. Firstly, the amount due to the inventor for the use of the Crown
in the period of hostility does not fall into the concept of fill compensation, that would be the
amount offered by a willing licensor to a willing licensee bargaining on an equal footing. The
amount paid for the compulsory assignment of the invention rather represents an arbitrary and
a notional remuneration assessed under the discretion of the Crown. Secondly, in practical
terms the claim put forward by the applicant is classified as an equivalent petition seeking a
paent ex gralla, rather than a legal challenge against the Crown Submitted to the court
entertainment.
The principles governing the use of a patent by the Crown in war time were, in summary:
in war time the use of an invention b y the Crown on grounds of defence gives to the inventor right to
compensation as an ex gratia award without any right to sue the Crown;5°
• the national courts have no power to review the amount assessed under the discretion of the Crown for
awards to inventors and as a result of claims arising out ofwar.5'
49 Prerogative is applied sath the meaning of a statutoly power conferred to the Crown 'ith exclusivity. The
use in r tune of a foreign invention under the command of the Crown could be legally classified as an act of
state. As such, the foreign patentee would have no right against the Crii to claim compensation. For some
legal thoughts on royal prerogatives see: Nissan v. AttomeGeneral [1970J AC 179 and [1%7J 2 All E.R
200; Burmah Oil Co. v. LordAdvocate [1964] 2 All E.R 348.
5° This principle is supported by authorities in similar cases, such as Burmaii 0:1 and Nissan (see previous
foetnote), and Aftomey-General v. de Keyser Royal Hotel [1920] AC 508. The court had, indeed, limited
power to declare rights and quash any abuse or excess of power committed by officials on behalf of the Crown
whose discretion, nevertheless, to assess the amount of compensation through an administrative tribunal was
left untouched. In the Burmah case, for instance, the amount payable wns left undecided.
Idem.
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These principles were mainly supported by the controversial section 29 of the 1907 Patents
and Designs Act as it was amended by the 1919 version. 52 After some doubts arising from
the wording of the head (2) of the ambiguous section, the court established that no private
party had the right to challenge the Crown, and the court had no power to entertain any
substantial dispute without the consent of the parties. The mere right of compensation due to
the patentee or inventor was to be exercised by means equivalent to a petition of iight.53
The alteration in law referred to above was applied retrospectively 54 and was deemed to
confer to the Crown the discretion to reftise or give jurisdiction to the court, which eventually
was substituted by a special tribunal 55 which had to report to the Treasury. Ultimately the
Treasury was the adjudicating authority, and that purposely reduced, as one may suggest, the
consideration to compensation for the use of invention by the Crown during the war periods.
The Crown, in effect, was made judge in causes of its interests; the impact of that,
nevertheless, was smoothed by the creation of two Royal Commissions to hear claims
regarding the use by the Crown of patented and unprotected inventions, designs and
processes arising out of the World Wars I & 11.56
Practices of the Royal Commissions on Awards to Inventors
Setting the first Royal Commission after the First World War, the 1919 Royal Warrant in
practical temis confirmed the principles specified above. The Warrant dealt with the power
conferred to the Commission and the basic standards governing its office. Acting upon the
request of the Treasury, the Commission had limited power in the sense that it consisted o
(a) enquiry into the circumstances of the case, and (b) making recommendations as to the
proper remuneration to pay. Later and viz the 1920 Royal Warrant, the Commission was
52 The 1919 Patents and Designs Ac1, s. 8.
Rowland and Kennedy v. Air Council[19271 XLIV R.P.C. 453 at 461.
Against the retrospective application see opinion of Sargant J. m Hale's Patens 119201 XXXVII RP.C.
171 at 175.
The tnbunal was the Royal Commission on Award to Inventors referred to below. And as a result of the
substitution, there are today only a few law cases reported.
Sitting for over 17 years, the 1919 Royal Commission was referred 1,834 claims. The 1946 Commission
worked for 9 years and in all received 729 claims. See 1919 Commission Final Report, 1937: Cmnd. 5594, and
Address delivered on 18th March 1960 by Lord Cohen, the Chainnan of the 1946 Royal Commission, after the
Annual Dinner of the Holdsrth Club, University of Birmingham, 1960.
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given authority to investigate and settle disputes, including power to decide on questions of
infringement and patent validity under consent of the Government Department concerned.57
Owing to the fact that the majority of the inventions used for the purpose of defence was
under secrecy, the Commission had no liberty to disclose its opinion. The chairman was
allowed only to report the proceedings under the Commission, and from time to time to
report to the Treasury the Commission's opinions under hand and seal. 58
 Whether that
circumstance had any consequential impact on the assessment of the compensation for the use
of inventions is unknown.
The discretionaiy character of the rewards derived primarily from the explicit terms of the
Royal Warrants. The payment ex gralia was made on a voluntary basis 59
 and in a sum
asserted entirely within the discretion of the Crown. The 1919 Royal Warrant stipulated a
compensation as a strict right for patented inventions (head 1), and ex gratia payments for the
use of unpatented inventions of exceptional utility (head 3). In the later situation in strict legal
terms no monopoly against the Crown existed, and the proviso of the head 3 did not fail into
section 29 of the then patent regime which dealt with the remuneration of patented invention.
Nevertheless, there was no essential difference, apart from academic, in the treatment by the
Commissions of the two situations described in heads 1 and 3.
The ex gratia reward was not only followed by the practices of the Royal Commissions.
The principle was also consistent with the 1946 Agreement between the United Kingdom and
the United States of America on Interchange of Patent Rights and Information. 60
 Concerned
with patent procurement, the Treaty did not recognise any right on any nationals of either
1920 Royal Warrant, s. 3. The 1946 Royal Warrant creating the Royal Commission on Awards to
Inventors after the World War II s drafted mutatis mutands in the line ith the tsw previous Warrants.
58 For that reason there are no data available as to the precise number of awards recommended by the
Commissions.
Ordinarily the awani was limited up to the sum of L50,000 (1919 Royal Warrant, s. 1). As to the nature of
the rerds the Warrant reads: M• though not conferring any menopoly zginct the Crown or any statutoly
right to payment or compensation, may nevertheless appear from their [the inventionsJ exceptional utility or
otherwise to entitle the inventor, auther or owner therto some remuneration for such use... the Commission
may, on the request of the Treaswy, enquire into the cimimstances of the case and may make
recomnvIthon" (Section 3.) Sec Royal Commission on Awards to 1nwntors First Report, Cmnd. 1112,
1921 and Second Report, Cmnd. 1782, 1922.
60 The 1946 US-UK Patent Interchange Agreement
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country to sue the respective Government to assert any claim, 6 ' and made no distinction as to
the condition of the inventions, whether patented or not, used by both countries in both
periods of hostilities.
The interest beyond the war spectrum
For several reasons, it was in the interest of the Crown to pay for the use of non-patented
inventions which were the majority. 62 Above all, there was a moral aspect in some way to
compensate the efforts of those who to a certain extent had contributed to the prosecution of
the war. Beyond this, there was an interest in tracing the inventions with potential application
to industry, and protect them against foreign appropriation.
Many inventions certainly had great commercial prospects. It was vitally uriportant for the
country to exploit them as soon as possible in competition with, or even against the will of
the inventors.63 In this connection, one might look again at the patent arrangement made by
United Kingdom and the United States. As a basis for patent procurement via Governments,
the 1946 UK-US Treaty limited the use by either country of patents rights, including non-
patented information. The Parties were allowed to make use of each country's inventions and
technical infonnation only for exclusive war purposes. 64 The effect of the disposition was to
discourage the United Kingdom to benefit from American inventions on a basis not
compatible with normal transactions. That insertion suggested that the two allied countries
were aware of how valuable was the technical stocks resulting from the war efforts, and
whose exploitation to the full extent was a matter for common concern.
The trade aspect was, at last, favoured by the flexible character of those mles vesting the
defence safeguards stated above, which gave Government authorities a broad discretion in
dealing with enemies' inventions. Such discretion served the development of the country
61 Idem, Article X(a) rnfine.
62 For me figures, see Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, Final Report; CmxxL 5594,1937.
Tbe legs1imon moved to give to the Crown tbe right not only to use, but also at aoy time to vend the
ailicles made in pursuai of the rights on inventions assigned to it As it was pointed out in Hale's PatenLc
[19201 XXVII RP.C. 171 at 175, that legal modification increased the nghts of the Crown against the
patentee's. Much more, it made the Crown legally equipped to better exploit the inventions in its possession
64 Article 11
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which, alier the war, needed to reconstruct its economy then affected by the overwhelming
consequences of the war. The legitimate effort of reconstruction in the post-war periods,
thus, far justified a legal policy on unauthorised use of patent. Reflecting the war events, the
use of inventions by the Crown on grounds of defence is a dominant factor during the first
period, but legal developments in the regulation of unauthorised use for private and
commercial purposes are also considerably significant.
(ii) Revocation and compulsory licensing
Under the 1902 Patents Act, the remedial revocation and compulsory licence were available
on the grounds of lack of fulfilment of the "reasonable requirements of the public with
reference to the patented invention."65 Although applied in the event that the compulsory
licence was not suffice to cure the patentee "default", 66 the revocation was a drastic measure
to the extent it worked as an absolute deprivation of the patentee from his monopoly iight.
Furthermore, while the revocation curtailed a secure exploitation by the patentee, doubts are
raised whether the measure was an efficient one as to the purposes pursued.
The ground for either compulsory licence or revocation has swung from the concept of
public interest (or public requirement by means of; e.g., the working of the patent within the
country) to abuse of monopoly. 67 The reasonable requirements of the public was at first
understood in terms of the satisfactory working of the patent by the patentee or/and through
licensing under reasonable terms. This notion implied the nianufiicture of the patented articles
in the United Kingdom and that the demand was properly met,68 so as to favour the
establishment of new industry or the fair running of existing one.
65 Section 22(3) of the 1883 Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act as it was amended by the section 3 of
the 1902 Patents Act.
Under the 1907 Patents and Designs (Amendment) Act, s. 15, the manuf.ture of the patented article or
the use of the process exclusively or mamly outside the United Kingdom was a proper ground for the straight
revocation of the patent, unless the patentee gave satisfacloiy explanation for his defauh..
67 Unauthonsed use of patents under the legislation cited in the previous ies required inter alia the
manifestation of an individual interest and proof of patentee's default (e.g. Izi of flillilment of the reasonable
requirements of the public).
Section 22(6) of the 1883 Patents, Designs aiil Trade Mark Act as it was amended by the 1902 Patent
Act, sections 24, 25(2Xb), and 27. This was a considerable development compared to the vrding of the
section XXXVI of the 1852 Act. The wonling
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The 1907 version of the patent regime expanded the scope of the reasonable requirements of
the public. In desciibing the circumstances of the default of the patentee in respect of the
patented invention, the Statute mcluded the conditions imposed by the patentee to "the
purchase, hire, or use of the patented article or to the using or working of the patented
process"69 made in a manner which unfairly prejudiced any British trade or industry. The
unfairness of such conditions could be taken in the sense that, for instance, they could make
diThcult either the entry of new corners or the expansion of existing competitors.
Legal characterisation of abuse of monopoly right
Under the 1919-to-1932 version, the reasonable public requirement as a ground for
revocation and compulsory licensing was replaced by the notion of abuse of monopoly tight.
It was characterised as an abuse:
• the non-working unreasonably of the patent in the United Kingdom on a commercial scale;
• the impartation from abroad of the patented article so as to prevent or hinder the proper working of the
patent in the United Kingdom;
• the failure to meet properly the demand of the patented arti cle in the United Kingdom;
• the detrimental effect against an existing or new trade or indust,y in the United Kingdom caused by the
unreasonable refusal to licence a patent;
• the unfair conditions attached by the patentee "to the purchase, hire, licence, or use of the patented article,
or to the using or working of the patented process", in a manner to prejudice unfairly any trade or mdusby
in the United Kingdom;
• the utilisation of a patent ofchemical substance or process (including those intendedfor food or medicine)
in such an unfair manner which prejudiced the manufacture, use or sale of related materi a/s in the United
Kingdom.7°
The legal description of abuse of monopoly right under a patent put together (i) trade
defaults derived from the mischievous utilisation of a patent by raising prices of commodities,
or trade hurt, 7 ' and requiring unfair conditions; (ii) and non manufcture or manufacture in
of the original s. 22 distinguished reasonable requiienients of the public from the non-working of the patent in
the United Kingdom and from a situation in which any person possessing an invention was prevented from
working or using it to the be advantage.
The 1907 Patents and Designs (Amendment) Act, s. 16(2), or s. 24(5) of the 1907 Patents and Designs
Act
° Sections 24 and 27 of the 1907 Patents and Designs Act as they were ama1gamaed as s. 27 by s. 1 of the
1919 Patents and Designs Act, and amended by s. 4(a) ol'tbe 1932 Patents and Designs Act.
Sections 3 (reference to s. six of the Statute of Monopolies) and 4 of the 1932 Patents and Designs Act
anieixiing both s. 25(2Xd)(n) and s. 27(2Xf) of the 1907 Patents and Designs Act
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the United Kingdom on inadequate scale. Although apparently comprehensive, the list gave
rise to doubts faced by those intending to apply for a compulsory licence 7
 The greatest
inaccuracy brought to attention was the characterisation of abuse of monopoly.
Since the legal definition of abuse was in line with the description of the previous
"reasonable public requirements", no essential change was made. The legal shift, however,
seemed to put the wording of the domestic law in line with international commitment,7
rather than a step ahead to charactense the patentee default with reference to a patent on the
strict basis of competition standards (i.e., conditions of economic efficiency). That would be
to confine the default to the context of undesirable competitive behaviour regarded as such by
reasons of its predatory, coercive or exclusionary effects, thus, contrary to efficient market
performance. In this connection, the description of some grounds for granting a compulsory
licence and revoking a patent denotes a sort of malpractice (e.g., unreasonable refusal to
licence and the use of patents in a manner to secure markets by blocking domestic
competition). However, it could be argued that a patentee's failure to exploit an invention in
full, as it would be desirable from the point of view of the development of British production
and trade, could not be described as an abuse, unless licences were denied unreasonably.
The grounds listed above reveal a protectionist character as far as they intend to compel
foreign patentees to develop new industry in the United Kingdom, or penalise them for not
making efforts to develop the industry in this country, without any scrutiny of injury for not
working the invention. The penalty could be a "licence of right" endorsement, a compulsory
licence74
 upon the patent with or not exclusivity or, more drastic, revocation. 75
 The proviso
departed from the presumption that the mere non-working of the patent would amount "to
72 Expressions sixth as "new trade or industiy", "demand" and "public interest" were interpreted in a narrow
way. See Patents and Designs Acts, Second Interim Report of the Departmental Committee, CnxL 6789, p. 8/9.
See Article 5A of the Convention for the Protection of hidustnal Property.
A compulsoiy licence under a patent (simply compulsoiy licence), and an entiy in the patent register of
eudorsement of a licence of right (simply licence of right) are both compulsory categories, in the sense that
their adjudication is given regardless the will of the patentee. The distinction between them is a matter of level
of legal implementation. The compulsory licence is an individual adjudication th full effect. The licence of
right is dispensed e,a omnes, i.e., is made availthle for any entitled person and cannet fully operate before an
iixlnridual adjudication is made, or a private arrangement is agreed.
Section 24(4) and 27(1) of the 1907 Patents and Designs Act; s. 27(3XaXcXd) of the same 1907 Act as it
wasmendedbythe& 1 of the l9l9PatentsandflesignsAct.
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favour the development of industries abroad at the expense of industries in the United
Kingdom."76
Referring once again to the list above, the potential of injuries to the trade of the country
would vary. Although the injury could possibly occur in the circumstances of the grounds (d)
to (f), under the grounds (a) to (c) the hampering would be less unlikely. The assumption of
abuse of monopoly under presumed circumstances could lead to a situation where the remedy
available failed to cure the alleged mischief If there was an efficient result from the
application of those rules of abuse, it was less obvious regarding revocation.
As law reports record only a few cases on patent revocation as a remedial measure, 7 it is
difficult to establish the impact of that remedial safeguard in business circles. Perhaps the
revocation had no more than a bargaining effect. Or it could be argued that in a situation of
abuse of monopoly, in the statutory sense, the benefit that the revocation could render was
uncertain, and disproportionately small in comparison with the scale of the moral impact of
the revocation on the patentee.
A revocation order would be considered in the event that compulsory licence (which could
be on an exclusive basis) at reasonable royalties was not suffice to cure a patentee default in
particular. If in a specific case compulsory licence could not effectively remedy a mischief:
one would wonder in which way the revocation could do any better. One possible reason for
a compulsory licence not to work would be that the market for the concerned invention was
not attractive enough for domestic or foreign entrepreneurs to embark into it, or that the
prospective licensees would lack the necessary know-how to exploit the invention. Neither
would the Government have an interest in promoting the particular business related to the
patent. In any of these hypotheses, it would be unlikely that the revocation would render any
76 Hatschek'sPatent.s In Re 11909] 78 L.J.Eq. 402 at 405.
That was the cuse IHatscheló Patents, preis footnote.
78 The statement is based on the cases published in the "Reports on Patents, Design and Trade Mark Cases"
(RP.C.).
S 1907 Patents and Designs Act, s. 27 & 25(2Xd), as they were amended by the 1919 Patents and
Designs Act, s 1; and 1932 Patents and Designs Act, s. 3 & 4.
80 For the entrepreneurs the decision to establish an industiy is supposed to be governed by market
conditions rather than by the particular event ofajudicial or administrative patent revoflon.
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assistance to a third firm, or would upset the market position of the patentee in the short or
medium term.
The revocation has the effect of putting an invention in the public domain. Subsequent to
the revocation of a patent the invention could be worked by third firms free from royalties.
However, if this hypothesis could apply in practice, a compulsory licence on reasonable terms
would be an effective and alternative remedy. In this case the revocation would deny the
institutional quid pro quo behind the patent. In destroying the patent right blessed for
centuries, the cessation of protection offered no apparent or immediate gain to the public. It is
realistic to suggest that the revocation was an unncessaly 8 ' or inefficient legal constraint
having a rather obscure objective.
Food and medicine patents
For chemical patents and patents related to substances intended for foods and medicines, the
granting of licences followed specific statutory conditions. Designed to meet the availability
of food and medicine to the public at the lowest possible price, compulsory licences were
granted regardless of abuse of monopoly, and the remuneration fixed would secure "to the
inventor due reward for the research leading to the invention." Inspired in welfare ends, the
compulsory licence was limited to preparation or production of food or medicine, but the
grant was to a great extent governed by the discretion of the comptroller.
The provision of licensing upon food and medicine-related inventions was introduced in
1919 concerning existing patents. At the same time, claims for patent on "inventions relating
to substances prepared or produced by chemical processes or intended for food or
medidne" were excluded. The denial of protection TM
 apparently suggests that the
In the event of the vñdng of a patent on basis of a bocnsing policy extremely anli-compelitive, and the
patentee having mark povr, the revocation could have an adjusting effect of the competitive process
bringing some benefits to the public. But compulsoiy licezxz wixild be a remedy equally efficient, and
revocation itmId be a too strong order.
82 Section38A(2)ofthe l9O7PatentsandDe nsActasitwasinseitedbys. 11 of the 1919 Palentsand
Designs Act
83 Section 38A(1) of the 1907 Patents and Designs Act as it was inseited by s. 11(1) of the 1919 Patents and
Designs Act. The denial of protection prevailed for three &iies before protection was restored by the 1949
Patents and Designs Act, second aihile.
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safeguarding policy had not been effective to revert the tendency of abusive behaviour in the
particular field of chemical-related trade.
Unenforceabiity (deprivation of actions)
Apart from abuse of patent monopoly, separate provisions were set out to prevent restnctive
conditions attached to licences. 85 Being in restraint of trade and contrary to public policy,
these conditions are null and void, but they may be included in a contract i despite them, the
licensee is able to exercise some sort of choice. This flexibility could open room for the parts
to circumvent the purposes of the legal policy. Additionally, the comptroller had, as he has
today, no power to act in relation to these provisions, unless a licence application is brought
before him in connection with a particular restnctive practice.
As an attempt to strengthen the statutory safeguards, it was created a defence on behalf of
any party who, sued for infringement, knew of a contract in force containing illegal conditions
related to the patent allegedly infringed. This unenforceability as a safeguarding measure was
designed to work against the patentee, but the public knowledge of these conditions was not
favoured since the lack of registration of patent transactions has never been subject to
meaningfiul penalty. Thus, deprivation of actions has had no significant effect to prevent
restrictive trade. This concludes the discussion of unauthorised use of patents in the period
prior to the first half of this century.
84 The denial of protection was follod by many inthes in Europe, establishing a set back in the patent
law wor1d-ide. This was a mistake of some leading industrialised ecommies that developing conntries not
only repeated, but also have failed so far to redress entirely.
85 For instance, t)ing purchase of unpatented materials as a condition to licence a patented process. Patents
and Designs Act 1907, s. 38.
1907 Patents and Designs Act s. 38(lXb).
87 Cnid.6789,para.35.
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5.3.3 Remedial measures, 1949-1988
(i) Crown use of patented inventions
Three legal aspects concerning Crown use are now discussed: the light of the Crown, the
right of the patentee and third parties, and the proceedings concerning disputes on
compensation.
The Crown's right revisited
From 1949 to 1977, the legal position of the Crown in relation to a patent changed along with
the obligation of a British patentee to working his invention. Under the 1949 patent regime, in
the event of the patentee failure to comply with a request from a Government department to
work the invention for the service of the Crown, the patent was subject to revocation. The
principle underlying the statutory provision' was that a patent was granted under the
presumption that it shall work accordingly, at the request of a Government department, to the
service of the Crown. This principle, now overturned, was not taken in absolute terms. A
revocation depended on a court ruling, a service of the Crown coming under statutory
authority, and the reasonableness element in regards to the cause of the failure and the terms
of working.
A prerogative of withholding a grant 2 is conferred to the Crown which, nevertheless, has
been bound to the patent statute. 3 The current legislation confinTis this principle and excludes
the Queen in her private capaity. 4 In contrast; the patent use by a Government department
under statutory authority has never been affected. Today the Crown's position is clearly
established as having a statutory prerogative to a non-free use. This right to use is based on
the principle that "Government departments should not be hindered by the existence of
'S. 32(3) of the Patents Act 1949 read follo: s... a patent may be revoked by the court on the petition of
a Government department, if the court is satisfied that the patentee has v.ithout reasonable cause failed to
comply 'with a request of the department to make, use or exercise the patented invention for the services of the
Crown upon reasonable terms."
2 l949PatentsAel,s.102(1).
1947 Crown Proceedings Act, s. 3 winch has been updated by 1977 Patents Act, Sch 5(1), and Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988, Sch. 7(4X1).
l977PatentsAct,s. 129.
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patents in the discharge of the statutory duty." 5 The recognition that a concurrent right in the
use of the invention is conferred to the Crown reduces the patent right to a claim for payment
in relation to the use, not infringement, of the invention. The Crown's prerogative,
nevertheless, falls within statutory confines.
The 1949 Act allowed any Government department and any person authonsed by a
department to "make, use and exercise" 6 any patented invention for the services of the
Crown. Although the statute did not confer to the departments a general power to "vend"
patented articles, selling was permitted in circumstances ansing from supply of defence
articles to foreign governments, and articles no longer needed for the purposes they were
onginally made. A general right to vend has only been conferred during a period of
emergency when the powers of the Crown to use a patent is rather wide. 7 These statutory
powers, in peace or war time, have been used largely to supply equipment to the armed
forces, but the use for civil purposes has not been unusual. In this context; it has been argued
that "Crown rights over patents are wide and are liable to become more intrusive if the
involvement of Government in industrial affairs continues to increase." 8 Regardless this
argument and giving expressions to existing practices, the 1977 Patents Act regulates the
Crown use to allow:
• where the invention is a product, the making, use, importation or keeping of the produc( or the selling of
it where to sell would be incidental or ancillary to any of the said acts; and the selling of it for purposes of
foreign defence, or for the production or supply of specfied drugs and medicines, or the disposal of it
(except by selling) for any purpose whatsoever;
• where the invention is a process, the use of the process or any of the actions set out above performed in
relation to a product obtained directly by the process;
• where the invention, or any product related to a process, is a specified drug or medicine, the selling of it;
• the supp'y or offer ofany means regarded as an essential element to put the invention into effect;
• the disposal or offer of anything which is no longer neededfor the purposes it was made, used, imported or
kept by virtue of the exercise of the Crown use within the meaning of this section.9
Connected with the allowed acts, some expressions are brought to attention. These are:
Banks Report, Cmnd. 4407, p. 124/125.
6 S.46(1).
Sections 46(6) and 49.
Banks Report, p. 124, Cmnd. 4407 (1970). Earlier, in 1947, there was a similar apprehension that the
exercise of "exceptional powers by the Crown [resultedi in competition ith the patentee or his licensed
manufturers." Swan Final Report of the Departmental Committee, p. 16, Cmd. 7206 (1947).
S. 55(1).
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"the seivices of the Crown"° (including the supply of anythmg for foreign defence purposes, production or
supply of specified drugs and medicines, and such purposes related to atomic energy affairs);
• "sale for foreign defence purposes"" (products required for the defence of foreign countries supplied under
an agreement in respect of defence matters, including operation to comply with a resolution of the United
Nations or any of its organ); and
"specified drugs and medicines"' 2 (drugs and medicines required for the provision of pharmaceutical,
medical or dental services, and other as specified by the Secrelaiy of Stale).
The statutory evolution made necessaiy the inclusion of indicative elements which, by
clariIjing these concepts, contributes to the better understanding of the legislation. These
concepts are not fully developed, and their construction depends on the limits of the Crown's
right to use a patent, and in the event of disputes, the conditions within which claims are
properly laid. In practice, to what extent the Crown's prerogative can be challenged
successfully is always a matter for debate. As a result, due compensation is the most
significant point connected with the right of the patentee and third parties.
The patentee' and third parties' right
An effect derived from the concunent right of the Crown to use an invention is that the
patentee or legal substitute has no legal power to prevent or stop such use. As interested
parties, the patentee, exclusive licensee or assignee is only entitled to claim payment. The
right to payment, nevertheless, presumes the existence of an enforceable right over a
protected invention. In this respect, if before the priority date the invention has, for instance,
been recorded by, or tried by or on behalf of a Government department, the inventor will be
entitled to no payment.' 3 For use taking place at any time after the publication of a patent
application, payment is only recoverable after the patent is granted.
'° Such an expression is defined by the House of Lords as consisting of any t "done for the purpose of the
perfonnance of a duty or an exercise of a posver which is imposed on or vested in the Executive Government of
the United Kingdom by statute or by prerogative " Iflzer Coraion v The Mirnst,y ofHealth [1965J S RP C.
261 See 1977 Patents Act, s. 56(2).
" l977PatenIsAci,s.56(3).
12 1977 Patents Act, s. 56(4).
' 1949 Patents Act, s. 46(2X3), 47(1)(b), 57(1); and 1977 Patents Act, s. 55(3X4X5).
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Ordinarily, the proprietor is the right person in title to receive payment in relation to use made
or anything done for the services of the Crown. Variation may occur.' 4 When an exclusive
licence (not only for nmning royalties) exists, the proprietor is replaced by the licensee, who
receives all the payments. In case of assignment running for royalties, the payment is shared
accordingly by proprietor and assignor. If an exclusive licence is in force for running royalties,
the licensee is entitled to receive such a sum to recover expenditure for developing the
invention, and other payments (other than royalties) made to the proprietor who cannot enter
into agreement with the Government department concerned without the licensee's consent. In
the event of disagreement on Crown use, and after a patent is granted, any interested party
has the right to refer disputes to the court.
Disputes on compensation
Under the 1949 Act, a Government department could change the course of the proceedings
concerning the Crown use by applying for revocation, including on the ground (now
overturned) of failure to comply with a Government request for the working of the invention
for the services of the Crown upon reasonable terms.' 5 Today the counter-claim for
revocation is only available on the ground of patent validity.' 6 The failure to use a patent on
request for the services of the Crown can, nevertheless, be considered by the court in
entertaining a reference of dispute or arbitration as to the terms of compensation for Crown
use.'7
No provision has been made as to the basis of assessment of compensation. Considenng the
matter, the Banks Report observed:
Notwithstanding the Ministry of Technology's view that patentees w generally satisfied with the payments
they receive, it has been contended that in some circumstances the present law operates unfairly against
patentee's interests, and that it should therefore be amended to allow for more generous paynent to be made
for the Crowii use ofpatents where justified.'8
' Cf. l977PatentsAct,s.57(3)to(8)andl949PatentsAct,s.47.
' S. 48(2)(a), and 1977 Patents Act, Sch. 1(1), Sch. 4(2).
16 1977 Patents Act, s. 58(7).
' 1977 Patents Act, s. 58(3Xb).
' Banks Report, Cmnd. 4407, p. 126
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To what extent a payment can be justified is at the gist of the statutory nght of the Crown to
use a patent. In being exercised, this right may lead to displace a contract from the patentee-
manufacturer which in consequence may experiment financial hardship. The consideration of
such loss of contract, nevertheless, in some way weakens the Crown's position of "a user
having concurrent rights in the use of the invention." 9 Similarly, the assessment on the basis
of a private bargain, as a deal between willing licensing and willing licensor, would bring the
Crown to a position akin to that of a private licensee. This, additionally, would award the
patentee the opportunity to make profit with no consideration to the willingness to provide
patented articles at a reasonable price, and total disregard to reasons of national security.2o
Because Government departments are guided in their actions by the public interest, a
balance should be struck in the assessment of compensation, therefore avoiding the rigid
application of the willing licensee/willing licensor approach. In this respect, guidance has been
set out in case law, which broadly indicates the terms of existing licences, the normal rates in
relevant field, and (if it is the case) involvement of know-how to be taken into account, but
excludes assessment of payment on basis of damages.2'
As the current law stands, compensation for loss of manufacture, which the court used to
exclude, is now possible. Provision has been made for the Government department to pay the
proprietor or exclusive licensee, if any, for loss of profit not been made due to loss of
contracts for the services of the Crown, and to the extent of under-utilisation of industrial
capacity. Claims for relief in relation to compensation are, nevertheless, subject to several
other limitations. The most important is that which deprives the proprietor or exclusive
licensee from any compensation for failure of recording a transaction or instrument from
which the actual right holder derives his title, before the Crown use. In sum, owing to the
bargaining power in the Government's hands, and the legal framework governing its actions
on the basis of public interest, one can never expect that compensation for Crown use will be
assessed entirely on a private bargain fashion resulting from a private licensing.
' Banks Report, CmzxL 4407, p. 127.20 Idem,atp. 128.21 See Patchett's Patent [196719 R.P.C. 77 and 237.
1977 Patents Act, s 57A as it s introduced by the 1988 Copght, Designs and Patents Act, S& 5(16).
1977 Patents A & 58(11), amended by the 1988 Cornght, Designs and Patents Act, Sch. 5(16X2X3).
Sünilar pmvision is not hind in tI 1949 Patents A1
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(ii) Compulsory licensing
Unauthorised use: legal grounds and patentee's duty
The tenor of today's policy for compulsory licensing is that the invention is protected on the
assumption that it works in the country "to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable." It
may not be to the satisfaction of the patentee to work the invention for the time being, but he
cannot impede others to do so in specific circumstances and on a royalty basis. In order to
flulifi that policy, the patentee is not specifically liable to work the invention in the country by
himself: but once he does so he, as well as any licensee or assignee, is bound to use all his best
efforts in order to develop the commercial and industrial activities of the country, to meet
national demand on reasonable terms, and meet a demand abroad. The law establishes in
which circumstances these purposes are not achieved; and once such circumstances are
present in relation to a patent, a licence should be available.
The fullest possible working of an invention is not fulfilled if
• being the demand partially orfully met by importation, the working of the invention in the countly, when it
is capable of being commercially done, is being prevented or hindered;
• by refusal of a licence on reasonable terms, a market for the export of any patented product made in the
UK is not being suppbet't
• by refusal of a reciprocal licence on reasonable terms, the working or efficient working in the UK of any
other patented invention which makes a substantial contribution to the art is prevented or hindered:
• by refusal of a licence on reasonable terms, the establishment or development of commercial or industrial
activities in the UK is unfairly prejudi ced;
• by reason ofconditions imposed by the patentee on the grant of licences, or on the selling or se ofpatented
product or process, the manufacture, use or disposal of unpatented materials, or the establishment or
development of commercial or industrial activities in the UK is unfairly prejudicea24
These grounds do not substantially differ from those of the previous legislation. They do
not imply necessarily the existence of a fault or reparable negligence from the patentee. As far
as the non-working of an invention in the country is concerned, no real injury to any person
nor against the public in general is in principle incurred.
A touch of improvement
24 1949 Patents Act, s. 37(2); 1977 Patents Act, s. 48(3).
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It may be that this apparent lack of injury explains why the 1977 Act eliminated the
revocation as a remedial measure. 25 As has been argued, such a revocation was an inefficient
safeguard, since no transparent interest could justily such a drastic remedy for merely not
working the invention. Even the idea of preventing or stopping the patentee from an
unintended benefit could hardly be an acceptable justification. In the 195Os the United
Kingdom was already equipped with competition mechanisms able to redress any serious
mischief relying on a patent. As it seemed to be an inappropnate remedy, revocation
represented the breach of the quid pro quo behind the legal concept of patent. At least on the
theoretical level, the banishment of revocation was one of the most notable alterations among
the few changes of the 1977 patent reform.
Another minor alteration worth noting concerns the expression substantial contribution to
the art, which is a legal commitment to the promotion of technical development. Construed
as being the outstanding merit of the inventive step properly assessed in regard to its technical
character and exceptional application, 26 the expression and the provision containing it call for
the due access to the art, as a convergence of interests in high technology and related to
intellectual property and competition.
Compulsory "licence of right"
A compulsory endorsement of a patent with a licence of iight has the effect of securing
anyone's interest in working the invention in future, and a "compulsory licence" purports to
meet an actual and specific demand of particular applicants. Both compulsory grants rely on
the same legal grounds. Two aspects worth entertaining which involve these remedial orders
The utmost legal consequence against the patentee who did not svrk his patent acandingly s tho
subsequent revocalion of tbe patent either by tbe couit on request of the Cros or by tbe comptroller on
request of any interested person. While nmfining the remedial revocation, tbe 1949 Act progressed in tho
sense that it required tbe elapsing of a period of time subsequently to a compilsory licence bofore a revocation
(otbsr than that requested by the Crown) order tod ple. 1949 Patents Act, s. 42 and 4S(2Xa).
The y the outstanding merit is calculated may be affected by the ciicumstances of the thy, or by strategic
charter oldie technology. Three examples of inventions regarded of substantial contribution to the alt weze:
the air craft engines and the air craft poicd by them called "Harrier Jump Jet", Rolls-Rowe (1971) Limited's
Patent 119751 RP.C. 292; the antibiotic named Cephalosponn C, National Research Development
Corjxration's Patent [19721 RP.C. 829; and that related to steel reinforcement in reinfori concrete, E. V.G.
Compans Patent [1%9J RP.C. 307.
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are the circumscribed comptroller's power and the legal meaning of the expression
compulsory endorsement for "all purposes."
To the extent that compulsory licensing is a lawful although limited invasion of a private
right, it shows the relative nature of the intellectual property. In this respect, modern
legislation places a great deal of emphasis upon this nght, with the exhortation of not to harm
it unnecessarily, or deliver the rightholder from undue burden which may discourage
enterprise. Reflecting these trends, grounds on which relief is established and criteria on
which adjudication may rely have gradually been made more specific.
Once at least one of the statutory grounds is established, an order may be granted by the
comptroller general either for a licence on the patent, or an endorsement of a licence of iight,
as it is applied for.27 In the case of a licence involving export, the order may restrict the
countries where the product relating to the patent is to be sold or used by the licensee. The
comptroller may also cancel or vary an existing licence when the applicant already holds a
licence on unreasonable terms, but the comptroller's order has no effect of revoking existing
licences, depriving the patentee of the power to work the invention concerned nor granting
licences. Therefore, the comptroller's discretion follows guiding principles.
For nearly a centu1y, the comptroller has retained the exclusive jurisdiction, subject to
appeal, upon the grant of compulsory licences, and no change has been made as to the 1949
directions under which he is allowed to exercise a degree of discretion in settling the terms of
a licence. It is a matter of legal certainty30 that such a discretionary power rely on a great deal
of accumulated experience and statutory guidance. Pleas for extended use of a patent and
applications relating to abuse of patent rights are governed by statutory principles. In short,
these principles aim at securing:
• the fidlest possible working in the UK of the invention in the public interest and without undue delay;
• reasonable remuneration to inventors having regard to the nature of the invenhon;
27 1949 Act, s. 37(3X4) and s. 38(1X2); 1977 Act, s. 48(4)10(8) and s. 49(1)0).
This power conferred to the comptmller by the 1949 Act, S. 38(3), and 1977 Act, S. 49(3), is no longer
available. 1988 Act, Sch. 5(13).
Sincethel9O7patentsAct..
3° Swan (Second Interim) Report, Departmental Committee, p. 13. Cmd. 6789 (1946).
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• fair consideration to the interest of any person engaged in the working or development of an rnvention in
the LK
When entertaining an application, the comptroller is bound to these principles and may take
into account certain matters, such as the diligence put forward by the patentee to work the
patent, the ability of a willing licensee to work an invention for the public good, and the risks
undertaken by any interested person for providing capital and working an invention if a
licence is granted.
Under the 1949 Patents Act, a private agreement which precluded the patentee from
applying for a voluntary endorsement would not prevent the comptroller from making a
compulsoty order which, once made, would 'for all purposes" 32 have the same effect as it
were a voluntary endorsement. This could raise expectations, eliminated by the 1977 Act,33
concerning some effects such as the cancellation and partial exemption of fees which in
principle are akin to voluntary rather than compulsory endorsement.
The point is that no statutory provision allows cancellation of compulsory endorsement.
The equivalence to a voluntary endorsement is only for the purposes of enforcement. As the
1977 Act makes clear,34 the licensee under a licence of right may in his own name institute
proceedings for patent infringements, as if he were the patent owner. In such a situation, the
patentee is not liable for any costs, unless he takes part in the proceedings. No other effects
can be expected from the legal expression "for all purposes." Only a licence of right
voluntarily endorsed is subject to cancellation.
The safeguarding effect of a voluntary "licence of right"35
311949 Patents Act, s. 39(1); 1977 Patents Act, s. 50(1). Allong a compulsory licensee to compete with an
unporter who has established in the UK in preparalion for the manufaclure of the invention is not necessarily
unfair. See Fette [1961] RPC. 3%.
32 S. 45(2).
S. 49(4).
5. 49(4) combined with S. 46(4)(5).
Voluntary endorsement have some effects, such as: the risk of application for a compulsory licence or
compulsory endorsement is reduced (1949 Patents Act, s. 35(2Xc), 1977 Patents Act, s. 46(2)(c), 1988
Act, Sch. 5(12); the patentee pays only half the amount of renewal fees, but in the event of cancellation
he has to pay the balance (1977 Act, s. 46(3)(d) and 47(2); and the licensee is entitled to sue against
infringement if the patentee fails to do so (1977 Act, s. 46(4).
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As the law stands, a "hcence of right" under a patent may be available as a result of an
application made by a third person (compulsory endorsement) or as a result of an application
made by the patentee (voluntary endorsement). Although the owner may apply for
cancellation of voluntary endorsement, an opposition to the cancellation may be lodged by an
interested person. Such an opposition has a safeguarding effect and is an element of
limitation on the proprietary right.
The ability to apply for voluntary endorsement or its cancellation is in principle based on the
owner's exclusive right to use and dispose of the subject matter which constitutes his
property. The law, nevertheless, has been developed to subject patent to public interest on
which third-party opposition against cancellation relies. To what extent opposition may be
considered is only assessed on a case-by-case basis. Contractual restrictions apart, good
reasons may disallow cancellation of voluntary endorsement. For instance, it sounds fair that
those investors (licensees) which took the initiative to market a product based on a patent
endorsed with a licence of right are not hampered with the cancellation which, if required only
for the sake of the patentee's interests, may put at risk the commercial feasibility of
investments already made by pioneering licensees for the working of an invention that the
owner was not either willing or able to do.
Apart from remedies intrinsic to intellectual property law, a ministerial application for relief
made on grounds of public interest and relying on a competition report may be entertained
under distinct procedure.
(iii) Reliefs in public interest
When in 1949 the comptroller was confen-ed power to issue an order in public interest in
consequence of a competition report and to remedy monopoly conditions associated to a
patent, the procedures were unnecessarily complex. Within the framework of competition
law, it required the concurrence of four statutory bodies to exercise a power to limit the use
of a patent, while under patent law the comptroller for nearly a century had, as he still has, the
1949 Patents Act, s. 35(1) and 36(1); 1977 Patents Act, S. 46(2) and 47(2).
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power do make similar order. This suggests that although a compelling force has indicated a
trend towards limiting intellectual property based on competition standards, at the same time
the system has resisted making any transfer of the almost exclusive power of the comptroller
to deal with the matter. To preserve such a power has been a policy which favours a quicker
procedure and avoids lengthy inquiry into economic and commercial matters. In this respect,
while the patent legislation makes void certain conditions, such as tie-ins and non-competition
clauses, with the effect, for instance, to deprive the patentee from action in case of
infringement, 37
 the Act does not entitle the patentee to justifr the conditions on grounds of
any technical virtue.
It has argued that the public interest test, under the 1948-to-1968 competition legislation,
proved to be an ineffective deterrence against abusive use of patent. It may be that the
leniency of competition law and policy and the lengthy inquiry carnedi out by competition
bodies are the main reasons. The proceedings for compulsory licensing under the authority of
the comptroller always seemed to render more results. To discuss the matter, firstly, the
focus is on the interaction of the 1949 Patents Act with the competition Acts in force until
1968, and secondly the similar legislation currently in force.
The Legal mechanism from 1948 to 1968
The Monopolies and Mergers Acts 1948 to 1965 empowered the Government to refer
monopoly conditions in the statutory meaning and mergers to the Monopolies Commission,
later Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) 38 . The reference was made through a
Department which had a wide discretion (e.g., it could declare agreements unlawfiul and
1977 Patents Act, s. 44. Before 1948 (a period of undeveloped competition law) competitive conditions in
public interest were ix apparently well understood. For instaie. in Brownie Wireless high pmdition at a
highpriewasixinecessarilyinthe,ubhcinterea [19291 R..P.C. 457 at 474. In
contrast, in the Yarn Spinners case tbe ut to(k the view that to keep the industry in an inefficient stale,
rat&r than cutting costs and improving innovation, in long run vi1d be gain putñic interest. 119591 1 All
E.R 299.
Nshbythe1973FairTradingAcis.4(1).
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prohibit price discriminations). 39 The MMC was and still is an independent body which has
only power to make recommendations. '10
The Department exercised specific statutory powers to remedy mischief found by the MMC
contrary to the public interest. Although the Department could inter alia declare agreements
unlawful and prohibit discriniinatoiy conditions, a departmental order could not affect any
condition attached to a patent licence. 4' Such a power was conferred in 1949 to the
comptroller based on a rather complex and, therefore, unworkable procedure.
Under the 1949 Patents Act, before an order was made effective by the comptroller, five
steps were observed: firstly, the Department referred the competition matter to the
Commission. Secondly, the Commission declared that a supply of goods of any description
consisting of or including patented articles, or in respect of exports of such goods, or in
respect of an application to goods of any description consisting of or including a patented
process operated or which could operate against the public interest. Thirdly, the
Commission's report was laid before the House of Commons which passed a Resolution
conlirmning the Commission's recommendations. Fourthly, the Department could apply to the
comptroller for an appropriate order. Fifthly, if upon the application it appeared to the
comptroller that the matter referred to in the Parliamentary resolution operated or could be
expected to operate against the public interest, he then would do either or both (a) to cancel
or vary conditions contained in any relevant patent licence restricting the use of the invention
or the exercise of the patent right; and (b) to endorse the relevant patent licence of right.42
Apart from the complex procedure, a number of restrictive conditions involving an invention
for product or process were not expected to come to public knowledge because the
legislation on competition, in many senses, did little to force the disclosure. Under the
Restrictive Trade Practices Acts 1956 to 1968, agreements entered by persons carrying on
business within the United Kingdom, and including restriction as to the production or supply
39 The Department coiterned s the Board of Trade. The 1965 Ntnopolies and Mergers Act. s. 3.
° 1948 Monopolies and Restrictive Practice (Inquity and Conti1) Act; s. 2(1); 1965 Monopolies and
MergersAct,s. IandSch. 1; 1973FTA,s. 5(1).
411948 Monopolies and Restnciive Practices (Enquiry and Contml) Act; S. 10(5).
42 1949 Patents Act, S. 40(3)(4).
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of goods had to be registered. Registration was to be made vith the Registrar of Restrictive
Trading Agreements, and the conditions were those as prices for goods, conditions of sale,
persons to whom goods may be sold, and quantities and kinds of goods which could be made
or sold. The same legislation excluded from its scope patent deals (licences, sub-licences and
assignments), except restrictions in respect of the invention to which the patent (or patent
application) related or articles by the use of that invention. 43 Before 1968, no penalty existed
for failure to register. The law, nevertheless, made it unlawful for any person carrying on
business in the United Kingdom to enforce restrictive conditions contained in unregistered
registrable contracts.
These contracts could be submitted to the scrutiny of the Restrictive Practices Court with
the purpose of establishing whether the relevant restrictions were or were not contraly to
public interest. A number of patent related contracts, however, were exempted from
registration, unless they included unpatented goods. Contracts covered by the exemption
were to be registered with the Patent Office, 45 but the comptroller had no compelling force to
order registration, nor could he take any action other than that taken on an application made
by a third person. No penalty was imposed for failure of registration with the Patent Office,
except that an unregistered licence or other document could not be admitted in court as
evidence.
Regarding the prohibition of resale price maintenance, which was also referred to the
Restrictive Practices Court, the relevant legislation was designed to apply to articles relating
to patents. Provision had been made, however, to the effect that the legislation could not
impair the right of licensors or assignors to regulate the price at which a licensee or assignee
sold products made or processed under a patent.47
The way the legal mechanism (expressed in the legislation cited above) is designed has
thvoured the keeping of conditions attached to a patent out of public knowledge, i e., out of
1956 Restrictive Trade Practices, s. 8(4).
1968 Restnctive Trade Practices Act, s. 7.
I949PatentsAct,s.74.
1949 Patents Act, s. 74(6).
1964 Resale Prices Act, s. 1(2).
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reach of the incumbent authority Government. In this context, a number of conditions adverse
to competition could never be challenged. While arrangements have been allowed to exist
quietly under competition legislation, and to the extent that they could contain conditions per
se void under the patent legislation, grounds have been provided for any firm willing to work
a patent without the own&s consent to apply for a non-voluntary licence. At least a
favourable bargaining position would be created for any firm interested in the patent to
negotiate better terms and conditions of licences. Such an outcome in some ways could meet
the purposes of the safeguarding policy in place.
The current legal mechanism
Before considering the subsequent evolution of the legal mechanism relevant to the
assessment of the public interest element associated with the exercise of the patent right and
the taking of remedial action to curb competition violations, a few points should be made
about the character of the current law.
Although in the past three decades or so the legislation has visibly evolved, the efficiency of
the system to redress competition mischiefs (mainly relating to patents) is still subject to
criticism. It is commonplace to say that the anti-monopoly legislation has been considerably
flexible (nothing in itself is unlawflul until the Secretary of State at his discretion declares so),
the anti-competitive practices regulation has been too formalistic (catching many inoffensive
agreements), but has little deten-ent effect due to lack of appropriate penalties. To the extent
that this character of the competition legislation relates to remedial measures on intellectual
property implemented on grounds of public interest and based on competition standards, such
a safeguarding policy tends to reflect the historical leniency of the UK competition law. The
result is that patent law still plays a major role in safeguarding public interest. The next part
explains the main elements in connection with an MMC report in consequence of which the
comptroller is called upon to set up the appropriate patent safeguard, and the changes
introduced in the current patent regulation.
48 Green Paper Report on Abuse of Mark Por, chapter 2, Cm. 2100.
211
The role of competition mechanism
Under the patent legislation, 49 the comptroller is no longer required to pass ajudgement on
the public interest requirement, as previous legislation suggested he do. Such a judgement is
exclusive of the Commission, whose opinions are laid doi before the Parliament but not
formally confirmed by Parliamentary resolution. The power to formulate an application to the
comptroller is given to a Minister or ministers concerned, not the Secretary df State. Also, the
range of anti-competition matters the MMC may deal with is now of wider scope, 5° and a
competition report has been made prima facie evidence of referred matters (unlawful
conditions attached to a patent) 5' for the effect of compulsory licensing on request of any
person.
As far as the public interest is concerned, investigations carried out by the Commission are
thus central, as evidence, for specific actions contemplated in current patent law. The
comptroller's order is designed to strike adverse effects of conditions contained m patent
licensing and refusal to licence, which have been included in the matters identified in a
Commission's report issued in consequence of one of the four qualified elements: monopoly
reference, merger reference, competition reference, and public sector reference. These
elements are now explained.
The control of monopolies is today governed by the 1973 Fair Trading Act (1973 FTA)
which empowers the Director General of the Office of Fair Trading (DGFT) to watch over
the activities of British industry and at first hand assess abusive conducts. When a monopoly
situation is identified, the DGFT may refer the matter (monopoly reference) to the MMC. A
monopoly reference may also be made by a Minister concerned. The Commission is asked to
investigate a specific matter in the light of particular circumstances, and establish on the basis
of the finding whether the situation exists and operates, or may be expected to operate,
against the public interest. A monopoly situation may be of two types: a scale monopoy
situation (e.g., at least 25% of goods of any description is supplied in the United Kingdom by
1977PmsActs.51asitasamendedbySck5(14)ofthe1988AcL
5° The 1980 Compition Act contemplates other anti-competitive practices n caught by t1 1973 F.TA.
Amended s. 53 of the 1977 Patents Act
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a person or company), and a complex monopoly situation (e.g., in the former situation the
goods are supplied by two or more companies who by agreement or otherwise conduct their
respective affairs in a way to prevent, restrict or distort competition). The Commission's
report contains conclusive opinions on questions raised in the reference, and, if it is the case,
considers measures to remedy or prevent adverse effects on the public interest assessed on
account of relevant matters and having regard inter aba to the promotion or maintenance of
competition, consumers' interests, development of new products, balance of distribution of
industry and employment, and competitive activity abroad by companies in the United
Kingdom. The report is made to the Secretaiy of State who decides the appropriate course of
action. This may include application through a minister concerned to the comptroller to take
action under the patent law, and in relation to licensing conditions or a refusal to licence a
patented invention.
The control of mergers is also regulated by the 1973 FTA under which the Secretary of
State may consider, whether appropnate, to refer a particular matter (merger reference) to the
MMC for investigation. In principle, a merger may proceed, unless the Secretary of State
decides otherwise upon the evidence of significant adverse effects on competition, in regard
to the volume of market share and assets, examined on a case-by-case basis and recognised
by at least two-third majority of the Commission. A merger is qualified for investigation when
two or more enterprises cease to be distinct. The role of the Commission is, firstly, to
establish whether the merger qualifies or not for investigation. If it does, secondly, to
determine whether it does or does not operate, or the merger may be expected to operate or
not to operate against public interest. Only a positive MMC conclusion may be overturned by
the Secretary of State who, in a case of a merger found against the public interest, decides
whether to block the merger or impose conditions. From this, and if no suitable undertakings
are being accepted, a ministerial application may arise for the comptroller to take proper
action.
A competition reference arising under the 1980 Competition Act (1980 CA) follows the
discretion of the Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT). Where, as a result of a conducts
inquiry, the DOFF finds that an anti-competitive practice exists, which operates or might
potentially operate against public interests, the party concerned may be asked to give
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undertakings to remedy the anti-competitive effects of practices such as exclusive purchasing
contracts, selective distribution systems, tie-ins, reflisa! of supply of parts required by
competitors, and restrictive licensing policies. The possible competitive effects may eliminate
competition, prevent the emergence of new firms, and, thus, distort competition between
firms. If undertakings are not given to revert the possible anti-competitive effects of these
practices, the DGFT may ask the Commission for further investigation. If in the MMC's
opinion it is found that the practices cariied out are against the public interest, the
Commission may make recommendations. Once the Secretary of State has decided on action,
and suitable undertakings are not carned out; he may make an order. Additionally, the
Secretary, through a minister concerned, has the power to apply to the comptroller.
Finally, the public sector reference under Section 11 of the 1980 CA covers investigation of
possible abuse of a monopoly situation carried out mainly by nationalised industries, as well as
privatised companies. The reference addressed by the Secretary of State is for the
Commission to investigate and report on relevant matters 52 concerning efficiency and costs of
the services provided, and, Wit is the case, to make recommendations for the improvement of
the performance of the public sector body, and prevent adverse effects of any abusive
conduct. The company is required in general to give its response to the Commission's
recommendations, and it may do so on a follow-up scheme completed in plenty of time. An
application to the comptroller to remedy an abuse of patent rights, if the circumstances justif'
it, is at least a remedy made available by the legal mechanism.
From the 1950s on, the legal mechanism reinforced or made available an improved method
to deal with the anti-competition exercise of intellectual property rights. Such a legal move
has not been confined to the United Kingdom. As a by-product of the post-war period,
competition legislation and policy has spread world-wide, mainly in the OECD countries.
While this move points towards an unparalleled political determination to force a change in
the ethics of trade relations, this legal intervention inevitably comes to influence the way the
intellectual property tight is exercised. As a result of its gradual interaction with intellectual
property, competition law has then affected the safeguarding policy which is per se a
52 Excluding asps relaling to Government policies like ministerial finanaal obligaluons imposed on the
undertakin&
214
concurrent mechanism of control attracting a general consent. 53 Ths seems to be a sign of
defeat of the absolute concept of property, but - veiy importantly - it does not mean the
surrender of property owners. They have claimed the establishment of greater transparency
concerning the grounds on which intellectual property may be limited. Competition rules are
intended to meet such a claim. As a valid mechanism to govern the safeguarding policy,
competition law has apparently become of immense value to guide both the legal control
upon the use of intellectual property and the intervention on efficiency grounds from
intervention on a welfare basis.M Further discussion on this point is to be found in next
chapter.
" Agreement on TRIPS, Article 40; IPIC Treaty, Article 6(3) (b).
Agreement on TRIPS, Article 31 (patent use without the patentee's coisent by the government or third
parties authorised by tl government); IPIC Treaty, Article 6(3Xa). See the jxevious nce.
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CHAPTER SIX
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORDER AND THE ROLE OF COMPEITLION
LAW
6.1 Introduction: the [PR exercise and the com petitive process
As was shown in chapter two, technical innovation in the theoiy of economic growth as well
as in market dynamics is a significant element in the modem economy. Intellectual property
iights, which protect innovation-related products, confer exclusivity upon their owners and, in
contrast, competition law usually strives to keep markets open. Therefore, tension between
these two matters is inevitable. As a result, competition law has increasingly been applied as a
general instrument to order the market by governing the exercise of proprietary rights. The
consequences of this are twofold:
the discouragement of certain safeguarding measures intrinsic to intellectual property law,
such as remedial revocation and compulsory licensing granted on non-working of patents,
and consequential emergence of remedial safeguards which rely on competitive grounds
and on individual merits;' and
• the stress on an institutional policy more responsive to efficiency and welfare claims.
The resort to unauthonsed use of intellectual property rights, or compulsory exchange of
intellectual property assets, suggests that the market does not run naturally. Although market
organisation freed from regulatory constraints has at all times been defended by liberal ideas,
historical reality has shown that the market itselt through self.adjusting forces of competition,
has failed to provide for a sound discipline of the exercise of intellectual property in a maimer
so as not to stifle competition and thus satisfy the social bargain.
While legal protection for the sake of private exploitation is a major concern, the role of the
law is equally addressed to encourage an efficient exercise of proprietary rights and ensure
competitive access to intellectual property.
The combination of the Articles 37(2), 31 and 40 of the Agreement on TRIPS refleets t1 tendency of the
legal policy applied in leIing industiialized countries and Great Britain in particular.
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As was seen in the previous chapter, some remedial measures adopted in the past were
apparently inefficient, and in being so unnecessarily oppressed the private autonomy of
exploitation. Today, there is a belief in the function of competition mies to order the exercise
of intellectual property iights. Evidence in support of this remark is the resurgence of
competition law, and increasing resort to its mechanisms to curb the effects arising from the
use of intellectual property in a manner adverse to competition. 2 The gradual application of
such mechanisms coincided with the abandonment of remedial safeguards3 which
unnecessarily restricted private exploitation of proprietary iights. Within the framework of
competition law, efficiency and weiflire arguments seem to be a legitimate tool against a
"sacrosanct" freedom of exploitation of proprietary rights. Where restrictions to this private
exploitation are allowed on grounds other than economic efficiency, a desirable legal policy
moves towards the establishment of tight conditions and transparent procedures, thus
suggesting an inteivention on efficiency grounds distinct from an intervention on a public
welfare basis. 4 The question now is this. Have thoughts and concepts on competition the
ability to provide for a satisfactory assessment of efficiency and welfare as preferable criteria
to limit the exercise of intellectual property rights?
It is suggested that competition law and policy do offer a basis for a welfare/efficiency
defence. Although incomplete, i.e., of relative value, the set of mies on the basis of which
welfare and efficiency are claimed inflict a commitment on the adjudicator. It is also suggested
that the resurgence of a competition phenomenon corresponds with the belief that the
working of a free market, and along with this a lawfiul private exploitation of intellectual
property rights, depends on sound control of the competitive process. Consequently, as far as
the market for intellectual property is concerned, what is best for society cannot be left
entirely up to market self-regulation or the choices of individual firms.
The second section of this chapter sets out to establish the evolution of competition
legislation and policy, as a post-war trend, and their contribution towards the ordering of
2 Agreement on TRIPS (Articles7, 8, 31 and4O)andlPlCTreaty(Article6).
Patent revocation on the ground of non-woiicing is an example, which was a safeguarding measure
intrinsic to the UK intellectual property law.
ci: Article 31 of the Agreement on TRIPS on regulatoiy conditions lbr the unauthorized use of patents by
the government and private finns, in.
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intellectual property. It will be seen that over the past three decades or so a number of
countnes have improved competition law and policy. Against a reluctant philosophy of the
past, this move itself is evidence of how desirable it is to improve competition. Different
reasons may compel countries to do this, such as to combat inflation, strive for wealth
distribution, and pursue a balanced market structure. Such improvement is in response to a
global economic reality of which intellectual property is only a part of the issue. In practical
terms, the advantages of that improvement include the strengthening of a safeguarding policy
on intellectual property, and the creation of a better environment for technical progress and
economic welfare.
The legislation, by addressing the interests of both foreign and national traders, envisages a
variety of purposes. It is designed to strive for gradual changes in the market structure, by
preventing firms from operating practices adverse to competition, and making sure that
market concentration does not lead to undue manipulation of the market. Nevertheless,
provided they do not impede competition, restraints may be tolerated. As to concentration,
the concern is that while joint ventures may be a vehicle to promote innovation and legitimate
creative businesses, they should not lead to a cartel so as not to stifle competition. By
pursuing these aims, the legal development has a great deal of impact on intellectual property
ordering.
In keeping the competitive process under surveillance, the working of the legislation has the
effect of balancing the role of intellectual property rights as a matter of public interest, i.e.,
while assuring the freedom of private exploitation, a set of legal measures is available to make
sure that intellectual property rights are not used as a basis for restraints incompatible with the
scope of the protected rights. To this end, the way the legislation operates is significant.
There are basic concerns, as to legal implementation. These include the withdrawal of state
patronage concerning sanctioning of unlawful practices, the facilitation of voluntary
compliance, the contribution of lay men, and a degree of discretion exercised by government
authorities. Relying on government agencies and individuals, enforcement also resorts to
guidelines as valid regulatory practices. Although precarious, guidelines may be useful as
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regulatoiy means to reach flexibility and transparency of procedures, which ultimately are
required to observe the particulars of individual countries and legal cultures
The third section examines the role of the thoughts and concepts on competition to limit the
exercise of intellectuai property rights by controlling the competitive process. A question
open to discussion is to what extent competition law ensures the achievement of welfare and
efficiency gains associated with the exercise of intellectual property. Having a relative value,
regulatory and judicial principles inform the legal activities and command the pursuit of
efficiency and welfare. To what degree these are achieved is an other story. As a legal tool,
thoughts and concepts provide a basis for the process of reasoning, and express general
commitment to which competition bodies and courts are bound.
To some extent, the legal framework recognises the capacity of policymakers, government
bodies and courts, to promote public welfare relying not only on efficiency. While entailing
some degree of flexibility, the "workable competition" and "useful effect" principles are based
on the assumption that efficiency should not be pursued for the sake of efficiency. Similarly,
under the "existence/exercise of right" divide, the exercise of intellectual property rights is
lawful to the extent that the owner does not expand his right beyond the boundaries of the
legal grant. The "per se rule" and the "rule of reason" are part of a scheme to approach the
problem analytically, allowing, however, a grey area between what is considered lawful and
unlawflul. In addition, the principles of "prohibition" and "abuse control" are part of the legal
framework governing the competitive process. These principles tell little about the ability to
provide effective control of that process. The same can be said as to the use of guidelines.
The gist of these legal instruments is that the concern with achieving efficiency and welfare
goals put the legal format and the process of decision making in the same focus.
In its international dimension, limitations on the exercise of intellectual property rights are
addressed through co-operation based solely on limited comities. This causes a gap between,
on one side, the international regulation of the existence and enforcement of intellectual
property rights and, on the other hand, the international regulation on the exercise of
intellectual property rights through competition rules. International regulation shows how
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much countries are committed to protecting intellectual property. On the contraiy,
governments are not sure about the degree of commitment they are prepared to make on
matters of international competition. As a result, competition regulation on the exercise of
proprietary rights internationally is rather poor. Such a contrast may turn into a source of
distortion.
This chapter starts with an overview of the legislation on competition in seven major OECD
jurisdictions. 5
 It is not a comprehensive survey, nor does it intend to answer why competition
legislation became fashionable in the post-war period. The main purpose is to give an account
of the growing development of the legislation within the region, and establish the main legal
features.
Canada, France, Gennany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States of America and European Union. The
expression "European Union" created by t1 Treaty on European Union, (Maasiricht Treaty) signed on
7.2.1992. is often replaced in the text by European Community, or simply "EC" or "EEC" interchangeably
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6.2 Resur2ence of competition law and policy
6.2.1 Main features of selected jurisdictions
(i) Canada
Canada has long considered the competition matter with due concern. Its first antitrust law
was passed in the last century,' but like other countries, such as England and France, before
the Second World War competition law had no significance. From 1959, the country has
formally kept antitrust co-operation with the United States as a result of its concern with the
extraterritorial effect of antitrust law. 2 The country has also held a policy of compulsory
licensing as to patented drugs adopted as a consequence of excessive drug prices in the 1950s
and 1960s. 3 The policy has been retained because it "has promoted increased competition and
reduced drug prices."4 A proposed law presented to the Parliament provided that:
a patent holder would be given an exclusivity period oflOyearsfivm generic drugs imports, or 7vea,s f the
generic company were to manufacture in Canada. A Patented Medicine Review Board would be set up to
monitor drug prices on the basis of comparison with prices of similar drugs elsewhere in the worl4 the
consumer price index, and the evolulion of manufacturing costs. If the Board finds that a drug price is
excessive, it would be empowered to set price ceilings and revoke the exclusivity rights. The legislation also
pmvidesfor a review by Cabinet in 4 years and by Parliament in 1Oyears5
Before passing new Acts, both the Government and Parliament have traditionally
investigated matters of intellectual property and competition, 6 perhaps because they are
'The Dominion antitrust statute of 1889 is prior to the US Sherman Act of 1890; the Canadian statute is
only preceded by the English Statute of Monopolies of 1624, and the French Law of 1791.
2 S Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act of 1984. Scherer & Ross. Industrial Mailcet Structure and
Economic Performance, p. 12, 13, 3rd ed., 1990; OECD, Competition Policy in OECD countries 1984-5, p.
50, 53/54.
Patent Act l%9, s. 4 1(4). As a result of an inquiry undertaken m 1985 reporting favourably the retention of
the compulsory licensing policy (OECD, oh. cit, p. 57), the 1987 Patent Act (Bill C-22) inlitxluced it
saves compulsory licence for domestic manufacture of dnigs, acawds protection for drug products (previously
only processes were subject to protection), and empowers a surveillance body either "to direct the reduction of
prices to a specified level, or declare that specified products axe xio longer covered by the statulozy exclusivity
penods." OECD, Competition Policy in OECD Countnes 1987-88 Report, p. 79.
OECD, Competition Policy mOECD Counines 1985-86 Report, p 63.
The pending Bill C-22 s expected to be enacted by June, 1987. OECD, Competition Policy in OECD
Countries 1986-87 Report, p. 56/57.
6 concerned authorities largely explore the implications of the pnlecflon of intellectual property to
competition. This is the case of the 1984 copynght reform launched by the Government to review the
Copyright Act of 1924, extending copyright protection to new subject matter including computer programs.
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aware of the fact that the Canadian economy is charactensed by having a "high level of
concentration and significant international competition." 7 The current legislation on
competition reflects such an awareness.
The new legislation passed in 1986 is the result of long preparation initiated in 1969 In an
introductory exhortation, Parliament outlined the general purpose of the Act, that is, "to
maintain and encourage competition" so as to:
• promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy,
• expand opportunities for Canadian participation in world markets while at the same time recognising the
role offoreign competition in Canada;
• ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunit y to participate in the
Canadian economy, and
• provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices.9
Similar to a trade pact, the Act is a modern piece of legislation where the interests of both
foreign and national traders are addressed. One merit of the Canadian Competition Act is its
departure from the rigid system which characterised competition legislation of the post-war
period.'0
The 1986 Act provides a guiding non-exhaustive list of anti-competitive practices.
-	 Moreover, it updates the level of fines, provides ftr the use of negotiated settlements and
relies on administrative law process and on non-criminal remedies. The flexible approach of
the enforcement process is designed to facilitate voluntary compliance. The adjudicative
function of the Competition Tribunal, made up of judicial and lay members, is kept separate
from the investigation and research inquiries activities."
Once the discussion was opened, a great deal of inputs was brought on the need "for checks and balance
against possible abuse of market power." The reform was made effective in 1987. OECD, Competition Policy
in OECD countries 1984-85 Report, p. 54; Report 1985-86. p. 62; and Report 1986-87, p. 57.
OECD, Competition Policy m OECD Countries 1986-87 Report, p. 52.
Competition Act and Competition Tnl,unal Act of June 19, 1986. See OECD, Competition Policy - 1986-
87 Report p. 52.
Competition Act, Section 1.1, OECD, Competition Policy - 1986-87 Report; p 52.
'° The previous Canadian competition law had been passed 75 years before and had limited enforcement
mostly due to the constmints of the burden of criminal evidence the old law embodied, a feature commonly
found in the contemporaneous competition legisbtiolL
" Ob. cit., p. 52.60.
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Particular attention is drawn to Section 32 of the Competition Act which provides for
remedial measures against undue restraints as to the use of patent and copyright.' 2
 The
provision reflects the Government's perception of the interface between intellectual property
and competition. In a statement issued by the main competition body, it is said that "where
the exercise of such rights [intellectual property] involves the undue restraint of trade,
competition policy can balance the role of intellectual property rights." 3
 All the leading
OECD countries share this awareness.
(ii) France
By the end of the I 970s, France had put a new policy in place. Its priority goal was gradually
to replace price control by free competition which pushed firms out of vicious practices
affecting supply conditions and industrial prices. One of the purposes of the legal measures14
was to strike the structural causes of inflation by eliminating trade restraints, inducing firms to
take frill responsibility on the market, particularly regarding prices, and exposing themselves
to sharp domestic competition as a step to facing international markets. The measures also
included the setting of new enforcement bodies.' 5 The Competition Commission was charged
with the control of cartels, advising the Government on competition issues, and delivering
opinions on concentration operations.'6
In 1985 France amended its 1977 Act.' 7 The amendment Law established new fonns of
competition, provided the concerned authorities with the necessaly decision-making power,
12 The 1988 Amendment Copyright Act (Bill C-60) provided an amendment In Section 32 of the
Competition Act 1986 in order to contemplate copyright-related anti-competitive restraints. Similar provision
is found in the Bill C-57, regarding the protection of the integrated cireuit topography. OECD, Competition
Policy in OECD Countries 1987-88 Report, p. 58; 1988-89 Report, p. 54; and 1989-90 Report, p. 89.
Canada, Canadian Competition Policy: Its Interface vith other Economic and Social Policies, A
Framerk for Discussion, p. 27, Bureau of Competition Policy Consumer and Corporate Affairs, September
1989.
14 Law No. 77-806 of 19th July, 1977, on the Control of Economic Concentration and Prevention of
Unlawful Cartels and Abuse of Dominant Positions. Regulations followed to bring the Act into operalioir
Decrees of 25th Octther and 23rd Ncwember, 1977. CiijIar of 10th Januazy and 14th Februaiy, 1978. The
previous legislation was passed as early as 1791, but in Schereis irds "s largely ignoreL" Scherer & Ross,
ob. cit., p. 13.
15 The General Directorate for Competition and Consumer Airs, and tbu Competition Commission.
16 OECD, Annual Reports on Competition Policy in OECD Countries 1979, p. 29-39
'"The Law No. 77-806 was amended by the Law of December 30, 1985.
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made procedures less legalistic, and subjected the power of investigation to court supervision.
As to anti-competitive practices, the new provisions focused on refusal to sell, pnce
discrimination, cartels and the abuse of dominant positions; provided that they do not impede
competition, such practices are acceptable as far as the result stemming from them is
positive
Taking the reform a step further, the 1986 Ordinance 19 consolidated and defined restrictive
practices, and improved the institutional structure by assigning responsibilities to
administrative and judicial authonties, and simplified procedures. The principles behind the
reform are summarised as follows:
• The withdrawal of the State patronage concerning the sanctioning of unlawful behaviour;
• The strengthening of surveillance of competitive structures in the economy with a view to controlling
concentration;
• The predominant role ofcivil courts in curbing unlawful practices between enterprises.20
Other features of the French reform included the role of the civil courts, which may hear
matters on competition and apply Articles 85-1 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome; and the
implementation of a system oriented to the depenalization of abusive trade practices. This is a
trend followed by OECD competition authorities, which have limited the use of penalties to
those obvious horizontal violations intentionally designed to restrict output and raise prices.2'
Overall, the aim of the French reform was to encourage technical progress and improve
market structure. This trend is essentially followed by Germany.
s OECD, Competition Policy m OECD Countries, Report 1985-86, p. 109
' OnlinanceNo. 86-1243 ctDecember 1,1986.
20 OECD, Competition Policy in OECD Countries. 1986-87 Report, p. 98/99. Reaffirmmg a liberal policy,
the reform goes ahead to frame a system where the State has no patronage role in dealing with competition
matters, but it ensws that an adequate structure is provided to safeguard the private interest An independent
body, the Competition Council, is created and undertakes some functions previously committed to the
Competition Commission.
21 OECD Secretariat, Competition and Economic Development p. 15, OECD, Paris, 1991. An exception is
the United States which has increased the level of criminal sanctions.
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(iii) Germany
Apparently, in the last centuly, Germany faced great diculties in developing a free trade
economy.22 The notion of freedom of trade was judicially construed to admit the legality of
cartels that the Imperial Court considered as a necessity (1897), and as such served war
purposes.23
After a long histoiy of cartelized economy, in 1957 Germany passed its Cartel Act (Act
Against Restraints of Competition), amended several times 24 A more liberal position was
addressed as to the regulation of unfair practices. Inspired by classical liberalism, the Act
Against Unfair Competition of 1909 provided abstract rules which have required a great deal
of work for the courts to construe on them. 25 Over the two last decades, German
competition legislation has been subjected to amendments, 26 in order to comply with the
current European sense of economic modernisation.
The challenge the country faced in the 1980s was to inhibit anti-competitive practices, and
to strike a gradual change in the market structure. Such adjustment over the years resulted in
the increasing need for both changing structural conditions and promotion of technological
progress. One of the available legal measures designed to push that progress is the legal
possibility28 of an IPR licence agreement to be declared ineffective or unenforceable, if it is
used as a basis for restraints incompatible with the scope of the protected tight
22 This difficulty is accused by Beier, when refers to the passage of the Freedom of Trade Act of 1869. in
Patent Protection and Free Market Economy, [19921 23(2) IIC 161.
Under Nazi policies, the formation of "compulsoiy cartels" was legally regulated (Law of July 15, 1933).
In Competition Laws, Documents on Politics and Society in the Federal Republic of Germany. p. 7i. Code
No. 700Q 5716,1990. Now called Documents.
24 The Cartel Act was amended in 1965, 1973, 1976, 1980, and 1989 (the flflh amendment came into force
in 1 January 1990). In Documents, p. 11.
Documents, p. 16. The Act on Price Reductions (Rebates Act) of 1933 is an ancillary statute as part of the
law against unfair competition.
The 1989 Cartel Act amendment aims at redefining the criteria on assessment of market position,
implementing measures for the merger control, and making an exception related to joint dealing. OECD,
Competition Policy in OECD Countries 1989-90 Report, p. 163.
27 See Competition Policy in OECD Countries - 1984-85 Report, p. 104; 1985-86 Report, p. 117; 1986-87
Report p. 114; and 1987-88 Report, p. 118.
The Section 20(1) of the Cartel Act reads: Agreements concerning the acquisition or use of a patenLs
utility models, or protected seed varieties shall be ineffective in si far as they impose upon the acquirer or
hcensee any restrictions on his business conduct which go beyond the scope of the protected right; restrictions
pertaining to the type, extent; quantity, temtory or period of exercise of such right shall not be deemed to go
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The extent to which a restrictive arrangement is held unlawful is to be assessed under the
statutory exceptions. In any case, no illegality is recognised in the absence of perceptible or
potential effects of the agreement on market conditions. According to the court interpretation
and the discretion exercised by the competition authority, these effects are disregarded on
different grounds, such as absence of market power, existence of alternative sources of
supply, minimal restriction, and safety and health considerations.
Although th different legal traditions, Japan also shares th Germany a past history of
economic concentration.
(iv) Japan
The experience of Japanese competition law is half as long as that of the United States. The
main statute is the Anti-Monopoly Act. 3° Its original text was written with the assistance of
the Allied Forces. Prior to World War H, the Japanese economy largely relied on business
conglomerates (zaibatsu) and "the concentration of economic power was not necessarily
regarded as a negative phenomenon." 3 ' As soon as the occupation ended, the Anti-Monopoly
Act was found too restricting, and for this reason was amended. A second amendment
occurred in 1977 as a result of business practices performed by major corporations.32
Following complaints of the inefficiency of the Fair Trade Commission, 33 Japan and the
United States moved into negotiation aimed at relaxing the rigid bar to the entry of foreign
beyond its scope. In Documents, p. 32. The Section 21 makes similar provision, concerning exploitation of
uncoded technical assets considered as trade secrets Limilalions to these provisions apply in specified
situations.
29 Cf. Oliver Axster, Joint Ventures and Antitrust with Particular Emphasis on the Development of German
Antitrust Theory and Practice, 1991 Corporate Law Institute, Chapter 24, p. 599. See IDocunients, p.7,81
3° Act No. 54 on Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade 1947 (Anti-Monopoly
Act). Other laws are: Act No. 120 Against Delay in Payment of Subcontract Proceeds 1956, Act No. 134
Against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations 1962. OECD, Competition Policy in OECD
Countries 1984-85 Report, p. 125.
31 Hiirishi Oda. Japanese Law, p. 343, Buflerrts, 1992. The concentration was a consequence of the model
of indusirializ.ation adopted by the Government in the late 19th century.
32 FL Oda, ob. cit. p. 344. The first amendment to the Anti-Monopoly Act was passed in 1953, and the
second in 1977 dining the oil cnsis and it was designed to strengthen market deinociatisalion.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the main Japanese competition body with exclusive mandate to carry
out investigations. The public enforcement is put forwani provided that a public interest reason is established.
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firms.34
 As a result of American pressure, the Japanese FTC is carrying out tougher
enforcement measures. 35
 Guidelines are also part of the enforcement programme. The
administrative guidance is a type of informal enforcement very peculiar to Japanese
culture,36
 and is expected to serve the development of competition policies.
The Japanese experience is interesting in the sense that it shows how the country, known as
having a highly concentrated market, 37
 has managed to emulate antitrust rules and adapt
them to the Japanese legal culture patterns. 38 In this respect, the Guidelines on unfair trade
practices related to patent and know-how licensing 39 are very illustrative. Introductory notes
recognise as a matter of principle the procompetitive effect of the patent, and that licensing
arrangements could also have procompetitive effects if they do not hamper market entry of
new traders, thus, increasing the number of competing entities, and "technology can be
utilised more efficiently." In the scrutiny of individual cases, the guidance is tested under the
surveillance of the FTC.4°
Three detailed and indicative lists of restrictions have been elaborated. Restnctive practices
are classified as follows: (a) restrictions in principle lawful; (b) restrictions which may be
found unlawful; and (c) restrictions highly likely to be found unlawful. The restraint is
regarded lawful under consideration of efficiency and that it has no apparent negative effect
Only in 1991, nearly two decades after the oil crisis, did the FTC start criminal proceedings against illegal
cartels.
The Structural hnpediinents Initiatives Talk started in 1991.
The actions include criminal prosecution against cartels. See Hideki Ogawa, "The FTCs Tougher Position
Confirmed in Tokyo for Price-Fixing Cane!, A Symbolic Food-Wrap Case?", [19931 17(1) World Competition
Law & Economics Review 155.
In the past, administrative guidance (Gyohsei-shidoh) served to assist domestic investors to achieve greater
economies of scale through concentration. See John 0. Haley, Administrative Guidance v Fonnoi Regulation:
Resotv:ng the Paradox oflndustnal Policy, in "Law and Trade Issues of the Japanese Economy, An American
and Japanese Perspectives" (1985) pages 107-123, edited by G Saxonhouse & K Yamamura.
See John 0. Haley, oh. cit, p. 107.
Traditionally, Japanese culture is well-known to be based on "the primacy of the group" rather than
individual freedom, so as "the individual interest is merged in the group interest" And it has been identified by
its "aversion to law", logical thinking and legal process. All of these contrast with the competitive rationale
behind the antitrust law. For aceounts on the Japanese concept of law, see Chin Kim & Craig M Lawson, 'The
Law of the Subtle Mind: The Traditional Japanese Conception of Law", 28 The Int'l and Comp. L.
Quarterly, 491; and F. K Uphazn, Law arid Social Change in Postwar Japan, p. 205/206, Harvard Univ Press,
1987.
See the 1989 FTC Guidelines for the Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices th Respect to Patent and
Know-how Licensing Agreements. [The Guidelmesi The text is published in [19901 2 1(5) IIC 662-679.
4° The Guidelines, Preamble, note 3. According to Para 2 of Section 6 of the Antunonopoly Act,
international arrangements are filed and examiner! by the FTC.
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on trade. The possible unfair restraint of those practices described in list (b) is examined in the
light of the nature of the market, the position of both licensor and licensee related to the
market conditions, and the length of the arrangement. In list (c) a specific reason has to justiiy
the restraint, otherwise it will be held unlawful. A clearance made by the FTC has no
perpetual effect. 4 ' After a clearance has been effective, the competition Agency may declare a
restriction unlawful in view of actual circumstances
Apart from the FTC enforcement activities at both criminal and civil levels, Japan is
considering or is conducting new developments in its law. 42 An amendment to the Monopoly
Act has been drafted, mainly to address higher criminal fines, and the Government has
promised a broad review of the cartel law for 1995. Guidelines have been and are being
developed with a view to striking more transparency in the distribution system and business
practices, and joint research and development. They now start looking at deregulation and
pnvatisation, a matter which may raise much domestic debate. The announced policy seems
to follow the British path, that is, to enhance competition first and deregulate later on.43
(v) The United Kingdom
The legislation from 1948 to 1968
Before the introduction of monopoly and merger control in 1948, the problem of anti-
competition behaviour in Britain was addressed only by common law, but it is unclear to what
extent it contributed to controlling the competitive process Above all, a trader was entitled,
"in all matters not contrary to law, to regulate his own mode of carrying it on according to his
41 me Guidelines, Section 3.
42 See Mr Yamath's statement on the Panel Discussion "The United States and Japan", in 1992 Proceedings
of tha Fordhain Corporate Law Institute, International Antitnist Law & Policy, Chapter 6, p.107 at 113, edited
by Barry Hawk, 1993.
Deregulation is associated vith privatisation and iiade liberalization. As a result of the implementation of
such a policy, state-owmed companies are transferred to the private domain, and entry of transnational
companies is allowed or facilitated, consequently there is a risk of aggregation of capital at private bands with
impact on market stricture. Thus, a workable competition policy is necessary to make markets competitive in
their structure and in the conduct of suppliers. The point now made may give room for some contention. In this
regard, see Gordon Borne's comments, p. 331 at 333, and debates on competition in developing market
economy, chapters 17, p. 385, 20. p. 533, and 21, p. 539, of the 1992 Fordham Corporate Law Institute
proceedings, "International Antitmst Law & Policy", Bariy Hawk (ed.), 1993.
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own discretion and choice." In the case of monopolies, there was a hostile attitude to them.
Monopolies were despised because of the stifling effect they had on freedom of trade.
However, it was believed that the results of monopolistic co-operation would not last for
long; under pressure of reactive market forces, sooner or later they would be eliminated by
competition between individuals. On these grounds, contracts in restraint of trade could
generally be upheld in the classical period. 45 Moreover, once a licensee accepted a licence he
was not allowed to challenge the validity of the patent in an action under the licence. This was
a restriction usually held at common law.
Albeit of limited scope, a significant element of the common law was the doctrine of
restraint of trade, according to which a restriction would be upheld as far as it was necessary
to protect the legitimate interest of a party to an agreement. There was no objective criteria to
assess the legitimacy of interest, except that the restriction had to be reasonable between the
parties. There was a presumption that the restriction was unreasonable and thus void, and the
burden to prove otherwise rested on the plaintiff. In general, the reasonableness required
proper consideration by the courts to circumstances of time, space and subject-matter. The
restriction also had to be reasonable as to the public interest, the burden of proof being of the
defendant, but the courts were reluctant to declare a restriction void under this requirement.47
It has been argued that at common law there was also a sort of economic tort, enabling "a
plaintiff whose economic interests have been injured by the behaviour of the defendant to
recover damages." From this, it has been suggested that to a certain extent, there appeared
to be a generalised unfair competition doctrine capable of preventing "one finn from
appropriating valuable commercial ideas from another which [did] not themselves qualiI,r for
protection under intellectual property law." 49 Nevertheless, it is unclear to what extent
Hilton v. Ecicerslev [18551 119 E.R. 781 at 792 (statement of Alderson, B.).
Wickensv. Evans [18291 145 ER 1201 at 1206 (statement of Hullock, B.). As it is referredby Atiyah, the
classical period is around 1800 to 1870. Aliyali, ob. cit. p. 410.
(I William Alcious et all (1982) Terrell on the Law of Patents, p. 258-260. The estoppet against tha
licensee was limited to actions under a licence. See Fuel Economic Co. LkL v. Murray [1930147 R.P.C. 346 at
353.
For an account about restraint of trade at common law, see John Bell, Policy Arguments m Judicial
Decisions, cli. VI, Clarendon Press, 1983. See also Mogul Steamship v. McGregor 118921 AC 25; Nordenfelt
v. Maxim Nordenfelt [1894] AC 535; Schroeder v. Macanlay [1974] 1 W.LR 1308.
Richard Whish, ob. ci, p. 58, 59. See this work for bibliography and cases on tl matter.
49 Iden idenL
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common law is reflected in contemporary competition law which, emerging after the Second
World War, relies entirely on statutory controls
In the second half of the 1940s, there was great concern about the growing concerted
practices formed in the inter-war recession. In contrast to the leniency of the Government and
the industry, political economists expressed hostile reactions against that monopolist and anti-
competitive behaviour, regarding it as detrimental to society and to economic productivity.50
The 1948 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act (1948 Act) was a
response against that growing tendency.
The 1948 Act established a system to investigate dominant finns. No illegal conduct from
which duties or rights could arise was defined. The Board of Trade had the discretion to
require the investigation of a concrete monopoly situation (e.g., the supply by or to the same,
or two or more persons, of at least one third of goods). If a restrictive practice was found to
prevent or restrict competition, remedies were exercisable with Parliamentary approval. In
1956 changes were made to include the control and investigation of other types of
agreements (e.g., market share and price fixing), to require the registration (without sanction
until 1968) of certain agreements, and to prohibit maintenance of collective resale prices. 5 ' In
1965 the control of services and mergers was introduced.52
It is unclear how significant these Acts were to the control of both restrictive agreements
and monopolies relating to intellectual property rights. Under the 1948 Act, as a result of a
report of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, Government authority had
no power to take any direct action against a restrictive condition relating to a patent or
design, or limit the exercise of the patent right. However, based on a competition report and
upon application made by the competent authority, the comptroller could issue an adequate
order. The report could also render prima facie evidence of a stated matter in relation to
which a licensing condition was considered void, thus depriving the patentee from action
against infringement Moreover, restrictive agreements relating to patent pooling, or
° 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy, Cmnd. 6257, pam. 54.
51 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act. The 1%8 Act of the same denomination (s. 7) made unregistered
registrable agreements void and unenforceable.
52 1965 Monopolies and Mergers Act.
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restrictions on prices and customers related only to patent and/or designs were not covered
by the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices. Nevertheless, the influence of this legislation for the
competitive exercise of intellectual property rights cannot be underestimated. Published in
1951, the Report on the Supply of Insulated Electric Wires and Cables found that the
licensing policy on patent and exchange of technical information was very liberal. Such a
policy was held by associations of manufacturers of telephone and mains cables.
Arrangements among affiliated manufacturers made patents readily available in conditions
such as:
• members having a patent made it available to any other member on request of a licence;
• no discrimination between members was permitted;
• with permission of the association, licences were granted to non-members on tenns and conditions not less
favourable than those to members;
• pennission to licence non-members could not be unreasonably withheld53
There was an extensive practice of co-operation between cable manufacturers, and no case
of refusal of licence to non-members was found. Although this isolated industrial attitude
cannot sufficiently support a suggestion that a competitive culture was being formed as a
result of the existence of the cited legislation, one should not ignore the value of the law as a
catalyst, and as such it may contribute to the competitive process generally.
The early legislation has now been replaced by the 1973 Fair Trading Act (1973 F.T.A.),
1976 Restrictive Trade Practices Act (1976 RT.P.A.), 1976 Resale Price Act (1976 RP.A.)
and the 1980 Competition Act (1980 CA) which comprise the main current laws.54
Monopoly and merger under the 1973 F.T.A.
The 1973 F.T.A. was designed to improve the legal system of the competitive process put in
place by the previous legislation on monopoly and merger control, mainly focusing on a
particular industry and product, excluded the bulk of monopoly situations in services dealt
The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission [195 1-521 10 Reports Commissioners & C., p. 23,
24, 50.
For the whole range of legislation, see Butterworths Competition Law, edited by Freeman and Whish,
1993.
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with under the restrictive practice legislation. 55 The Act enables the Secretary of State to
refer a merger situation to the MMC as he thinks fit. I also created the Office of Fair Trading
which plays a central role in the implementation of the competition policy, and reduces the
threshold requirement of market share to 25% in terms of the buying or selling power of
relevant goods or services.
It should be noted that the arbitrary figure of 25% does not necessarily imply market power
in the economic sense, but has only the purpose to define the relevance of the situation to be
investigated, thus, to unleash the jurisdictional duties of the referring agencies. 56 The
statutory policy is this. A market share in the legal meaning less than 25% is not relevant from
the point of view of the public interest.
Pricing arrangements not falling under the 1976 R.T.P.A may be investigated under the
provisions dealing with the complex monopoly of the 1973 F.T A. In this respect, it has been
argued that problems may arise sometimes as to the system, whether the F.TA or the
R.T.P.A, applicable to a particular type of anti-competitive behaviour.57
Apart from the possibility of some action against the owner of intellectual property to be
followed after an MMC report,58 the 1973 F.T.A. reduces the exemption concerning anti-
competitive agreements which may relate to intellectual property falling outside the Act.59
Anti-competitive practices under the 1980 CA.
Apart from the provisions abolishing direct price control and concerning the efficiency of the
public sector, the 1980 CA. is mainly concerned with control of anti-competitive practices
outside the scope of the 1973 F.T.A. 6° Compared with the latter, the former was designed to
See excejXions m Part II, ss. 107-117, of the 1973 F.T.A.
See cnticism to these terminologies in Richard Whish, oh. cit. p. 68-70.
R.Whish,oh.cit.,p 71,155,156.
1977 Patents Act, s. 51; 1988 Act, s. 144, 238.
section ioi.
60 For an anatomy of the 1973 F.T.A. and the reasons for the enactment of the 1980 CA, see Liesner
Reports: A Review of Monopolies and Mergers Policy, Cmnci 7198 (1978), and A Review of Restrictive Trade
Practices Policy, Cmnd. 7512 (1979).
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speed up the investigative process of anticompetitive conduct of single dominant firms or
corporate groups with an annual turnover of not less than £5 million. The practices
investigated include refusals to supply and those which raise barrier to ently and consequently
restrict, distort or prevent competition. Despite the link with the market position, anti-
competitive practices do not require market dominance. 6 ' The practices may be preliminarily
investigated by the DGFT who may or may not proceed with a reference to the MMC which
has no mandate to make recommendations about agreements falling within the jurisdiction of
the Restrictive Practices Court.
The systems of the 1973 and 1980 Acts show a variation in competition policy. While the
control of monopolies and mergers are submitted to a more exhaustive investigative process
under the 1973 F.T.A.,62 the investigative process of anti-competitive practices of dominant
firms is swifter and the investigation can also be made by the DGFT. More severe yet is the
control of restrictive trade practices scrutinised by the Restrictive Practices Court.
Restrictive trade practices under the 1976 R.T.P.A.
The RT.PA is concerned with agreements in any form affecting the buying and selling of
goods and services, containing restrictions on conduct accepted by two or more parties
cariying on business in the -63 The restrictions are related to prices or charges, market
shares, business conditions or terms, quantity or description of goods, manufacturing process
to be used, and amount of goods to be manufactured. The parties are required to send to the
DGFT particulars of the agreements to which the Act applies. The legislation excludes some
agreements from the need to be registered, as well as those dealing with patent, copyright or
trademark. If the DGFT establishes that the agreement is a registrable one, i.e., contains a
significant restriction, he refers it to the Restrictive Trade Practices Court for examination."
61 See Richard Whish, ob. cit, p. 102.
62 As a result of an exhaustive investigation somelinies tbe MMC is able to discover mischiefs which ll
outside its jurisdictional power. SeeR Whish. oh. cit. p. 71-72, 170-171.
Sections 6, 7, 11 and 12 of the 1976 RTJ'.A. contemplate four categones of registrable agreements:
restrictive agreements as to goods, information agreements as to goods, restrictive agreements as to services,
and information agreements as to services.
Reference may no be made if it may cause a conflictual problem arising from the operation of a specific
pnwision of the Community Law.
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The restriction will be prohibited if the Court finds it contrary to public interest Yet under the
1976 LT.P.A collective resale price maintenance is prohibited., the DGFT must take
proceedings in respect of registrable agreements, unless he is allowed to do otherwise; 65
 and
some restrictions are presumably against public interest. These make the control
comparatively rigorous. Perhaps such rigorous control, mainly affecting market share and
price-fixing agreements, contrasting with the two flexible systems previously described, is
justified on the basis that the scrutiny and prohibition of restrictions of that nature is a
mechanism which per se discourages monopolies.
The Act has being criticised for being too formalistic (regarding the description of
agreements and arrangements), thus making enforcement difficult and failing to tackle
harmfiil cartels. 67
 Nevertheless, the system has impeded several restrictive agreements to
proceed and discouraged the formation of similar ones.
For over four decades, the whole competition system68 has been gradually improved.
Reform has been discussed69
 with a view to inter a/ia encouraging private enforcement,7°
and putting the system in line with EC law.
(vi) The United States of Amenca
Legal framework and competition bodies
Designed to promote a competitive open market, the main US antitrust laws comprise the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act,7 ' amended a number of times. Additional legislation
65 Sections 1(2Xc)and2l.
66 Sections 10, 19.
67 See Richard WhisK, ob. cit.. p. 170, 171.
Includmg the 1976 RP.A. which also applies to goods related to intellectual property, s. 10.
69 Green Paper on Abuse Maitet Por. Cm. 2100 (1992).
° Although private actions are not prohibited, damage is limited. Cf Protection of Ttding Interests Act
1980, S. 5.
' The Sherman Act 1890, and The Clayton Act 1914.15 USC 15. The latter has specific pmvisions and the
former - basically a criminal statute - employs a broad wording
72 The Rcbinson-Patman Antidiscnmination Act 1936 and the Hart-Sa)tt-Rodino Antitnist hnprovements
Act 1976 amended the Clayton Act
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brought substantive improvements, 73 and other supplements provide for exemptions or
reduce restrictions. 74 In order to fliffil the policies behind the law, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) was created and given authority 75 to policy anticompetitive practices,
enjoying the power to deliver interpretative rules, and state general policies concerning unfair
or deceptive practices affecting commerce.
In broad terms, the legal framework prohibits practices in restraint of trade, involving
actions of a single person or group of persons possessing monopoly power, and consisting in
price fixing or market division, combination or conspiracy to monopolise and attempts to
monopolise, and price discrimination in sales of goods. It also makes tying arrangements
unlawful as well as take-overs and mergers having anti-competitive effects. The impacts of
these prohibitions on trade are pervasive, and their effectiveness is to rely on public and
private enforcement.76
As far as recent legal developments77 are concerned, three events merit consideration: the
statutoly provisions on joint research, the Department of Justice's Guidelines, and the
statutory limitation on the patent misuse doctrine.
The National Co-operative Research Act
The Wilson Tariff Act 1894 makes illegal combinations and contracts involving importers into the United
States. The Federal Trade Commission Act 1914 created the body of the same name and provided for unfair
methods of competition.
The Webb-Pomerene Act 1918 exempts from the Sherman Act export business from the USA with no
domestic competitive harm. And sector exemptions are made by the McCarmn-Ferrugson Act 1945 and the
Newspaper Preservation Act 1970. The Export Trading Company Act 1982 was passed to increase US exports
by reducing restrictions on trade financing and provides for clearer regulation concerning antitrust application.
" J3esicies the inundate conferred by the Federa] Trade Commission Act 1914, the FTC was given additional
power as a result of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment Act 1938 and the Magnuson-Moss Act 1975. The
Department of Justice and Stale Auorney-Generals also are made antitrust authoritie&
76 number of private litigalions, i.e., suits brought to US courts by private firms or individuals is ten
times higher than the number of claims presented by public agencies See Janet D. Steiger, Effectively
Enfoiting Competition La: Some Aspects of the US Experience, p. 1 at 25, in "EC and US Competition
Law and Policy", Fordham University School of Law, 1992.
' Other relevant legal measures inch& the Local Government Antitrust Act (Pub. L. No. 98-544), which
relieves antitrust officials from onerous financial penalties. and the deregulalion of the passenger airline
industiy. The deregulation is a result of the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984 and implementation of
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, and yet of the Surface Freight Forwarder Deregulation Act (Pub. L. No.
99-521). See OECD, Competition Policy in OECD Countries 1984-85 Report; p. 20112; 1986-87 Report; p.
237/8. Another development is as to antitrust violations; the fine and sentencing systems was improved under
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Idem, 1987-88 Report. p. 238; 1989-90 Report. p. 27617.
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The fear that joint research could hamper antitrust laws led the American Congress in 1984 to
pass new legislation78 designed to limit the potential damage posed by co-operative research
and development to competition. This limitation is made effective by means of excluding from
the concept of "joint research and development ventures" some activities which would
amount to illegally anticompetitive practices. The effect of the Act in practice is a matter of
fact, whose assessment judicially follows the "rule of reason" test. The mandatory application
of such a judicial standard introduced into the legislation confers on it a flexible character.
This element, as opposed to strict legal formality, also gives great discretion to the
competition authorities.
The Act requires the involved parties to give information about the establishment of a joint-
research deal. General details of the co-operation agreement are disclosed to the public. The
interested parties have prior access to the content of the publication which is made under the
initiative of concerned authorities,79 who take appropriate actions in order to discourage the
agreement, or do not take any measures under their discretion. Although the publication may
confer a degree of transparency on the operation, the fact of that discretionary power being
immune from judicial review confers on the monitoring bodies a considerable role in assessing
and protecting public interest.
The Department of Justice's Guidelines
Considerably important for the legal development have been those Guidelines 80 issued by the
Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice, covering vertical restraints, antitrust
enforcement regarding international operations, and horizontal mergers. They form a
framework designed to strengthen logical steps for the analysis of antitrust-related facts. For
instance, the 1992 version of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, released jointly with the
78 The National Co-operative Research Act (Pu,. L. No. 98-462), 1984.
79 Tlie competition authorities are the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission [Sec. 6(a)J
80 Some guidelines issued by the Antitrust Di'ision of the US Department of Justice include the Guideline
Concerning Vertical Restraints, the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (the 1988's
is currently being re'ised), and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (versions 1968, 1982, 1984, and 1992), the
latest version being issued jointly by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. See OECD,
Competition Policy in OECD Countries 1985-86 Report. p. 221; 1986-87 Report, p. 238; 1987-88 Report, p.
238; 1988-89 Report, p. 269/70; [19931 61(2) AntitrustL. J. 505.
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Federal Trade Commission, set up standards of concentration designed to evaluate the post-
merger effects. The scheme takes into account three degrees 8 ' of concentration, and is based
on the principle that anticompetitive behaviour is likely to occur as concentration increases
beyond a safe zone.
As far as intellectual property licensing arrangements are concerned, a four-step analysis82
applied by the Department of Justice has today abandoned the presumption that intellectual
property rights create monopolies, so conilicting with antitrust laws, as was thought in the
past. Unless the arrangement is a sham, a test of procompetitive benefit is carried out in order
to establish whether a relevant anticompetitive risk presented by a restriction (tie-ins, package
licences and such like) could be off-set.
Statutory restriction on patent misuse doctrine
According to the judicial doctrine of patent misuse, the court may refuse to enforce a patent if
in the course of an infringement the owner is engaged in any business practice or conduct
considered a "misuse" of the patent to the extent that the mischief violates the anti-trust law
or in any way is contrary to public interest. 83 In the past, if the claimant alleged an existing
misuse (e.g., tied purchasing of goods) he was not required to prove that the patentee was a
dominant firm. However, as a result of the 1988 Amendments to the Patent Law, 84 the
misuse patent standard does not apply, unless the patent owner has power in the relevant
market, which is assessed in the light of all circumstances. The misuse standard, nevertheIess
is established as a means of defence in patent infringement suits. The Act goes further, making
81 Assessed under an ec*:monuc index (HI-il), concentration is classified as (a) HHI below 1000 points, a "safe
harbour" w1e an increase in concentration raises no competitive concern; (b) HHI between 1000 to 1800,
moderated concentration where a 100- point increase requires attention; and (c) HHI above 1800, high
concentration where a raise of more than 50 points potentially represents a significant concern, and increase
superior to 100 points bnngs room for a preswnptlon of anticompelitive effeets. See item 1.51 - General
Standards ci the Guidelines.
82 Theses steps inqwiy into (1) the conditions of the technology licensing maiicet, (2) other maiiiets, (3) the
harm, if any, cia vertical restraint, and (4) if an anticompetitive risk is present, how an offsetting efficiency
benefit can be held. According to particular circumstances, some steps may be found unnecessary. See the 1988
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, pages 22-29.
United States Gvpswn Co. v. National Gypsum Co. [19571 352 US 457,465.
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 1988, Pub. L No.100-703,35 U.S.C. 271(d).
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it unlawful to use, sell., or import products manufactured by patented processes involving
infringement of patent.
The legal restriction on the misuse doctrine seems to assuage the formalism of old US court
decisions which did not require a violation of antitrust law. This is a point of contrast with the
formalistic approach taken by the European Court of Justice much criticised 85 in analysing
agreements under Article 85(1).
(vii) The European Union
The experience of the European Community in competition law is singular in that it pursues
the expansion of a single market, which is the essential goal of the Treaty of Rome. The
uneven economic conditions and imbalance market structure encountered in the member-
States posed the most crucial challenge for the implementation of the ground rules87
governing competition. Such implementation did not come out until a two-decade period
elapsed from the time the Treaty came into being. At that time, the original member-States88
did not even have a filly-developed legislation on competition. At the Community level,
legal developments were speeded up only in the I 970s.
The development of the Community competition law is the result of a convergence of
events. Firstly, there has been influence from outside the Community. Secondly, new
85 See Konih, EEC Competition Polic y - Legal Form or Econonuc Efficiency. [19861 39 CL.?. 85; and the
Advocate-General opinion in Consten and Grundg v Commission, [19661 ECR 299, at 358, 370. 376, 377.
In general. in less developed economies, the Government is reluctant to a certain extent to adopt and
enforce sound competition legislation and policies. A dommant view shared by Government and industiy is
that some degree of concentration is regarded as beneficial to industries in a developing stage. Due to cultural
background, in the short or medium term zx significant response to any legislation towards a free competition-
based market can be expected.
Treaty of Rome of 1957, Articles 85 and 86. The European Coal and Steel Community Treaty of 1952 also
provided for control of restrictive practices and mergers, Articles 65 and 66.
France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg These coimmes were also
members to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).
89 As Gaspaii points out, the Treaty of Rome does not cover the control of concentration. The reason is that
when the Treaty was drafted there was no experience in this respect, nor the law of member countries
developed. OECD, Twenty Five Years of Competition Policy: Achievements and Challenges, p. 10, Paris.
1987.
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members have entered. The outside influence originated from the OECD, 9° which has played
a significant role in the legislative improvement since it was installed 9 ' One contribution with
major impact was the Organizations Recommendation issued in 1979,92 which made several
members review their legislation. As to the entry of new members to the Community in
l973, it increased the prospect of conflicting interests in competition. These additional
elements urged the implementation of the relevant rules of the Treaty of Rome. The response
to these challenges required not only appropriate regulation to cope with the new competitive
environment, but also to build up a strong Community competitively equipped to face the
existing industrial structure over the Community's territory.
To a certain extent, the EC law forms a suprastate order with which the Union's Members
are bound to comply. The Treaty prohibits quantitative restrictions on the free movement of
goods, and makes provision for the control of anticompetitive agreements. 94
 Individual
clearance and block exemptions, however, may apply. Intellectual property tights may be
limited if their use is in disagreement with those provisions. There are also a number of
secondary regulations95 , some of them with direct effect in the field of intellectual property.
As to patent licensing agreements, the main objectives of the block exemption regulation
was to strike "at removing the need for individual notification and exemption for most patent
licences and to provide a method for obtaining a quick reaction from the Commission in
borderline cases."97 These aims have been successfully achieved. 98
 Another development was
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which came into being in 1961 and
repheed the Organiition for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) established in 1948. The OECD was
found by those original OEEC members plus Canada and United States of Amenca. Later Fin1and Japan, New
Zealand and Australia also became members.
Since it was set up in 1961, the OECD Conunittee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices has
contributed to strengthening competition policy and legislation among its members. OECD, Twenty Five
Years of Compelition Policy: Achievements and Challenges, p.10.
The 1979 OECD Council Recommendation. Virtually every OECD countiy, including EC members, in
some way reviewed its competition legislation after the Recommendation. OECD, Competition Policy in
OECD Countries 1984-85 Report, p. 125.
93 0n 1 Januaiy 1973, the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark became full EC members.
The Treaty of Rome, Articles 30, 34, 36,85 aM 86.
See "Butterworths Competition Law Handbook", third edition, edited by (3 Lindrup, 1993.
' Commission Regulation 1983/83 (exclusive distribution agreements); Regulation 2349/84 (patent
liceusmg); Regulation 556/89 (know-how licensing agreements).
97ldem.
OECD 1985-86 Report, p. 253. As a result of the regulation, the number of notifications of patent licences
redixed from 100 in average to a dozen in 1985.
240
in know-how licensing agreement The Commission recognised the procompetitive effects of
these agreements, to the extent that they may promote the dissemination of know-how
throughout the Commumty, so as to increase the competitiveness of the industry in EC
territory Concerns, however, have been raised owing to the nature of unpatented know-how.
As it was pointed out, know-how licensing without appropriate regulations could easily
lead to abusive practices against competitive rules. Moreover, "the fact that the confidentiality
between partners in a know-how transfer relationship does not enjoy the degree of legal
protection as patents." The Commission showed concern and recommended a control
similar to that of the patent.
Joint ventures have become another concern. The Commission found that a competitive
environment requires both great flexibility to facilitate co-operation between firms, and
permanent adjustment to structural changes. Joint ventures fit these objectives. They have
been a favourable form of co-operation among industry in Europe. However, not being
necessarily a cartel nor a merger, joint ventures could possibly either lead to a cartel without
being caught by competition rules, or be subject to rigid rules and thus impair legitimate
creative businesses.'00
 Amongst the positive effects, the promotion of innovation and transfer
of technology, as well as the strengthening of the competitive position of small and medium
sized firms are included. Nevertheless, joint ventures can have anticompetitive effects in
circumstances leading "to market sharing, raising of barriers to entry, and the intensification of
market power."°'
The evolution of competition law and policy is a world-wide phenomenon. All countries
under the OECD umbrella have improved their legislation or enacted new laws over the last
four decades. To a certain degree, this move has inevitably influenced other countries,
developing ones, which, nevertheless, are not prepared to face the cost of regulating the
Ob. cit, p. 253.
' A OECD report on tie matter says: "In the absence of adequate legal standards for assessing joint
ventures there is a possibility that they ll either espe antitnist review altogether or, at the other extreme, be
subjected to excessively rigd tests which stifle ziew creative and desirable business activities." OECD,
Competition Policy and Joint Ventures. p. 93. 1986.
'°' OECD 1985-86 Report, p.2545.
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competitive process, or have no political determination to implement their laws. They are at
the same stage that the majority of the industrialised countries were before the Second World
War. This disagreement in policy, i.e., each country having its own competition policy and
others in practical terms having no policy at all, suggests a source of conflict in the field of
trade and technical exchange which has become increasingly international.
In addition to the evolution of competition law and policy, in those systems really
committed to the implementation of the legislation, principles have been developed or
construed; these benchmark rules reflect modern thought, and are forged to accommodate
local and regional interests. These legal and judicial principles form the basis of modem
competition law, regulates the competitive process and inevitably guide, affect and limit the
exercise of intellectual property rights.
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6.3 The role of modern competition thouahts and concepts
6.3.1 Regulatory and judicial principles
(1) Competition goals
States have the right to adopt appropriate measures in order to promote technological
innovation and disseminate technology for social and economic welfare. This general
assertion forms the basic of a competition policy, which is designed to safeguard public
interest by controlling monopolies and anti-competitive practices relating to inter a/ia the
exercise of intellectual property.' As a statement this is of little assistance for the
development of intellectual property order and the regulation of the competitive process.
Transparency and practical operation of objectives require specific and clear rules. This is
fundamentally what a country should consider. A first step in this direction is to establish the
regulatory goals of the competitive process that a country is determined to pursue.
In a strict sense, competition primarily strikes a balance of allocative and productive
efficiencies. However, more than these there are interests worth protecting. The "Chicago
School" states that:
A society in which a/locative efficiency, or welfare, is maximized is better than one in which ills not; or
alternatively, more welfare is better than less;
Policvmakers are capable ofcreating and implementing a policy ofmaximizing total social wealth without
regard to the way in which wealth is distributed;
Policy concerns about wealth distribution, on the other hana' reflect purely political conflicts between
interest groups and cannot be justified in any rigorous, scientific
manner;
Efficiency goals and distributional goth or, alternatively, efficiency effects and distributional effects can
be segregatedfrom each other.2
These statements underlie the theory of regulation of the competitive process, but they
cannot be taken for granted. The only and simple assumption aiising from them undoubtedly
is that the regulatory mechanism can be designed to improve efficiency and welfare. The
'See Aiticles 7,8,31 and 40 of the Agreement on TRIPS.
2 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, [1985-86J 84 Michigan L. It 213 at 245.
244
capability of policymakers to maximise total social welfare with no regard to the way wealth
distribution is made has never been proved in practice. Moreover, to rely on distributional
effects by only pursuing efficiency goals would be an ideal for a society where all members
have the same capacity to consume, and all firms have similar capacity to produce, but in
reality some members or firms have less capacity than others, and yet others members have
no capacity at all Hlstoiy shows that the law, while harmonising conflictual interests, has
consistently varied according to these circumstances and pursue distnbutional goals which
may or may not meet efficiency criteria. This is universal. The regulation of the competitive
process and, connected with this, the intellectuaJ property order reflect such a background.
It is thus inherent in the nature of the regulation of the competitive process that welfare
concerns go beyond efficiency3 effects. Welfare is primarily concerned with criteria of wealth
distribution, and may include inter alia increase of employment, promotion of small business,
and (equal) access to the benefits brought up by technical improvements.4
 The choices made
by the appropriate body represent a matter of public policy committed to wide social
objectives
The goals of competition legislation may be to pursue discouragement of aggregation of
capital, protection of small and local business against powerful rivals, efficient gains or
"consumer welfare description". 5 This is drawn from statements of the US Supreme Court
whose policy is briefly summarised in terms of "efficient allocation of resources and the
maximisation of consumer welfare."6
"Efficiency" in itself may be conceived in different ways. A concept is formulated by Eleanor Fox "in terms
of serving consumers' long-run interests and implemented by protecting the competition process", and
intending to harmonize efficiency and non-efficiency goals, so as to suit the modern antitrust policy. Eleanor M
Fo; The Modernization of Anlitnist: A New Equilibrium, [1981J 66 Cornell L. It 1140.
The narrow concept claimed by the so called "Chicago School" for economic e1fare limits competition
"effes on prices and consumer choice." But it seems highly unlikely that such a guidance much influences
worldwide competition law. See Herbert Hovenkainp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 11985-85184 Michigan
L. It 213; and a statement of Prof Eleanor Fox igiinct the syndrome of economic efficiency says that "on
whole the cowls are slow in accepting the Chicago School's belief in the self-sufficiency of the market forces."
Quoted by Louis A. Schapiro, in "Great Expectations for Intellectual Property Licensing under the Future DOJ
Antitrust Guidelines for International Operafions," 1987 Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Chapter 3, p 45 at
54.
Cf United States v Aluminum Co. of America 119641 377 US 271; Browo Shoe Co. v United States
[19621 370 US 294; Continental T.V. Inc. v GTE Sylvania Inc. [1977] 433 US 36; Reiter v Sonctone Corp
[19791 442 US 330.
6 Department of Justice's Guidelines for International Operations, 1988.
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The large range of goals include policies such as economic balance, regional and industrial
development, economic adaptability, public security, utilisation of society/s resources, wealth
and environmental protection, incentive to innovation, consumer well being, and export
expansion. The problematic meaning of these terms encountered in a variety of legislation7
discourages any rational classification.
Although of little practical importance from the point of view of judicial construction, the
value of stated goals cannot be overlooked. As an ideal normative, they provide a competition
rationale which does not segregate welfare from efficiency. Indeed, competition laws
substantiate a purpose that is not only to deliver freedom of trade from unreasonable restraint,
but also and ultimately to entail a sense of determination and political justification of public
policies8
 underlying the intellectual property bargain, it is a major challenge to fonnulate the
regulatory principles in such a way as to harrnomse the interests concerned.
(ii) Principles of prohibitions and abuse control
There has been an attempt to group the format of competition laws into two broad
categories: one is based on the prohibition principle, and, in contrast, the other is based on the
abuse control principle. In terms of systematisation, these are only methods to organise the
legislation and, to a certain extent, may affect the way the law is implemented. They may also
express the attitude of policymakers, i.e., rendering more or less severe treatment, towards
monopolies and cartels.
In essence, however, these principles at some point may show a logical approximation. This
requires an explanation. A legal framework of competition contains substantive provisions
which describe pattern of wrong conducts. In defining the scope of these provisions, the
method of the prohibition system suggests a scheme of the kind - every restraint is prohibited
(declared illegal). According to the system of abuse control, rules are formulated in a fashion
giving effect to the statement - everything declared illegal is under control to the extent that it
"See the Australian, Canadian and European (e g, Fiench, Danish, Irish and Norwegian laws) jslatjon
on compeuton.
The Preamble of the Agreement on TRIPS recogmzes "the underlying public policy objectives of national
systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and techmlogical objectives."
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means an abusive practice. Exceptions apply to both systems, and what is ultimately wrong
depends on legal interpretation and how further investigation is required by the interpreter.
Although having different denominations, both systems are similar. The difference between
each other may be only a matter of form.
In practical terms, there is no pure legal system of automatic prohibitions There are always
exceptions. Nor can one say which system, whether abuse control or prohibitions, is the best
to fit the needs of a particular country. What actually does matter is how satisfactory a
regime, whatever its format might look like, works. The law operates as a process which
needs to be fuelled continuously. Thus there is no finished legal system.
To make a business conduct automatically unlawful, i.e., without further investigation to be
canied out by the authority concerned, may not facilitate enforcement. Looking at the US
approach, the legislation on anti-cartel and monopoly is typically a "prohibition" one.9
However, it does not seem con-ect to associate the prohibition approach with the strong
reputation of American antitrust law. The 1914 reform carried out by the US Congress and
subsequent amendments, and the development of case-law, prove rigid rules to be less than
the most effective ones to implement a competition policy. The effectiveness of the system is
a complex matter which should not rely only on a particular format of the legislation. The
historical evolution of competition legislation proved it.
Before the I 970s, many OECD countries had passed some sort of competition legislation,
but regardless of the appearance of the laws, i.e., whether in the form of prohibition or abuse
control, excepting the USA, they failed to enforce their legislation satisfactorily. To explain
this failure is outside of the scope of this dissertation, but at least one may assume that there
must be some benefit to a country, like Germany and Japan in the past, to adopt a
monopolistic policy. The general observation points to a lack of political determination as the
most obvious reason for that failure. It follows that a theoretical reference may be of some
assistance for the analysis and formulation of a legal framework on competition, and such a
reference may relate to the stage and features of the market structure of a particular country,
SeeGreenPaper,tableatp. 31, Cm. 2100(1992)
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i.e., at some stage of a countiys development a legal system of automatic prohibitions may be
found inappropriate 10 Ths, again, is a matter of perception and political determination.
These principles give no guarantee of working effectively in practice. With regard to the
nature of the competitive process and the political discretion surrounding its regulation, one
could suggest that the combination of the two may render better results.
Bearing in mind the variation in the way legal provisions are formulated, in that their
features are exchangeable and their formats indistinguishable, one may find it more
interesting not to define the principles, but say what they are and what they are not in respect
to enforcement, types of deterrents, level of statutory specificity and merger control.
A prohibition-based system in particular may provide for a general prohibition, or a ban on
specific conducts. But an illustrative list of practices liable to violate the law may be adopted
under any of the systems, and applied to the whole domestic market or part of it. A binding
statutory list may be a considerable choice, but guidance notes, albeit precarious, may work
as well. The way the lists are organised, whether indicating practices likely to be lawful
(general permissions) or unlawful (general prohibitions), may be governed only by arbitrary
options, in the form of exemptions or safe-ways, and they follow no rigid or scientific criteria.
None of the principles in particular can be associated as having more effective deterrents, or
favouring most an efficient enforcement. An aspect which prohibition system may stress is a
separate or independent body having quasi-judicial duties and invested with power to
investigate infringements. Nothing suggests, however, that this cannot also be found in abuse
control oriented systems. Deterrents as well, such as fines, relief for injured or threatened
parties, divestment and price control, can also be accommodated in both systems. Whether
financial penalties are extended to past conducts is not, once more, a feature incompatible
with a regime drafted in the abuse control fashion.
Abuse control is not to be taken as designed to fit necessarily a small country. A
competition philosophy linking a flexible approach with abuse control has recommended this
10 The UK policy has been one of abuse control. Only now Government authorities are contemplating
moving towards a prohibition system m line th tbe EC design.
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system as the most suitable one for small countries, such as Greece and Denmark, which are
also supposed to need no merger control. The reason given is that in those countries a high
concentration is needed to foster international competitiveness, and would not necessarily
lessen competition." Nevertheless, two points have to be made. Firstly, the Irish Competition
system, relying on abuse control, has merger control, and Belgium, as well as other small EC-
countiies, has adopted a prohibition system and introduced merger control. Secondly, those
European countries under the EC-umbrella are governed by Community Law anyway, which
to a certain extent fills the lack of domestic regulation. In such instances, it would be incorrect
to regard the size of country or market and the lack of merger control as being features
particular to the abuse control system.' 2 The best results depend on the political
determination and the management of the system, whatever the format of that system.
(iii) The guideline approach
Enforcement planning
As far as the administration of the control system of the competitive process is concerned,
resorting to guidelines is also a point worth considering. Because of lack of coercion,
guidelines are not binding rules. They bear, however, a considerable value as to the
development of law, and the
transparent administrative enforcement. While reflecting an enforcement policy, guidelines
state categones and rules, and design legal tests vith a view to instructing business circles,
and advancing an interpretative model that judges may follow.'3
As an instrument of enforcement policy, the Guidelines state an attitude of the
administration towards targeted legal situations. The duties of authorities are made less
"See Kurt Stockmann, Trends and Developments in European Antilmst Laws 1987 Fordhani Corporate
Law Institute, Chapter 18. p.441 at 457, 459.
I 2 If one locks at the firm's size as a function of market dimension, one has to consider the firm's response
to the demand sithin overall opportunities in the open maitet. The range of opportunities may go beyond the
counWs boundaries, and then neither the national temtoly nor the dimension of the domestic market may be a
valid reference to answer how large a firm should be suitable for competition.
' See Steven A Nenbom & Virginia L Snider, The Growing Judicial Acceptance of the Merger Guidelines,
[1992160 Antitrust Law Journal 849.
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burdensome by the application of the principle of efficient means (l'économie des moyens),
which requires the enforcement body to let the interested people know when it is prepared to
act. By applying a more efficient way, the authority is required to pursue a balance of gains
and costs. In this respect, guidance specifications normally limit the discretion of the
incumbent body, allow it to organise a sensible training programme and claim adequate levels
of finding support, as well as enable staff to undertake realistic and co-ordinated
enforcement activities.
It is uncertain how much the guideline approach contributes to a planned enforcement,
since planning is not an immediate legal concern. As a theoretical element, however, the
planning arguments put forward a demand to organise enforcing activities as a requirement
for more effective enforcement as well as to rationalise the competition bodys performance.
In establishing priorities or alternatives, deciding what to challenge, and what to leave for
further analysis, the authority is urged to set up a pattern of operation which reflects a
problem-solving activity, and avoids unnecessary interference in the market forces.
One may argue that planning is not exclusive to the guideline approach. That is true. What
seems appropriate to point out is that such an approach arises in the context of a an activism
of the competition body which is supposed to apply work methods very distinct from those
normally applied by judicial bodies. In order to perform its duty efficiently, the competition
authority, while keeping its independence, has close or proper connections with other
government agencies, business circle, consumer associations, international bodies, and with
the media for public information and education. Such an interface requires responsive actions
taken within a planned background. The ability of the competition agency to act efficiently
has to envisage an improved role of government bureaucracy.' 4 This ultimately reflects
positively on the expectations created by the business circle.
Instructive role
' 4 A desired new face is contrasted with that image the members of the public normally have of government
bureaucracy as a nwsm and negligent
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As far as private businesses are concerned, the guidelines have an instructive role. They help
businessmen and trade associations to comply with the relevant legislation. That may
encourage traders to engage in non-risk activities, deter commercial adventures, and may
create a strong expectation of being on the lawful track, so as to avoid fines, high-costly
litigation, and the risk of having an agreement declared invalid.'5
An interpretation advanced by guidelines is primarily of assistance for the issuing body.
They may clariIj obscure points of vague provisions, or establish conditions where strict rules
do apply or do not, undoing inappropriate restrictions and promoting discussions of
competition matters among professionals and members of academia. The interpretation
intends to meet a demand for complex choices statutorily allowed and which may be observed
by courts. In this way, guidelines not only facilitate counselling but also may be used as a
catalyst and channel to address practical thoughts brought by representative of interested
groups. This leads to transparency.
Transparency
Another point to note is that the guideline approach avoids enforcement practices based on
unguided or informal standards (known only among officials) drawn from unwntten
experience. Learning from past situations may be valuable as far as it helps to establish
paradigms which may serve as a basis for future and infonned decisions. However, without
institutionalised guidelines, unwritten cr,tena remain confined to the knowledge of a few
officials who may keep valuable data not shared by their superiors.' 6 Key infonnation on a
particular market or a whole industiy sector and regulated practices run, as indicators of
performance, may be important to identifr the anti-competitive exercise of intellectual
property rights, so as guidelines may have an impact on policy and choice of legal strategy. It
is fundamental sometimes to have guided criteria about the production and management of
' For the importance of compliance programmes, soc David H Marks, "Setlmg up an Anti-tmst
Compliance Programme"; and Clive Standbrook & John BaIliff, "EEC Anti-tnist Audit", both in [19881 ECLR
88 and 334.
16 is referred by Daniel Gifford as one typicul occurrence in Police Office. "Discreiionaiy
Decisionmking m Regulatory Agencies: A Conceptual Framework", in Malang Regulatoiy Policy. p.233 at
253-4, K Hawkins & J Thomas (eL), Univ of Pittsburgh Press, 1989.
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relevance data, because as a result of data being ill-treated or not disseminated properly, the
regulatoty body may face the risks of taking decisions and adjustments on the basis of limited
information.
The discussion about the function of guidelines has been to focus on their merit as an
element in the control of the competitive process and with this the implications to the
intellectual property order. As practical methods put in place for the pursuit of efficiency and
welfare goals, guidelines may change at times to focus on structural elements or to implement
a new policy. Ths sense of flexibility is a feature which suits modern competition law and
policy, that is, a competitive process which keeps working in pursuit of its goals.
(iv) Workable competition and the useful effect principles
There is a political element in the question of how much society at large is prepared to pursue
efficiency and enforce competition. The concern requires a degree of consensus about
affordable costs at which it is believed that public welfare will be improved, and a level of
creative innovation will be sustained or increased.
Whatever the degree of competition the countly is prepared to pursue, there might be a
presumption that such a degree ensured by the competition system is what society at large
deserves.
Although the perception of the political will at times may be unclear, 17 what benefits society
most depends on the judgement, accurate or not, made by the institutional bodies or the
government of the day about the role of a competition policy.' 8 The political inspiration,
Between 1971 and 1986, Canada experienced long debates on legislative initiatives: Bill C-256 (1971),
Bill C-227 (1973), Bill C-42 (1977), Bill C-13 (1977), Bill C-29 (1984), and Bill C-91 which rendered the
Competition Act 1986. During that period there had been fleite disagreements on the antflrust model which
'vu1d best soit the cowitzs interests. The Canadian legislative sage is also illustrative of the political sense of
workable competition. For accounts on the historical perspective of the Canadian La, see J William Rowley,
The New Cniiin Antitrust Laws - Reflecti from the Private Sector, Chapter 9 of the 1987 Corporate Law
Institute, p. 157.
' 8 0n the occasion the Brazilian Minister of Justice addressed the Bill No. 3.712 (1993) on the reform of the
Bri1um competition law, he stated that the draft legislation wss based on the "presumption that in a chiinging
world, and particularly for the so-called developing countries a legislation to safeguard the competitive process
is i per a fimdamentat mstniment for the efficient and just working of the market xioiny." Explanatoiy
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inherently cyclical,' 9 in some way intends or pretends to follow fashionable economic
thoughts which may not gather consensus. This initial remark illustrates the sensitive issue
behind the economic and formal senses of the principle of workable competition.
The debate about competition and its function on economic perfonnance brings two broad
theoretical arguments into consideration. 2° The first is that under conditions of perfect
competition consumers are better off They are supplied with the zight quantity of goods and
services they need at a price they are prepared to pay. It is believed that the output level of
goods and selMces necessary to meet demand and supply is produced by utilising the least
number of inputs and at the lowest possible cost. As a result of perfect competition, not only
the overall society's wealth is maximised and the price of goods and services is the lowest
possible, but also profit is limited to a marginal level. Diametrically, under pure monopoly
firms are free from competitive pressures and thus have no incentive to reduce costs nor to
make the best use of resources. They have the capacity to set high prices, control output and
pursue above normal profits. These two static models, perfect competition and pure
monopoly, are unrealistic. In practice, the market is rather dynamic. But the larger the number
of competitors, the more efficient and competitive the firms tend to be. Conversely, the fewer
the number of competitors, the more firms tend to monopolisation.
If perfect competition is an unrealistic model never encountered in practical terms, it should
be still be discussed whether rigid efllciency should be a desirable policy. It is argued that less
than perfect efficiency is, to a certain extent, acceptable and even beneficial to society,
although a more competitive market is better than a less competitive one. The question now
is which competitive configuration is practicably workable from which a beneficial effect on
finns' conduct and performance is worth saving.
With criticisms, analysts have discussed a range of elements (minimal requirements) forming
a workable competition. These criteria are grouped in three categories:
statennt No. 184 (24/4/93) of the Ministry of Justice, accunpanying the Message No. 2 13/93 from the
Executive branch.
19 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitnist Policy After Chicago, [1985-86J 84 MichiganL. it 213.
20 See Chapter 2 (subsection 2.3).
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• structural (e.g., a minimal number of traders, and no artificial inhibition on firms' mobility
and entry),
• behavioural (maintenance of some freedom to rivals as top
	 initiative and pursuance of
independent goals, and no inefficient suppliers to be shielded permanently), and
• peifonnance (e.g., pricing policy not to intensify cyclical instability, and some oppoi-tunity
for introduction of technically superior products).2'
Criticism of these criteria focus on the difficulties of formulating norms in advance which
tell "how much competition is needed to achieve desirable economic performance." To
make competition workable, not necessarily perfect, has become a policy based on an
exercise of balancing detrimental and beneficial effects. In this respect, competition
restrictions are carned out in circumstances which thvour social objectives and outweigh the
adverse effects arising from the mischief.
The assumption behind the workable competition principle is that the competitive process
does not pursue efficiency for the sake of efficiency, nor that perfect competition is the
ultimate goal, but provided that a reasonable degree of competition is saved, a restraint
potentially adverse to competition may be allowed on beneficial grounds. Three basic
conditions are required:
the existence of a benefit resulting from an improvement of production or distrilution, or promotion of
technical or economic progress;
• the restriction should be indispensable for the objectives pursued by the related agreement or concerted
practice; and
• the restriction eliminates no substantial part of competition in the market concerne*i23
The principle has been employed by competition authorities with the function to uphold
crisis cartels and restnlcturmg agreements "whereby firms in industries suffering from
recession or depression attempt to shield themselves for a period of time from the full rigours
of the competitive process." 24 In these agreements, for reasons such as recession and over-
capacity, finns agree to reduce their production to specified amounts by fixing production
quotas. As a consequence, prices are likely to be increased artificially.
21 See Sosnids Scheme of Workable Competition in Scherer & Rnss Industrial Market Stnicture and
Economic Peribimance, p. 53/54.
22 Idem, idem
See Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome. RT.PA s. 29.
24 Richard Whish, th. cit, p. 229.
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The problem of overcapacity, sometimes resulting from technical advancement, is that a
demand trend falls behind the level of production, and in the long term it becomes
economically unsustainable in terms of efficiency and cost. An adjustment is thus needed,
which is operated by market forces at a level of individual judgement. When these forces fail
to make such an adjustment, the Commission is prepared to allow manufacturers to take the
necessary steps collectively, pursuing a planned rationalisation of the production.25
Nevertheless, in other cases the Commission has denied exemption under the consideration
that the restrictive provisions were either incompatible with the objectives pursued, or
inflicted an unnecessary or yet excessive burden on the competitors.26
In the Metro case, the Court of Justice of the European Community made direct
reference to the principle of workable competition. Examining the effect of a "selective
distribution systems", the Court stated:
The requirement contained in Articles 3 and 85 of the EEC Treaty that competition shall not be distorted
implies the existence on the market ofworkable competition, that is to say the degree of competition necessaiy
to ensure the observance of the basic requirements and the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, in
particular the creation of a single market achieving conchtions similar to those of a domestic market In
accordance with this requirement the nature and intensiveness of competition may var y to an extent dictated
by the products or services in question and the economic structure ofthe relevant market.
The Court ruled that a selective system of distribution aimed at providing retail trade
supplies does not infringe Article 85(1) of the Treaty, provided that the selection of re-sellers
is made taking into account qualitative criteiia relating to technical qualifications and
suitability of trading premises. In regard to its discretion, the Court was satisfied that the
uniform application of these conditions met the Treaty, which was interpreted in the light of
the useflul effect doctiine?
See inter a/ia Re Slichting Baksteen. Case JV/34.456, [199314 C.M.L.R. 385; Re Emchem SpA and Id,
Case 1V131.846, [1989] 4 CML.R.. 54; Re A Synthe1i Fibres Agreement [19851 1 C.M.LR. 787; Re LC.L
and B.P. Chemicals [198512 C.MLR. 330. For a similar question under UK legislation, see Re Distant Waler
Vessels Development Scheme [1966] 3 All ER. 897.
Bureau National Du Cognac v. Aubert 11988] 4 CML.R. 331; Re Rolled Zinc Produets 119831 2
CMLR. 285. A cimilr decision under UK legishthoii, see Re Yarn Spinners' Agreement [195911 All E.R
299.
27 Case 2W76, Metro v Commission [1977] II E.C.R.. 1875.
The Metro case, at 1876.
29 As a method of interpretation, the doctrine is briefly stated as follows: "the rules laid doii by an
international Treaty or a law presuppose the rules thout which that treaty or law uld have no meaning or
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In practical terms, the useful effect doctnne works as prescnptive advice to direct the
interpretation in a manner to uncover the policy behind the legislation. It is a judicial duty to
ensure the Treats useful effect, that is, to seek the achievement of the Treats policies or
objectives.30 Thus, the competitive impact of a trade restriction is interpreted accordmg to its
effects rather than its literal meaning. And this is particularly significant in ordering the
exercise of intellectual property tights.
(v) The existence/exercise of right divide
The distinction between the existence and exercise of intellectual property tights raises the
essential question of the inviolability of legal monopoly, which has a large dimension in the
context of the European Community. 3 ' The distinction was firstly established in the Consten
case.32 The exercise of an enforceable intellectual property right is not unlawful as far as the
holder does not expand his right beyond the boundaries of the legal grant. But when two or
several parties, regarding their position in a particular market, prevent or limit the competition
of one of the contracting parties or third parties by creating an unjustified advantage at the
expense of the consumer or user, then the restrictions go beyond the property right.
The Court went on to argue that the Commission Law does not interfere with the existence
of the national intellectual property tights. It may only operate against an agreement Ncapable
of constituting a threat, either direct or indirect, actual or potential, to freedom of trade
between Member States in a manner which might harm the attainment of the objectives of a
single market", as well as against improper exercise, so as to limit the tight "to the extent
necessaty to give effect to the prohibition under Article 85(1)."
could not be reasonably and usefully appliccL" Case No. 8/55 Fédérahon Charbonniere de BeIgiqie v High
Authoriy of the ECSC [19561 E.C.R. 245 at 299.
3° See Baastian van der Esch, The Principles of Interpretation Applied by the Court of Justice of the
European Communities and their Relevance for the Scope of the EEC Competition Ru1es 1991 Corporate Law
Institute Pmceedings Chapter 12, p. 223, Bany Hawk (cci), 1992.
In the anibit of the EU, the existence/exercise divide has been disoussed Mth respect to State-owned
industries, legal monopolies conferred on state bodies and other undertakings, and free movement ci goods.
See Deutrche Grammop4on GmbH v Metro [1971] 10 CML.R. 631; Case C-260/89, ERT v DIMOTIKI
[1991] ECRI-1915; CaseC-18/88 GB-JMfO-B1if [1991] ECRI-5941.
32 Consten & Gninthg v Commission [19661 E.C.R 299.
Loc. cit, p. 341 & 345.
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The ECJ has found the exercise of intellectual property rights in a manner contrmy to the free
movement of goods thin the Community to be illegal. This provision may be derogated to
the extent that the proper exercise of a patent right prevents an import from one member
State to another. However, this is not the case "where the product has been put onto the
market in a legal manner, by the patentee itself or with its consent, in the member State from
which it has been imported, in particular in case of a proprietor of parallel patents." The
principle has been affirmed in a variety of precedents, which instigated a doctrine of
exhaustion within the Community.35
Another aspect involving the exercise of intellectual property rights examined by the
Commission is in regard to agreements of minor importance. In this respect, a clause dealing
merely with royalties was found unable to affect inter-state trade. A minimum royalty clause
was found not to be offensive to Article 85(136 Adversely, clauses such as non-competition
and no-challenge ones have been repeatedly rejected as an unlawful exercise. 37 This is an
illegal case per se where little room is left for exception.38
Respect for the exclusive right conferred by intellectual property is a central issue
conceptually settled. The tension arising from that exclusivity in contrast with competition no
longer affects the subsistence of that right,39 which in the European Community is "without
prejudice to the application of the competition rules under Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty. ,,40
Case 15174 Centrafann BVv Sterling Drug Inc [197412 C.MLR. 4*) para. 11.
Tbo move in the international trade law is to deter exhaustion of intellectual property rights, but
confirming it in the boundaries of trading blocs. [See GAiT Agreement on TRIPS, Article 6] Such a move is
of significant distorting effect on rld trade, and is likely to impair a demand for open maitet, unless a
multilateral agreement on competition takes pla.
See Re Ramon&Co. [1972] 11 CMLR D45;AOlPvBeLward [197611 CMLRD14.
' See VeicroSA AphxSA [19891 4CMLR 157.
BayerAG v Sulihofer [199014 CMLR 182.
See Glen P Belvis, Coight & Tying Agreements: An Argument for the Abandonment of
tha Presumption of Market PirM, [19871 28 Boston College L. K 265; William Monlgomeiy, l'he
Presumption of Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, [1985] 85
ColumbiaL. K 1140.
4° Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs of 14 May 1991, recitals pam. 27
(91/250/EEC).
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In the "Magill case" 4
 the ECJ reaffirmed the principle of existence/exercise of right. Magill
TV Guide Ltd. ('Magill') had been prevented from publishing a comprehensive weekly list of
TV programmes (received by more than 30% of households in Ireland and Northern Ireland)
broadcast by RTE, ITV and BBC, which claimed copyright protection for their programme
listings. These television stations allowed daily and periodical newspapers to publish their
programme scheduleson basis of a freeof-charge licence and subject to conditions relating to
the format of the publication. However, there was no substitute for weekly magazine making
available in advance full information on TV programmes.
Confirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, the
Court of Justice of the European Communities ('ECJ') held, inter alia, that:
• although mere o.nership of an intellectual propeny right does not amount to a dominant position, third
parties such as Magill wishing to publish programme information were facing a situation of economic
dependence, and in this way the television stations, the only sources of such data were hindering the
emergence of an effective competition on the info,mation market;
• the refusal to provide programming infoimation relying on national copyright wauld lead to exclude
potential competitors from geographical market, thereby being capable of affecting commercial exchanges
between Ireland and the United Kingdom.42
Protection of copyright under national law is compatible with the European Union (EU') law.
The existence of domestic copyright and its exercising is not in itself an abuse. Nevertheless,
such a right cannot be exercised on a discriminatory basis, thus hampering free movement of
goods or services, or perverting mies governing competition. The ECJ accepted that the
copyright owners (appellants) had economic strength enough to put Magill in a situation of
unnecessary economic dependence. This suggests a flexibility in the assessment of a dominant
position (EEC Treaty, Article 86). Such a flexible approach was in effect applied to spare a
potential trade flow intra Community.
An implication from the Ma gill case is that limiting the exercise of copyright on
competition grounds does not amount to an unreasonable prejudice of the author's right.
Therefore, no conflict exists between this proposition and Article 9(2) of the Berne
" RTE and ITP v Comrni.sion (Jointed cases C-241/91 P and C-242191 P), as "Magill Case",
judgement of 6.4.1995. [1995] I E.C.R. 743.
42 Idem.
258
Convention. Although highly reasonable, this point was not specifically established by the
EQ.
A fundamental consideration in the ED ruling is that it legitimates a duty upon the owner
to exercise his right according to competition rules, thus confirming the assertion that
protection of intellectual property rights requires a proper control of anti-competitive
practices.
As far as the exercise of the right is concerned, the remaining question, crucial in a number
of cases, is essentially a matter of evidence. The standards namely per se rule and rule of
reason are only a manner of addressing such a matter.
(vi) Per se rule versus rule of reason
Originating from the US antitrust experience, the judicial standards per se rule and rule of
reason are directly associated with Section 1 of the Sherman Act which loosely makes every
trade restraint in contractual form, combination or conspiracy fflegal.4 Early on the
American Supreme Court sensed that the literal interpretation of the provision would make
the Act unworkable, because the essence of every agreement or regulation on trade is to
restrain those who have an obligation to comply with it. The Supreme Court, thus, asserted
that the Act, which did not derogate common law, would not condemn reasonable restraints,
otherwise it would destroy the entire freedom of trade doctrine extolled by common law,
"and the courts could not avail themselves in interpreting it [the Act]." 44 With disagreements,
the Court went on to read the statutory provision prohibiting every restraint of trade as
actually being every "unreasonable" restraint of trade, and pointed to the need to discern
between illegal contracts, combinations, and partnerships which by their effects stified
competition and raised prices, from those regarded useful for the development of trade that
the Act did not intend to outlaw. The US Congress made no such a distinction, since the Act
provides no concept of restraint.
° Section 1. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among several States, or with foreign natK)ns, is hereby declared to be illegal." (First part.)
'" For accounts on the interpretation of the Sherman Act and the early cases, see Letwin. (1967) 'Law and
Economic Policy in America", especially Chapter Five
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The next step was to establish the nature of the test of reasonableness. Under the rule of
reason, an agreement might fall outside the Act for their procompetitive effects assessed
within qualitative considerations. In this connection economic analysis is to play an
appreciable role in order to scrutinise the competitive effects. In another more simplistic test,
the reasonableness is assessed in a formalistic manner. Under the per se illegality rule, an
agreement is prima facie to violate the Act. The assessment is carried Out with disregard to
any beneficial effect the contract might have upon economic efficiency. The party only needs
to prove the existence of the agreement or restraint. Two points should now be made. Firstly,
there is no clear distinction between the situations to which the tests apply. The case-law has
shown that the presumption that a particular agreement, such as pnce-iixing and market-
sharing arrangements, is per se unlawful has at times been tempered by either developments in
economic analysis, or simply as a result of the court's experience.
A second point is that there has been an increasing number of cases where the application of
the rule of reason has prevailed, so the courts have rejected the mechanical application of the
formal test of per se violations of which many of them involve licensing in intellectual
property tights.45 The trend partly relies on the change of attitude towards intellectual
property, in the past normally regarded as leading to a monopoly situation. This old stance,
now being reviewed, created a direct conflict between intellectual property and antitrust
goals, and consequently restrictive licensing practice was always held per se anti-
competitive.
The change of perception concerning the connection between monopoly and intellectual
property led the US Department of Justice to advocate beneficial effects stemming from
patent and know-how licensing, mainly "when it is international in scope."47 In this regard,
what matters is an injuly effect on the US commerce, which could be interpreted as an injuiy
Charles Rule, USDJ Assistant Attorney General, traces the points of change over a 10-year period, from
the Continental TV. Inc. v GTE Sylvaia [19771 433 Us 36, to Matrushita Elect Indus Co. v Zenith Radio
Coip. 11986] 475 Us 574. "US Enforcement Policy and Jurisdiction", 1987 Fordham Corporate Law Institute,
Cbapterl,p. 1.
46 Idem.
' 'Whether the position of the Department of Justice claimed distinctive policy, one invcthring IPR-related
restrictions %ith international scope and other for domestic impact, one has no elements to affirm it. See details
in Charles Rule's article, previous footnote.
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to an industry rather than to competition. Moreover, by means of proposed legislation, the
Department urged the US Congress to clarify points in law, including that "restnctive
provisions in intellectual property licenses should be judged by antitrust courts under a rule of
reason, and to limit antitrust liability based on antitrust practices to actual dam ges." The
guidance, however, has not been converted into a bill. It was not surprising, then, that the
courts became sensitive to that conceptual change. They started applying the rule of reason to
patent misuse50
The mood extended to the US Congress which passed new pieces of legislation absorbing
conceptual evolution, despite the scepticism manifested by the American Bar Association.5'
The Congress established that tying of a second patent, or a separate product "cannot
constitute 'patent misuse' unless, in view of all the circumstances, the patent owner has power
in the relevant market." 52 These are an equivocal departure from the per se rule approach.
Additional illustrative indications follow the tendency.
The categories of arrangements traditionally regarded per se illegal included price-fixing
arrangements, horizontal division of markets or customers, boycotts and refusal to deal, and
tying agreements.53
 In the Trenton case, a price-fixing restraint was charged as unreasonable
in itself for its intended effect. In the Court's assertion, that sort of agreement always intends
to eliminate competition. To look into its reasonableness would also require the Court to
monitor price-fixing continuously as its effects may change with the dynamic of market
conditions. This would be a task incompatible with judicial duty. A more flexible view,
however, is seen in the Sharp case. 54 In this precedent, the Supreme Court held that "in order
See McElderiy v Cathay Pacfic Airways Ltd 678 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y.), and USX Corp. v United
Stales International Trade Commission, 682 F. Supp. 60, both commented in the OECD 1988-89 Report, p
288/9.
OECD 1988-89 Report p. 272.
5° See Wind flngsecitedbyLuis A Schapiro, ob. cit. p.45 at 51.
51 The National Cooperative Research Act 1984; Report of Section of Antitrust Law, Patent; Trademarlç
and know-how Committee on HR 4070(1986), at p. 17.52 OECD, 1988-89 Report, p. 269. See the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Sections
1341, 1342 (Pub. L. No. 100-703).
See US v Trenton Pofleries, 273 US 392; US v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc. 310 US 150; California
Retail Liquor's Assi. v Midical Aluminum mc, 445 US 97; US v Topco Assoc. 4.05 US 596; Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealer's Assjj v Pacific Stationary, 234 US 600; International Salt Co. v US 332 US 392;
Fortner Enters Inc. v United States Steel Corp. 394 US 495.
Business Electronics Corp. v Sharp Electronics Corp. [1988] 485 US 717, 108 S. CL 1515.
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to establish a per se violation of Section 1 for vertical price fixing, there must be proof of
some agreements on prices or price levels.""
As to horizontal restraint in the division of markets, an exception was established to
consider the essentiality of the restraint for the availability of the product. 56
 Doubts regarding
boycotts and refusal to deal have been raised from the Northwest case. 57
 The Court asserted
that "a plaintiff seeking application of the per se rule must present a threshold case in which
the challenged activity falls into a category likely to have predominantly anticompetitive
effects. The mere allegation of a concerted refusal to deal does not suffice because not all
concerted refusals to deal are predominantly anticompetitive. When the plaintiff challenges
expulsion from a joint buying co-operative, some showing must be made that the co-
operative possesses market power or unique access to a business element necessary for
effective competition."58
Patent or copyright alone (as a legal entitlement) no longer supports the presumption of
market power. A tying agreement involving intellectual property, for instance, is examined in
the light of competition criteria. It is a matter for inquny whether the owner is using his right
to capture market power, and whether such a power, if it does exist, is being used abusively.
In this connection, to what extent extended examination is needed in order to establish
whether the tie-in is or not permissible is not so clear. In general, the tying per se rule test
requires the existence of a tying arrangement, an appreciable share of market power, and that
the arrangement affects a considerable amount of commerce in the tied market. The
application may open room for extended discussion.59
The application of the per se rule seems to foreclose full adjudicatory exploration of
reasonableness. A possible implication is to deprive the plaintiff of having trial-type hearings
about the actual competitive effects of the restraint or monopoly behaviour. In deciding which
The quotation is from the comment in OECD 1989-90 Repon, p. 274.
USvTopco Assoc., 405 US 5%.
' Northwest v Pacific Stationay, [1985] 472 US 284
Idem, 472 US 298.
For an account on recent precedents and further development of the US case-law see the (1993] 61(2)
Antitrust Law JournaL
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technique to apply which would be consistent with the conditions of a particular case, the
court passes a judgement of adequacy of proceedings In contrasting recent cases th
previous ones, one has the impression that the court now recognises past errors. The correct
observation, however, is that judges are cautious to construe in a very dynamic matter about
which consensus is difficult to reach. Some perceptive judges may find a way to create a
convincing ruling about complex subjects, others not. The individual expertise, therefore,
does indeed matter. This leads to the undesirable effect of the rule of reason involving the
myth of numbers.
The rationality required to support a conclusive economic inquiry over competitive effects
may drive talented people to manipulate empirical parameters, or forge theoretical models in
order to produce figures to support technical arguments or assumptions which only specialists
are able to comprehend and reftite.
In the 1MB case,6° a point was made about misleading measure of the economic rate of
return to infer profitability. The case was illustrative because it also raised other live issue of
testing price predation (pricing below cost) involving "IBM's production and pricing of the
306/90 CPU series in the early 1960s."6 ' Referring to the use of statistics in the context of a
structural regression model, IBM's expert witness warns: unless care is taken to explain how
the precision of estimation is measured, a judge or jury can be readily conftised by objections
raised by the relatively untrained or the unscrupulous."62
The question of safe evidence under the rule of reason is to a certain extent subject to
debate. Generally unwilling to deal with figures, judges may not have the taste or sufficient
skills for scrutinising economic analysis. If the expert fails to pinpoint the gist of the legal
matter in contention, the court may arrive at a conclusion which lacks economic sense. The
question, then, of adequacy of proceedings will always be a controversial matter.
60 United States v IBM, [1982169 Civ. 200, Us District Court, Southern District of New York. The case
as cited and commented (the analytical aspect) by Franklin M Fisher, in HjJ	 ()j7
Econonucs, and the Law", p. 79, John Monz editor, 1990.
61 F. Fisher, oh. cit. at 140. Here one has no ability to comment on the technical aspect of the case, and that
secms to be unnecessaiy, but for details see Fisher's book The author s involved th the case. As an
economist-ecpert, he worked for IBM sewing as a witness.
62 F Fisher, oh. cit., p. 453.
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While none can expect that logical premises flow from the legal principles governing the
competitive process, the economic tests of efficiency by its nature also allow a margin of
error. As a result, the sense of appropriateness of means to assess efficiency and welfare
effects does not go beyond an exercise of approximation. Exchange of information and
experience between governments may not only encourage an approximation of procedures at
international level, but also provide for a consensual legitimacy by the adoption of similar
means.
6.3.2 Principles of international co-operation
(i) Avoiding conflicts between governments
It is assumed that a freer market potentially leads to increasing economic transborder activity
and accelerates international trade. As a result, questions may anse involving specific issues
such as intellectual property law, government procurement, investment, trade and antitrust
policies. There is a possibility that the application of competition law and enforcement direct
or indirectly affects the global competitive scene. This conflictual tendency is obviously a
natural aspect of interdependent world trade. In this context, it is appropriate to address the
competition problems on the basis of co-operative efforts towards, if not the irprovement of
means of assessing economic efficiency, at least the setting of similar procedures.
Given the fact that the impact of these laws on competition is not always predictable, two
preventive measures are welcome. Firstly, where there is a potential situation of conflict,
those governments involved should have an opportunity to engage in consultation. Secondly,
the conflictual prospect should command attention, permanent surveillance and prompt action
taken by competent authorities in an attempt to either avoid unnecessary conflict or redress
distressing retaliatory actions.
Regarding antitrust enforcement in particular, a policy carried out by a government (e g.,
control of merger or export cartel) may have adverse effect on the interest of another. When
an unavoidable conflict is caused, the best way to annul divergence is to seek a mutually
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agreed compromise, which the law does not give advice on how to attain. Negotiation is the
only influential rule for adjustment of interests, and avoidance of "hostile reactions." Apart
from avoidance of conflicts, two other principles informing the antitrust co-operation are the
discouragement of anti-competitive practices and the sharing of information.63
(ii) Redressing anti-competitive practices
The efforts of national authonties to table their interests fall under the assumption that both
have a common objective, which is to bring an end to anticompetitive practices. A key
ingredient in determining a reasonable outcome is the supply of detailed information, but
access to this information is frequently hindered by national laws. In order to overcome this
kind of obstacle, some principles on co-operation have been developed.
(lii) Learning by sharing experience
Opposing ideas different expertise and perspectives - all of these make it to reach consensus
on the manner competition should work rather difficult. In this respect, countries may benefit
from the diversity of approaches they apply. By sharing information and experience, they have
the opportunity to learn with each other, and may thus contemplate actions dictated by a
sensitive response to common problems.64
These ideas have been incorporated in bilateral agreements and guiding competition policies
among OECD countiies.65 One of the measures provided by these co-operative instruments
63 D. Ginsburg, International Antitrust Cooperation, p. 26, in "Twenty Five Years of Competition Policy:
Achievements and Challenges", OECD Report W.00050/D.390 (2473), Paris, 1987.
Ob. cit., pp. 27t28. Ginsburg's ideas have been developed in the context of the OECD countries, where a
sense of integration is massively shared. From them thase less privileged countnes gathered in blocks such as
American Economic Organimlion and MERCOSIJL may have much to learn.
65 Some bilateral instruments include the Australia-United States Antitrust Co-Operation Agreement of
June 1982, EEC-USA Competition Laws Co-Operation Agreement of 1991, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) of 1992, and Memorandum of Understanding between US and Canada on Procedures
Governing Antitrust Matters of 1984. As an unilateral and protective acl see US Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act of 1982; it follows US Department of Justice's Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations of 1988, Foreign ExtiBterritorial Measures Act of 1985 (Canada), and Japan Fair
Trade Commission's Draft Guidelines for the Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices in Sole Import
Distributorship Contracts, Etc. (Import Guidelines) arid Antimonopoly Act Guidelines Concerning
Distribution Systems and Business Practices (Distribution Systems Guidelines) of 1991. The US Department of
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is that the countly is given the opportunity to notiIr the other about any policy that it has
adopted and may have competitive implications for the other. Following this initial step,
further actions are expected to be taken at co-operation and co-ordination levels, and on
good faith and a transparency basis.
These principles form an intangible infrastructure and a good will basis to improve
regulation of free markets between States. As a moral force, they may encourage the
development of an international competition law. To what extent these principles are
observed in practical terms, depends on the dimension of the interests involved and how much
a particular country is prepared to co-operate.
The weakness of co-operation lies in the situation where a few countries join to procure
advantages which are suspect in the light o1 or incompatible with, multilateral ends. In this
respect, it is worth mentioning the 1986 Arrangement Concerning Trade in Semiconductor
Products between Japan and the United States. The agreement raised much concern among
third countries, for the possible detrimental effects on competition and anti-dumping
implications. The issue was relevant also in view of paragraph 11 of the 1986 OECD
Recommendation on Competition and Trade, which "calls on governments, when negotiating
export restraint arrangements, to take into account the interests of their trading partners and
to give consideration to the effect of such arrangements on competition in the market
concerns."67 Several interested parties, most of them outside the OECD, argued against the
Justice has also cooperaUon agreement svith Germany and Australia 119761 4 Trade Reg Rep. # 13,501 and
[1982] 4 Trade Reg. Rep. # 13,502.
The US-Japan Chip agreement came out as a result of an anti-dumping investigation undertaken in 1985
by the US Department &Commeive (DOC). It was alleged that Japan was selling a variety of memory chips at
pnces below a "fair value" in the United States, and then violating American anlidumping law. Reconciliating
their interests, both c**intries agreed to regulate the quantity of the products exported from Japan, to control
and set export prices at a market value assessed by the DOC arding to US company-specific cost The
arrangement was found inconsistent th the GAU Article Xl: 1 (Report of the Panel adopted on 4 May 1988,
1J6309, GATF/BISD, 36th Supp. 1990, p. 116). Studies undertaken by Andrew it Dick, University of
California, say that there was only little dumping evidence. l'he "fair value" was based on current-period costs,
rather than "shadow cost of production" which in semiconductor industry "lies below current-period costs []
because of the presence of a learning curve that allows firms to lower their unit costs tomorrow by acquirmg
production experience today." [19911 XXXIV(1) The Journal of Law and Economics 133.
67 OECD 1986-87 Report on Competition Policy in OECD Countries. p. 37.
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anticompetitive effect caused by the agreement 68 , chiefly an increase in the price of memory
chips.
This event apart, modern agreements69 not only incorporate the principles above, but also
contain provisions to some extent significant to the process of international competition.
They are the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on a regional level, and the
Agreement on TRIPS on a multilateral basis.
(iv) Co-operation policy under NAFFA
Despite the general character of its provisions, NAFTA is relevant from the point of view of
competition regulation. This agreement, signed by the United States, Canada and Mexico,
establishes long-term co-operation in trade and related areas. It is important not only in terms
of the prospect of growth, mobilisation of resources and market expansion, but also for the
impact on domestic law involving a vast range of trade-related subjects. As far as competition
policy is concerned, NAFTA:
• includes provisions on anticompetitive government and private business;
• calls on each party to cooperate on issues of competition law, enforcement and other competition issues,
including intellectual property;
• lay down groundrules to limit business praclices ofState enterprises and legal monopolies;
• provides for each coun fry to ensure that such monopolies do not use their positions to engage in
anucompentive practices outside the non-monopoly market; and
• anticipate that a trilateral committee will consider issues regarding the relationship between competition
laws, policies and irade.7°
Although of regional scope, these rules are a significant manifestation of the modern attitude
towards the phenomenon of competition and the importance paid to the competitive process
The agreement allowed US firms to compete with Japanese firms. In this respect, the agreement was
beneficial to chip producei but severely detrimental to those chip iniporting counlnes. In its statement, Brazil
argued that sinee the United States and Japan came to agreement, "an inerease of between 10 and 25 per cent
in the price of integrated circuits of 256K niemeiy type, which Brazil imported from various sources had been
observed. Brazil was also encounlenng difliculties in importing several types of components from alternatives
sources other than Japan and the US." GATF/BISD, 36th Supp. 1990, pp. 150/151.
69 See the "Agreement on the European Economic Area" and the Agreement by the E.F.TA States on the
Establishment of a Surveillm Authority and a Court of Justice, of 2 May 1992. The 1993 GAU Agreement
on TRIPS has also a number of gnund rules affecting international competition.
'° NAFFA Treaty, Article 1501.
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on transnational level. 7 ' The main purpose of the legal co-operation is to strike some
convergence in administrative practices, look at closer enforcement procedures, and enable
the Parties to call at other	 discretion to address the problem of export cartels.
Although of limited scope, legal co-operation seems to be initial steps towards a multilateral
agreement on competition law which, nevertheless, is still far from reality.
(v) Co-operation under the Agreement on TRIPS
Co-operation on matters of control of anti-competitive practices and conditions under the
Agreement on TRIPS is specifically concerned with adverse effects of intellectual property on
trade, transfer and dissemination of technology. The relevant provisions of the Agreement
indicate the nature of the adverse effects which may give rise to co-operative activities, the
scope of the consultations, and the terms of the commitment required from the member-
States. The provisions seem to be a minor step under the GATT framework towards co-
operation against international cartels. This is an area of great conflict mainly because while
each State adopts its own law, the competitive process increasingly expands beyond frontiers.
Furthermore, the existence of international standards in intellectual property contrasts with
the lack of equally developed standards in competition internationally. Against this
background, Article 40 of the Agreement on TRIPS is expected to have little impact.
For the provisions to be invoked, it is necessary that the requesting State establishes the
probable existence of an abuse of intellectual property rights, consisting of anti-competitive
licensing practices or conditions (e.g., exclusive grantback non challenge to IPR validity,
coercive package licensing) specified in national laws. The mischief should be in violation of
the competition law at least, and detrimental to the industry, of the requesting State. The
infringing firm, the owner of an intellectual property right; should be a national or domiciliary
" Pointing to the same direction, see the "Agieement on the European Economic Area" and the
"Agreement by the E.F.TA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Ccxni of Justice", of
2May 1992.
72 Among specialists. tI tenor of the speeches is of duleief in a multilateral agreement on private
competition. See 1991 Corporate Law Institute. p 87 and 107. (ed) Ha
Part II, Section 8, Article 40.
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of the addressed State Another situation that the Agreement contemplates is when a national
or domiciliary of a State is being prosecuted in a second State for violating the competition
law (anti-competitive exercise of intellectual property rights) of the latter. The second State is
committed to grant the former an opportunity for consultation under the conditions above.
The purpose of the consultation is primarily for exchange of information relevant to the
investigation of illegal export cartels, and to minimise conflict between States. The host
country is asked to:
• accordflill and smpathe1ic consideration;
• afford adequate opportunity for consultation with the requesting Member;
• co-operate through supply ofiwailable information relevant to the matter in question.74
In principle, the request is to supply only public infomation. The exchange of confidential
information is normally curtailed by specific rules. Nevertheless, confidential information
available to the Government may be exchanged provided that mutually satisfactory agreement
is concluded concerning the safeguarding of confidentiality.
The ultimate interest of the requesting State is to secure compliance with its legislation.
Although the addressed State by no means is not obliged to take enforcement action, it may
be asked to do so. This is a possibility which is not contemplated in the Treaty. 75 But if such a
request is made, conflictual interests of legal significance are likely to arise. Firstly, the host
country is not supposed to take any enforcement action if the alleged mischief is excluded
from prosecution under its law. Secondly, as the application of competition law is
predominantly confined to the national territoiy, the matter ofjunsdiction is inevitably open to
question.
Problems concerning co-operation in dealing with export cartels have emerged in the
context of the IJS/EC Co-operation Agreement of 1991.76 A prominent issue in this respect
Agreement on TRIPS, Article 40(3).
In this respect the scope of the Agreement on TRIPS is not as large as that of the US/EC Co-operation
Agreement76 The USA has concluded agreements of the kind with several countries, including the European
Communities, Germany, Austra1ia, Canada
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is whether the prosecution of an export cartel on request of an interested country (party to the
agreement) is a matter of law (a legal defence to the requesting State) or a discretionaiy
comity. 77 The latter has the acceptance of the predominant view.78
On the basis of sympathy to a request made by a trading partner or fearing retaliatoiy
attitude, a country may be willing to challenge at home an export cartel started abroad. Legal
problems of jurisdiction may be circumvented by the application of the controverted effects
doctrine (meaning a country has jurisdiction to enforce its competition law against foreign
conduct by foreign finns, even if lawful where the conduct has occurred, so long as that
conduct has an adverse effect on the country's commerce). 79 However, the central issue is to
what extent the national competition law and policy support an enforcement action8° to
prevent or control cartel effects which are adverse to the trade of the requesting State, but
beneficial or unharmli.il to the commercial interests of the host State. The experience shows
that the host country is hardly prepared to sacrifice its own interest. 8 ' This is an outcome
which limits the function of co-operation on international trade.
' Ailicle V of the US/EC Agreement
8 Cf James R Atwood, 1991 Fordham Corporate Law Institute. Chapters 4 and 6, (ed Ha4c).
79 Re Wood Pulp [198513 C.M.L.R 474. As the British Government has contended, economic effects alone
are n sufficient to establish the national jurisdiclion. Consequently, Britain has resisted exira-lerritorial
application of competition law. Opposite stai, hoever, is adoiled by the US courts and the EC
Commission. Richard Whish, ob. cit., p.375 and 385.
80 The American policy is that the US Congress "intended the Sherman Act to pmtect American consumers
and American competitors, but not to benefit foreign consumers in t1ir home markets." James Atwood, ob.
cit., p. 86
s JamesAtwood, ob. cit., alp. 89.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
ADJUDICATION ON NON-VOLUNTARY UCENCES OVER UK PATENTS
7.1 Introduction: reasonin2, discretion and public policies
From common law to modem cases involving deliberations on trade matters under public
policy arguments, reasoning has been developed to give decisions a greater sense of certainty
and acceptability or legitimacy. Although subtle, this development has been a result of the
legal evolution from broad statements to detailed statutoly provisions in particular instances
of intellectual property and competition law. In the preceding chapter, it was seen that
developments in economic analysis and thoughts have also played a distinct role, vely
influential on judicial decisions. Reflecting these developments in law and economics, the
investigations cartied out by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) provides for
a reasoning method which contrasts with both old common law and modem discretionary
junsdiction.
If they are not guided by sound criteria applied to particular cases, discretionary
judgements in general may lead to legal obscurity, of the type encountered in the reasoning
performed by common-law judges. Such a recurrence would be incompatible with the level of
transparency and certainty required by international standards.' In this respect, the analysis of
the adjudicatory process on non-voluntary licensing is at the same ttime a warning towards a
potential failure of the discretionary adjudication, and a claim for reasonable procedures free
from the temptations of unsound justifications, even in the name of a theoretical public
interest.
The legal literature shows that the judicial duty descnbed in terms that judges have simply
to ascertain facts and identi1i the proper rule applicable has never been a convincing idea. Nor
are judges mechanical dispensers of precedents 2 As they have done for centuries, judges are
I SeernterahaArticles4l to43 oftheAgreementonTRlPS.
2 For an account of the modern views of the judges pohtical mle see Richard A. Maidment, The Judicial
Response to the New Deal, Manchester University Press, 1991; J. A. G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciaiy,
4th ed., 1991; Daniel A. Fauber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991;
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led to apply concepts of ends entailing sensitive elements of public interest, which has
ultimately been elevated to a categoly of legitimacy for both statutory choices and judicial
reasonmg
The implications of courts dealing with public interest are twofold. Firstly, adjudicators do
not appreciate setting policies which may appear to be their own. Secondly, if the law
fails to provide the zight guidance to solve a particular legal problem some judges may feel
reluctant to deliberate, mainly if questions are affected by economic ideas and thoughts which
at times emerge with significant influence. Other judges having or sensing they have,
sufficient ability to handle these sorts of questions may venture in a debatable reasoning. As a
result of these discrepant attitudes decisions tend to vary. This was veiy typical in the
assessment of restraints of trade on public policy arguments at common law.
Despite the variation of opinions on restraints of trade - a very unwelcome result, judges at
common law were never divested from their duty to decide according to their own
knowledge and experience. It was part of their mandate, tacit or expressly stated, to pass
judgement on public policies. In their role as guardians of public interest, courts could strike
down a contract or clause regarded as unlawful restraint prima facie void, subject to
reasonableness. The judicial intervention was justified to protect a person in a weak position,
giving way to an argument oriented to an individualist law, that was the assessment of public
interest in consideration of the interests of individual parties. Although present, the perception
of a collective interest3 was obscured by that individualism. The former only gained
prominence later with the emergence of new legal mechanisms put in place to watch over the
interests of a growing consumer society.4
William F. West, Administrative Rulemaking, Politics aix! Pmcess Greenwood Press 1985 John Bell. Policy
Arguments in Judicial Decisions, Clarendon Press, 1983.
John Bell speaks of a collective eliäre, ob. cit., at p.77,81/82 and 219
Alongside an ideology of economic welfare which gained momentum at the turn of the centwy, piritection
of public interest s improved with the emergence of a legislation designed to regulate the competitive
process in the USA, such as the Sherman Act in 1890, the creation of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914,
and in Engjand the emergence of compulsoiy licences over, and revocation of;, patents. With relevant statutoiy
regulation, little by little public policies could be drawn 'viith less uncei1aints.
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The legacy of the restraint of trade doctrine is a disarray of reasoning associated with the
application of public policy arguments, and a consequent uncertainty (unpredictability) of the
judicial process, an outcome inadequate to the pattern of procedure claimed for the
adjudication on non-voluntaiy licensing. Likewise, the Leyland case, 5 significant for the type
of judicial commitment it contains, is a modem warning about what an adjudicatoiy policy
should avoid. By contrast, the reasoned MMC reports about the effects of restrictive
practices can be identified as a paradigm of reasoning. 6 While pursuing an empirical public
interest, the Commission relies much on what can be observed and very little upon the
construction of law. The same cannot be said about discretionary decisions.
While doubly affected by the availability of limited information about concerned facts and
by concepts of ends, the discretional rationality much depends on public policy arguments. A
discretionary mandate is to flilifi purposes ansing from ill-defined rules or guidance, which
may lead to a state of uncertainty. Redressing this prospect, there is a case for circumscribing
the jurisdictional discretion to statutory and judicial limitations.
In the analysis of the comptroller general's decisions, it will show that discretionary power is
primarily limited by specific statutory provisions such as those setting the purposes of the
non-voluntary licensing, and enabling the comptroller to act as he "thinks fit."7 The scope of
this circumscribed jurisdiction is understood in the sense that the exercise of discretion is to be
proper in regard to the purposes envisaged by the statutory policies, and not hinder the patent
nght unnecessarily. Described here as "useflul" discretion, this notion requires a response to
varying contextual factors or determinative reasonable answers. This will be tested in a
number of situations, and particularly employed in royalty computation.
Regarded as reasonable in the interests of the parties, royalties are not only submitted to the
patentee/licensee's bargaining. They are also assessed in accordance with the nature of the
invention. Ultimately, the computation of a royalty economic value is a function of rationally
differing features of an invention. The rigor of this criterion, nevertheless, may not be
[19861 R.P.C. 279.
6 PJse important, the investigations carried ont by the Commission are highly significant for their impact on
the intellei.tua1 property order.
Patents Act 1977. ss. 48(4), 49(1).
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observed in the assessment of remuneration for Crown use. In this type of remuneration the
judicial role is minimal In this respect, UK safeguarding policy is open to criticism.8
Discretionary judgements involving issues such as sublicensing, importation, and dumping
defence are challenging. In entertaining these issues, adjudicators may not be free from the
temptations of welThrism imposed by a safeguarding policy and the economy it oversees
The policies that the comptroller is to implement are a matter of public interest, translated
into elements of efficiency and welke. While these elements may be properly considered
under the procedures governed by the framework of competition law, the adjudication system
of unauthorised patent use intrinsic to the legal framework of intellectual property has proved
to be inadequate to address issues connected with international trading. In this area, the
discretionary jurisdiction on balance is inclined to favour the country's interest which may not
satisfy an efficiency defence.
Although the discussion of discretionary jurisdiction will bring the comptroller's decisions
into focus, the purpose is not to assess whether the adjudicatoiy outcomes were the nght
ones in the particular circumstances. The aim is instead, to approach the reasoning put in
place in selected cases and to look at the criteria employed. The question that one should
consider is this. How to set up an adjudicatory legal system of control over the exercise of
intellectual property rights in a manner which complies with goals or criteria of efficiency and
welfare, and avoid the undesired outcome of diversity of opinions typical in the common-law
doctrine of restraint of trade? In order to address this question a number of points are
considered.
Firstly, It is argued that whatever the format of the judicial opinions, the role of courts and
judges is incontestable. More than a defence, this is an assumption which underlies the
institutional process of adjudication.9 Case law is a source of consolidated knowledge and
experience. Precedents contain enduring lessons necessary to build up a safeguarding policy.
In addition to sil,section 7.3.2 (iv) below, see Chapter 7, substions 5.3.2 (i) and 53.3(1).
While leading mdusthalized countnes can benefit fmm a long expenence in safeguarding adjudication,
many other countnes cannol.
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Such precedents may also have a catalyst function of great assistance to improve the statutory
regulation and cure past mistakes. As an example, one should bear in mind the benefit of the
experience gathered by the comptroller and many times referred to in court. Thus, to be able
to bank on a consolidated adjudicatory experience is indispensable to the formation of a
sound and confident safeguarding policy.
Secondly, despite of the uncertainties of the old doctrine of restraint of trade, one is bound
to argue that in dealing with public policy issues judges have proved to be less than clear, but
without them it is worse still. Judges are influenced by economic thoughts and theories. At
times they are invited to examine the issues before them in the light of arguments alien to legal
discourse. This is usual in issues concerning the control of intellectual property and
competition process. Applying their particular perception of the economic background,
judges develop a rationality of their own which may not be in accordance with economic
analysis and methods. These in general are found difficult to understand and very confusing
indeed for judges.'° Economic analyses, however, have contributed to improving and
enforcing competition law. It follows that resorting to economic analyses to back public
policy arguments is advisable.
Thirdly, provided that they are given the right guidance, adjudicators are able to make a
more rational use of public policy arguments. In this connection, one may look at the
proceedings of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. Taking public interest into
account, the Commission is guided by legal circumstances clearly set up. While influential in
ordering the use of intellectual property rights, MMC reports illustrate the benefits of having
not only sound legal guidance on matters of public interest, but also the contribution of non-
legal professionals in the make-up of an adjudicatory body. In this respect, one may observe
that in the process of non-voluntary licensing adjudicators are not always legal specialists. The
presence of academics and businessmen from other areas other than the legal branch has
proved to be important for the interpretation of the economic background and to pass to
judges sound impressions and informed advice on economic matters. Incidentally, the
1 This is so b se judges are poor economists and unskilled politicians. Their decisions on legal matters
affected by economics are not al 	 veboozne m tl business circle, and may spread uncertainties.
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comptroller general's decisions on non-voluntaiy patent licences are not always delivered by
legal professionals.
Fourthly, statutes, regulations, or any sort of guidelines are all imperfect. They always
contain some gap. They may be too iigid or confer too broad a mandate to the adjudicator.
The conceptualisation of a safeguarding policy (the legal machinery designed to limit the
exercise of propnetary rights) should rely on clear legal definitions and guidance, but it is not
commendable nor practical that all matters are regulated in a strict manner. To allow some
discretion is also desirable. In sunimaly, as part of an institutional adjudicatory process,
judges or adjudicators are responsive to rules, have discretion, and are committed to
principles designed to substantiate efficiency and welfare goals and ciiteiia.
Taking into account these arguments, one cannot establish beforehand the amount of
discretion that an adjudicatory process should allow, but one may state that a sound process
requires, on balance, rules narrowly drawn, and a degree of discretion. The assumption is that
a combination of discretion and clear rules is necessary for a sound reasoning, as well as for
an efficiency defence allowed within legal limits. In order to understand the nature of the
adjudicatory process on non-voluntary licences, all of these points will be discussed. For the
sake of compaiison, the chapter starts dealing with public policy arguments at common-law
and modem decisions. Then, it discusses the discretionary power of the comptroller general
and courts in the adjudication on the use of UK patents.
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7.2 Review of public policy ar2uments
7.2.1 Reflections on public interest
(i) The importance and notion of public interest
Despite its intangible nature, public interest is a notion central to legal theory and
enforcement. Its content, a priori undefined, is a constant puzzle to decision-makers in
different branches of law, and in particular to the regulation of the exercise of intellectual
property rights and the competitive process. These indicate the relevance of the principle to
which the safeguarding policy is committed, and justifies the brief reflections on the
theoretical thoughts' which explain the public interest as an element of legitimacy, the
interface between private and public interests, and the process to select and ascertain the
criteria of public interest.
Public interest is an element of legitimacy as far as it works as valid grounds for general
acceptance of both statutory choices made by Parliament and legal rationality put forward by
courts on a case-by-case basis. In this respect the decision-making machinery on
Parliamentary or judicial level is a relevant institutional process of identifring public interest,
of which statutes and court rulings are in some sense expressive sources. Obviously there are
no determinative terms to describe public interest. The ambiguity surrounding its concept
does not make it immune from being manipulated to serve purposes other than those
regarded as not convenient to the public at large. It follows that in passing a judgement of
public interest Legislature and courts or tribunals have the duty to secure the interests of
society at large from being exploited by particular groups seeking purely private gain at public
expense.
There is a relationship between individual and public interests. Individuals or groups of
people may pursue vaned interests; some pertain and others do not to the society at large.
For literature on public mterest discussion s Torben Bech Dyiberg, The Politics of the Indivithial and
Public Interests, Essex Paper No. 91, University of Essex, 1992, from which much has been dra A simibir
topic equally undefined is the so-called public choice, dealt vith in the "Symposium on the Theoiy of Public
Choice". [1988174 Virginia Law Review 167.
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This observation leads to the assumption that society is capable of having interests of its own.
The question is how it is possible to distinguish the interests of the public at large from those
which are confined to the individual sphere.
One may assume that the aggregation of individual interests forms the interests of society,
but this would discard antagonistic interests of other groups or would require that groups
give up their interests to aiulrm those of society's. The assertion may be possible in principle,
but no one would suggest that it could be so to the full extent. As a result, what is claimed as
being of society or public interest can only substantiate interests of a majority against the
interest of a minority. From what is said one may figure out the risk posed by the way public
interest is constmed, that is the possibility of groups imposing their interests upon others.
Granted that there is no other way to establish public interest but through the majority rule,
it highlights both the vital role that process plays in the legal theory and the way public
interest is officially established. The recognition of public interest as a key element means that
the operation of policies through legal implementation ought to be made on behalf of society.
Out of such an aim there is no legitimisation. In addition, the way individual and public
interests are related is a matter of representation. Now it remains of concern that the
encapsulation of a particular interest in the legal mainstream could eventually lead to the
domination of groups by means of biased information or even repression.
The representational expression of public interest requires both an articulation of elements
which may confer a democratic sense to the legislative process, and the justification of
interests which go beyond the individual sphere. Such a mechanism operates the conversion
of political choices into legal options designed to repeal incidental benefits for individuals or
pressure groups and to pose Limitations, one general the other nanower. Both the Legislature,
in designing those options, and the courts, in operating them, have a common aim which is to
endeavour that the inherent ambiguity of public interest is not directed for the privilege of an
elite. How much the legal scheme is able to guarantee such an aim is a matter for the court to
say, but in particular circumstances one can establish that what is or seems to be good for
society at large fits in with public interest.
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(ii) Compliance with the Parliamentary options
It is not for the courts or tribunals to override legal options. However, apart from having to
articulate with standards of instrumental rationality courts also have to apply conceptions of
ends. In doing so, they keep in touch with contemporaiy thoughts and theories regarded as
considerable intellectual forces, eg, the idea of public benefit, freedom of trade, consumers'
interest, respect of properties, and intellectual property bargain. However sensitive these
concepts may be, the courts have a duty to apply them in compliance with statutes and
regulations. In respect to these developments, it is reasonable to suggest that in the province
of safeguards on intellectual property the idea of public policy may or should be apprehended
through the interpretation of the relevant statutes and that the test of public interest can only
be articulated usefully in terms of purposes and concepts statutorily stated, in an implicit or
express mariner, and narrowed down. 2 It is assumed that the courts and administrative
authorities are committed to these purposes and concepts. In reference to these, courts and
tribunals play their role in completing and construing the law on a rational basis and thus
establishing the policy behind the statutes In other words, the policy is laid down by the
Parliament or upon the mandate conferred by it. As a result, although the adjudicatory bodies
cannot abdicate their function of applying arguments of public policy, such an office is a
limited one. This limitation is a requirement of legal certainty pursued by the modern process
governing the safeguarding policy.
The following subsections discuss the relation between the adjudicatory function and public
policy arguments, and the consequential implications of such a relationship.
7.2.2 Revisiting public policy arguments at common law
It is a settled and much documented fact that at common law opinions on public policy varied
"with every change of the wind." 3 Looking bnefly at the decisions, it could be suggested that
2 The lack of indications uld make judges unsuited to decide on matters involving economic aflirs,
although they have often been required by the Government of the day to do so, even vith the risk of arriving at
an economic nonsense. See JAG. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciaiy, 4th ed., especially pages 48, 49, 50,
63, 73,275, Fontan Press, 1991.
Cf Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, p. 383-387.
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the most common cause for such a variation of opinions was due to lack of informed and
unsatisfactory legal guidance. In discerning what was for the public good, judges followed
only their personal expenence and the perception drawn from the circumstances of the
particular cases They had only the principle of freedom of trade (in fashion among political
economists) as an opaque basis to start with. Those judges who were either less informed or
not convinced that public welfare was a matter for them to deal with, preferred to resort to
settled principles and precedents instead of venturing an opinion on the basis of an abstract
general public policy. It is not proper nor necessary to carry out here an extended discussion
of the matter. A brief comment follows only with the purpose of illustrating the facts stated
above and supporting the suggestion that lack of reliable guidance was the reason for the
disarray of opinions and uncertainty that should be avoided in the modern regulation of the
adjudicatory process of control of the exercise of intellectual property rights.
(i) Reasonableness as to individual and collective interests
In the Mogul Steamship case,4 an association of traders was found to have interfered with the
course of trade unduly, by raising prices or offering rebates. Such a practice was considered a
wrong of public mischief The House of Lords, however, did not embrace the public policy
argument. In a remarkable statement, a member of the court considered the public policy
argument to be a dangerous venture compared to "an unruly horse" with no sense of direction
which could make judges unreliable interpreters.
Similarly debatable ruling was set in the Nordenfelt case 5 In this, the evolution of the
public policy doctrine is explained. According to it, the community had a material interest in
maintaining fair dealing. Courts, however, had little idea how to protect such collective
interests. In the past, the doctrine was stated as a general rule, i.e., that restraints of trade
were all void. That was found to be too rigid. It was believed that, to a certain extent, some
restraints could be allowed under conditions of bona fide, good considerations or
reasonableness. Now what would fall within such a standard? Under the courts' ruling,
restraints necessary for the protection of trade would be lawli.tl. In an attempt to elaborate a
[1892 AC25
Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns Ammunition Compan y 118941 AC 533.
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definition of reasonableness, the court introduced an element of limit: the restraint having no
tenitorial limitation would be contraiy to the commercial policy of England and not meet the
requirement of validity. Such a test distinguished partial from general restraint; later it proved
to be unsatisfactory.
The prevailing perception was that a trading restraint, no wider than needed, was
reasonable, and as such valid, with reference to the interests of the parts and the public. The
latter, nevertheless, was confined to the interests of the former, i.e., "if the agreement was
reasonable in the interests of the parties, then it was presumed to be in the interests of the
public."6 The judicial intervention to strike down a contract or clause was justified to protect
a party in a weak position and thus a victim of an unconscionable restriction. This traditional
meaning of the doctrine of the restraint of trade seemed to support an ideology of
individualism, and consequently indicate a failure of the courts to secure protection to
collectivist interest. 7 Protection of collectivism is only later improved under the influence of
new thoughts8 and subsequently strength of competition law, in this century.
(ii) The influence of economic theories
At the turn of the century the matter remained debatable and apparently was never entirely
settled. In a more recent case, 9 the House of Lords dismissed an appeal to confirm a decision
which held a copyright agreement null and void on the grounds of unreasonable restraint of
trade. The plaintifi a young song writer, under contract, agreed to assign to the publisher his
full copyright for the whole contractual term. The agreement would be in force for five years
6 Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, p. 699. As the author adds, it was almost impossil)le to
prove that a trading restriction operated against the public interest
Protection of collectivist interests is a result of greater perception of a growing conswner society. A
reflection on the change from iadMdniIism to collectivism is developed by John Cooke and Da'id Oughton,
Th Conunon Law of Obligations. chapter 4, second edition, Bufterwnrths, 1993. The suggestion of an
ideology of indMthilicm is also supported by the traditional notion present in the tort law, that is, the tort as a
scheme of interpersonal disthbution of losses, rather than an injuly against the public. See John G. Fleming,
The Law of Torts, p. 4-6, 1992.
S These thonghts include or are related to the rise of the econonuc liberalism, the role of the state and
conseqnent rejection of the notion of laissez-faire, and the recognition of the failure of the market forces alone
to provide for the best benefits to consumeis (i.e., the proscription of an idea of free market associated with a
defence of consumer welfare). See Cooke and Oughton, oh. cit
Macaulay v. Schroeder Pubhslung [19741 1 W.L.R 1308.
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and automatically extended for a flirther five years in the event that during the first term the
royalties exceeded a certain figure. The publisher had the discretion to terminate the
agreement at any time. The agreement also prevented the song writer from dealing with his
rights involving a third party without the publisher's consent. The remuneration was confined
to royalties on published works and there was no obligation for the publisher to promote or
publish the author's works.
The point in law at issue was to know whether the contract was likely to conflict with
public policy defined as "the interest of both the public and of the individual that everyone
should be free so far as practicable to earn a livelihood and to give to the public the fruits of
his particular abilities."'0 The Court confirmed the principle that under normal bargaining
conditions the parties may choose any restriction to operate the agreement in such a manner
they think proper. The contract in particular, however, was found null and void because its
clauses were unnecessarily unfair and the parties were in a situation of unbalanced bargaining
power. Nevertheless, in his reasoning (which theoretically appears to be in disagreement with
Lord Reid's reasoning concerning public interest) Lord Diplock acknowledged that the court
was implementing the public policy in the sense of "protection of those whose bargaining
power is weak against being forced by those whose bargaining power is stronger to enter into
bargains that are unconscionable." He went on to ascertain that "under the influence of
Bentham and of laissez-faire the courts in the 19th century abandoned the practice of applying
the public policy against unconscionable bargains to contracts generally, (...) but the policy
survived in its application to penalty clauses and to relief against forfeiture and also to the
special category of contracts in restraint of trade. '12 Although the reasoning on this intended
to reflect the economic theories cunent at that time, ultimately what was regarded
unconscionable between the parties was a matter of judicial perception, and the outcome of
the decisions paid no regard to the general public interest.
Clearly, at common law, judges were influenced by economic theories, but they had their
own perception of economic matters. The statement by Lord Diplock is also confirmed by
10 LordReid's statement [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308 at 1313.
" Idem,at 1315.
' 2 Iden ideni
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another specialist who writes: "what the judges said [at common law] was one thing; what
was necessarily implied or involved in their decisions was something else again." 3 Judges
today are also influenced by economic theories. If they are not given the right legal guidance
their opinions tend to be as diversified as the decisions of the common-law judges.
7.2.3 Critique of the British Leyland case'4
This landmark case is a public policy apology used to exclude intellectual property right
against the copying of purely functional objects (spare parts). The underlying public policy
was broadly expressed in the words of Lord Scarman in the following terms: "the
manufacturer of an article such as a motor vehicle or other consumer durable cannot by the
exercise of copyright preclude the user of the article from access to a free market for spares
necessary to maintain it in good working order." 5 As the House also suggested, this principle
is latent in British law and applies to intellectual property rights in general, i.e., upon
copyright, designs and patented inventions. The decision has a positive aspect, to the extent
that the court manifested a commitment to a particular policy, and a negative aspect, that is,
while recognising the existence of copyright, a majority view denied enforcement. It is
suggested that a contradiction rests on the very foundation of this outcome.
The dispute arose over the copyright claimed by car manufacturers (plaintiffs) to prevent
others from reproducing without consent a particular exhaust pipe, a component part
required for the repair of a motor vehicle. After being entertained by a trial judge, the claim
was submitted to the consideration of both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. The
latter, against dissenting arguments, eventually allowed the appeal to dismiss the claim of
copyright infringement. In summary, four decision models were contemplated as follows:
• copyright protects car manufacturers against reproduction in three-dimensional form and
manufacturing for sale of exhaust pipes, and there is no principle of law to exclude the
enforcement of such a statutory right. (Court of Appeal);
' P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, p. 386.
' British Leviand Motor Corp. and Others v. Armstrong Patents Co. Ltd [19861 R.P.C. 279.
' Idem, atp. 349.
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copyright affords no protection to car manufacturers against reproduction of exhaust
pipes. If a statutory right do exist otherwise there is no principle in law to bar its
enforcement. (Lord Griffiths),
• copying of exhaust pipes did not attract copyright protection, if it did, no relief was to be
available on the grounds of free access to spare-part market. (Lord Scarman);
• copying exhaust pipes is an infringement to the copyright on the mechanical drawings,
but on the ground of non-derogation from grant such a right cannot be enforced. (Lords
Templeman, Bridge of Harwich, and Edmund-Davies);
It upheld the theory that the exhaust pipe, as a purely fimctional object with no eye appeal
(intrinsic beauty), is not registrable under the 1949 Registered Designs Act, and does not
meet the conception of invention, but the corresponding drawings under the copynght regime
amended by the 1968 Design Copyright Act are entitled to protection. In accordance with
precedents long settled, the unauthorised reproduction of a three-dimensional object (the
exhaust pipe system) depicted in a drawing is in principle an infringement.' 6 The House of
Lords, however, did not allow the inflingement defence on the grounds that the enforcement
would be particularly contrary to the right to repair invested in the cafs owner as it was
supported by analogous authorities.
The decision was regarded as not contrary to settled practices (precedents), and the matter
affected outside the scope of the legislation examined. Therefore, there was a nanow sphere
unfilled by the statute nor filly treated by previous authorities. This permitted the Court to
construe the law in an unusual manner. In doing so, the House of Lords revived a public
policy which should be read cum grwzo salis, i.e., its effects are to be read in a manner not to
extend beyond the economic background of spare parts.
(i) Commitment to policies
Through a careful analysis of the case it is possible for one to draw some limitations upon the
policy behind the decision. The public policy can be stated in the following terms: that an
16 Cf. Report of the Copyright Committee, Part I, p. 82, Cmd. 8662 (1952). See also Chapter 3 (subsections
3.2.1 and 3.2.2 about puIj arguments on the doctnne of useful article in America.
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unrestncted market allowing the straight copying of exhaust pipes is in the public interest, so
that car owners can enjoy, to the most economical extent, the inherent right of freedom to
have their cars repaired. Such a right to a fair repair does not amount to making a new article,
a car in this case, and it is explained as follows.
Cars are made and sold with components which are bound to fail in the course of the cafs
lifetime. From the relationship between vendor and purchaser an irrevocable grant is born in
favour of the latter concerning the proper use of the car which, if not repaired, becomes unfit
for the purpose the grant is made. To require the purchasers to buy replacement parts only
from the car manufacturers or their licensees is an improper interference with the right of the
former to have their cars repaired. That is stated, briefly, in the principle no one can derogate
from his own grant.
One factual limitation of the decision is that it was established with reference to a specific
economic background: mass-produced goods (spare parts), and the need to maintain a
consumer durable article in a good working order. The mass-production represents a
considerable market exceeding $1 billion dollars a year. The maintenance need was
established by the degree of frequency of the car part replacement, calculated as many as ten
times during the average car lifetime. These conditions describe a situation per se regarded as
able to confer a monopoly right, relying on copyright in technical drawings, to an extent, as
the House of Lords concluded, not intended by the statutoiy copyright.
The evolution of the law, section 10 of the 1956 Copyright Act as it was amended by the
1968 Design Copyright Act, led to the protection of useftil articles. What the Parliament truly
wanted, however, was to make attainable the copyright purpose, that was to secure the due
remuneration for the artistic work. Bearing in mind such a purpose, the Court conduded that
indirect copying could not truly be taken beyond that purpose, i.e., protection was provided
only to restrain unfair copying. If the statute gives room for an interpretation which makes the
reproduction of a useful article an infringement in any circumstances, enabling the owner to
take from it the commercial interest to all extent possible, the majority of the House of Lords
concluded that it was time to correct the law, i.e., construing it in a way which unveils its real
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intent. Hence, enforcement is only allowed where, because of the reproduction of the artistic
work in three-dimensional form, the owner is prevented from achieving the real return upon
his intellectual effort. This is an extremely important point in law clarified by the House of
Lords. Some obscurities, however, still remain.
(ii) Obscure grounds
Protection without enforcement is a negation of protection or no protection at all. Granted,
however, that the scope of the statutory protection (set up with no exemption) was only to
allow the copynght owner to reap the due return from his artistic work, and no more than
that, what gross mischief could, besides that, despise protection? A positive answer gives rise
to a puzzling issue, that is, where to draw the line to separate a necessaly protection from an
undue or excessive return. Additionally, in certain circumstances it is not easy to discern
repairing an article from making a new one.' 7 However, it would be easier and suflicient to
establish a situation of monopoly disproportionate to the "statutory protection" afforded, by
investigating an alleged abuse of right, a submission which was denied. An abuse of iight
could be remedied and the intellectual property continue to exist meaningfully.
The implied licence could be a solution. A submission in this connection was also cast aside:
its assistance would be only usefully conjured up against a patent which bears a true and
stronger monopoly right, stated the Court. (The rule of implied licence has been applied to
copyright only in limited scope, i.e., coupled with patent.' 8 ) In rejecting the implied licence,
the Court avoided expanding the application of this rule to copyright, which traditionally
relies on statutory framework. The Court, however, overlooked the fact that the exercise of
copynght applicable to industrial elements (industrial copyright) can have the same effect as a
patent, i.e., both industnal copyright and patent can create a legal basis for abusive practice.
Hence, there is no sound reason why the implied licence should not be applied to copyright as
it was argued.
'7 See the Solar case reported in the foolnote below 11977] RP.C. 537 at 554.
' In Solar Thomson Engineering Co. Ltd andAnother v. Barton the Court of Appeal upheld the doctrine of
implied licence to exclude an infringement claim in respect of copyright in or relating to specified drawings of
a patented prodnct (polyrim pulleys). In recognizing the right to repair on behalf of the defendant, the Court
treated the doctrine as equally applicable to both the patent and the related copyright [19771 RP.C. 537.
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To return to the question above, if a negative answer is the case (i.e., beyond a due return
there is no mischief su:fficiently gross to curtail protection), it could be assumed that the
"enforcement exception" could take place only when both a conflicting right, of the kind
invested in the car owner, and a right of normal exploitation concur. Such a conflict of rights
would lie only (broadly speaking) in a monopolistic background. On this point the plaintiffs
made, indeed, a substantial contention: as long as they and licensees were willing to offer
adequate supply at reasonable charges there was no detriment to the alleged right of car
owners. The House of Lords refused such a test and considered that to enforce the claim
would bring the prospect of the plaintiffs acting unreasonably.' 9 Accepting the potential for
unfair behaviour as an able premise, it could be argued that what ultimately justified the
enforcement exemption was the existence of an extra-statutory conflicting right opposed to
the copyright claim. The Court was satisfied with a formal conflict arising from the mere
existence of alleged rights (a right of consumers and a right over drawings of exhaust pipes),
rather than from the exercise of an intellectual property right.
In justifjing the policy behind its decision the House of Lords paid no credit to other
submissions, namely, abandonment, exhaustion of rights, licence to the world and fair dealing.
The first three patterns of defence overlap to a certain extent: they depart from the point in
which a right ceases to exist by lack of control, deliberate relinquishment, or preclusion of the
right under particular circumstances. These models rely on settled judicial practices regarded
as standing apart. In addition, fair dealing would not operate beyond the statutory conditions.
The prevailing solution, modelled outside those submissions, avoided extolling any defence
which apparently favoured a blanket licence which could easily be extended to other
situations. This suggests that the case, unlike previous ones, 2° is a limited precedent. The
application of its effects to any other situation outside the province of the spare-part market is
a costly venture. The case has its merits, however.
19 Resting on the public policy argument, the Court followed a per se rule approach as to the mark power
assessment How far such an adjudication criterion i1d be a valid oi uixler the 1988 C.D.PA. s. 238 is
debatable.
20 Given per incunam or not, as it s referred by Lord Harwich 11986, RP.C. at 3571, Pope and Swish
cases broadly established that the reproduction of a purely fuixiional object was a breach of copyright in tbe
drawings See King Features Syndicate Inc. v.0. & KL Kleeman Ltd. [1941] kC. 417 and LB. (Plastics) Ltd.
Swish Products Ltd. [19791 R.P.C. 551.
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The ultimate merit of the decision rests in the sensible result it sought: to safeguard a public
policy which was eventually reduced to a general interest, i e., the collective welfare of car'
users (consumers). There was a basic concern, which was to bar an attempt to expand the
boundaries of intellectual property to a point where rivals are obliged to copy in order to
compete. There is another implication. The rationale for the decision could be stated in this
way: if copying is worthy from the point of view of public interest, protection is not
necessarily available. In this way the ruling contributes to re-thinking or reshaping the theoiy
behind the intellectual property. All of these, however, do not obscure the critical part of the
decision.
It could be argued that the decision seems to conjure up a safeguard with no legal
provision. There is a risk in this which a safeguarding policy should avoid, and here it seems
proper to cIarif' a point. A claim inherent in the intellectual property bargain is that the
intellectual property is protected under the presumption of mutual benefits based on elements
of efficiency and or welfare. This is valid as a theoiy designed to explain the scope of the legal
protection, to inform the drawing of the statute and its interpretation, but it is not to be
invoked with a force of its own to cease protection by the permanent denial of enforcement;21
perhaps this may be advisable only to strike an exceptional statutoly inconsistency. The
theoiy in itself: however, is an aid to not a principle of law.
As the judicial reasoning has a rationality of its own, without a statutory regulation
previously known the treatment of the intellectual property is rather obscure. In addition, to
safeguard public interest, however noble, based on a mere doctrine only leads to an unclear
policy. No doubt, in the Br/lAsh Leyland case, the complex and difficult choice adjudicated
among competing factors cannot be seriously overlooked as fruit of a legal reasoning
committed to a central matter: the public interest pursued in a way which, at the scrutiny of
any learned man, attracts fill legitimacy22
21 This is at least discouraged by the Agreement on TRIPS, Article 31.
22 The supeivenient legislation seemed to have incorporated the Leyland case, but the matter is not entirely
settled. See Ford Motor Company Limited and Iveco Fiat's Design Applications (19931 RP.C. 399.
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Although welcomed, the policy drawn from the case was put forward in an unsatisfactoty
way. Once a statutory tight is recognised and protection iiscertained, a public policy is set
out consisting of the reward element along with other elements of efficiency and welfare
informing the social bargain. In the name of this social bargain, protection to the right may be
limited, or even suspended in the presence of a senous mischief, i.e., anti-competitive
practice. However, to cease protection against the statute means to overrule the bargain
behind the statutory protection. Bearing in mind that intellectual property is a statutory tight,
not a common-law tight, it is extremely difficult to understand the decision. Thus, the
Leyland case is a source of legal uncertainties and obscurity.
Given the scale of disagreements aimng judges and counsels, all of them presenting impressive
arguments. the impression is that the final decision was delivered against the precedents and statutory
provisions examined.
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7.2.4 The public interest under the MMC's reports
(i) Investigation by the MMC
After discussing public policy arguments at common law and in the modern cases,
deliberations of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) on public interests are
now brought forward for comparison. Unlike the cases previously exaniined, the MMC
reports seem to contain safer reasoning. This suggestion is associated with the Commission's
proceedings, and the features of the legal framework governing them.
Central to the competition investigations carried out by the Commission is the legal
guidance concerning the scrutiny of business practices operating, or expecting to operate,
against public interest. The MMC is required to give regard to all relevant matters, but it shall
take into particular account the desirability of pursuing efficiency and welfare goals by
promoting:
and maintaining effective competition in the UK between the suppliers ofgoods and services;
the interests of consumers, purchasers and users in the UK in respect ofprices, quality, and variety of the
goods and services supplied;
• through competition, the reduction of costs and the development and use of new techniques and new
products;
• andfacilitating the entry ofnew corners into ,jjJj;
• and maintaining a balanced distribution of the indusb and employment in the UK,
• and maintaining the export interests of UK producers ofgoods, and suppliers ofgoods and ser.'ices.t
The assumption inherent in these guidelines is that competitive efficiency, although
important, is not an element of pre-eminence over welfare matters. Although efficiency may
lead to economic welfare, there is a sense of social welfare which at times may be contrary to
the former. For this reason, and because efficiency in the context of the capitalist systems is
most desirable, policymakers in general may be led to disguise, but not to abandon or deny,
the social welfare side of trade regulations. In association with this, competition legislation is
by nature "suffused with political discretion." 2 This, unsurprisingly, to a certain degree is
reflected in the process of investigations carried out by the Commission.
Section 84(1) of the 1973 F.TA vJuch also applies to references under the 1980 Competition Act.
2 Cf Richard Wiush. Competition Law. p.60 61.
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Based on pragmatism and performed by panels, the MMC investigative system, the critics
say, is lenient and has failed to develop a "coherent decisional practice." 3 However, nothing
suggests that the investigatory procedures adopted by the Commission are incompatible with
its role, predominantly advisory. While passing a judgement on public interest, the
Commission's reasoned reports are important material deserving to be taken as an element for
companson.
This section does not intend to make a ui11 analysis of the Commission's investigations. This
is not necessary for the purposes of the dissertation. Only three "cases" (subject matters) are
selected in which the intellectual property issue was under consideration. Whether the MMC's
recommendations in these reports have been sound ones is not a matter of concern. The
purposes in considering the MMC reports are, primarily, to contrast the outcome of the
Commission's reasoning with the outcome reached by the common-law judges employing
public policy arguments.
The Commission is guided by specific directions not available to the common-law judges.
The eclectic professional background of the Commission's members is nothing compared with
the personal experience of the common-law judges. Although the Commission may not be a
model of an adjudicatory body to apply safeguarding measures on intellectual property, the
certainty of the conclusions of its reports is incomparably superior to the adjudicatory
outcomes of the common-law judges. The point is, as thr as predictability and quality of
decisions are desired, the specification of sound legal directions and personal experience are
decisive elements to entertain matters of public interest. On these elements the system of
adjudication on non-voluntary licences over intellectual property rights should rely, in order
to avoid the inconvenient uncertainties of the common-law decisions over restrictive practices
and passed on grounds of public policy arguments.
It is also intended to assess the impact on the intellectual property order4 of the
Commission's function as an apparatus working under the framework of competition law. It
RWhish,ob.cit,atpages23and6l.
Intellectual property order is defined as the way the
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has been affirmed in this dissertation that the mechanisms of competition law have a value
apart, distinct from the remedial measures intrinsic to the intellectual property law. The
estimation is that these remedial measures alone are insignificant to curb the misuse of
intellectual property tights. In consequence of such insignificance, and from the point of view
of the objectives of the social bargain, protection of these rights has little or no sense without
an effective control of the competitive process. In this connection, the examination of the
Commission's reports has an additional purpose, which is, to find out how the legal process
under the framework of the competition law is significant to the intellectual property order,
i.e., to what extent the control of competition ensures an alignment of the market conditions
concerning the licensing and exercise of the intellectual property nghts. Obviously, one is
aware that the MMC investigations are only a part of the mechanism of competition control,5
and a few reported cases do not cover the complete role of the Commission. Nevertheless, it
is believed that, as far as the method of the Commission's reasoning is concerned, the
selection shows a true picture of its unique procedures. The selected cases deal with the
background business practices related to electrostatic reprographic machines, car spare parts,
and database services in which the intellectual property factor is of considerable value.
(ii) Background cases
Indirect Electrostatic Reprographic Equipment6
The investigation was concerned with the conditions of supply in the United Kingdom of
indirect electrostatic reprographic equipment. Complying with the terms of a reference made
by the Secretary of State, the Commission found that Rank Xerox retained substantial market
power. Relying on this monopoly situation, the company applied a discriminatory rental
system. By the operation of a "Group Pricing Plan", Rank Xerox was able to reduce the copy
charge, but the discriminatory policy was kept, and the Plan worked as a bar against
intellectual property rights are exercised in relation to the market forces. It is assumed that t1 exercise of tlse
tights is responsive net only to the rules of supply aixi demand (the market sell ordering), but also to the state
regulatoiy intervention upon competition.
5 The control of the competitive process in Great Britain involves several bodies, including the Secretaiy of
Slate for Trade and Industry, the Director General of Fair Trading (DGFF), the MMC, t1 High Cowl, and
Restrictive Prtices Court
6 MMC report 47, A Report on the Supply of Indirect Electrostatic Repmgrapliic Eqwpment (1976).
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competitors. The MMC recommended, inter al/a, the termination of the piicing plan and the
surveillance of the sale prices of the company.
Apart from the reported conditions of supply and the pricing arrangements, the Commission
found out that Rank Xerox possessed a stock of more than 2.250 patents, of which a large
number were not used. A considerable proportion of these inventions were related to
processes of indirect electrostatic reprography. A particular process, called the fusion of toner
to plain paper, was protected by several Xerox patents, and was vital for the development of
faster machines. It was brought to the Commissions attention that competitors could not
easily find alternatives to that particular process. Moreover, it was suggested that the Rank
Xerox patenting policy worked to discourage potential competitors, mainly by taking out
patents to expand the scope of existing ones.
In the Commission's view, a portfolio of hundreds or thousands of patents in the field of
important technology impedes and delays the emergence of competition, not only by the
charge of excessive royalties, but also by the intimidating cost of tracking down the technical
validity of the inventions. 7 In the case of Rank Xerox, the company itself was not able to
identify the number of patents in use. The significant barner posed by the Xerox patents was
such that "compelled competitors to expand substantial time, effort and money both on
ascertaining the scope of the group's patents and on developing alternative, and sometimes
inferior, process in order to avoid infringement. g
The Commission recognised that it was not in a position to examine whether the Xerox
patenting policy conflicted with public interest. Therefore, the background information
suggested that the restrictive patent licensing allowed Rank Xerox to deter competitors and
maintain its dominant position 9 The inference was made on the basis of the inquiry about the
position of the Xerox group carried out by the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC). As a
result of the investigation, the American agency fouixl Xerox to be in breach of section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. The FTC eventually issued a Consent Order of world-
Idein, para. 387.
Idem. para. 388.
klein, para. 391.
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wide scope setting out, inter alia, that Xerox was required to licence all patents relating to
office copiers, a licensee could designate up to three patents to be licensed free of royalty, the
royalty rate could not exceed both 0.5% on net revenues and an accumulated royalty of
1.5%, Xerox was obliged to provide licensees with know-how except know-how for
manufacture abroad, for five years Xerox could not operate any price plan, and for ten years
the company was prevented from acquiring any interest in any supplier of copiers.'°
Taking into account the effects of the FTC's consent order, the Commission made no
recommendation concerning the patenting affairs. Furthermore, in the 1991 report on Indirect
Electrostatic Photocopiers (IEPs)" the Commission observed that after the 1976 report
competition developed quickly among manufacturers and importers in the supply of JEPs, and
it was satisfied that no barner existed either to entry or exit from the IEP market.'2 Nothing
thus operated or expected to operate against the public interest.
Car parts'3
The investigation considered the wholesale supply of motor car parts either for resale as such
or for replacement in motor cars. The Commission detected the existence of a complex
monopoly situation in favour of certain car manufacturers and importers. The suppliers
required purchasers to buy from them exclusively or from sources approved by them. This
trading restnction, an exclusive buying requirement, was found anti- competitive.
The MMC concluded, in summary, that the exclusive buying:
• limited the extent to which component manufacturers can compete with one another and with car
manufacturers and importers;
• restricted price competition;
• hmite4 on the level ofservice, the benefits franchisees could take from a more competitive market;
• restricted competition among factors (retailers).'4
10 Idem, paras. 157 to 160.
"MMC report, Indirect electrostatic photocopiers, A report on the supply by manufacturers and importers
of indirect electrostalic photocopiers in tho United Kingdom, Cia 1693, (1991).
12 ldem,para.9.156.
13 MMC, A Report on the matter of the existence or tho possible existence of a complex monopoly situation
in relation to tho wholesale supply of motor r parts in tic United Kingdom, HC 318 (1982).
' Ideni, pars. 6.34.
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The Commission found that practices other than exclusive buying also impeded the
development of the components industry. These practices included minimum stock
requirements and stock control systems, sales or purchase targets, discounts and bonuses, and
restrictions on advertisements. Altogether these were fomis of restrictions on the freedom of
franchisees to sell spare parts.' 5 The MMC, however, had no specific mandate to investigate
any practice but exclusive buying in connection with the replacement equipment market, thus
excludmg supply for production of cars and to importers. In this respect, the Commission
observed:
We recognise that the fluture of the components industr y has important implications for the public interest,
affecting, as it does, the employment directly and indirectly of a very large number of workers and the export
of a substantial volume ofgoods. But our terms of reference are narrowly draw,i and it is therefore necessw
to consider whether by adopting any of the practices mentioned in the previous paragraph car manufacturers
and importers 'require persons to whom they supply car parts to acquire them exclusive! from them or from
sources approved by them' 16
The position of the British component industry was this. Although impeded from supplying
directly franchised outlets, a large number of component manufacturers reached this part of
the market through car manufacturers. Relying on their own business, a small number of car
parts manufacturers supplied the replacement market both at home and abroad. In some way
they benefited from the situation. A third class of component manufacturers, unable to supply
car manufacturers in the required volume, and prevented from supplying franchised outlets,
even indirectly, could only supply non-franchised outlets. In this way, the bulk of parts for
cars made in the United Kingdom was supplied by UK industry, but a proportion of these
partS was imported by car manufacturers, with whom the UK component industry could not
compete.' 7 This state of affairs made the equation of interests a very complicated matter. The
situation was maintained thanks to the intellectual property right over designs of car parts.
While copyright was strengthened by legal precedents,' 8 specialists in the Government were
in controversy whether protection should be removed or reduced.' 9 Relying on this
' Idem, para. 6.11.
16 Idem, para. 6.12.
17 Idem,paras.6.20to6.24.
18 See British Northrop Ltdv Texteam Blackburn Ltd [19741 RP.C. 57, Dorling v Honnor 119641 RP.C.
160, and Amp v Utilux [1972] R.P.C. 103. These cases had the effect to assure pinteclion for lifetime plus 50
years against coping of the useful articles, i.e., in their three dimensional shapes.
19 Whitford Committee, Report on Copyright and Designs Law, Cmnd 6732 (1977); the Government Green
Paper, Cmnd 8302 (1977).
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protection, car manufacturers held a high bargaining power capable of threatening
competition.20
Considering the copyright issue, the MMC argued that "the use of copyright to protect
functional articles in the absence of any element of invention [appearedi to be particularly
capable of being directed towards unreasonable restriction of competition, and there may well
be a case for some change in the law." 2 ' In this respect, the MMC could not be of any
assistance. Additionally, its mandate was rather limited under the reference.
The Commission recommended the abandonment of the practice of exclusive buying, but
commented that the removal of such a restriction was a small step of limited impact, and
suggested that further investigation would be needed to look at the full implications of the
restrictions mentioned above. 22 The intellectual property issue was later re-assessed in the
Ford case reported below.
Ford Motor Company Ltd.
The investigation concerned the restrictive policy conducted by the Ford company regarding
the licence for manufacture or sale of certain spare parts. Licence was available only for firms
supplying spare parts to the company which was claiming copyright over the designs of the
replacement body parts. Upon specific reference, the Commission carried out an inquiry and
concluded that Ford's practice was anti-competitive, and adverse to public interest, thus
confirming the preliminary report of the Director General of Fair Trading. The MMC
recommended changes in the law of copyright and registered designs (to accord protection
only for five years) as the only means to remedy the anti-competitive consequences, and
hoped that in the meantime Ford would agree to license the manufacture of the parts on
reasonable royalties.
2 klein, cf. paras. 438 and 4.39.
21 Idem. para. 6.18.
Idein, para. 6.54.
MMC, A report on the policy and practice of the Foni Motor Company Limited 1 not granting licences
to manufacture or sell in the United Kingdom certain ttplacement body parts for Ford Vehicles. Cmnd. 9437
(1985)
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In accordance with the reference, the MMC was required to investigate the pursuit of the
policy and practice described above, but not to give any opinion on possible anti-competitive
effects arising from the protection of the drawings or designs of spare parts, nor the validity
of the intellectual property right being claimed by Ford.24 The success of the claim would
allow Ford Company and other car manufacturers and importers "to eliminate the
competition provided by independent suppliers of panels which infringed Ford's copyright or
registered designs," with significant impact on the market.
The effects of Ford's practice (refusal to license) on employment and balance of payments
was brought to the Commission's attention. lithe car manufacturers were to win the battle of
proprietary iight, the job losses would exceed 2,000 in areas where unemployment was
already high. It would directly affect people employed by independent suppliers, others
indirectly employed on sub-contracted work, and also those indirectly employed in support
services 26 Furthermore, owing to trade cessation, the cost of vehicle repairs would increase,
and export by independent suppliers would be jeopardised by the increase in the export prices
(computation of royalties in the price structure), thus reflecting in the balance of payments.27
Apart from these would-be consequences, the characterisation of the exercise of intellectual
property tights as anti-competitive, and the suitable remedies to cure its adverse effects were
discussed.
A course of conduct capable of being qualified as anti-competitive practice was a manner by
which a person carries on a business, Ford argued; quite differently, it added, is a mere
exercise of a property right which is not part of that conduct. Ford also contended that a
practice is only anti-competitive if once it has stopped, an opportunity for competition
opens.28 The contention was rejected by the Commission on the grounds that refusal to grant
licences over copyright is as anti-competitive as it is under patent, and that if the referred
practices "were to be abandoned, lawful competition would become possible. Whether it
24 Tl intellectual property right issue was sub judice. see
Br.hshLeylandvArmslrong [198413 CIVLLR. 102
Cmnd. 9437, para. 5.33.
klein, para. 5.22.
27 Idem, paras. 5.23 and 5.28. The unpact on overseas trade in the Commission's view was comparatively
insignificant" Para. 6.47.
28 Idem,para.6.7.
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would be economically possible as well as legally possible nobody can tell until the legal
obstacle is removed." 29 From the point of view of public interest, the problem was to assess
the sort of change necessary to let competition emerge.
The Commission in principle understood that the grant of licences at a reasonable price
would solve the problem, and Ford was prepared to accept such an undertaking.3°
Nevertheless, there were practical and legal difficulties to enforce the remedial licensing due
to the lack of ability of the Secretary of State to make a licensing order, and to arbitrate
royalties. Recognising a conflict between a 1 5-year protection and the public interest, the
MMC asserted that five years would give Ford an opportunity to obtain an adequate return,
and equally would "provide continuing stimulus to innovation and development."3'
Historical on-line database services32
The subject of investigation was the supply in the UK of text retrieval services, providing
users with on-line access to historical databases containing business and financial data. The
reference limited the inquiry to database material reproduced or summarised from daily and
Sunday newspapers, and excluded from real-time services (continuously updated
information).
The Commission established the existence of two monopoly situations: one in favour of the
Financial Times group (retaining about 40 per cent of the reference services under the name
FT profile), and the other in favour of Knight-Ridder Inc and its subsidiaries (about one third
of the reference services under the names Data-Star/Dialog). Because of the significant
competition among the suppliers of database services, and despite some concerns among
them relating to existing restrictions on information access the MMC found no evidence that
they operated or expected to operate against the public interest. The Commission also
observed that in the course of the investigation the FT group not only declared themselves to
Idem, paras. 6.18 and 6.25.
3° Idem, paras. 6.53 to 6.55.
31 Idem, paras. 663 to 6.65.
32 MMC, A report on the supply in the UK of seivices which provide access to databases containing archival
business and finaria1 information, Cm. 2554(1994).
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be prepared to license all their publications, but also opened new licensing opportunities33
The MMC collected authorised views of interested parties, concerning licensing policies
applied by the major UK players in the electronic information market, who predominantly rely
on copyright protection over the databases they host and/or create. Safeguarding licensing
has been contemplated in regard to the reality of the market for electronic information, the
profile of the firms and their trading practices.
The market for electronic information is of an international nature. While data are stored in
one country, electronic access to users is provided in many other countries. A service
available in the UK may be provided by a host computer located in the USA or Switzerland,
and information may be accessed from anywhere in the world, even before the produced data
can be available for the first time in hard copy. In the future, it may be possible through
inteffigent sofiware to "allow users to bring together information resources in a single search
inquiry, although those resources would actually be held in many different places on many
different computers on the network."34 Due to this background, information providers tend
to be big, and operate in different countries.
The information industiy is dominated by large companies, competing on an international
basis. They invest in sophisticated retrieval software to answer user inquiries, select and
compose databases which require a great deal of editorial techniques. The companies rely
heavily on copynght to protect their products. It is believed that for the development of a new
database no incentive other than copynght exists. Without it the industry is not sustainable.
While relying on copytight, the industry is keen on some world-wide practices, such as
exclusive and restrictive licensing, leading to some impediments to information access.
However, low bathers to entry, threats of new forms of competition and the existence of
several players are the characteristics of the market. Alternative sources of informative
material is also available. These are believed to secure users' choices, and new corners' ability
to compete, and thus guarantee a workable degree of competition.
Iclem, paras. 5.28, 5.29. It was explained that the change was due to the availability of new technology.
Idem, para. 8.27.
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As far as the restnctive practices of dominant firms are concerned, a key point is the practical
difficulty of putting in place an adequate compulsory licensmg policy without damaging data
suppliers (hosts, copyiight owners) unfairly. In the view of the major group, compulsory
licensing would require a change world-wide because "a change in one country merely meant
that people in other countries gained the benefits without having to make changes
themselves."35 However, the view of the overwhelming majoiity36 did not regard copyright
over databases sacrosanct. They believed that the copyright owner may be compelled to
licence, when opportunities exist to exploit without uthir damages, such as, already-
published information by other publishers or database producers being withheld or limited.37
If copyright is to be regarded as sacrosanct, and in order to make it a unique means for the
host company to stay ahead of the competition, it could discourage the information industry
to seek improvements, 38 such as, better editorial techniques, more friendly software retrieval,
and reduction of operational costs and consequent better prices. Such discouragement is a
possibility, though hypothetical, which requires in-depth analysis
(iii) Assessment of the investigations
A relevant conclusion emerging from the analysis is that, while the common-law judge
assessed public interest on the basis of precedents and principles, the Commission is
concerned with an empirical public interest Another conclusion is that although in the cases
above no recommendation was made to make available a licence of right upon, or to order
the owner to licence, the intellectual property right concerned,39 in practical terms the
consequential effects of the recommended remedies were to make possible a general access to
that right, thus satisf,'ing the social bargain.
ldem.para.644.
36 Only the European Information Industiy Association (EllA) stated that m no circumstances compulsory
licensing should be imposed upon copynght holder. Para. 8.32.
Idem,para.810.
See in this respect The Daily Telegraph's initiatives, at pars. 6.49.
The unavailability of specific measures addressmg the intellectual propeTty issue, and the limitations on
the MMC investigatory capacity imposed by the terms of the references denote the benignity and political
discrthon of the system.
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Empirical public interest
Concentrating on specific practices, such as discriminatory rental scheme, exclusive buying,
and restrictive licensing policy, the task of the Commission was to establish the existence of a
monopoly situation, and the charactensation and effects of the referred mischief without
sophistication. While working on facts, the reasoning is developed in a language very
understandable by the main players (businessmen). The feeling is that the proceedings satisfy
all, the Government as guardian of public interest and the traders involved. Not all interested
firms in the end feel happy with the conclusions, but these firms are able to follow the
reasoning and understand the sense of public interest, and the likely effects of the
recommendations and the actions, if it is the case, implementing them. All of these give the
proceedings and the applied reasoning a touch of legitimacy. This would not be possible if the
Commission were not required to carry out the investigation under settled guidelines. The
gain for the public arising from State intervention is the alignment of the market.
The impact of the MMC reports on the intellectual property order
As part of the social gain,40 the impact on the intellectual property order is visible. In the case
of reprographic equipment, the dimension of the threat posed by the patenting policy was
clearly established, but in this respect the Commission saw no reason to recommend any
specific remedy. The disclosure of the competitive situation itself brought up with the
investigation worked as a deterrent, as was confinned in later reports
Concerning the spare parts case, one could not tell that the first investigation contributed to
more improved competition, but this may be inferred from the terms of the reference of the
second report which did not include the investigation of the practices previously scmtinised.
Assuming that such an improvement occurred, presumably the exercise of copyright became
less abusive It should also be noticed that in the course of the second investigation Ford
advanced that it was prepared to licence at fair royalties. Again, the investigations per se
reflected positively on the bargaining power provided by the intellectual property, irrespective
4° The social gains include impmvement tourds better prices, employment, expansion of tax basis, exports.
and consumer choices.
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of the absence of any licensing order. (Incidentally, at the time of the investigations the
legislation provided no grounds for a licensing order.) The effects could also be assumed from
the muscle of the state machinery (the MMC mechanism for instance), bearing pressure on
the industry.4'
As far as the exercise of copyright is concerned, the database case suggests that an adequate
safeguarding policy should give due regard to a particular field of technology. Sensitive to this
aspect, the Commission did not feel encouraged to advance any opinion or recommendation.
Surprisingly enough, while the investigation was being carried out the major investigated
group announced a change in their licensing policy. Officially, such a change was credited to
technical reasons. The force of the event, nevertheless, is not to be underestimated as it
suggests a possible effect of the investigation on the pattern of business conduct regarding the
exercise of copyiight.
All of these confirm the suggestion that control of the competitive process most likely
reflects considerably in the exercise of the intellectual property rights. Consequently, that
control itself works as an effective limit to these rights.
As an option largely applied not only in Britain, but also in the legal system of the leading
industrialised nations generally, the implementation of remedial measures intrinsic to
intellectual property may not follow the proceedings of the MMC investigations. Factors such
as time and enforcement cost are likely to discourage an emulation. As far as reasoning and
public policy arguments are concerned, the MMC system is, however, a contrasting paradigm
to assist the structuring of the legal mandate of an incumbent body in charge of the
adjudicatory process of non-voluntary licensing, in a manner so as to avoid the uncertainties
of the common-law decisions.
41 Incidenhly, see the message inserted in the latest MMC's report on Motor Car Parts, pp 158/159, Cm
1818 (1994).
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7.3 Decisions on non-voluntary licences over UK patents
7.3.1 The discretion of the comptroller-general
(1) Discretion within the statutory framework
Under the British patent statute the unauthorised use of a patent is governed by detailed
statutoty conditions. Nevertheless, the statute entrusts to the comptroller a great deal of
discretion' in the entertainment of applications for, or in relation to, non-voluntary licences.
The comptroller may apply his discretion in several situations. In an application for a
compulsory licence on grounds of non-working to the extent reasonably practicable, he may
allow sufficient time to enable the patent to be worked, and so adjourn the granting of an
order. In determining the grounds for his decision, the comptroller is not required to look at
evidence arising after an application has been lodged, but he may do so in the face of a good
reason. Where an application has been opposed, a degree of discretion may also be exercised
concerning the length of the scrutiny of any question of fact raised in the proceedings.
It is said that "the grant of a compulsory licence admittedly is a matter of discretion."2
However, the comptroller cannot reject an application unless he has strong reason to do so.
The discretion is not a blanket charter, either. Nor is any party adversely affected by the
comptroller's discretion without being given an opportunity to be heard. 3 Without prejudice
of more objective indicators,4 a general guidance is given to the comptroller as to the matters
he approaches on an application for compulsory licensing. The purposes of the statutory
guidance is to secure:
reasonable and most efficient work in the United Kingdom o a patent for the public advantage;
• reasonable reward to inventors and proper regard to the nature of the invention; and
• fair protection to the commercial interests of those cairying on an invention in the country.5
'1977 Patents Act, ss 47-52. Traditionally, legislature has implicitly relied upon the unrivalled expenen
and expethse of the comptroller. See Smith Kline case (19901 RP.C. 203 at 249 (Nicholls U's statement) and
Allen case [19871 RP.C. 327 at 373 (Dillon Li's statement).
2 Zanetn-Streccia's Patent. 119731 RP.C. 227. at 229. (Statement of Whitford, J.)
l977PatentsAct,s. 101.
See section 50(2) of 1977 Patents Aa
1977 Patents Act, s. 50.
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The resort to discretion is also allowed particularly in situations described in statutoly
provisions enabling the comptroller to settle terms of licences as he "thinks fit." 6
 The fitness
to be ascertained must satisfy a balance of interests, i.e., the interests of the patentees, would-
be licensees and opponents, as well as the interest of the public at large. In this respect,
discretion is considered particularly when the comptroller is invited to ascertain specific
matters of facts, such as
• the working of a patent to the extent reasonably practicable in the country,
• the fulfilment on reasonable terms of the country's demand for a patent-related product,
• the denial by the patentee of a licence on reasonable terms, or
• the unfair prejudice (derived either from a refusal of a licence or imposition of conditions
by a patentee) operated against the establishment or development in the United Kingdom
of commercial or industrial activities.7
The case law indicates that courts also share the comptroller's discretion.
(ii) The amount of discretion as assessed by courts
The courts in many cases recognised a wide discretion in thvour of the comptroller. The
general view is that such a discretion should not be disturbed, unless to remedy errors which
make the discretionary decision inconsistent with a statutory direction. Nevertheless, what is
in the comptroller's discretion is also within the discretion of the courts on appeal.
Consequently, the discretion of the latter can overrule the fonner's
In the Allen case,9 the comptroller's discretion was assessed in respect of two points: the
extension to which the comptroller was allowed to impose limitations and conditions
concerning the terms of a licence of right, and the jurisdiction of the comptroller to start
proceedings to settle terms before the earliest date from which a statutory licence of right
6 1977 Patents Act, s. 48(4XaXc). The "thinks-fit" clause is also inserted in s. 49(1).
1977 Patents Act, s. 48(3XaXbXdXe).
See l977PatentsAct,s.99.
A 1/en & Jianhurys Ltd v. Generics (UK) Ltd eta/li 119861 RP C. 203.
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takes effect. The House of Lords accepted that in settling terms of licence, the comptroller
had the discretion to insert conditions concerning importation of a patent-related product and
quality control. The use of such discretionaiy power is justified on grounds of public interest
or public advantage, and it is not for the courts "to tell the Comptroller how he should
exercise his discretion."° The idea of wide discretion, nevertheless, is taken cum grano sails.
As a matter of clarification, it was argued that the comptroller could not impose restrictions
inconsistent with the statutory direction, and he could not interfere unnecessarily with the
control the owner has over his patent." The legal control over the use of the invention
conferred to the patentee was to a certain degree meant to work against the comptroller's
discretion. For instance, if a compulsory licence is granted and there is no disagreement as to
the conditions of the licence in principle the comptroller cannot alter such conditions.
However, the patentee's control over his right cannot amount to bar an application for
settlement of terms presented before the end of the sixteenth year over a patent treated as
endorsed licence of right, as specified in transitional provisions.' 2 In this connection, it was
argued that the application would be premature and the comptroller had no jurisdiction to
entertain it, an argument accepted by the comptroller. Overcoming the jurisdictional obstacle,
the Court concluded that for practical reasons the comptroller could entertain the
application.'3 This suggests that in exercising his discretion the comptroller is empowered to
do anything necessaly to comply with his statutory duty and not contrary to, or inconsistent
with, the patent regulation.
The principle of wide discretion' 4 is recollected from an old practice of the Patent
Appellate Court, which consists of not interfering with the comptroller's decision as to the
method of evaluation of a royalty rate. If the comptroller arrives at a conclusion plainly
supported by the facts of the case that the royalty should be assessed per kilo or on a
'° Idem, at 250 (Lord Diplock's statement).
"Lord Templeman argued that if m licences of right the proprietor and applicant agree on certain lawful
terms or conditions, the compUoller could not limit these terms. Allen case [19861 RP.C. at 255-257.
12 The 1977 Patents Act extended from 16 to 20 years the term of protection for those mventions patented
under the 1949 Act; but established that at the end of the sixteenth year the patents were treated as endorsed
licences of Tight Schedule 1, pam. 4(2Xc).
13 Allen case, [19861 R.P.C. at 255-257.
' 4 The wide discretion is understood in the sense that as long as it is properly exercised there are no grounds
for the court to interfere on appeal, unless the comp(rollefs decision is affected by plain inaceuracy.
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percentage of the selling price, and as no principle exists concerning the mode of assessment,
then the tribunal should not alter the result, unless the common-sense applied by the
comptroller appears to be a gross
Further discussion on the perception of a wide, but not exclusive, discretion has raised a
question about the role of the appellate courts, whether they have or have not more than a
mere supervisory function. However wide the discretion could be, it cannot be read in a
manner to deny the discretion also exercised by the court. Clearly, if the law opens an
opportunity for appeal, the judge cannot assess the accuracy or error of the comptroller's
adjudication unless the court is entitled to undertake a full re-hearing and exercise a "fresh
discretion".'6
The revisional assessment is made on the basis that judges have a duty to search for the
right answer. 17
 Obviously, such a duty is entrusted to the appellate courts. Consequently the
power of review attracts the same amount of discretion conferred to the comptroller, within
the limits of the appeal.
The right answer may rely on the interpretation of a particular statutory provision which
provides a straightforward outcome, or if the provision is too broad its application is left
therefore to the arbitration of the judge. In the first example discretion does not apply or
hardly does. The second example occurs where discretion is significant, and a great deal of
work is done to establish the facts and complete the statute. In this respect, when asked to
examine the question of royalty rates the Patents Court has exercised a discretion to the same
extent the comptroller has used for the same purpose of resolving the question, and,
concerning the same matter, the Court of Appeal has appeared to be rather liberal.'8
iden iden
16 119871 RP.C. 327 at 374 (Dillon Li); [1988] RP.C. 51 at 59 (Falconer J); and [19901 RP.C. 203 at
223 (Falconer 1), 239 (Lloyd Li), and 249/250 (Nicholls U). As to the Court of Appeal the discition is limited
because the appeal to it is not "a complete hearing." Sm th Kline case [1990] RP.C. 203 at 236 and 250.
' The duty to search for the nght anssier is not the same as the duty to give the right ans the former
may be intemipted lbr masons of cost/effectiveness and, unlike the latter, is part of the positivist conception of
law which gives no direct definition of what is right and what is wrong
Not all courts hear appeals on questions of flicts. From the comptroller's decisions on compulsoiy licences,
appeals shall lie with the Patents Court, but the Court of Appeal may hear appeals from decisions of the former
only on points in law and if leave is given. 1977 Patents Act, s. 97(l)(3).
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In the Smith Kline case,'9 the Court of Appeal stressed its limited discretionary role in dealing
with calculation of royalties, a question essentially of fact and discretion. Nevertheless, the
appeal was entertained in the consideration that guidance uld be needed in order to clarify
"important issues of principle involved". 20 The reporting judge added: "I do not propose to
isolate at this stage the questions of law on which alone an appeal lies." 2' This attitude reveals
great consideration of the matter of royalties.
Within a system of non-voluntary licences, the intellectual property right to a great extent is
reduced to a matter of reasonable remuneration conferred to the patentee. For this reason, the
assessment of royalties should attract careftil attention of the adjudicatory bodies. And a
distinction between matters of fact and matters of law in order to establish a limitation in the
conditions on which appeals lie to the courts can amount to irremediable damages to the right
of the owner to a just remuneration. Frequently, judges have to scrutinise facts in order to
pass a judgement on wrongs in law. When this occurs, there may not be a clear division
between matters of facts and error in law. In the Smith Kline case, the Court of Appeal had a
good reason to refuse to hear the appeal. It could argue that if the Court has to examine
complex facts in order to approach an alleged wrong in law, the appeal is not to be heard. If
had been the case, the distinction between matters of fact and matters of law could amount to
an inconvenient bar.
(iii) Conditional applications
In Enviro-Spray systems Inc's Patent it was alleged that the applicants for a compulsory
licence (over patents concerned with the flow control of a product from a container by means
of propellant gas) had proved no ability to work the patents. They provided no information
on how they intended to exploit the inventions and gave no details about financial resources
and technical assistance. In the course of the proceedings the comptroller was asked to make
a conditional grant, i.e., to grant a compulsory licence with effect from a future date after the
19 E19901R.P.C. 203.
20 Idem, at p.236 (Lloyd U).
2Ij
22 Section 97 of the Patents Act 1977 does nc deal with the matter in sixth dail.
23 [1986] RP.C. 147 at 156.
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comptroller was served with further evidence of the applicants' ability. The request was
dismissed on the ground that the statute made available no power for such a two-stage
process. Although the decision sounds correct, clarification is needed concerning the
comptroller's argument.
It could be argued that because the statute has no provision on the contrary the comptroller
could allow the conditional grant under the concept of useful discretion. The validity of this
argument cannot be ruled out. And in this respect it seems to be within the comptroller's
capacity to take any measure, without explicit statutory provision, and in the precise and
necessary extent to comply with a safeguarding policy, provided that it does not lead to
unnecessary restiiction upon the intellectual property right. In the Enviro-Spray application,
while alleviating the applicants evidentiaiy burden, the conditional grant would require the
patentee to keep tracking down or following up the process, and thus impose an inconvenient
cost upon the owner with no reasonable justification. It follows that whoever has the interest
in exploiting an invention, by means of a non-voluntary licence and within specific statutory
conditions, has to be prepared to demonstrate in the first place his ability to do this. The
conditional grant, in the Enviro-Spray case, would amount to an unnecessary disturbance of
the patent right. The same cannot be said in respect of an early application for settlement of
terms concerning a class of patents treated by the patent statute as endorsed with licence or
rights.
(iv) Early settlement of terms of statutory licence of right
Having extended the patent term from 16 to 20 years, the 1977 Patents Act also made such a
new tenn applicable to existing patents which, nevertheless, were to be treated as endorsed
licences of right from the first day of the 17th year. 24 In Allen v Generics25 an early
application was at issue relating to a patent of that class.
After unsuccessflil negotiations with the patentee, the interested firm started the
proceedings to settle tenns before the date on which a licence of right would automatically be
24 1977 Patents Act, sch. 1(4X2Xc).
[1986] R.P.C. 203 at 249 to 252.
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available. The comptroller regarded the application a premature one and adjourned
entertainment. The decision was challenged and reversed.26
Later in the House of Lords it was established that there was nothing against the
comptroller exercising his juiisdiction. In regard to the short period of the subsistence of the
automatic licence of right, it was recognised to be in the public interest that a licence could
start operating as early as possible within the remaining four years. To this end, the Court saw
no obstacle in starting the initial procedure in the course of the sixteenth year. The decision
was an exception, justified under the particular circumstance of a licence of right operating
automatically, depending solely on a mere lapse of time. The practical approach was entirely
proper. Given the described situation, the early application was a matter of time-saving and
caused no hindrance to the patent right. The next point shows the comptroller acting to
favour this right.
(v) Cancellation of endorsement of licences of right
In proceedings to cancel an endorsement 'licence of right', 27
 the patentee (applicant) showed
a bonafide interest to manufacture the patented article in this countiy, but to facilitate his
intent he wanted to withdraw the endorsement. The sole opponent, a British company, was
allegedly about to commence manufacturing the patented article and intended to challenge the
validity of the patent. If it failed in such a challenge, the company, then, would like to apply
for a licence.
The facts showed that a considerable demand for the patented article was being met only by
importation. It was also substantiated that the patentee had previously tried to get the patent
worked with no success but he decided to apply for the cancellation because a group of
British businessmen was seriously negotiating the working of the patent, but the group saw
no prospect of a deal unless the endorsement was cancelled. The cancellation would make
possible for the interested group to have an exclusive licence which had been required for
financial reasons.
26 Idem, idem.
27 &renyzN Patent 119381 R.P.C. 228.
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The opponent knew of the patent at least four years before the application and took no step
either to challenge the validity or to apply for a licence under the provision of licence of right.
For this reason, and on the balance of the whole circumstances, the comptroller, under his
discretion, allowed the cancellation as a best way to meet the public interest. The cancellation,
moreover, would not prevent the opponent from challenging the patent validity through
proper proceedings. The comptroller would have inflicted inconvenient harm upon the
patentee nght if the cancellation were not allowed.
If an endorsement 'licence of tight' has been made upon a voluntaiy application of the
patentee, a later request of his own for cancellation can only be denied on the basis of an
impediment of public interest objectively assessed. In the Serenyi case refeffed to above such
an impediment was not present, since the opponent was not qualified as an existing licensee.
This argument in itself was sufficient to allow the cancellation. In withdrawing the
endorsement, the comptroller paid due regard to the patentee's right of private control over
the patent. Having the duty to respect this tight, the comptroller can, again, only exercise his
discretion against it to satisfy a competing statutoly policy. This argument is now tested as
regards sub-licensing
(vi) Sub-licensing
Sub-licensing is an issue frequently raised in applications over patents on pharmaceutical.
Applicants are normally holding companies which have a number of subsidiaries. In Hi/ti AG'S
Paten?8 the applicant sought the liberty to grant sub-licences to companies under their
control. The application was made under the assertion that the patentee would have no
prejudice. The first question at issue was whether the comptroller had junsdiction to dispense
such an order.
The matter does not seem to be one of lack of jurisdiction. In principle, a sub-licence may
be regarded as a tight of a licensee to extend the licence to others (subsidiary companies for
instance). The nature of the request may be compared to a multiple application which the
[19881 RP.C. 51.
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statute does not prohibit. 29 But some difficulties may arise concerning the adjudication on
proper conditions of sub-licensing.
A sub-licensee, even a subsidiaiy company, is an independent entity whose business the
comptroller hardly knows about, unless the sub-licensee is qualified in the application. This is
the first difficulty. In order to perform his duty, the comptroller is required to watch over
specific interests and pursue a balance of these. His ability is impaired if he has to entertain an
application on behalf of an unknown would-be sub-licensee.
A common argument in favour of a sub-licence is that its terms follow those of the licence.
This approach does not seem to be a proper one to safeguard fairly the commercial interests
involved, of which the comptroller is an institutional care-taker. In this regard, if the patentee
opposes a sub-licence, not even providing reason for the refusal, the comptroller has no
secure basis to decide otherwise, nor has he an entire account of what the factual situation
will be at the time the sub-licence is to become effective. Thus, the comptroller is not able to
assess whether the sub-licence is beneficial or not to the public interest.
In a very few cases sub-licences have been allowed,30 but the judicial policy is to preclude it
under the fresh-application rule, which requires the assessment of evidentiary elements in
substantiam and in continenti tempore.3' In the Salbutwnol case a patent upon a
pharmaceutical substance (salbutamol) was treated as endorsed of licences of right. The
application was to settle terms. It was at issue, inter alia, whether the applicant could be
allowed to sub-contract the manuThcture of the final dosage drug. The sub-contract was
permitted by the comptroller who argued: "sub-contracting of the manufacture of final dosage
forms by genetic companies is common practice and is regulated by the product licensing
authority, the sub-contractor being simply an agent of the licence holder who retains full
responsibility. Thus, to my mind, sub-contracting is to be distinguished from sub-licensing and
I can see no objection to this being permitted under the licence." 32
 The Patents Court
Section 41 of the 1949 Patents Act pmhibiting sublicensing even of subsidiaiy companies
	 not
retainedbythe 1977 Patents Act, sch. 6.
3°S Whiford J's statement in the Soibutainol case referred in the footnote below [19871 RP.C. at p. 366.
Salbutamol case [1987] RP.C. 327 at 380.
32 Idem, at p. 349.
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disallowed the sub-contracting Confirming the latter's decision, Dillon Li in the Court of
Appeal stated:
If the appl:aInLN want to sub-contract the making of the final dosage forms, they and their projxsed
subcontractors should put detailed proposals, with the intended form of sub-contract, before the comptroller
on afresh application.33
What is fresh is the data and reasons attached to the complete proposals referred to, and
from which the authority may derive his reasoned justifications, brought with the application
under consideration.
As far as the control of the patentee over the patent is concerned, the fresh-applicailon rule
is a criterion of some assistance for the proper exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction. The
private control exercised by the patentee through voluntary licensing is statutorily encouraged
and should be saved as far as possible. This policy is based on the belief that the patentee is
materially better prepared to exploit the market within the monopoly right statutorily
affordable. In exercising his discretion, the comptroller has the ability to interfere lawfully
with the private control to satisfy a specific competing policy, but in doing so he needs to give
proper regard to the facts and merits of individual claims. As long as the fresh-application
guidance is observed, sub-contracting or sub-licensing may be granted.
The importance of sub-licensing may lie in the encouragement of competition, and in this
respect regarded is given to sub-contracting or sub-licensing as a common practice in the
chemical and pharmaceutical industries, as it was referred to in the comptroller's statement
quoted above. However, the matter requires further guidance. Sub-contracting may concern a
small component or a relevant part of manufacturing, and it may be ordered abroad thus
involving importation with implications which need to be assessed in the light of the purposes
pursued by the non-voluntary licensing policy. Under this consideration, the distinction
between sub-contracting and sub-licensing is irrelevant. In short, sub-licensing may be
granted; but if it is not contemplated in a fresh application, the comptroller will have difficulty
[1987J RP.C. at 380, line 35.
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in performing his duty properly, as regards, inter a/ia, the working of the invention in the
country to the fullest possible extent, a point examined below.
(vii) The patentee's duty to manufacture in the country
In the McKechnie cas?' a compulsory licence was claimed upon a patented process (an
invention oiiginating in a German company) for improvement in the manufacture of light..
resisting lithofone. The Applicant alleged abuse of monopoly right, specifically, non-working
of the patent in the UK on a commercial scale, the working being hindered or prevented in the
view of the demand being met by importation, and refusal of the patentee to grant a licence,
thus in prejudice of a new trade or industry in the UK and against public interest. The licence
denied to the applicant was late granted to a third finn.
The patentee suggested that he had had difficulties in finding suitable licensees and that the
working required considerable investment. These circumstances were put forward to justify
the denial of licence and the late working of the patent.
The application was allowed by a decision eventually confinned by the High Court. The
comptroller-general did not find enough evidence to accept the patentee's excuse, and
established:
• that the patent was not being woi*ecL although shortly after the application the worlang in the UK had
started;
• that in the five or six-war interval between the date the patent was sealed and the date the application was
lodged supply was made by importation, infemng from that the existence ofa domestic demand;
• that the importation apparently was hindering, in the sense of moiang more difficult, if not preventing,
manufacture under the patent;
• that it was of the interest of the community at ke that the patent worked in the UK without undue
delay. 35
The analysis below has not the purpose of assessing whether the comptroller's decision was
in fact the right one in the circumstances of the particular cases from the point of view of
competition or efficiency. One has no ability to do so here, nor the information available
McKechnie Bms. IA's Patent [19341 R.P.C. 441.
Idem.
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would allow such an examination Instead, the purpose is to infer from the published
reasoning what in fact have been the procedures and cnteiia the comptroller has used in the
entertainment of the application.
In fact; at the time the application was made the patent was not worked in the United
Kingdom, and the circumstances in which the patentee did not early promote the working of
the patent remained unclear. On this point; however, the comptroller-general stuck to the
simple fact that the patentee had time enough to take the necessary steps to work the patent.
In so doin& the controller did not explore in fill the reason presented by the patentee, and,
for instance, the reason for the patentee discriminating between willing licensees was not
investigated, a practice which, although debatable, has some relevance from the competition's
point of view.
Apparently, there was a demand for articles related to the patented process. No figure,
however, was brought to make some quantitative sense. Was that demand from the point of
view of distribution and pnce unsatisfactorily met? How could the entry of another licensee
be in the public interest? These issues are relevant. Depending on the market conditions
surrounding the patented articles it could be assessed how the supply by importation was
hindering the working in the country and the sort of benefit which it could render to the
public. If the manufacture in the country is not; or cannot be, caned out in an efficient way,
importation could make available to the public better quality and price. This would be an issue
of public interest; and an mquuy in this regard would require a test of gain for the community
at large to be performed.
The fact that the comptroller had failed to perform a test of the community's benefit was not
a mistake in itself It rather reflected the underlying policy, which was, as it is today, to foster
manufacture in the country, and consequently to create conditions to expand both
employment opportunities and a tax basis, and so to heat the economy as a whole. In order to
satisfy this welfare policy, the patentee is required to take as much effort as he does abroad to
work the invention or carry on the process, and in doing so not to take advantage of the UK
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market at the expense of traders in the countiy. 36 The implementation of such a policy in
particular with no regard to efficient allocation of resources is justified on grounds of welfare,
in the sense that it favours fundamentally, as was said, the expansion of employment and a tax
basis. It favours consumer choice, but not necessarily guarantees better price and quality.
The argument of lack of economic viability of the working in the country as a patentee's
defence was also disregarded in two more cases. In the Fabricmeter case37 a compulsory
licence was requested upon a patented invention (originated in a US company) for
improvements in and relating to fabric measuring machines. The applicant alleged abuse of
monopoly right under the charges, namely, lack of working unreasonably, hindering or
prevention of manufacture in the UK due to importation from abroad, demand of the
patented article not being met adequately or on reasonable terms, and detriment of an industry
or trade in the United Kingdom by reason of refusal to grant a licence. It was reported that
the patentee had set up a manufacture at the date of the hearing only to the effect of
disallowing the application.
The patentee suggested that the manufacture in England would be commercially
impracticable and economically impossible, so that the company would face diminution of
profit. This contention was rejected both because there was no full evidence in that respect
and the allegation was not an adequate excuse for not working the patent in the country. The
comptroller felt satisfied with the factual background, and established that there was no
working of the patented article in the country on a commercial scale, and that the demand
was not satisfactorily met, in prejudice of domestic industry or trade.
The failure to manufacture in the country was also an issue in the Kalle case.38 A
compulsory licence was granted upon a patented process (an invention originating in a
Germany company) for producing photo-mechanical printing plates, on the grounds that the
patent was not being worked in the UK and demand was being met by importation. The
respondent contended that the UK market size would make the commercial working
See Hatschek's Patent [19091 RP.C. at 241.
' FabIicmeter Co. Ld.'s Applicalion [1936J 53 RP.C. 307
Kalle & Co. kG.'s Patent [19661 F.S.R. 112.
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uneconomic, mainly because of the high manufacturing cost. In view of this, importation
would be the only practical means to meet the demand.
Rejecting the submission, the court held that the UK market seemed to be larger than the
patentee suggested. This assertion, based on unsafe evidence, derived from the considerable
volume of the respondent's annual sales, and on royalty figure proposed by the respondent.
All the cases cited above were discussed in the light of different legislation. The efficiency
argument is also rejected under the proceedings governed by the current patent regime.39
One may argue that competition (efficiency) would be ill-placed since the proceedings
conducted by the comptroller do not allow a full economic analysis. This is true. Therefore,
the unsuitability of the proceedings to carry out an economic analysis confirms the argument
that the adjudication system of non-voluntary licence has been designed to pursue welfare and
efficiency goals. While not allowing a proper entertainment of the efficiency argument, thus
neglecting the efficiency goals, the proceedings turn rather into a pro-welfare system.
It is understood that the safeguarding system is governed by the principle that intellectual
property rights are protected to the extent that they work for the benefit of the country. Lying
in this statutory principle, a duty is imposed upon the iight holder, that is, to exploit the
invention fully in the country. The process is precisely in accordance with the policies behind
it.
The policy in itself is a choice of the country in the defence of national interests. Nothing
wrong with this. The criticism goes to the proceedings which fail to distinguish non-voluntary
licences on grounds of efficiency from those on grounds of welfare. As far as the legal basis
for unauthorised use of UK patents includes efficiency grounds, and the efficiency defence is
not fully allowed, the system of safeguarding policy fails to deliver the goods.
In Extrude Hone Corporation's Patent [19821 RP.C. 361, an application being made under the 1977
Patents Act, a conipulsoiy licence was granted upon an invention (originating in an American company) on
the gmunds of inter alia, the patentee's failure to fully exploit the invention relating to a method, apparatus
and material for abrading or honing surfaces. The patentees contested alleged market fragmentation and lack
of commercial viabihty. Casting aside the submission, the decision relied purely on the absence of the
patentee's real effort to introduce the invention in the UK
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(viii) Restrictions upon importation from non-EC countries
As was said, the granting of non-voluntaiy licences to import was an issue dealt 'vith by the
courts on several occasions. The House of Lords came to recognise the comptroller's
discretion to decide in the circumstances of a particular case whether to allow or not
importation, including from EC-countnes. Later, the European Court of Justice established
that the limitation concerning importation from EC-countries was contraly to the Treaty of
Rome,4° which prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports between Member States. 4' Now
the issue has only importance concerning limitation on imports from non-EC countries. And
in this respect the discretion of the comptroller is no longer contested. The issue, however,
has some remaining implications concerning trade protectionism, dumping and disclosure of
sensitive information.
A trace of protectionism
While the law allows discrimination between EC-countries and non-EC countries, the system
of non-voluntaiy licensing is used to protect trade in favour of a block of countries.
Protectionism in such a scale should be a matter for concern, not only from the point of view
of the trade liberalism as a message entailing the new GATT frameworlç but also from the
point of view of consumer interest. As has been pointed out during this dissertation, this is not
the only way the intellectual property and competition policies in place in the industrialised
World are used in a protectionist fashion. Before deciding whether to emulate or not these
policies, other countries should be aware of the consequences.
A general purpose governing the granting of a licence is to secure the adequate working of
the patent in the countly and that "the interests of any person for the time being working or
developing an invention in the United Kingdom shall not be unfairly prejudiced." 42 These are
key policies to be considered when the prohibition on imports from non-EC countries is at
° Articles 30 and 36.
Re Compulsoiy Patent Licences: EC Commission v. United Kingdom (Spain lnteri'enzng), Cases C-30/90
and C-235/89 [19931 RP.C. 283 and [1992] I E.C.R 777, 829. See also Allen wid Hanbwys Limited v.
(Jenencs (UA) Limited, E.C.J. Case 434/85 11988] 14(6) F.S.R 312.
1977 Patents Act, s. 48(3Xa) and 50(lXaXc).
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issue. Pursuing those policies, the practice adopted by the comptroller is to prohibit imports if
adequate manufacture of a patented product is being carned out in the countiy
The issue is usually raised in cases related to patents upon chemical or pharmaceutical
compounds Allen v. Generics is the landmark case where the House of Lords established
that in settlement of terms of licences of right the comptroller can include limitation on
imports. The patented article was a medicine drug an anti-asthmatic antibiotic known
under the generic name of Salbutamol. The licensees wanted to manufacture salbutamol
tablets in the UK and vith this purpose intended to import raw material from Italy. A degree
of discretionaiy prohibition was allowed.
In dealing with this question the authority may be encouraged to exercise his discretion in
the light of a liberalising ideal, and holding that imports, once admitted, should not distinguish
between countiies be they EC members or non-EC members. However, neither the
comptroller nor the courts can put forward their own liberalism. They can only search and
implement the policies statutorily laid down which are the choices made by the Legislature.
The Dumping issue
A second implication, dumping, has not been a serious allegation, and the matter to some
extent is overlooked. On the one hand, the proceedings before the comptroller do not seem to
allow proper consideration to the problem, which, on the other hand, is not a frequent one.
In Ciba-Geigy A.G. 's Patent, the invention related to the production of a chemical
substance called triaiyl phosphate which acts as a flame retardant.45 The patent was being
worked in the United Kingdom. The applicant, an American firm already working the patent
in the United States under a licence from the patentee, wanted to export the product to the
UK That would amount to a reciprocal arrangement: Ciba-Geigy manufactured in the UK
and export to several countnes including to the United States; the applicant manufactured in
See tI Cimehdine e [19901 R.P.C. 204 at 247 and 262; and 663 at 694.
[1986] R.P.C. 203.
119861 RP.C. 403.
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the latter and wanted to export to the former country. As was suggested by the comptroller,
in principle only on the basis of exceptional reasons, the scope of that quid pro quo could be
restricted. The patentee argued that importation would be detrimental to its business.
Additionally, it was alleged that the price of the imported product would be lower than
those applied in the UK, hence the patentee's apprehension that competition could not be
afforded, unless an anti-dumping element was included in the royalty rate. Aller careful
consideration of the facts the comptroller decided to allow importation on the ground that to
face competition would be a normal consequence brought up by compulsory licence, and he
saw no reason to believe that importation would unfairly harm the patentee's business or put it
at severe risk. As to the dumping defence, no consideration was given. Holding a dissenting
view, the Patents Court reversed the decision under fresh consideration.
Having due regard to the figures contained in the aidavits put forward by the patentee's
representative, Falconer J. concluded: the patentee had made huge investments to develop the
market in the UK and would continue to do so in order to keep its industrial reputation; no
suggestion was made that the demand was not being met on reasonable terms, nor that the
invention was not being worked to the fullest extent possible; if a licence for importation was
granted, part of the demand would not be met by manufacturing in the country; the applicant
had the advantage of making use of its spare capacity and could sell the product at a price
substantially lower then the patentee's price, as a consequence of which the applicant would
capture a very significant share of the European market at that time being exploited by the
patentee, a UK-based company. The tenor of the argument was to protect the interest of a
company working the patent in the country. While taking this into account, the decision of the
Patents Court (disallowing importation) not only favoured the countIs trade expansion, but
equally avoided the dumping argument, at least directly or explicitly. Looking at the reasoning
no one can tell that the dumping issue, in the judge's mind, was neglected.
It seems at least improper for the courts to embark on the analysis of dumping questions
without legal guidance, but to ignore it simply does not seem a sensible choice. There is in
klein, p. 410-416.
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dumping an element of public interest For this reason, if a substantial dumping allegation is
made before the comptroller, and importation is eventually allowed, it would be proper for
one to suggest, de lege referenda, that the comptroller could contemplate the possibility of
bringing the matter to the attention of the competition body, without prejudice to the course
of the proceedings
The disclosure of information issue
The third element surrounding the discretion concerning the licence to import is the disclosure
of commercial information, a matter that is given increasingly legal importance today. As far
as the protection of this type of information is concerned, the disclosure of information is a
point to treat with care. In approaching this particular question, the comptroller has found
some difficulty in exercising his discretion with respect to authorisation of importation.
Without relevant information, adjudication on public interest (i.e., balance of patentee',
would-be licensee', a country' or region' in particular, and the societs interest) appears to be
a hard task, and, for this reason, more guidance is needed.
The point to consider is whether the applicant for a licence including importation should
disclose infonnation about the source of supply, or the countly or counines from where the
licensee may import the patented article to the United Kingdom. The lack of disclosure leads
to the question whether there should be a general licence to import, i.e., with no need for the
applicant to disclose the information pertinent to the importation. This was a major question
contended in SKF's Patents47
There are different types of information such as the countries from which the applicants
intend to import, the particular ingredient to import if more than one, the applicant's list of
potential customers, the intention to export, the direct costs and selling pnces. There are
some questions: Is the licensee required to provide detailed information? Has the patentee the
right to require it? Is it within the comptroller's discretion to limit the amount of information
required? Are the answers to these questions affected by the fact that (a) the application falls
Smith Kline & French Laboratories Limited's Cimeti dine Patents [19881 RP.C. 148.
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under a licence of right, (b) the intended importation is to be made from countries which
afford no protection to the type of invention in question, (c) the patented article is a
pharmaceutical one so having a particular price elasticity? The SKPs Patents case failed to
address all of these.
The choice from where to import in principle should be left to the licensee' and patentee's
decision. In default of an agreement the authority can only judge the restriction imposed by
the patentee at the convenience of specific interests statutorily protected. Objectively the
patentee cannot impose limit on importation from any EC-countries neither can the
adjudicating authorities. In this regard, there should be a general licence to import from the
Community. Nevertheless, the patentee may be the interested in being provided with details of
the imports. Concerning imports from non-EC countries, if satisfactoiy evidence shows that
importation affects or puts at severe risk the interest of any person working the patent in the
United Kingdom or brings no advantage to the domestic demand, then the authority is in a
position, to sustain the patentee's restriction.
The patentee may argue that importation is likely to affect his interests in a particular way,
but he needs specific information which is in the applicant's possession in order to make a fill
assessment. As long as the authority is satisfied that the information required by the patentee
is substantial to assess the alleged unfair detriment, then the patentee has the right to require
the disclosure of the data, which supposedly is equally necessary for the authority to exercise
his discretion. What would happen if the would-be licensee did not provide the required data?
The non-compliance of the requirement may lead to a situation of relevant risk to those
interests referred to above, consequently the restriction raised by the patentee should be
satisfied.
As was pointed out by the comptroller, "it must remain a matter for the applicant's own
judgement whether or not they can substantiate their case without disclosing [certain]
information." Obviously, if the applicant does not disclose a relevant piece of information or
Statement of the supermtending Mr Vivian, MF. [19881 RP.C. at page 152.
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is not required to do so, they should bear the consequences of not disclosing material
evidence.
It is inherent in the comptroller's discretion to assess and declare whether, in the
circumstances of a particular case, a piece of information is or is not necessary for the
adjudication. This is a matter to be decided in the light of the circumstances of a particular
case. But it is reasonable that at least the applicant should name the countries from where he
plans to import. The applicant does not necessarily have to import from the list of countries
presented, but it is assumed that such information (a list of countries) is a minimal and
reasonable requirement. And the patentee may have a commercial interest in knowing this;
furthermore, he is entitled to know the probable countries where the import should be from.
Such a right was recognised in the SKF'S Patent case. This iight emerges from the control the
patentee has over the patent, a right which subsists regardless whether the patent is or is not
endorsed as a licence of right.
In the name of good administration of the patent, the patentee has a reasonable interest in
other types of information. It is of legitimate interest to him to gather relevant information in
order to track down potential situations of infringement, or to enable him to establish sound
royalty policy. It is in his interest to know whether his patent is protected in the exporting
countly, and what level of demand is in that country for the patented article. This infonnation
may be of some assistance to establish, among other things, a competitive price policy for
either the licence or the patent-related product.
The importance of the information may depend on the knowledge, or lack of it, the patentee
has about the market, and how the price or royalty charge responds to a variation in demand.
Again, the assessment of all these, in the light of the background of each case, stands beyond
the issue of import restriction. As the SKF's patent case shows, lack of necessary information
may be an impediment for the proper exercise of discretionary power, making it more difficult
to strike the proper balance of interests and rights.
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(ix) Securing the manufacture in the country
When the interest of a manufacturer is at issue, assessing the unfair prejudice the importation
might cause is not always an easy task. In Research Corporation's (Carboplaiin) Patent, 49 an
application was lodged to enable the importation of an anti-cancer drug called Carboplatin.
Because of its high cost, the same drug was normally replaced by another, Cisplatin, already
out of patent and obviously cheaper. However, the side effects of the later required patients
to be treated in hospital. Conversely, the Carboplatin could be used for the treatment of out-
patients.
The Carboplatin drug was being manufactured in the United Kingdom (i.e., formulated in
Spain for the UK market) under a licence, and the licensee was engaged in research and
development and supported clinical trials at a very high cost in order to make the drug fully
approved. The applicants, who were not undertaking research, were subsidiaries of an
Australian company which formulated the drug in Australia and from where they intended to
import carboplatin at a reduced pnce. Evidence showed, however, that the reduction would
not bring a substantial increase in the demand, and would disturb the R&D activity then
canied out in the UK.
The applicants alleged that there was an unsatisfied demand in the UK and that the
manufacture of the product was contracted out. The Court rejected the argument that the
demand was not being met for the time being on reasonable terms, and on balance concluded
that the advantage which could be brought by the applicants in terms of reduced price would
not render much benefit compared with the prospective business run in the country. On this
ground importation from outside the Community, which had been allowed by the
comptroller, was prohibited. This was a difficult decision, because in the short tenn
importation from Australia at a reduced price would alleviate the financial burden on the
National Health Service in two senses The high price being charged by the UK supplier of
carboplatin limited the use of this drug by the N H.S. Importation could encourage more use
of it in the treatment of out-patients. The Court opted for a medium or long term solution,
[19901 RP.0 663.
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and at the same time satisfied the policy of manufacturing in the country It made sense
Apparently, it was a sensible decision based on grounds other than efficiency But it was not a
decision in favour of consumer welfare.
The point in favour of consumer welfare is that importation may provide for a continuing
inflow of improved products at lower prices thus directing consumer choice Nevertheless,
importation substitution is always desirable from the point of view of the balance of
payments, favoured by the policy of manufacturing in the country. As the Carboplatin case
shows, the assessment whether the importation unfairly prejudices the domestic
manufacturing seems to be, in fact, a much more complex matter, and may involve elements
of industrial policy. From the Carbopkzän case, however, it cannot expected that the
comptroller and the Patents Court on appeal are able to indulge in a sort of workable
competition. Discretion is not to be so limited as to frustrate the objects of the safeguarding
policy, but is not to be exercised so extensively to the extent that it becomes unnecessary to
implement the policy behind the patent statute.
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7.3.2 Discretion in royalty rate assessment
(i) Judicial perception of royalty computation
Within a non-voluntary licensing system, to a certain extent intellectual property rights are
reduced to a matter of reasonable remuneration conferred to the owner. This is one central
reason why the computation of royalties should attract careful attention from the
adjudicators. The other reason lies in the fact that royalty assessment is one of the most
difficult issues to set. Aware of these, adjudicators do, or are invited to do the best they can in
order to arrive at an acceptable figure.
The nature of the difficulty to establish a sensible remuneration is that the process is always
surrounded by uncertainties and the outcome can never be one of mathematical exactitude.1
Usually, statutory criteria are too general, and judicial orientation cannot always be followed
directly because of the unusual features of the cases. Moreover, alleging confidentiality,
interested parties are generally unwilling to provide hdlpfiul information. The submissions of
both patentees and would-be licensees are by definition an exercise of contrast: the former in
general tend to maximise the amount of remuneration and the latter to ask for the minimum.
Such behaviour tends to reflect competitive attitudes, established in opposite directions:
unwilling to share their market, patentees may ask for an excessive rate, while licensees offer
low royalties so as to enable them to compete successfully. 2 In the end, what is reasonable
may be a matter of impression or common-sense, because no determinative rules exist.
As Luxmoore pointed out, "no one can hope to lay down any exhaustive rules to enable
the question whether the terms of a proposed licence are reasonable or not to be ancwered
with certanny in every case."3 Having limited information and relying on ill-defined
'See obseivations of Nicholls U in the Cimehdine case 119901 RP.C. 203 at 250.
2 In me sectors the tension of competitiveness is more appareiut than m others. Examples of the former are
the pharmaceutical and integrated circuit industnes and the electric lamp mdustiy in the past. In this respect,
t cases are instructive: Research Corporation's (Carboplatin) Patent (19901 RP.C. 663 at 697; and Bro.rne
Wireless Co. Ld. 119291 XLVI RP.C. 457 at 475. The tension is an impact of inter a/ia, the massive
investment in R&D those industrial sectors require and this is unsurprisingly reflected in the process of royalty
assessment
Brownie Wireless Co. IA 119291 XLVI RP.C. 457 at 473.
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guideline, adjudicators search for reasonableness with regard to the circumstances and
probabilities of the case. In doing so, judges are required to use their discretion.
Reasonableness is too broad a legal requirement. Its meaning can only possibly be
established in the light of particular circumstances. In construing it, courts take into account
current conditions and existing relevant practice, and exercise their discretionaiy power on a
case-by-case basis, choosing between given rules and accepting or rejecting particular
methods brought before them for the calculation of the due amount of royalty. As far as the
British system is concerned, the role of judicial discretion is perceived in the development of
general and specific rules which are applicable to situations, such as the assessment of
royalties relating to patents over drugs and medicines, and the assessment of notional
remuneration and compensation for loss of profit concerning the Crown use.
(il) General rules
The reasonableness of royalties raises the question "reasonable" for whom and regarding
what.4 In addressing the matter, the legislation evolved from detailed provisions to more
general considerations. 5 The 1919 regime put forward provisions which referred to a set of
elements, such as:
• the reasonable advantage assured to the patentee from his patent nghts;6
• the maximum advantage to the patentee, provided that the licensee working the invention in the United
Kingdom could enjoy a reasonable profit;
• equality of advantages among several licensees, and b y virtue of this pwpose the royalties could be
reduced in the light of costs incurred under hcences previous/v granted to test the commercial value, or to
secure the working on a commercial scale, of the invention.8
' According to the Patents Act 1977, the remuneration due to the inventor or "other person beneficially
entitled to a patent" shall be reasonable in regard to the nature of the invention and the interests - which shall
not be unfairly prejudiced - of any person working x developing the invention in the countly. Section
50( 1)(bXc). The provision is substantially the same of the Patents Act 1949, Section 39(lXb)(c).
Contrast Section 24(l)(b) of the 1907 to 1919 Patents and Designs Act with Section 50(lXbXc) and
Section 39(1)(bXc) of the Patents Act 1977 and 1949, respectively.
6 See Patents and Designs Act 1907 to 1919, s. 27(4Xb), similar provision regarding royalty in exclusive
licences.
See 1907 to 1919 Act, s. 27(4)(a), as indicated in the previous footnote.
8ldem
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According to the current statutory policy, the parties have, or should have, the first say about
what is in their best interests. Departing from tabled submissions, the comptroller arrives at a
figure which for him appears to be a reasonable remuneration. The process entails a fettered
discretion.
In the statement of Lloyd LI, in the Court of Appeal, an appropriate royalty should reflect
the prospect of profitability for both patentee and licensee. In his words, reasonable
remuneration means:
the royalty that would be agreed between a willing patentee and a willing licensee, having regard to the other
terms of the proposed licence.9
The consideration to the balance of interests of both parties is twofold: it directs the setting
of royalties to a fair trading approach, and restricts the action of the comptroller to the
proposed terms subject to disagreement.
The amount of remuneration assessed in a particular case which did not allow the licensee
to compete would lead to the unfeasibility of the system of patent safeguards. A remuneration
set at an unreasonably high rate can turn the licence to no practical effect.'° To avoid such an
outcome, the patentee, on the one hand, is assured the right to an adequate reward. On the
other hand, the licensee is given an opportunity to run his business in a way commercially
possible. Thus, as an arbiter the comptroller has "to be fair to both sides, and set terms which
are reasonable in the sense that the licensee should be able to enter the market, but which are
not so generous that they allow the licensee to disorder the market by unfair competition.""
Such a concern is clearly present in those cases giving rise to the anti-dumping contention
which in general is circumvented.
The dumping defence
Smith Kline & French Laboratones Ltd's (Cimetidine) Patents 11990] RP.C. 203 at 236.
'° This argument was put forwani in Allen & Hwthur Ljmitea"s (Salbutamol) Patent 119871 RP.C. 327 at
378. However. adjudicalors axe wise enough to avoid such an exaggeration.
' Mr E. F. Brake, Sritex Corporati on's Patent 119861 RP.C. 585 at 593.
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The anti-dumping element was at issue in the Shiley Inc. Patent case' 2 relating to an
artificial tilting-disc heart valve, a high-tech based invention involving heavy R&D costs. The
patentee claimed the inclusion of an anti-dumping clause preventing the licensee from selling
below the patentee's price, consequently providing for an additional rate in the instance the
licensee's price was reduced. It was held that the point was not significant, since the royalty at
a fixed rate would be enough to deter the alleged effect.'3
The allegation of the dumping effect is difficult to prove. In another case, it was suggested
that the applicant intended to sell in the country below a fair price. 14 The patent related to
dehydrated potatoes was manufactured and sold in the countly at a reasonable price. There
was a fear that the applicant, a company financially backed by the government in the countiy
of origin, could embark into a dumping pricing policy. No further inquiiy into such a matter
was made, and the defence was dismissed for lack of evidence. The allegation was also found
to be irrelevant. As the comptroller concluded, the licence, if granted, would amount to no
benefit to the public. Thus, the order was refused.
On another occasion of allegation of dumping, the comptroller once again was not
impressed by the evidence, and preferred to view the effect of the importation on the
patentee's business as a normal consequence derived from the competition process. 15 The
patent concerned a manufacturing process of triaryl phosphates for use as flame retardant
placticisers in vinyl chloride polymers which the applicant wanted to import benefiting from
the low costs incurred in the country of origin. On appeal, the Patents Court, reversing the
comptroller's decision, did not deal with the dumping question directly, but regarded the
applicant's competitive capability as a trade injury against the patentee's manufacturing
interests. Consequently, the importation was found to be contraly to the statutory policy,16
but as to the dumping allegation no judgement was passed on.
12 [1988] RP.C. 97.
13 [19881 R.P.C. 97 at 104 and 105. Conversely, the fixed rate per-unity basis may enable the patentee to
embark into price-cutting competition and by undercutting his price may imperil tbe licensee's business. See
this discussion below.
' Fanners' Marketing & Supply Co. Ltd.'s Patents [19661 RP.C. 546.
' Ciba-Geigy kC.'s Patent [19861 RP.C. 403 at 406.
16 Even if dumping practice does not exist, importation 1mm outside the Community may be pmhibited in
order to avoid prejudice to the manufacturing interests of the person developing the invention in the countly.
See Research Corporation's (Carboplatin) Patent [1990] 663 at 696.
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Considering the lack of interest or inability of adjudicators (comptroller, tribunal and courts)
to entertain a dumping defence and scrutinise the matter properly, an improvement of the
adjudicatoty system could open an opportunity for the question to be referred to a
competition authority. Such a reference would be on the grounds of public interest (efilciency
or welfare), so that it would not prejudice the normal course of a settlement of terms of a
non-voluntary licence.
Reasonableness as to the nature of the invention
As far as the reasonableness of the remuneration relates to the nature of the invention, the
comptroller is required to give proper regard to the intrinsic value attached to the novel
feature of the invention, i.e., its importance to the advancement of the art, and related to its
contribution to meet a particular need of society, the time and investment spent in its
development, and the commercial reality of the invention.' 7 It could be said at once with
regard to this matter that the importance of the invention defines what the licensee has to pay
for, i.e., he should be charged for what he asks for. In affirming this guidance, the comptroller
may exclude payment on account of accessories not covered by the patent claims,' 8 but he
cannot overlook the patentee's obligation concerning the disclosure of the invention.'9
Computation method and bargaining power
It is settled practice not to interfere with the comptroller's decision dealing with methods of
royalty assessment. It has been a1rmed, 2° as a policy held by the Appeal Tribunal (now the
Patents Court), that once a decision upon a particular method has been made by the
comptroller it is not to be altered, unless to cure an unacceptably plain inaccuracy.2'
Obviously this rule is not absolute, and can be balanced in respect of the parties' bargaining
power.
See the Carboplahn case [19901 663 at 683. For a more exploraloly notion of the natere of the invention,
see the concept of exceptional invention in [19691 RP.C. 307, [19701 RP.C. 523, and [19721 R.P.C. 829.
8 For instance royalties may not cover know-how. See CassouPatent [19711 RP.C. 91 at 93 and 94.
CL Agreeincnt on TRIPS, Article 29(1).
20 F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Company kG.'s Patents 119731 RP.C. 587 at 620 and 621.
21 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. kG.'s Patents [19731 601 at 620.
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Royalties may be fixed on a lump sum per-kilo basis, or expressed in terms of a percentage on
either the patentee's or the licensee's selling price The general practice is to establish the
royalty basis upon the patentee's selling price instead of the licensee's selling price; the fonner
- it is suggested - would reflect circumstances favouring the patentee. However, the
settlement at a fixed rate per unity tends to be prevalent over these two previous bases. The
argument is that a royalty on the basis of a lump sum and set irrespective of the selling price is
exceptionally welcomed, since it is supposed to work as a deterrent against distortion of
competition. This view, based on the assumption that a lump-sum royalty would be neutral
from the point of view of competition, is debatable. The royalty at a fixed sum may operate to
favour the patentee who may undercut his prices while the licensee, enjoying no subsequent
reduction in royalty and not affording to compete, may be driven out of the market. This
argument is supported by a hearing officer, who sees no evidence to suggest that a royalty
rated per unity quantity prevents the licensee from being put out of competition.22
It is essential to consider, in the end, the potential bargaining power of each party, whether
the licensor or licensee, to carry out a distortive cut-pricing practice. In this respect, "it would
be wrong to assume that it is always the patentee who is in the more powerful bargaining
position: the patentee may be an individual inventor and his prospective licensee a powerful
company, in which case the former's position will be relatively weak." As regard practice of
non-interference, the observation is that the choice of methods leads ultimately to a question
of appellate jurisdiction.
Assessment methods - a question of fact or principle?
It has been argued that the issue relating to methods of assessment concerns a question of fact
and discretion rather than an issue of principle. Therefore, it would not ordinarily be
subjected to an appeal on grounds of law. 24 The rigor of such a rule, however, has been
relaxed by the Court of AppeaL 25 It took the view that adequacy of remuneration is a
See obseivation of Mr KE. Panchen in the Carboplatin case, [19901 RP.C. 663 at 682.
Richard Whish, Conipelition Law, p. 625/626, (1993)
24 Section 97(3) of the Patents Act 1977 limits appeals to the Cowt of Appeal only on grounds of law.
See statement of Dillon U. in [19871 RP.0 327 at 373-376. The same view taken by Lloyd Li. in 119901
RP.C. 203 at 235/6.
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relevant matter involving "important issues of principle" so as it does allow a fresh discretion
and enable the Court to issue proper rule. The exceptional intervention of the Court was
clearly welcome. A final decision by a high court on controversial matters, such as royalty
computation, has the benefit of bringing more certainty to the business circle
Per-cent rate and field of technology
A practical sense of reasonableness is concerned with per-cent rate. On average, a 5 to 7%
royalty rate is quoted for patents relating to mechanical engineering. Some variation,
however, may be justified in the consideration, for instance, of the medium or other elements
covered by the licence and relating to any technical back-up which possibly involves transfer
of know-how?
In the Extrude case, the compulsory licence was over a patent relating to abrasive flow
machinery (a technique for aero engines). The remuneration was set at 7% upon the selling
price charged to customers, payable on all fixtures and accessories fomiing part of the
machine.27 A different approach is not to be ruled out. In the Shiley Inc. 'S Patent,28 the court
accounted on the particular function ot and the burden in R&D costs involving, a mechanical
device. The patented product was a tilting-type heart valve. The colz 4ptroller's decision
assessing a 7% royalty was reversed on the ground that the invention was rdlated to a surgical
device to which, along with drugs, the prevailing practice was to allow a rate ranging between
25 and 30 per cent. In making its own assessment, the Patents Court arrived at a figure of
15% upon the patentee's price, following a settled practice in the field of drugs and
medicines. This was an unusual case in which the Tribunal disallowed the method applied by
the comptroller.
While demonstrating the complexity of royalty computation and the court's role in dealing
with this, the Shiley case confimis the idea that in complex matters, governed by
See Extrude Hone Corporation's Patent I 1982J RP.C. 361. [The Exirude case].
27 See previxis footnote.
[1988] RP.C. 97.
[19881 RP.C. 97 at 109-112. See Fairfax (Dental Equipment) Linuted's Patent (application by Filpm
Filpost Lhnited), Patent Office, 1993, [19931 16(6) IPD 13.
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unsatisfactory and incomplete rules, it is of undeniable assistance to have the commitment of
the adjudicators to superior policies involving considerations of welfare and efficiency Taking
the differentiation of methods of royalty computation as an example, it is inherent in the
welfreJefficiency model of limitation that a safeguarding policy should assure a due return on
an investment. Aware of this policy, an adjudicator may be inclined to use his sensitivity and
vary or chose a royalty method in consideration to the particular nature of the invention under
the assumption that, as far as a due return is concerned, a proper method of computation is,
or should be related to the field of technology. The test that the adjudicator is invited to apply
in a particular circumstance is this. Is the computation method appropriate to the field of
technology? Obviously the assessment of such appropriateness relies a great deal on the
adjudicator's experience, and the test requires him to search for a sound justification of the
method chosen. This leads to the next point.
(iii) Royalties in the field of food and medicines
The 1949 regime provided specific statutory guidance as to the considerations the
comptroller should take into account to settle terms of royalties in respect of a licence over a
substance or process used as, or for the production ot food or medicine. 30 Although no
similar provision as to that category is found in the 1977 Patents Act, the courts still keep the
guidance as a valid criterion.
Rational discrimination
The reason for a provision addressing a particular field was to give distinct consideration to
the nature of the class of inventions. The essential nature of the health of the Nation, or the
crucial conditions of the market reality for the food and medicine industry was a particular
concern. In passing the Patents Act 1977, the Legislature omitted the specific provision,
leaving it entirely up to the comptroller to search for and apply the proper method according
to his discretion and under the circumstances of the case
3° Section 38A(2) of the 1907 to 1919 Patents and Designs Act addressed specific gwdance as to
considerations for the assessment of royalties regarding patents relating to chemienl products and substances
intended for food or medicine. The same provision was mutatEs mutandis reproduced by Section 41(b) of the
Patents Act 1949, but omitted by the Patents Act 1977.
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The omission of the 1977 Act is explainable. In setting a particular method to apply to a
specific field (food and medicine related inventions), the previous legislation seemed to be a
discriminatory treatment. A vanation in criteria applied to different fields can, however, be
rationally justified by offsetting the vaiiation of features. In essence, the consideration to the
nature of the invention entails a rational (or positive) variation in method. The legal policy,
however, is not to set statutorily any specific method, but rather leave it with the adjudicator.
Thus, the omission would not amount to the abandonment of the old criteria, governing the
special categoiy of inventions relating to food and medicines (surgical or curative devices
being included). Consequently, section 41 of the 1949 Patents Act is still a valid guidance that
the comptroller may apply as he thinks fit.
The section-41 approach was to be read in conjunction with another provision, which was
that the reasonableness of royalties was related to the lowest prices to the public and the
reasonable advantage to the patentee. 3 ' Obviously the availability of pharmaceutical products
to society at large was, as it is today, an element of public policy. One cannot tell whether the
immediate result of the section-41 approach led to a reduction in the patentee's remuneration
which, reflecting a reasonable advantage, was based on two allowances altogether classed as
compensation elements, and a reward element, namely:
• an allowance covering the patentee's R&D costs, and seivicing of the capital;
• an allowance for promotional or marketing costs; and
• a rewari.L i.e, a reasonable return upon the investment (an appropriate profit upl4ft).32
Two other criteria have also been applied. The comparison (comparable royalties) approach
essentially relies on what licensors and licensees, bargaining with their strengths and
weaknesses in a given market, have been able to agree in similar and past cases. A great deal
of effort is required to interpret concurrent data, exclude differences or dismiss unusual
31 Patents Act 1949, s. 4 1(2): "In settling the terms of licences wider this section the comptroller shall
endeavour to sue that food, medicines, and surgical and cutative devices shall be available to the public at
the lowest prices consistent with the patentees' deriving a reasonable advantage from their patent rights."
32 Details of the complex calculation of the section 41 approach are discussed in Geigy £4 's Patent [1964]
RP.C. 391. The criterion was approved in Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. A.G. 's Patents [1973] RP.C. 601,Allen
& Hambwyr Limited's (Salbutamol) Patent [1987] RP.C. 327, and Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd
[1990] 203.
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features,33 and identiFy similarities. The establishment of an authoritative "comparable"
requires an exercise of comparing one thing with another and finding a sense of proportion
and approximation which relies on expert evidence as much as on experience.
A third method, called the profit-sharing approach (or profits available), is little known and
consists of dividing the profit on sales between patentee and licensee. 34 This formula directs
the royalty computation to a share in risks and profits, in a proportion in which one may find
no apparent logic, and the comptroller is asked to measure what is reasonable to both licensee
and patentee. These three approaches (section 41, comparable royalties, and profits available)
are normally employed subsidiarily, i.e., to check how sound the elements at issue are,
allowing exclusion of possible excesses. The prevailing figure is a result ofjudicial choice, i.e.,
an eventual outcome which, justified on the account of the overall circumstances of the case,
does not disturb the common-sense apprehended from established practices.
An aid, not a right
A point in law which is beyond doubt is that these calculations do not represent vested rights,
i.e., no party is entitled to require that the royalty be assessed under a particular criterion of
computation. Formulated by discretion, a method of calculation is an aid to arnving at a
sound figure.
The confirmation of specific criteria by several precedents does not elevate the method into
a principle of law. If the method of computation were made a principle of law, the rigidity of
such a rule would make it impractical to follow precisely in every case. Once converted into
law, a discretionary formulation would prevent judges in subsequent cases from exercising a
fresh discretion. The reason for this assertion is that a method is subject to alterations in order
to satisfy the circumstances of the particular case.
The judge's attention goes to those comparable figures agreed upon in conditions other than those of
normal bargau
In Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd's (Cimetidine) Patents 119901 RP.C. 203 some idea of
comparable and profit-sharing approaches is found. As to the latter method more information is found in
unreported cases of the Patent Office, namely, Frosst's (flmalol) Patent (1988), Tanabe Seyakzi Co. Ltd's
Patent (application by Hams Pharmaceutical Ltd) and Eli Lilly's Patent (application &v Generics (UK) 14.
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It is most unlikely that two cases could be found which followed precisely the same criterion.
The material variations affect, for instance, the way royalties relate to costing. The rates and
basis of its appropriation vaiy, and it may be expressed on historic or current figures, local
or on a world-wide scope, estimated or actual. Such variation affects the proportion of the
licensee's contribution to the expenditures incurred by the patentee. The elements of
compensation, thus, change inevitably with the case's background. All of these make a
particular method indeterminate, vaiying according to the comptroller's discretionary
approach and the circumstance of the particular case.
(iv) Crown use: notional remuneration and compensation36
While having "a shared or concurrent right to use [an] invention" irrespective of a licence,
whether "from the patentee or the comptroller, or from the court," 37
 the Crown has to
compensate the patentee for such use. The compensation is not for infringement. The
patentee has a right to a reasonable payment or a notional remuneration, and a compensation
for limited loss of profit for use in a non-emergency period.38
The idea of notional remuneration is of a sum estimated with no necessary regard to its
constituent elements, nor immediate link with market conditions. The negotiation over the
reasonable sum due to the patentee or his substitute is run with total disregard to any sense of
bargain of the kind a licensor and a licensee would strike. There is no specific provision as to
the proper assessment of the notional remuneration and the loss of profit for exclusion of the
actual manufacturing interests.
Confidentiality is always a problem is accessing commercial data and setting update figures. In this
respect, the Patents Court rejected a vanable royalty per unit quantity fixed in line with the falling prices
(cascade rate) charged by the patentee, the problem being the lack of reliability as to the updated figures. See
11 Cametidine case and Research Corjratzon's (Carboplatin) Patent, both, [1990] RP C. 203 at 245, 259,
and 663 at682/3.
See discussion at 5.3.2 (1) and 5.3.3 (i).
31 Statement of Dillon, Li in Salbutamol case 119871 RP.C. 327 at 369, 370, and statement of Diplock Li in
Patchetfs Patent [1967] R.P.C. 237 at 251. The use is specifically for the services of the Cros
Patents Act 1977, sections 55, 57, and 57A as amended by the 1988 Cight, Designs and Patents Act,
295 and sch. 5(16). The same regime does apply to designs nghts.
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The lack of specific guidance whatsoever may work as an element of pressure on the patentee
by the Government, who in a particular situation may use their strength to get the payment
reduced. In this respect the industry may have a case for concern. In practical terms, however,
the dimension of such a concern, whether serious or unfounded, can only be measured up in
the light of the traditional attitude of the Government in dealing with the interests of the
industiy in the context of the freedom of trade. Apart from that, one can tell only a little about
the discretionary side.
In the bulk of cases the Government inters into an agreement with the patentee. The
question of reasonable payment is a matter dealt with by the Administration. For this reason,
the role of judicial discretion on the assessment of compensation for the use of the service of
the Crown is rare. Nevertheless, if necessary in the circumstances of a case, it is entirely
proper for the court, aware of its function, to conduct its discretion taking into account the
muscle of the State over the individual firm (patentee or any substitute). Also influential is the
traditional attitude of the government towards private competition. The more liberal the State
is, the more the patentee's interest is taken into account, without prejudice to elements of
public or national interest. Additionally, it is fundamental to look at previous practices settled
by the Administration.
Patcheh's Patent was a very rare case brought to court under sections 46 to 48 of the 1949
Patents Act.39 The invention was related to a patented machine gun of which thousands were
manufactured for Crown use. The court took the view that apriori the sum would be of fair
royalty payment nature, rather than compensation for damages. The remuneration would be
that sought by a willing and minded licensor and a willing and minded licensee bargaining on
an equal footing. This is understood in terms of a notional or token concept, because there
are no actual licensor and licensee.
In the past, the reasonable payment was calculated on production costs, and could not be
affected by the prospect of profit the patentee might bear as a manufacturer. In between 800
and 900 cases negotiated by Government departments, 4° an initial rate of between 5 to 7.5%
[1967] RP.C. 77 and 237.
4°Evidencebroughtbyaveiyexpenencedexpeil, 11967] at 254.
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was agreed by the Government, or a company authorised by it, to manufacture a quantity of
the invention-related products. The rates varied in accordance with the number of articles
manufactured, and the supply of technical assistance or know how if it was the case. For
subsequent use of the same invention (i.e., manufacturing of a new series of the product),
lower rates applied in accordance with a sliding scale. While in the Patchett's case interest
was granted at the court's discretion, the above figures show that the role of the court in
royalty computation is rather minimal.
(v) The nature of the adjudication of royalty prices
A last consideration about the assessment of royalties is that the discretion should not be
exercised in such a way as to make the comptroller a price regulating authority. The use of
the adjudicatory process of non-voluntary licences with the purpose of controlling the licence
prices would be an acceptable restriction. The analysis of the comptrolle?s decisions has
suggested nothing of the kind, and the approach now made is to agree with the manner the
comptroller has adjudicated royalty rates.
In a competitive society prices are supposed to be mutually determined, and are based on
the amount sellers are prepared to offer for sale and the amount which buyers wish to buy.
Since there is no perfect market, abuses and excesses do exist. They are discouraged by
regulatory policies which may take different forms. Price monitoring; usually designed to curb
inflationary trends, aims to:
• limit the extent to which prices may be increased on account of increased costs;
• secure reductions as a result ofreduced costs;
• reinforce the control of prices by a control on profit margln while safeguarding investments and
promotion of innovations and technical improvements; and
• reinforce the effects ofcompetihon and to secure its fill benefits in the general level ofprices.4'
None of these are pursued by the comptroller. In principle patentees and licensees are free to
negotiate royalties. In the assessment of royalty rates the comptroller and the tribunal
intervene to setfie terms of royalties only to the extent patentees and licensees have not been
Section 2(2) to the Pnce Commission Act 1977 repealed by the 1980 Competition Act.
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able to agree The adjudication may affect the structure of costs and the pricing policy held by
the patentee or licensee, consequently altering the final figure at which articles produced or
processed are sold. 42 However, this outcome is irrelevant. The legislature places no duty
upon the comptroller to consider economic investigation.43
It could be argued that in assessing royalties the comptroller as well as the Patents Court by
means of justifying proposed royalties eventually exercise a degree of price control. The
justification the comptroller or the court is required to give is a matter of ratio decidendum
derived from the duty imposed on judicial activity in general, that is, to follow logical
reasoning, and has nothing to do with pricing policy.
7.4 Principles ofjudicial discretion: a summary
This concludes the discussion of the public policy arguments, reasoning, and discretion and
their consequent implications for understanding the nature of the adjudicating process on non-
voluntaiy licensing. In the review of the public policy arguments at common-law, and the
comparison with contrasting modern cases, the inconvenient legal uncertainty arising from the
decisional inconsistency on matters of restraints of trade has been indicated. This was due to
lack of legal guidance. The courts were reluctant to adjudicate solely on the basis of broad
principles, such as public interest, or under considerations of freedom of trade. Unlike broad
clauses, clear rules laying down a specific mandate provides a sense of certainty for the
petitionaiy public in general, and make judges more confident in the application and
enforcement of the law.
The way legal provisions are drafted has a direct effect upon the court's function, that is, to
enforce the statutory provisions in line with the policies they bear. The reasoning process that
courts are required to develop in order to justify their decisions is supposed to satisfy these
42 Tlp situation resulting from a licence is net considered illegal by the Resale Prices Act 1976, section
10(3).
' Intertype IA [19261 RP.C. 305 at 309. The statute, nevertheless, does not prevent the authority from
considering practical issues prima fade found to distort competition, such as a dumping-led remuneration or
methods for calculating royalty rates which potentially lead to a dumping price (in case the non-voluntaiy
licence includes importation).
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policies. While the connection between legal guidance and consistency of decisions makes a
strong case for statutoly conditions (on which non-voluntary licences should rely) to be
drawn narrowly, a degree of ambiguity and unpredictability is still inevitable. Legal policies
are not always fully enacted, or the authority is given power to vary the legal consequences in
accordance with particular circumstances.
The tests of discretion performed by the comptroller and the courts on appeal have largely
shown that the regulation of every matter of safeguarding policy does not always or should
not always follow strict rules. This is especially true in the case of the legal conditions for
royalty assessment. It follows that the legislation inevitably contains gaps and ill-defined
clauses.
Where the statute provides for a discretionary jurisdiction the boundary of the discretion is
always a matter in dispute, but a number of limitations stand out from this analysis. In
particular, this means that the discretionaiy jurisdiction amounts to no unfettered discretion.
Having the satisfactory operation of a safeguard regime as a primary concern, the study has
identified two classes of limitations: statutory and judicial. Either ascribed by statute or
courts, these limitations convey a sense of duty to give reasons (justification), a sense of
appropriateness of reasoning, and a sense of duty or power to act if necessary.
In exercising discretionary power, the comptroller can do anything not statutorily prohibited
in order to implement a particular policy or legal purpose. Stated in this way, the comptroller
fulfils a dual function, as guardian of public policies and a caretaker of patent right. As an
authority in interpreting in the first place the policy behind the law and implementing it, the
comptroller is an instance of law in the sense that the task of completing the legal choice that,
directly or indirectly, the statute purports to set down is conferred on him; it is not his choice
as an arbitrary authority,45 but the statutory desideratum. In contrast, relying on his discretion
The perception of the inappropriateness of ngid rules to regulate some legal matters has led to the
increasing number of flexible NgUldeIineSN issued by competition bodies m tbe USA, Canida , Japan and EEC.
One may assume that the judge actually has power to make his own choice which may necessarily nci be
the choice desired by the Parliament, but it is it for the judge to profess having exercised that power.
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the comptroller cannot impose restrictions inconsistent with the statutory directions, nor can
his discretion amount to unnecessary hindrance to patent right.
Another idea of limitation comes from the principle that says a body entrusted with a
discretion must not develop rules or a policy so rigid as to prevent the discretion being
exercised with reference to the individual case. This is a demand for flexibility and practical
sense.
A statutory duty to give regard to certain legal purposes is a requirement of producing
reasoned justifications. It is only by the giving of reasons that the comptroller and the court
can demonstrate that a rational approach has been taken rather than deciding on whim or by
prejudice. The discretion has to be based on the demand of reason, thus making the law in line
with a reasoning which is based on observations and experience, i.e., a contextual rather than
a priori justification
The discretion properly exercised means that an authority is required to give proper regard
to the merits and facts of the individual case, i.e., to deal with the substantial points in a
rational manner, developing informed arguments. Rationally reasonable means that there are
good arguments for a decision to be held as one rationally conclusive and determinative of
reasonable answers, as such recognised as a right one. This leads to the last remark.
The recognition of the duty to operate the discretion whenever it is found necessary is based
on the perception that the authority has a power and the duty to search for right answers to
save the interests concerned and upon request. The primary source of this discretion is the
legal framework on patent within which the comptroller operates legally permissible
justifications.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS: USE OF PROPRiETARY RIGHTS AND REGULATORY
ThEORY
8.1 The problem restated: conceptual framework
The regulation of the protection of chip designs has raised important questions bearing upon
the limitation of the exercise of intellectual property rights projected in recent times by the
IPIC Treaty and the Agreement on TRIPS. Defined at the outset of the dissertation, these
questions have inspired the present legal research. The study of the theoretical and legal
aspects of limitations on intellectual property in the context of the process of innovation has
attempted to answer how the legal treatment of these limitations is shaped and to what degree
the legal machinery (rules and institutions) is appropriate to pursue its objectives. Such legal
machinery has a limited ability to yield efficiency and welfare gains related to the exercise of
proprietary rights. From the analysis of the preceding chapters, the conclusion is drawn that
criteria of efficiency and welire permeate the legal treatment, supported by an emerging
institutional and safeguarding policy understood within an historical perspective and in the
light of an economic rationale. The analysis leads to a regulatory theory based on a
conceptual background. One result of the study is to clarif' this conceptual basis.
(a) From social bargain to welfare/efficiency perspective
Based on a theoretical background, the study has established that underlying the protection of
intellectual property there is a sense of social bargain. Particularly pertaining to the US legal
theory, the expression "social bargain" means that society through the State is committed to
protect intellectual property. In exchange, the right holder has a duty to exercise his right in
such a way as to pursue the social objectives summarised in section 23.1. Essentially, such a
quid pro quo has a role in the welfare/ efficiency approach A conclusion was reached in
Chapter Two that as the innovation process is carried out in circumstances of increasingly
imperfect competition, right holders are likely to break that social arrangement by exercising
their rights in a manner likely to stifle competition. In this respect the study of the economic
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rationale was highly instructive and confirmed an old principle deeply rooted in the UK law
that intellectual property is protected as far as it works for the public benefit In the face of
this finding, one has a case to limit the exercise of intellectual property rights in a
welfare/efficiency perspective.
By iegally monitoring the competitive process, a country can develop a legal policy of
inducing owners to use their intellectual property rights efficiently. At this point, it is
fundamental to clarify to what extent welfare and efficiency are taken for granted and what
the dichotomy involves.
The dichotomy is self-evident. Welfare and efficiency are in many respects basic postulates
which lie at the foundation of intellectual property and thus govern the exercise of proprietary
tights. Borrowed from economic and political realms, they are turned into legal principles of
considerable value. Nevertheless, welfare and efficiency gains cannot rely on legal machinery
unconditionally. Alongside a feasible legal control, having regard to the conditions of a
country's economic structure, a sound industnal and technological policy has to be put in
place and maintained. As a result, no-one can ensure that an intellectual property system in
force, for instance, in an Asian country is drafied to achieve more social welfare than
efficiency compared to any legal system in North America.
The legal sense of economic efficiency is best expressed in terms of reduction of costs and
prices, demng consumer choice by increasing the variety and quality of goods and services,
facilitating the entry of newcomers and the development of new technologies and products.
An assumption established throughout the dissertation is that welfare can be increased
through efficiency. In addressing welfare and efficiency, the law tends to treat them in a free-
value perspective. This is borne out partly by the availability of a larger quantity of goods and
services for society as a beneficial result of competition, and partly by improving employment
resulting from the easing of restrictions on trade. However, it is worth pointing out that a
legal background supporting a safeguarding policy on the exercise of proprietary rights does
not merely pursue efficiency for its own sake Neither parliaments through statutes, nor courts
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through case-law search for a rigid sense of efficiency. The study has demonstrated that by
limiting the exercise of intellectual property tights, the law, as it stands in the industrialised
world, does not overlook the social dimension of welfare. Thus, beyond or outside efficiency,
social welfare is also a legitimate intent. This also comes from the presumption that the
exercise of intellectual property iights without harming competition goals will increase
economic growth and meet society's needs, which include a range of goods and services. The
improvement of these is highly dependent upon a technology-based economy. This
conclusion is founded on the analysis of unauthonsed use of UK copyright and patent laws,
and the discussion in sections 2.3.1, 6.3.1 and 7.2.4.
The welfare/efficiency perspective is also designed to support an adjudicatory procedure
favouring a sound defence. The dichotomy includes proper and incontrovertible respect for
proprietary rights and the owner's interests. It is a matter of great consideration that the
essential ftmction of proprietary rights should not be harmed unnecessarily. Additionally, the
right holder must be informed of the law, as far as is possible, before it is applied to
implement a limiting measure. The owner's interests are defined as matters in which the right
holder has a legitimate stake justified by requirements peculiar to his activities. A proper
respect claims a sensible, even inevitable, approach to delineate justifications for limiting the
exercise of proprietary rights. Justifjing limitations raises a debate about questions of a
theoretical and practical nature. These require thU and open regard to factual and normative
elements which can be explored in turn, although they tend to melt into efficiency and welfare
considerations. Promotion of welfare should in principle satisfy the conditions of efficiency
economics. Once more, this assertion should not be taken, however, to deny the possibility of
conflict.
Although a proceeding with respect to unauthorised use of proprietary rights is expected to
allow an efficiency defence, the study has identified (particularly in Chapter Seven) that in a
number of cases an efficiency defence was not allowed or it was ill-assessed. Therefore,
where legal proceedings fail to allow an efficiency defence, limitations on proprietary rights
presumably tend to favour a welfare end departed from an efficiency objective. This quite
inevitably leads to a grey area that modern law, the Agreement on TRIPS in particular,
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purports to overcome. In this respect, judicial reasoning broadly based on the public interest
clause is not always clear.
It is an incontestable assertion that the law is apt to limit the exercise of proprietary rights
on grounds of public interest or public policy. There is a great deal of vagueness in these
expressions which in this siudy are replaced by the welfareJefficiency perspective. Applying
this dichotomy, the thesis places the legal treatment of the exercise of proprietary rights into
the focus of competition rules. This adds fresh thought to the assessment of the function of
intellectual property, thus providing a better comprehension of how it works, and allowing
the maximum room for the construction and performance of legal techniques designed to limit
the exercise of proprietary rights.
(b) Appropriateness of protection
Being a concern prevailing throughout the entire discussion, the legal treatment of the
limitations on intellectual property does not ignore the idea of "adequat&' protection. Such a
concept, however, cannot be conceived other than within the statutory frameworic In this
respect, it has been suggested that perfect standards of protection, which do not exist,' would
require an adequacy of protection in respect of both stage of development of a country or
region, and a particular field of technology. 2 On the contrary, available regimes of protection
are uniform to rather than consonant with such particulars. In this context, and assuming that
right holders originating from technology-generating regions and operating in markets of
technology-borrowing regions are to enjoy an incremental advantage from strong protection
of intellectual property (e.g., broad patent claims, effective protection of trade secret, and
streamlined enforcement mechanism), an implicit suggestion of this study is that the limitation
on the exercise of intellectual property rights through a safeguarding policy seems to be a
sound response to mitigate the effects of increasingly imperfect competition.
'In this study, the idea of "adequacy" of protection is entertained only for the sake of argument
2 This matter is discussed in Rushing F.W. & Bro, C.G. (editors), Intellectual Property Rights in
Science, Technology, and Economic Performance, Westview, 1990.
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An "adequate protection" is not a concern. The study suggests, nevertheless, that if such
adequacy existed it would be considered in regard to:
• the nature of the proprietaiy right (i.e, patent, copyright or design);
• the subject matter of protection (field of technology);
• the condition of the industrial structure existing in a countly or region; and
• the state of enforcement.
Moreover, an adequate protection would be one reasonably satisfactory for the purposes
(social bargain) it serves or is intended to pursue. Whatever legal format it has, the system
would not become inadequate by the introduction of a class or type of constraint to curb
inappropriate exercise of proprietary rights for which exercise the system was neither built nor
intended to serve. As explained below, the "adequacy" of protection would be related to
other concepts underlying the limitations on the exercise of proprietary rights.
(c ) Intellectual property order and state intervention
Whilst the legal apparatus supporting the limitations is put in place to order the exercise of
rights, the ordering requires a degree of state intervention. The study describes the intellectual
property order as the exercise of intellectual property rights in relation to market forces. It is
assumed that such exercise is responsive not only to the rules of supply and demand (market
self ordering), but also to state regulatory intervention on competition. The degree of
intervention is one reasonably necessary for the alignment of market conditions (for licensing
and use of the proprietary rights) with the social bargain. It is essential that in the pursuit of
the bargain behind the intellectual property the economic logic is not exaggerated, but follows
criteria of significant flexibility. This is governed by a "workable competition", a soft concept
which denotes a variety of perceptions.
As a warnin& workable competition implies that efficiency should not be pursued for its
own sake. As a situation not defined a priori, it reflects a competition configuration
practicably assessed in relation to structural and behavioural competition aspects and
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performance. As a utilitarian notion, it defines a balance of significant detrimental and
beneficial effects. As far as the exercise of proprietaiy rights is concerned, it suggests that a
mischief is to be evaluated in the light of "contingent rules" rather than asserted on the basis
of a general statement of illegality. It is clear now how strong the competition strand is in
driving the exercise of the proprietary iights, and the chip design in particular.
(d) Audit trail and investment input
The regulation of the protection of chip design, chosen as a paradigm of new technologies, is
significant for the influence of the competition element impregnating its structure. The
analysis of this showed that protection is afforded on account of investment rather than
intellectual input. This was made clear by the discussion, for instance, of the concept of "audit
trail" described as the output arising from the documented trial-and-error job performed along
with chip designing, including logic circuit arrangements, test data, time records, and
accidental errors or traps. Printed on paper or electronically stored, the audit trail is a
debatable proof of originality. Its significance, nevertheless, rests on evidential elements
projecting systematic tasks and investment. This background is directly associated with the
subject-matter of protection. That is, in order to stand as a legally protected design, the
topography has to be a product of substantial analysis and study, recorded in a substantial
audit trail showing how the mask work was designed, thus reflecting considerable time and
money invested in the creative activity.
The stress on the investment input reflects the competition strand bearing upon the
statutory protection of new subject-matters, information technology in particular. The
competition element emerges more vigorously in connection with the exercise of rights
governed by institutional safeguards. The role of a safeguarding legal policy based on
competitive elements leads to the inevitable conclusion that without an effective control of the
competitive process, protection of intellectual property rights makes little or no sense. 3 At
least three evidential elements have been brought to the support of this defence. Firstly,
See recent article by David J Geiber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-Lileralism,
Competition Law and the "New" Europe stressing the value of competition law under the influelKe of the
"Freiburg School" of legal and economic thoughts. L1994J 42(1) The American Journal of Comparative Law
25
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because of the dynamics of innovative activities being carned out in a context of increasingly
imperfect competition, authors and inventors tend to use their iights in a manner likely to
impair the social bargain. Secondly, at the level of legal policy there is an increasing resort to
competition legislation to direct the intellectual property order. Thirdly, in the enforcement of
safeguards by adjudicatory bodies, the application of the public policy argument considers
efficiency and welfare aims within a framework of competition law. These are part of an
institutional policy which has gradually been shaped and adapted to meet competition criteria
and goals increasingly demanded by an interdependent worid economy.4
(e) The role of a safeguarding policy
Dominating the study, an institutional safeguarding policy has been portrayed as the manner
in which the law:
defines the mandate of incumbent authorities;
defines the rights and obligations conferred or inflicted on individuals and the State; and
relates all of these to a set of defined remedies and their enforcement intrinsic to
intellectual property and competition laws put forward to limit the exercise of copyright,
designs and patents.
Theoretically, a safeguarding policy relies on the assumption that intellectual property is
protected to the extent that it works for the benefit of the society at large. This theory relies
on two propositions. Firstly, an "adequate" system of intellectual property protection should
not be drafted, enforced or exercised in a manner which unnecessarily binders the goals of
competition law and policy. Secondly, a workable system of competition law and policy
should be compatible with the availability of a system of intellectual property rights which
enables innovative firms to pursue the best strategy to capture an appropriate return from
As has recently been highlighted, the features of this apparent interdependency include onentalion to
intensive R&D activilies, production based on ecoiomy of scope, and the increasing importance of intellectual
property and competition. The stnngency of this interdependency has led to gmung unstable economic
iships and has threatened the eapacity of the leading G-7 conntries to coocdinate a sustainable irld
development. See discussion by Hugh Miall, in Shaping the New Ewvpe, especially chapter 3, Pinter
Publishers, 1993.
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their investments The implications provided by the contrast of these propositions are
threefold:
there is a necessary interaction between intellectual property and competition laws;
an adequate regime of intellectual property is a function of a workable system of
competition law and policy; and
that interaction brings a convergence of two goals, the pursuit of social benefit and the
promotion of innovation both of which a safeguarding policy is committed to.
While providing for a conceptualisation of a safeguarding policy in place in developed
countries, the study allows some reflections and suggestions. The legal infrastructure, as
analysed, belongs to developed economy countries open to international trade, and therefore
exposed to competition. While claiming greater protection for intellectual property, these
countries seek to improve the legal monitoring of the competition process, and thus the
ordering of the exercise of intellectual property rights. The effects of such an intervention
include boosting pnvate bargaining power, and the creation of guidance for a strategic and
pro-efficiency trading behaviour. The perception is that an open economy, strong protection
for intellectual property, effective control of the competitive process, and workable
safeguards pursuing welfarelefficiency ends fit together. Once the intellectual property issue is
taken up and studied, keeping its connection with the overall system, the conclusion that
strong protection creates a demand for a sound safeguarding policy Ibilows. This brings the
intellectual property issue back within the context of a societal covenant, that is, the exercise
of proprietary rights committed to the creation of mutual benefits for owners and society at
large. The participation of the State in this covenant to organise the system legally and watch
over it also amounts to a matter of enforcement.
A last concept related to the enforcement of safeguards is named "useful discretion." This is
defined as the use of discretionary power in a manner:
to satisfy the public policy drawn from the statute (statutory bargam);
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committed to fulfil the legal pre-conditions (social bargain) governing the setting of the
propiietaiy rights; and
• not to constraint unnecessarily the legitimate interests of authors and inventors or owners.
Drawn from the British legal regime of discretion concerning unauthonsed use over patents,
these elements are projected in both the IPIC Treaty and the Agreement on TRIPS, and are
the basis for a regulatory theory on the limitation of the exercise of proprietaiy tights.
The need to satisi\j a public policy drawn from the statute raises a crucial question of
regulatory policy, that is, as far as unauthorised use of proprietaiy rights is concerned, to
define the scope and limits of this public policy in a manner that one may reasonably predict
its result. The issue is posed by the contrast between the degree of guidance provided by the
IPIC Treaty5 and the Agreement on TRIPS concerning non-voluntaiy licensing over chip
designs.6 While the less guided regulation of the former Treaty may lead to legal obscurity,
the detailed conditions of the latter could not be detached from legal underpinnings, but
meaningfully conceived in the context of related ground rules. 7 Whatever regulatory model is
considered, an element of balance that a regulatory theory on safeguards has to countenance
is not to constrain the legitimate interests of the owners unless it is reasonably8
 necessary to
safeguard the ends the exercise of the intellectual property is intended to serve. The
dimension of this regulatory theory raised by the study is further explained below.
8.2 Reulator'v choices and the pursuit of efficienc y and welfare
The study has focused on efficiency and welfare as legitimate cntena to limit the exercise of
proprietary tights. More than a research proposal, an efficiency/welfare sense is found
underlying the aims of the statutory safeguards intrinsic either to the intellectual property or
competition law. The study suggests there should be efficiency/welfare gains as a result of the
application of the safeguarding measures studied. However, it recognises that although
Article 6(3Xa).
6 Article 37(2) c.w. Article 31(a) to (k).
Mainly Articles 7 and 8 of the Agreement on TRWS.
Reasonable in accordance with certain standards identified in the circumstances of individual merit, and
based on prOOf beyOnd a pattern of probability.
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difficult to pursue practically, efficiency and welfare ends are inherent in the regulation of a
safeguarding institutional policy. As a significant point in the thesis, the study explains the
reduction of the pursuit of efficiency and welfare ends to:
commitment to principles and incomplete rules;
subscribed discretion; and
• streamlined process.
Such a theoretical scheme is conceived to approach the policy behind the rules of the IPIC
Treaty and Agreement on TRIPS governing limitations on the exercise of proprietary rights.
(a) Commitment to incomplete principles and rules
Whilst showing the need for clear descriptions of legal circumstances in which adjudicators
are entitled to act, the study showed an underlying incompleteness in the principles and rules
on which a safeguarding policy relies. This characteristic reflects an incomplete knowledge of
the economic phenomenon and the process of innovation within the dynamics of competition.
More specifically, economic analysts do not know everything about the behaviour of
competitive forces, and the changing nature of the economic process. Although a likely
inadequacy of instruments of analysis is also part of the problem, the insufficient knowledge is
not a failure of the economic analysis in itself but is derived from the lack of precise
information about economic elements.
A concurrent fact is that firms in general are reluctant to release information relevant for the
full analysis of economic structure. Because of the lack of fill knowledge, it is difficult to
predict the behaviour of private firms and the movement of the economic process.
Consequently, there is an inherent imperfection in selecting and writing policies concerning
incentives for innovation and competition control. 9 This consequential imperfection affects
not only the legal structuring of intellectual property (often uncritically regarded as a means to
improve innovation), but also the regulation of safeguarding measures designed to limit the
See in addition Robert Boric The Antitnst Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself 1978.
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exercise of proprietary rights. Facing this imperfect knowledge, the regulatoiy policy relies
considerably on "contingent" rules and principles which produce contingent responses (i.e.,
dependent upon the merit or assessment of individual situations) not always being sufficiently
reliable and consistent. Taking this background into account, the ability of safeguarding rules
to commit adjudicators should be viewed with caution.
Clear legal descriptions are expected to express binding commitments. The functions of
fonnal rules of commitments are twofold. Firstly, for adjudicators, commitment rules are
points of departure on which they may rely to take efficient deliberations. Adjudicators are
committed to taking action when a situation arises. The existence of such commitments is
supposed to improve the outcomes of adjudicatory actions. The adjudicator is committed in
advance to a nile for determining the effects of the exercise of proprietary rights. The more
informed criteria the rules provide, the less adjudicators tend to resort to discretion. Secondly,
from the point of view of accountability, public opinion and surveillance or reviewing bodies
are better equipped to test the consistency of the adjudicator's decision which is expected to
be in accordance with the announced policy.
Part Two of dissertation, particularly Chapter Seven, provides substantial basis for these
remarks. Nevertheless, there are subjects in respect of which drawing prescribed conditions is
almost impossible. Computation of royalties is an illustrative example. Given the inherent
impossibility of drawing strict rules to regulate every matter, the exercise of discretion could
be either an inevitable and casual resource, or an expressed legal policy.
(b) Commitment to discretion
As a legal policy, discretion denotes an absence of rules to bind the adjudicator in advance in
respect of a course of action. The legislature provides the authority with a general goal and
power to implement the underlying policy. The statute thus creates legal conditions within
which the adjudicator is allowed to choose among permissible alternatives. This may be
related to substantive matters, such as "adequate remuneration" and "reasonable terms and
conditions", or involve procedural issues, such as "due" or "fair" proceedings.
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Essentially, the lack of satisfactory adjudicatory criteria is the most serious point arguing
against a de discretion. A system of safeguarding policy which instead of relying on formal
rules assigns a significant role to the adjudicator's reputation, i e., relies on the ability and
experience of the person in office to implement the legal policy, hardly fits in with the policy
behind the Agreement on TRIPS. Even that person being given the predication of
independence, there is a difficulty in principle to justilr a wide discretion in a legal system
organised on a check-and-balance basis. A contrasting point is that discretion allows a degree
of flexibility' 0 in the implementation of policy.
To what extent flexibility is needed in order to outweigh the unwanted uncertainty is
however a debatable question to which the study gives no answer. Nevertheless, the study
recognises it to be proper for a safeguarding policy to make use of a subscribed discretion, in
circumstances where discretionary interventions attract statutory support and are based on
reasoned explanations, and where the adjudicator's decision is assessable by a higher judicial
or administrative body.
In fact, a fettered discretion is necessary to cope with problematic legal concepts (sensitive
to varying contextual factors), to adapt them to the economic reality, and direct them to the
society's needs. Such a limited discretion necessary for the operation of safeguarding rules
relies to a certain degree on the skills and intentions of the adjudicator, who is expected to
take into account incomplete information about economic elements.
Although free to make a particular choice, the adjudicator is in some way committed to the
policy expressed by concurrent principles and incomplete rules governing substantial and
procedural matters
(c) Commitment to process
° In the field of monetaiy policy, the warning comes from Milton Friedman: "the granting of wide and
important responsibilities that are neither limited by clearly defined rule for guiding policy nor subject to test by
external cntena of performance is a serious defect" which potentially uses uncertainty and instability, [...J
"eliminating the danger of instability and uncertainty of policy is far nre urgent than preserving 'flexilility."
A Program for Monetaiy Stability, pp 85/86, 1960.
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Relying on tightly drawn rules and guided discretion, a safeguarding policy claims a
"commitment to process", through which facts are asserted, rules are meaningfitlly stated, and
the bureaucratic exercise of discretion takes place. Obviously the operation of law necessarily
requires a set of procedures. More than that, the expression "commitment to process" as it is
here applied implies the observance of a formal process qualified by "fair" and "equitable"
procedures. The fairness is in respect of a variety of elements, such as:
• the treatment of the parties;
• the production of proofs;
• suitability of remedies;
• legal requirements free from unnecessaiy burdens;
• protection of sensitive commercial information;
• independence ofjudges;
• opportunities to be heard given to the parties;
• motivated decisions;
• appropriate or limited efficiency defence; and
• self-execution of relevant rules contained in international agreements or treaties to which
the country is committed.
These elements are directed towards the rational treatment of public policy, private and public
interests.
The rationality the study contemplates consists of the commitment inflicted upon the
adjudicator to seek the best answer in particular legal drcumstances reflecting
comprehensible substantive choices. This requires the existence of guidance, objectively
defined or having a degree of incompleteness, known at the outset for the resolution of the
concerned issue. Even bearing a degree of obscurity, the process is projected as a means of
challenging factual, logical and legal premises. From the point of view of rationality, the
normalisation of the process as a demand for the pursuit of efficiency and welfare gains
implies, therefore, the existence of rules susceptible to control, and applied with individualised
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attention to concrete interests (considerations to individual merits), and in response to
pressures reasonably representative of the interests of society at large
The process, nevertheless, has its underlying constraints. Open to the arguments of
contesting parties, the process does not always allow fill access to or analysis of economic
information. In order to remove these restrictions, the study suggests a legal process which
would take into account the view of informed members of society by harnessing private
expertise.
A sense of commitment is above all understood as directing the adjudicator's attention to a
legal consideration whether a business conduct in connection with the exercise of proprietary
rights offends or has offended efficiency economics or any relevant point of public welfare
asserted with a degree of objectivity. While attempting to convey the idea of a streamlined
adjudicatory process, a theoretical approach must not exclude consideration of common
sense. In this respect, case studies are particularly illustrative.
By portraying an emerging institutional policy designed to correct defaults in the exercise of
intellectual property rights and direct them towards the improvement of social welfare, a
promising avenue for fliture research remains. The alignment of legal standards governing the
procedural conditions for the operation of safeguards intrinsic to the intellectual property and
competition laws could form the basis of a further study.
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